The interplay between foreign direct investment, security and European integration by comparing Poland and Romania by Stoian, Carmen R.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Stoian, Carmen R   (2004) The interplay between foreign direct investment, security and European








THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, 
SECURITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
BY COMPARING POLAND AND ROMANIA 
by 
Carmen Raluca STOIAN 
Supervisors: Dr. I. J. Manners and Prof. R. W. Vickerman 
ý yl. 33; ý, ý, 
ýýp+ýý t, -1ý .. 
t. " ý. i . 1 i'' 
ý ý "ý : ý 
November 2003 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Ph. D. in European Studies at the University of Kent 
DECLARATION 
I hereby certify that the work embodied in this thesis is the result of my own investigations except 
where reference has been made to published literature. 
I declare that this work has not already been accepted in substance, nor is it currently being published 
in candidature for any other degree. 
ABSTRACT 
This work investigates the factors that have led to Poland and Romania's different evolutionary paths 
during the process of accession to the EU, placing an emphasis on security concerns, foreign direct 
investment and the interplay between the two. We identify two sets of determinants of the accession 
process, one in the political sphere and one in the economic sphere. Each set of determinants, be it in 
the political or economic sphere, has the potential to constitute a vicious or a virtuous circle which 
includes the prospect of EU membership itself. Furthermore, each of these circles is self reinforcing 
and can reinforce the corresponding circle in the other sphere. Finally, political and economic elements 
of the circles considered here can constitute security concerns for each of the countries analysed, while 
FDI represents a main element of the economic circle. 
We find that until 1996 Romania has been trapped in a combination of two vicious circles in both the 
political and economic spheres, while Poland has benefited from a combination of two virtuous circles 
since 1993. We test the hypothesis that, by changing perceptions of security and enhancing FDI, the 
prospect of EU membership can break the vicious economic circle of high perceptions of insecurity, 
low FDI, slow reforms, poor prospects for EU integration and hence high perceptions of insecurity in 
which Romania has been trapped. This is achieved firstly by a qualitative comparative analysis 
between Poland and Romania with regard to the determinants of FDI and the nature of their security 
concerns. Secondly, an econometric model assesses the determinants of FDI in ten transition countries 
candidates for EU membership and in particular the role of security and European integration variables. 
Our results support the hypothesis that, by creating positive perceptions of security of the candidate 
countries (especially of poor reformers), the prospect of EU membership may enhance FDI, thus 
speeding up economic reforms, leading to full membership of the Union and hence positive 
perceptions of security. It also appears that the prospect of EU membership can lead to a virtuous circle 
in the economic sphere through providing motivation for economic reforms and through financial aid 
and its impact on foreign direct investment and economic reforms. 
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1. The background, purpose and main argument of the dissertation 
Half a century since the end of World War II and over a decade since the dramatic fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the division of Europe between the East and the West appears to be over through the accession 
to the European Union (EU) of eight former communist countries. Poland, a great victim of the Second 
World War, an early reformer and a favourite of the enlargement process for most of the decade, will 
be one of ten countries to join the Union in May 2004. This will happen despite numerous doubts 
expressed by the EU in 2000 over Poland's capacity to keep pace with the frontrunners of accession. 
However, the era of the Ribbentrop Molotov Pact and of Yalta will not end for all former communist 
countries that since 1989 have embarked upon democratisation, marketisation and accession into the 
EU. Romania, another victim of Yalta and of a ruthless dictatorship until 1989, will not be part of the 
first round of the EU's enlargement. Romania is only likely to join the Union in 2007, provided that 
accession negotiations are concluded by the end of 2004 with marketisation and sufficient progress in 
economic reforms achieved. 
The purpose of this study is to identify the factors that have led to Poland and Romania's different 
evolutionary paths during the process of accession to the EU and to draw lessons from the first decade 
of transition regarding these determinants. The dissertation argues that the different evolutions of 
Poland and Romania in their quest for EU membership have been largely determined by security 
concerns and foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as by the interplay of the factors with the process 
of EU enlargement itself. Thus, FDI appears to be an essential determinant of accession to the EU 
given its impact on transition to a market economy and on economic integration. Furthermore, security 
concerns have driven the European integration process since its early stages and even more so during 
the present enlargement, given the changed nature of security since the end of the Cold War. The 
present approach does not ignore the role economic transition has played in accelerating each country's 
accession to the EU membership as part of the Copenhagen criteria of membership. On the contrary, 
the progress to a market economy is analysed in order to clarify the determinants of the EU accession, 
and especially the role of FDI. Finally, security concerns include external threats as well as internal 
insecurity resulting from political and economic instability as will be discussed later on. 
The main argument of the dissertation is that performance in the EU accession process is a result of the 
interaction between a political and an economic set of determinants. Each set of determinants, be it in 
the political or economic sphere, has the potential to constitute a vicious or a virtuous circle which 
includes the prospect of EU membership itself. Furthermore, each of these circles is self reinforcing 
and can reinforce the corresponding circle in the other sphere. Finally, political and economic elements 
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of the circles considered here can constitute security concerns for each of the countries analysed, while 
FDI represents a main element of the economic circle. Until mid-1990s, Romania seems to have been 
trapped in vicious circles in both political and economic spheres while Poland appears to have enjoyed 
a combination of two virtuous circles for most of its transition. The two spheres, the security concerns 
realm and the elements of the model in each sphere are presented in diagram IA. Prospects for EU 
membership become here both a dependent variable and an explanatory factor. 
How do the economic and political circles work and interact? In the political sphere, governments risk 
losing popular support and willingness to reform unless international financial backing offsets some of 
the costs of transition and long run benefits are promised through the prospect of EU membership. This 
potential vicious political circle can create a vicious circle in the economic sphere by slowing down 
economic reforms and creating internal political instability as in diagram 1A(a, b). ' Slow economic 
reforms and poor perceptions of security can in turn determine low prospects for EU integration, thus 
reinforcing the political vicious circle as in diagram 1A(c). Furthermore, insecurity resulting from slow 
reforms and internal political instability can deter FDI, thus slowing economic reforms and EU 
accession, thus reinforcing the economic vicious circle as in diagram 1A(d). Here the model draws a 
parallel between the concept of security as used by political science and risk as used in economic 
science. Overall, the two vicious circles have the potential to reinforce each other. Similarly, a political 
virtuous circle can determine an economic virtuous one and be reinforced by it. Thus, prospects of EU 
membership have the potential to create a virtuous political circle by enhancing popular support, 
governments' willingness to reform and internal political stability as in diagram 1A(e). In the 
economic sphere, perceptions of security resulting from internal political stability and progress in 
economic reforms can then attract the FDI necessary to enhance economic transition and accession to 
the EU. By maintaining the prospects of EU membership the virtuous economic circle can further 
enhance the virtuous political one as suggested in diagram 1B. 
' The letters a, b, c etcetera refer to the explanations given at the bottom of each diagram used throughout this 
dissertation. 
Diagram 1A 
Vicious and virtuous circles in the political and economic spheres in the quest for EU 
membership 

















The political sphere 









a) Arrows 1(-), 2(-), 3(-), 4(-) indicate the vicious circle induced in the political sphere by poor prospects of 
EU membership for Romania for most of the first decade of transition. 
b) Arrows 5(-), 6(-), 7(-), 8(-) or 5(-), 6(-), 7'(-), 8'(-) or 5"(-), 6"(-), 7"(-), 8"(-) indicate alternative vicious 
circles induced by poor prospects of EU membership either through their effect on economic reforms or 
through perceptions of insecurity and hence a negative impact on FDI. 
c) Arrows 8"(-) and 8"(-) show that poor economic reforms and negative perceptions of security reinforce 
a vicious political circle. 
d) Arrows 5"(-), 6''(-), 7 "(-), 8"(-) show a vicious economic circle created by perceptions of insecurity. 
e) Arrows 1(+), 2(+), 3(+), 4(+) show a virtuous political circle induced by early prospects for EU 
integration. 




These two scenarios indicate that there is a certain potential for path dependency in attracting FDI, 
achieving economic transition and accession to the EU. This challenges findings by early studies of 
transition which conclude that the initial conditions can be overcome by using the right policy mix as 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter two. On the other hand, this confirms the assumptions of the 
path dependency theorists such as Stark and Grabher and raises the question over path shaping 
potential in transition countries. 2 The two scenarios bring up the question of whether a combination of 
vicious economic and political circles can be turned into a combination of two virtuous ones. The 
argument put forward by this dissertation is that unless security concerns are considered in the process 
of EU enlargement, there is a danger that the slow reformers are trapped in the vicious economic circle 
of perceptions of insecurity, low FDI, poor economic reforms, low prospects of EU membership and 
thus further insecurity as in diagram 1A(d). This vicious economic circle has then the potential to 
reinforce itself and to determine a vicious circle in the political sphere. This scenario would have 
potential negative effects on Europe as a whole by challenging the security of the continent. However, 
political decisions on EU enlargement, such as the one taken at the Helsinki European Council, appear 
to have the potential to break this vicious economic circle. By maintaining prospects of EU 
membership despite relatively poor records of economic reform, the EU can enhance prospects of 
security in the candidate countries, thus creating the conditions for a virtuous economic circle. 
Prospects of security can attract the necessary FDI for reforms and for EU integration. This virtuous 
economic circle can then reinforce itself and enhance a virtuous political circle of determinants of EU 
accession. By turning the vicious circle into a virtuous one, such a scenario appears to diminish the 
threat that instability in a candidate country poses to Europe as a whole as in diagram 1B(a). 
The remaining part of this chapter is organised as follows: the significance of the study, the scope and 
methodology, explanations of the choice of comparison, definitions and finally the organisation of the 
dissertation. 
s Grabner, G. and Stark, D. (eds. ), Restructuring Networks in Post Socialism: Legacies, Linkages and Localities, 
OUP, Oxford, 1997. 
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a)Arrows 1(+), 2(+), 3(+), 4(+), show how prospects of (early) EU membership can enhance positive perceptions of 
security in the candidate countries, thus creating a virtuous circle in the economic sphere. Furthermore, arrows 
5(+), 6(+), 7(+), 8(+) show that through its impact on the prospects of EU membership, this virtuous circle in the 




1.2 The significance of this study 
Several arguments can be brought forward to justify the importance of this study. First, the study has 
an interdisciplinary nature and investigates the interplay between politics and economics in the process 
of the eastern enlargement of the EU. To my knowledge, this is the first study that puts forward a 
coherent model that explains the EU enlargement from this dual prospective while equally emphasising 
the role of security factors and of FDI. Thus, this project addresses Nelson's call in the early years of 
transition for studies which address the new nature of security and its interplay with the processes of 
democratisation, marketisation and Europeanisation. 3 
Second, the present research enriches the debate over path dependency and path shaping potential in 
transition and accession to the EU. Identifying the dynamics of the present enlargement process 
remains a useful exercise, given that in the absence of firm guarantees of EU membership by 2007, the 
accession of the remaining negotiating candidates Bulgaria and Romania may be influenced by the 
effects of the first phase of enlargement or by unexpected events. Furthermore, the lessons learned 
from such a comparison may be useful for the assessment of the relations between the EU on the one 
hand and Ukraine and Moldova on the other. By acknowledging the path dependency potential the 
project follows Ekiert's plea that post-communist studies take into consideration the particular nature 
of the legacy of the communist system in the countries considered. 4 
Third, as a comparative empirical study of Poland and Romania's quest to accede to the EU, 
accomplish economic transition and attract FDI, this research enhances our understanding of the post- 
1989 evolution of each of these two countries. To my knowledge, so far there has been no in depth 
comparative analysis of Poland and Romania with regard to the processes mentioned above. The merits 
of the comparison lie equally in the different paths that Poland and Romania have followed with regard 
to EU accession, economic transition, attracting FDI and eliminating security concerns, given that most 
comparisons are usually made between countries with roughly similar evolutions. 
Finally, from a methodological point of view, the study demonstrates the advantages of adopting a 
multi-method approach. The qualitative assessment allows the establishment of causal relationships 
between the factors considered in the model, while the use of quantitative methods allows 
generalisations with regard to all ten transition countries candidates to EU membership and to possibly 
future candidates. The findings of the comparison are validated within the larger framework of the ten 
central and eastern European countries (CEECs) considered. 
3 See Nelson, D., "The Comparative Politics of Eastern Europe", Political Science and Politics, Vol. 27, No. 1. 
1994, p. 51. 
" Ekiert, G., "Peculiarities of Post- Communist Politics. The Case of Poland", Studies in Comparative 
Communism, Vol. 25,1992, cited in Sakwa, R., "Postcommunist Studies: Once Again Through the Looking 
Glass (Darkly)? " in Review ofInternational Studies, Vo1.25, No. 4, October 1999, p. 716. 
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13 The scope and methodology 
The analysis combines a qualitative and a quantitative approach. The hypothesis of the existence of 
vicious circles in the quest for EU membership is tested first qualitatively by comparing Poland and 
Romania in chapter three. In order to capture the complexity of the relations between the factors 
identified and the full nature of the potential vicious circles, the hypothesis is also tested with regard to 
the process of economic transition in chapter four and with regard to the determinants and the impact 
of FDI in chapter five. The connection between the political and the economic spheres considered in 
the overarching model of the dissertation is investigated in chapter six by using critically the concept of 
security concerns, drawing on the work of the Copenhagen School, as will be presented in chapter two. 
The hypothesis is then tested quantitatively by using data for eleven years between 1990 and 2000 for 
the ten central and eastern European candidate countries for EU membership, i. e. Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. No references are 
made in the econometric model to the pre-1990 period given the fundamentally different economic and 
political systems of the CEECs before this date. The series end in 2000 but capture the main stages in 
the quest for EU membership. The econometric model assesses the determinants of FDI and of 
economic reforms using security and European integration variables as regressors and considering the 
interaction between them. 
The analysis has drawn on a variety of both primary and secondary sources ranging from archives, 
interviews with academics and civil servants, statistical data, surveys and policy documents to 
newspaper articles, journal articles and books written by both local experts and international scholars. 
Statistics databases of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank and 
the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WI W) were the main sources for the 
econometric model and for the empirical evidence throughout the dissertation. 
1.4 Explaining the choice of comparison 
Poland and Romania were chosen for this study for the following reasons. First, the two countries had 
different communist legacies which were reflected in their post-1989 evolution. The pre-1989 attempts 
at economic and political reforms in Poland gave the country a certain comparative advantage despite 
the serious economic crisis of 1989. Romania, on the other hand, lacked any real experience with 
democratisation and marketisation prior to 1989 and thus had a considerable disadvantage. Second, the 
early transition period saw a considerable gap open between the two in terms of their quest for EU 
membership, economic transition and attractiveness for FDI. This made Poland a frontrunner in the 
accession process and Romania a follow-up candidate, posing the question of path dependency. 
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Furthermore, security concerns acted as a brake for Romania's quest for EU accession while Poland 
appeared to turn its security concerns into an 'engine' for returning to Europe. The choice of the two 
countries was thus equally based on the differing influence of security concerns, especially in the light 
of the changing security concerns resulting from the 1999 Kosovo crisis. Third, Poland and Romania 
are comparable from a number of perspectives. They are respectively the largest and the second largest 
country amongst the CEECs in terms of area and population. They both have a large agricultural 
sector, although Poland's agriculture was hardly collectivised during communism and has now 
decreased its contribution to both GDP and employment. These large agricultural sectors provided 
similar concerns in the process of EU accession and with regard to the restructuring of the economy. 
Furthermore, both countries have important comparative advantages relative to the EU in the textile 
and steel industry and have a significant mining sector. These characteristics led to meaningful 
comparisons regarding the restructuring of the economy and the desirability of EU membership for 
both EU and the two candidate countries considered. Finally, Poland's geographical strategic position 
and Romania's more peripheral, albeit still strategic geographical position, made the comparison 
meaningful from the perspective of the EU's strategic interest in each of the two countries. 
1.5 Definitions 
The present section sets out the conceptual framework of the dissertation by offering working 
definitions of key concepts such as FDI, security, European integration and economic transition. 
According to Krugman, FDI represents international capital flows 'in which a firm in one country 
creates and expands a subsidiary in another with the distinctive feature that it involves not only a 
money transfer, but also the acquisition of control'. 5 The subsidiary becomes a part of the same 
organisational structure, as opposed to portfolio investment, where only a small share of stocks is 
purchased, therefore not allowing control. 6 The purpose of FDI is to allow the formation of 
multinational enterprises and the extension of control. By providing financial resources to their 
subsidiaries, FDI is an alternative way of accomplishing the same goals as international lending. ' 
However, its effects on the host economy are potentially more complex and more lasting than 
international lending or portfolio investment, hence the interest in its role in the process of economic 
transition and accession to the EU. This 'superiority of FDI' is emphasised by defining FDI as a 
'composite bundle of capital stocks, know-how and technology'. 8 The present study refers to FDI flows 
unless specified otherwise and draws on both working definitions provided above. Furthermore, the 
phrases FDI and foreign investment will be used interchangeably. 
s Krugman, P., International Economics. Theory and Policy, Longman, Harlow, 1997, p. 16. 6 Krugman, International Economics. Theory and Policy, p. 16. 7 Krugman, International Economics. Theory and Policy, p. 16. 8 de Mello Jr, L.. and Hussain, K., "International Capital Mobility in Developing Countries", Journal of International Money and Finance, January 1999. 
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A second notion which is included in the title and which will be defined here is the notion of security. 
Based on Buzan's concise definition of security as 'freedom from threat', this study adopts the broad 
view according to which security is not purely of military nature, but includes several sectors. This 
makes it possible to talk about political, economic, societal, environmental and military security. " 
Previously suppressed under the prevailing nuclear threat during the Cold War, in the post-Cold War 
period these non-military sectors of security became increasingly relevant, intrinsically related and self 
reinforcing. Thus, political security concerns the organisational stability of states, systems of 
government and the ideologies that give states legitimacy. 1° Therefore, political insecurity in the 
CEECs and subsequently in Poland and Romania is related to the more fluid and unpredictable 
political environment which has emerged during the democratisation process. " Economic security 
concerns access to resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and 
state power. 12 In the case of the CEECs, economic decline and poor economic performance in general 
constitute security issues both at individual and at state level. 13 Societal security concerns the 
sustainability, within acceptable conditions of evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and 
both religious and national identity and custom. 14 Environmental security concerns the maintenance of 
the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. 15 
Finally, military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive 
capabilities of the states and state's perceptions of each other's intentions. " The present study refers 
mainly to political and economic security corresponding to the economic and political spheres 
investigated. Furthermore, it adopts the understanding of security as a self-referential notion as 
proposed by the Copenhagen School. From this point of view, security is subjective rather than 
objective and it has to be perceived as such by the observer. " Moreover, this study draws on the 
Copenhagen School's later concept of security as a speech act, as developed by Waever in 1995. It is 
9 The concept of sectors of security evolved with each new work of the Copenhagen School, including: Buzan, 
B. et al, The European Security Recast: Scenarios for the post-Cold War Era, Pinter, London, 1990; Waever, 0., 
Buzan, B. et al, Identity, Migration and the New SecurityAgenda in Europe, Pinter, London, 1993; Buzan, B., 
Waever, O. and de Wilde, J., Security: A New Framework ofAnalysis, Lynne Rienner, London, 1998. For an 
analysis of the concept development see Huysmans, J., "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative 
Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe", European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 
4,1998, pp. 488-490. 
10 Buzan, B., "Is International Security Possible? " in Booth, K. (ed. ), New Thinking about Strategy in International Security, HarperCollins Academic, London, 1991. 
11 Dorman, A. M. and Treacher, A., European Security. An Introduction to Security Issues in Post-Cold Europe, 
Dartmouth Publishing Company, Dartmouth, 1995, p. 93,139. '2 Buzan, "Is International Security Possible? ", pp. 34-35. 13 Cable, V., "Wiat Is International Security? ", InternationalAffairs, Vol. 71, No. 2,1995, p. 306. 14 Buzan, "Is International Security Possible? ", pp. 34-35. 's Buzan, "Is International Security Possible? ", pp. 34-35. 
Buzan, "Is International Security Possible? ", pp. 34-35. "Jahn et al distinguish between a threat and a perceived threat in a working paper cited in Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen", p. 491. 
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thus possible to 'securitise' some issues, bringing them from 'non-threats' into the political sector of 
security. " This is a social constructivist interpretation of security, as will be discussed later. 19 
Third, the term of European integration refers here to the process of the EU's eastern and central 
European enlargement from the preliminary stages of early 1990s to the Copenhagen European 
Council of December 200220 Then, the EU committed itself to welcoming in May 2004 ten new 
members -eight former communist states and two Mediterranean countries- and acknowledged the 
target date 2007 set by the remaining candidates, Bulgaria and Romania. The more general term of 
European integration was also used in order to anchor the analysis in the general debate on European 
integration so far. Terms such as 'return to Europe', the 'accession process' or 'the quest for EU 
membership' will be used to refer to the present enlargement of the EU. 2' Drawing on a definition 
provided by Balassa, integration will mean here both 'the process and the state of affairs' i. e. the 
enlargement process and a certain state reached in this process by the two candidate countries 
discussed, Poland and Romania 22 A further distinction used by this study is that between formal (or 
institutional) and economic integration. Thus, formal integration is a political stage of integration 
beyond a simple interdependence of economies. In the flexible terminology employed by Wallace and 
relied on in this study, formal integration includes 'those deliberative actions by authoritative policy 
makers to create and adjust rules to establish common institutions and to work through and with those 
institutions'. In particular, formal integration refers in this study to different stages of the accession 
process represented inter alia by the signing of the Europe Agreements, the setting up of the 
Copenhagen criteria in June 1993, the publication of Agenda 2000 (including the Avis) in 1997 or the 
opening of accession negotiations in 1997 and in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis and of the Helsinki 
European Council of December 1999. The study also uses elements of economic integration such as: 
convergence of economic welfare; increase of mutual trade and infra-industry trade; increase in factor 
(labour and capital) mobility; increase in policy co-ordination. 24 
Another key concept of the analysis is economic transition. This represents the process through which 
each CEEC aims to achieve the transformation from a centrally planned economy into a market 
economy. During this study, economic transition is also referred to as 'transition to a market economy', 
'8 Waever, 0., "Securitization and Desecuritization" in Lipschutz, R. D. (ed. ), On Security, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1995, pp. 46-86. 
19 Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen", p. 492. 
20 The author is aware that the process of European integration comprises in the broad sense organisations other 
than the EU, NATO included, but a discussion of these other components of the process of European integration 
is beyond the scope of this study. 
21 The author is aware of the discussion regarding the nature of 'return' to Europe as presented by Grabbe, H. and 
Hughes, K. , Eastward 
Enlargement of the EU, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1997. 
22 Balassa, B., "The Theory of Economic Integration: An introduction", in Nelsen, B. F., and Stubb, A. C. (eds. ), 
The EU. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, Palgrave, New York, 1998, p. 173. 
23 Wallace, W., The Transformation of Western Europe, London, 1990, p. 54. 
21 Molle, W., The Economics of European Integration. Theory, Practice, Policy, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1997. 
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'marketisation' or simply 'transition'. As there is no uniform concept or form of market economy, this 
study adopts the criteria proposed at the Copenhagen Council and endorsed by the Agenda 2000 with 
the publication of the Avis. These criteria recommend that the level of functioning market economy 
and the capacity to deal with the competitive forces within the EU are assessed by: liberalisation of 
prices; liberalisation of trade; stabilisation of the economy; reform of the financial sector; patterns of 
ownership; quality of human and physical capital; quality of infrastructure; establishment of free 
trade. u 
1.6 The organisation of the dissertation 
The remainder of the dissertation is organised as follows. The second chapter provides a brief survey of 
the literature and sets out the theoretical framework of the dissertation. Chapter three discusses the 
relative importance of political and security factors and of compliance with the Copenhagen criteria in 
the process of Romania and Poland's accession to the EU. Amongst the Copenhagen criteria, the focus 
is on the economic criteria i. e. achievement of a market economy and the withstanding of competitive 
pressures. This chapter also provides evidence of economic integration between each of the two 
candidates and the EU, thus identifying FDI as an important element of economic integration. Chapter 
four analyses the factors responsible for each country's transition towards a market economy and 
demonstrates the interaction between the political and economic sphere in determining economic 
transition. It also suggests that attracting FDI represents an important policy during economic 
transition. Chapter five assesses qualitatively the main determinants of FDI in Poland and Romania 
with an emphasis on the investment climate of each country. The second part of the chapter provides 
evidence of the impact that FDI has had so far on Poland and Romania. The impact is analysed at the 
microeconomic level. FDI is seen as a way to speed up transition to a market economy, a means to 
enhance the host country's integration into the world economy and into the EU, a way to increase 
internal stability and to attract further FDI. Chapter six identifies the main security concerns of Poland 
and Romania since the fall of the Berlin Wall and analyses their impact on the EU accession process. 
The security concerns include the political and economic spheres and internal and external factors. This 
chapter also identifies the channels through which the EU can ensure the security of the candidate 
countries. Chapter seven tests the impact of the prospects of EU membership on foreign direct 
investment and economic reform. It assesses the role of security and European integration factors in 
enhancing FDI and the impact of FDI on economic reforms. It uses quantitative methods to test and 
confirm the inferences suggested by the qualitative analysis conducted so far. Finally, chapter eight 
presents the main conclusions of this study and their importance for the field of political economy. The 
diagram below shows which elements of the overall model are addressed in each chapter, as well as the 
relationships between these elements as they are discussed in the dissertation. 
Grabbe and Hughes, Eastward Enlargement of the EU, p. 5 
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Diagram 1C 
Chart flow of the chapters 
The political sphere 
The arrows indicate the bi-directional relationships investigated in this study. The numbers attached to these 
arrows represent the number of the chapters that deal with these relationships. Regarding the factors in the 
political sphere, chapters 3,4 and 5 approach the bi-directional relationships from different perspectives i. e. from 
the point of view of the quest for membership of the EU (chapter three), of the economic transition (chapter four) 
and of attracting FDI (chapter five). When one relationship is addressed in two different chapters e. g. 5 and 7 or 6 
and 7 the first one offers a qualitative assessment while the second one offers a quantitative one. Alternatively, 
one chapter may just identify the relationship while the other one addresses it in depth. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The aim of this chapter is to survey the literature and on this basis to develop the theoretical framework 
of this study. This chapter is organised as follows. First, it reviews the political theories which may 
explain European integration from a security perspective. Then it presents an account of the economic 
integration theories which assess the economic motives of European integration and of EU 
enlargement. The chapter continues with a review of the literature on the FDI determinants and on the 
impact of FDI in transition economies. It then examines the theoretical approaches to economic 
transition in the CEECs. Finally, the chapter presents the theoretical framework of this study. This 
study draws on theoretical approaches from political and economic theory, on transition and FDI 
literature, placing the analysis within the broad domain of political economy. These theoretical 
approaches correspond to the main elements of the model put forward in chapter one and represented 
in chapter one in diagram IA. 
2.1 Literature review 
2.1.1 Explaining European integration and the present EU enlargement 
Since its beginning, European integration has been driven by both security and economic motives. This 
interaction can be seen in the present process of the EU enlargement and is at the core of the present 
study, as will be detailed in the section dealing with the theoretical framework. The security 
externalities of economic integration are the focus of research by political theorists while economists 
are mostly interested in the impact of economic integration on welfare. The following pages will 
review several explanations for European integration offered by political, economic and political 
economy science with the aim of placing this study within the present debate. 
Explaining European integration through security motives: theorising on European security 
The 1989 Eastern European revolutions have led to an increased debate and an epistemological break 
in the study of European security. ' While Mearsheimer was quick to predict a return to realism, Nye, 
Keohane and Hoffman argued that the new world order would be better explained by interdependence 
theory, international regimes and various patterns of co-operation. 2 Hyde-Price even suggested that 
what was needed was a new synthesis and a broader and richer conceptual framework. 3 The realist 
narrow understanding of security in military terms was challenged and security needed now to include 
Hyde- Price, A., European Security beyond the Cold War. Four Scenarios for the year 2010, The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, London, 1991, p. 16. Z Mearsheimer, J. J., "Back to the Future", International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1,1990; Nye, J. cited in Hyde- 
Price, European Security beyond the Cold War, p. 14; Keohane, R. O. and Hoffmann, S., "Conclusion: Structure, 
Strategy and International Roles" in Keohane, RO., Nye, J. and Hofftnann, S. (eds. ), After the Cold War. - International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1989-1991, p. 401. 3 Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War, p. 14. 
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other dimensions such as political, economic, environmental and cultural. Furthermore, the realist 
assumption of states as rational utility maximisers was weakened by the 1989 dialectic between 
domestic and international behaviour. 4 The new paradigm was meant to explain the conditions of peace 
and not the causes of war. Indeed the recent years have seen the emergence of a new paradigm, Social 
constructivism, which suggests that the neo-neo debate is too narrow. 5 Furthermore, a blend between 
the social constructivist strand of Waever and the neo-realism of Buzan constituted the basis for the 
emergence of a school of European security studies, the Copenhagen school. ' Neo-realism, neo- 
institutionalism, social constructivism and the Copenhagen school will form the basis for explaining 
the new security concerns since the end of the Cold War, the security motivations for the EU 
enlargement and the role of the EU in ensuring European security in chapters three and six. 
A neo-realist view on security motives for European integration 
Neo-realism represents the revival of realism in International Relations and is mostly associated with 
Waltz. He updates the realist analysis by emphasising the systemic level of analysis. ' Hence, neo- 
realism is a theory of 'how the structural properties of anarchy provide particular sets of limitations 
upon possibilities for action in international politics'. 8 Five basic assumptions constitute the core of the 
neo-realist approach as synthesised by Mearsheimer, one of its most insistent advocates. First, in the 
absence of an overriding authority above states, the main principle of the international system is 
anarchy. Second, states' military capacities have an offensive nature. Third, states regard other states 
with uncertainty and thus suspicion. Fourth, the main driving force of states is their desire for survival 
or in other words the protection of their sovereignty. Finally, states are instrumentally rational, hence 
they act strategically to ensure their survival. ' 
Based on these assumptions, certain kinds of behaviour are anticipated to arise. Given the lack of an 
overriding authority, states act in the name of self-help. Fears of cheating and considerations regarding 
relative gains inhibit co-operation, thus obstructing the operation of international institutions. " 
Furthermore, as the concern for state sovereignty prohibits external institutions from interfering in the 
priorities of a state, institutions lack the ability to impose some collective interest or enforce rules of 
conduct. On the contrary, institutions aim to advance the particular interests of powerful states. " The 
4 Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War, p. 14. 3 Croft, S. et al, The Enlargement of Europe, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999, p. 13. 6 Manners, I., "European [Security] Union: From Existential Threat to Ontological Security", COPRI Working 
Paper No. 5, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Copenhagen, 2002, p. 17. 7 Waltz, K, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1979, pp. 88-93. 8 Rosamond, B., Theories of European Integration, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2000, p. 132. 9 Mearsheimer, J. J., "The False Promise of International Institutions", International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, 
1994/1995, pp. 8-9, p. 10. 
10 Grieco, J. M., "Anarchy and the Limits of Co-operation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
Institutionalism", International Organisation, VoL42, No. 3,1988, p. 499. 11 Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", pp. 8-9, p. 13. 
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leading states create and shape institutions so that they can preserve their share of world power, or even 
add to it. 12 As a result, institutional outcomes reflect the balance of power between states. 
At a first glance one would have difficulty in explaining the EU enlargement towards the east from a 
neo-realist perspective. First, neo-realists explain the initial steps of European economic integration 
through balance of power. Integration was a means of enhancing co-operation of partners amongst the 
common threat of the Soviet bloc. Once the common threat of Communism was gone, it seemed 
reasonable to authors such as Mearsheimer to anticipate that institutions such as NATO or the EU 
would lack justification and instead anarchy and violence would characterise the newly formed multi- 
polar world. 13 Second, the emergence of several civil wars in the Soviet successor states of 
Transcaucasia or in the former Yugoslavia and the impossibility of international institutions to deal 
effectively with them seemed to confirm the bleak anticipations of neo-realists. 14 
However, despite the Cold War being officially over, certain inertia in international relations justified 
some CEECs' fear of being drawn back in Russia's sphere of influence, thus increasing the appeal of 
membership of the EU, NATO and other international organisations. Neo-realist arguments seemed to 
apply here. Membership of the EU was driven by self-interest and by the CEECs' desire to balance the 
looming threat of a potential revival of Russian influence. The CEEC's motives for membership 
resembled Germany's fear of abandonment which was the driving force towards European integration 
in the 1950s. Thus, the balance of power principle acted as an 'engine' of the enlargement process 
rather than as a 'brake'. Moreover, initiatives such as the Stability Pact show that the EU has learned 
how to deal with conflicts that threaten the security of the continent. Furthermore, Germany's fervent 
support for early Polish membership of the EU can be interpreted as a means to enhance and maintain 
its influence in Poland that would be acceptable both bilaterally and internationally. Germany's success 
in lobbying for Poland within the EU, despite some divergent interests, is an example of how at times 
institutions are means to promote the interests of some influential member states. This was not the case 
with France's support for Romania in its quest for EU membership. Finally, another neo-realist 
security motivation for the EU enlargement appears to be the EU's desire to increase its international 
stand within the post-Cold War multi-polar world, consistent with EU's adoption of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. A different power balancing strategy was a security motivation for further 
integration in the early 1960s and continues to be so at the dusk of the third millennium. 15 However, 
Grieco admits that the realist theory collapses under the post-Cold War conditions, given that no 
'Z Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions"p. 13. 
13 Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions"pp. 4-56; See also Snyder, J., "Averting 
Anarchy in the New Europe", International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4,1990, p. 9. 14 van Ham, "Can Institutions Hold Europe Together? " in Mall, H. (ed. ) Redefining Europe. New Patterns of Conflict and Co-operation, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1996, pp. 186-187. 15 Moravcsik, A., The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, UCL 
Press, London, 1999, p. 30. 
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hegemonic power seems to have emerged in the EU. On the contrary, EU member states bandwagon 
with Germany which, from a realism's own point of view 'would appear to be a serious empirical 
anomaly'. 16 Wallace also rejects the hegemonic stability argument as there is no single government that 
plays a hegemonic role in the EC. " The neo-realists' pessimism regarding the survival of European 
institutions in the absence of a common threat was counteracted by the neo-institutionalist view which 
is briefly reviewed below. 
A neo-institutionalist view on security motives for European integration's 
The neo-institutionalist approach to European integration consists of a number of studies influenced by 
refined versions of neo-functionalism, regime and interdependence theories. It was derived from 
Katzenstein and other political economists whose research shows that power is not everything in 
international relations. " It draws mainly on the claim that institutions matter? Similarly to neo- 
realists, neo-institutionalists argue that self interest is the major incentive that motivates interstate co- 
operation in an interdependent world. For example, interdependent member states engage in 
institutionalised co-operative ventures such as those in the EC framework because they are not able to 
address their increasingly complicated problems alone. 2' Furthermore, following arguments derived 
from models such as the prisoners' dilemma, neo-institutionalists maintain that co-operation avoids 
outcomes that are sub-optimal, i. e. situations in which states will be worse off owing to their neglect of 
mutual agreement zz 
Drawing on regime theory, neo-institutionalists claim that institutions, or 'regimes' as Krasner called 
them, minimise anarchy and make inter-state co-operation easier through various ways. They can 
mediate policies and conflicts. They reduce the transactional costs of interstate relations. They also 
provide trust and facilitate the identification of common interests and the emergence of shared norms, 
rules and values . 
2` They facilitate an environment of security among states which, according to 
16 Grieco, J., "Understanding the Problem of International Co-operation: The Limits of Neoliberal 
Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory" in Baldwin, DA. (ed. ), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, p-330- 
17 Wallace, H., "Making Multilateral Negotiations Work", W. Wallace (ed. ), The Dynamics of European 
Integration, Pinter for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1990, pp. 224-225. 18 Neo-institutionalism is also known as Neo-liberal institutionalism. 19 Church, C. H., European Integration Theory in the 1990s, European Dossier No. 3 3, University of North 
London, 1996, p. 32. For a thorough discussion on different types of Neo-institutionalism, see Rosamond, 
Theories of European Integration, pp. 113-123. 
20 Rosamond, Theories oJEuropean Integration, p. 113. 
21 Keohane, R. O., After Hegemony, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984. 
22Young, OR., "International Regimes: Towards a New Theory of Institutions", World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1, 
1996, p. 109; Keohane, R. O., "International Institutions: Two Approaches", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 
32, No. 4,1988, p. 386. 
n Krasner, "Sovereignty. An Institutional Perspective", Comparative Political Studies, Vo1.21, p. 66,1988; 
Baldwin, R. E., Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism. The Contemporary Debate, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1993; Church, European Integration Theory In the 1990s, p. 32. 
24 Sandholtz, W., "Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3,1996, p. 406. 
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Keohane, allows government to emphasise absolute gains. ' States co-operate even if they will not be 
the only or the greatest beneficiary. ' Neo-institutionalists further argue that the member states remain 
the key actors with institutions facilitating co-operation and providing the rules for it. 27 However, 
institutional dynamics propels the process of integration beyond national wishes. 28 The role of 
institutions is thus seen as going beyond instrumentalism 29 As Jachtenfuchs notes, 'institutions create 
theories about themselves which have, in turn, consequences for the interaction of actors'. 30 
Furthermore, an institution can obtain an identity which is autonomous from the states that inhabit it, 
thus becoming an international actor in its own right which pursues the aggregated interests of its 
member states 3' Finally, success in some areas of co-operation brings expectations of positive future 
relations, creating a virtuous circle. As a result, states get caught up in a continuing process through 
which the areas of co-operation are widened. 32 The argument that European integration has been 
necessary in order to prevent another Franco-German war is of neo-institutionalist nature. The 
deepening of integration as a result of widening though enlargement is also of neo-institutionalist 
nature. Neo-institutionalist arguments appear to explain the post-Kosovo crisis decision of the EU to 
safeguard security in Europe by maintaining the pace of the EU enlargement. 
Despite its powerful explanations of the dynamics of the European integration, neo-institutionalism has 
certain limitations. First, institutions are only sometimes and not always capable of exerting significant 
effects. They have the potential to facilitate co-operation but they can neither transform interests that 
are fundamentally in conflict, nor foster altruism 33 This is why the Copenhagen criteria of EU 
membership have aimed to ensure that candidate states share the same set of values with the Union, 
including democracy and market economy, prior to membership. Furthermore, the success of 
institutionalised co-operation is seen to depend on the number of participant member states, with fewer 
participants likely to prove more successful than larger numbers. 34 This argument justifies the initial 
u Keohane, R. O., "The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and State Strategies", in 
Haftendom, H. and Tuschhoff, C. (eds. ), America and Europe in the Era of Change, Westview, Boulder, 1993, p. 
53; Krasner, "Sovereignty. An Institutional Perspective", p. 66; Baldwin, R. E., Neo-Realism and Neo- 
Liberalism, The Contemporary Debate, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993. 
z6 Stein, A. A., Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 1990,99.115-117; Keohane, R. and Martin, L., "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory", 
International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1,1995, pp. 44-45. 
27 R. O. Keohane, AfterHegemony, 1984. 
28 Pierson P., "The Path to European Integration", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2,1996, pp. 123- 
163. 
29 Keohane, R. O. and Hoffmann, S., "Conclusion: Structure, Strategy and International Roles" in Keohane, R. O. 
and Hoffmann, S. (eds. ), After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989- 
1991, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 401. 
30 Jachtenfuchs, M., "Conceptualising European Governance", Jorgensen, K. -E, (ed. ) in Reflective Approaches to European Governance, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997. 
31 Archer, C., International Organisations, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1983, pp. 141-149. 
32 Lyons cited in Archer, International Organisations, p. 263. 
33 S. Croft at al, The Enlargement of Europe, p. 14. 
34 Axelroad, R. and Keohane, R. 0., "Achieving Co-operation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", World 
Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1,1985, pp. 234-46. 
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EU's reluctance to enlarge, the need for an institutional reform prior to enlargement and the fears 
within some of the CEECs over the EU's possible loss of enthusiasm for expansion. 
Neo-institutionalism is relevant for the present study for several reasons. First, in the neo- 
institutionalist view, international organisations are entrusted a pivotal role in post-Cold War Europe. 
The dense institutionalisation of Western Europe was seen to help sustain co-operation, despite the 
absence of a common threat. Second, neo-institutionalism emphasises the gradual nature of integration 
as well as the potential for a virtuous circle of development induced by integration which will also be 
assumed by this dissertation. Finally, the neo-institutionalists acknowledge the role of institutions in 
enhancing the security of their member states and creating the conditions for superior gains. This 
present study assumes that the EU enlargement has been strongly driven by security motives as will be 
seen in the theoretical framework of the dissertation and discussed in chapter three. 
A constructivist view on security motives for European Integration 
Social constructivism suggests that the neo-realist-neo-liberal institutionalist debate is too narrow. 35 
Constructivists see both neo-schools as part of a positivist approach to International Relations that they 
reject. In contrast with Positivism, Social constructivism maintains that there is no objective truth in 
International Relations and that reliance on empiricism is therefore analytically dangerous. In their 
view, the observer and the observed cannot be separated. 6 Instead, knowledge is socially constructed, 
hence the real world is constructed by the values and the agents of that world 37 Constructivists like 
Risse-Kappen reject the idea of an objective threat They also argue that once functioning, the 
institutions are shaped by shared values. Finally, it is easier to adjust an already existent 
institution rather than to create new institutions of security co-operation. 38 
The constructivist approach was largely used to explain NATO's survival and metamorphosis since the 
end of the Cold War. 39 Constructivist arguments may also be used to explain EU enlargement Thus, 
EU enlargement represents an attempt to broaden the basis of those who embrace the common values 
promoted by the Union. Democracy and market economy are amongst those values and can be 
enhanced through the process of EU enlargement, as will be argued in this study. Furthermore, by 
offering prospects of EU membership to the candidate countries their security concerns may be de- 
35 Croft et al, The Enlargement of Europe, p. 14. 
36 Croft et al, The Enlargement of Europe, p. 13. 
37 Neufeld, M., "Reflexivity and International Relations Theory" in Turenne Sjolander, C. and Cox, W. S. (eds. ), 
Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1994, p. 15; 
Peterson, V. S., "Introduction" in Peterson, V. S. (ed. ), Gendered States: Feminist Re(Visions) of International 
Relations Theory, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1992, p. 12. 
33 Risse-Kappen, T., "Identity in a Democratic Security Community: The Case of NATO" in Katzenstein, P. (ed. ), 
The Culture of National Security, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 359-399. 
39 Risse-Kappen, "Identity in a Democratic Security Community", pp. 359-399. 
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securitised, i. e. moved out from the security realm, hence annulled. However, there are certain 
limitations to this constructivist approach to the EU enlargement. First, it is not implicit that the EU 
member states want to share their values with all the applicants 40 Hence, there may be limitations to 
EU's predisposition to enlarge. This argument has loomed over Romania's quest for EU membership 
and justifies the interest in the factors that can contribute to Romania's successful accession. Neither 
does it necessarily follow that member states of an institution believe that all candidates can share 
those values and benefits. 41 This again has influenced the EU's openness towards enlargement. Third, 
it does not follow that all institutions are equally important in preserving and promoting these shared 
values or that all western organisations share the same values. 42 Institutions can collapse if they no 
longer represent shared values or states can withdraw as a result of internal changes. 43 This is why the 
focus of this study lies on the values promoted by the EU and acknowledges that there are not only 
benefits, but also challenges from the enlargement process. The present study maintains that the EU 
has a vast potential for complementing NATO in ensuring European security through broadening the 
basis of those who embrace democracy and market economy, as will be seen in chapter six. 
A view on European security by the Copenhagen school 
An important school that this study builds upon is the Copenhagen school of European security. The 
research conducted by its proponents represents 'possibly the most thorough and continuous 
exploration of the significance and the implications of a widening security agenda for security 
studies'. " The aim of the Copenhagen group has been to provide a fairly radical 'translation of a meta- 
theoretical stance into new conceptualisation and eventually theoretical innovation!. 4' They investigate 
how to move security beyond a narrow realist agenda, while 'avoiding ending up with an all embracing, 
inflated concept dealing with all kinds of threats to existence, well-being or development of 
individuals, social groups, nations and mankind'. ' Their focus is on normative ideas and inter- 
subjective meaning. 47 The school has also developed concepts such as 'securitisation', 'societal security' 
and the 'regional security complex'. Although some of these concepts emerged before the setting up of 
the school, they have been subjected to a collective dynamic. As a result, the concepts introduced by 
the authors have changed dramatically and the concept of security is the most obvious one. 48 The 
40 Croft et al, The Enlargement of Europe, p. 16. 
41 Croft et al, The Enlargement of Europe, p. 16. 
42 Croft et al, The Enlargement of Europe, p. 16. 
43 Armstrong, D., Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society, Claredon Press, 
Oxford, 1993. Although Armstrong is a leading proponent of the English School, rather than Constructivism, his 
inions are relevant here given the linkages between the two theoretical perspectives. 
Huysmans, J., "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in 
Europe", European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 4,1998, p. 483. 
as Jorgenson, K. E. (ed. ), Reflective Approaches to European Governance, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1997. 
46 Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen", p. 482. 
47 Jachtenfuchs, M., et al, "Which Europe? Conflicting Models of Legitimate Political Order", European Journal 
of International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 4,1998. 
48 Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen", p. 483. 
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definition of security according to the Copenhagen school was adopted by this study and was presented 
in chapter one. However, two points are worth making here. Among the five security sectors the 
political one is no longer considered the most important one as in the work of Jahn et al. 49 Instead, a 
special emphasis lies on the societal sector. 50 However, the Copenhagen group seem to underestimate 
the relevance of the economic sector of security and the present study will address this limit. Second, 
the group distinguished between a 'real threat' and a 'perceived' one. Since security is primarily a 
political issue, in order to be considered a security issue or concern, a threat has to be perceived as 
such. It can be perceived wrongly, but it has to be defined by actors to be of relevance to the political 
debate. 51 In recent works security changes, however, from a perception to a'speech act. ' Security is no 
longer a perception which refers to something real that exists independently of this perception. Calling 
something 'security' makes it into a security concern. It transforms an issue, for example an economic 
one, in a security concern. Security becomes a self-referential practice. 52 However, the construction of 
a security concern by means of the speech act of security is not in the power of an individual actor. 
Instead, it is an inter-subject act: 'Politics ultimately rests neither with the objects, nor with the subjects 
but among the subjects'. 53 Both the successful performance of the speech act and the logic of security 
are ultimately internal to the interplay of social practices X54 This study uses both perceptions of 
security and securitisation or de-securitisation as a speech act, as will be detailed in the theoretical 
framework. 
A last concept proposed by the Copenhagen group which is of relevance for this study is the 'security 
complex'. 55 This was proposed by Buzan et al in order to introduce the regional level into security 
studies. The security complex approach assumes that a relatively autonomous security dynamic can 
exist between units of a region. It maintains that in certain regions the security interdependence can 
have such intensity, that it forms a sub-system security pattern which can be separated by its 
environment 56 This can be considered a limitation of the Copenhagen approach, given that recent 
events have supported the opposite idea of European security being indivisible rather than divisible. 
Hence the need to expand the system to the whole of Europe. The present study draws on the 
conceptual framework proposed by the Copenhagen school as will be seen in the theoretical 
framework. 
49 Jahn et al cited in Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen", p. 488. 
30 Buzan, B. et al, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, Pinter, London, 1993. 
51 Jahn et al cited Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen", p. 491. 
52 Buzan, B. et al, Security: A New FrameworkforAnalysis, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 479. 53 Buzan et al, Security: A New FrameworkforAnalysis, p. 479. 
54 Huysmans, "Revisiting Copenhagen", p. 493. 
55 Buzan, B. et al, The European Security OrderRecast. Scenarios for the Post Cold War Era, Pinter, London, 
1990, p. 14. 
s° Buzan et al, The European Security Order Recast., p. 14. 
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To sum up, European integration and the present EU enlargement have been driven partially by 
security motives which can be explained through the lenses of neo-realism, neo-institutionalism, social 
constructivism and the Copenhagen school as in chapter three. However, security motives are not fully 
accountable for the process of European integration or for the CEECs' accession to the EU. Economic 
motives have played an equally important role in explaining European integration so far as will be 
shown in the following pages. 
Explaining European integration through economic motives: economic theories of European 
integration 
While political theorists of European integration are interested in the political results of integration i. e. 
the peaceful resolution of international conflict, economic theorists argue that economic gains are the 
chief motive for the continuation of the integration process. The economic literature distinguishes 
between degrees of economic integration corresponding to several institutional frameworks which vary 
from free trade areas to complete economic integration. Furthermore, the main interest of economists 
lies in the study of the welfare effects of such areas and of the conditions for their creation. The main 
stages of economic integration acknowledged by the economic literature and used in this study read as 
follows: 
a) Free trade areas, where member countries agree on reducing intra-area restrictions to trade, while 
still keeping individual protection schemes against third countries; 
b) Customs unions, where the members liberalise the intra-union trade and establish a common 
customs tariff against third countries; 
c) Common markets, where the reduction of trade restrictions is also extended to factor movements; 
d) Economic unions, where apart from reducing restrictions on trade and factor mobility there is also 
some harmonisation of national economic policies to cut remaining sources for discrimination; 
e) Unification, which presupposes a supra-national authority with power to pursue unified policies in 
various areas, including monetary, fiscal and social policies. s' 
Studies dealing with the welfare effects of economic integration can be loosely divided into Orthodox 
and neo-classical theory. Although the discussion of the benefits of EU enlargement will be based on 
neo-classical theory, a brief reference will be made to the Orthodox literature below which forms the 
basis of the former. A review of other strands of economic literature is beyond the scope of this study. 
57 Balassa, B., "The Theory of Economic Integration: An introduction" in Nelsen , B. F. and Stubb, A. C-G. (eds. ), The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, Palgrave, New York, 1998, 
p. 175. 
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Orthodox v, neo-classical theoryofEuropean integration 
The theory of integration of product markets is relatively recent, although classical economists such as 
Ricardo also investigated the problems of free trade and of preferential trade agreements S8 The theory 
of economic integration stems from the seminal work of Viner who in 1950 examined the static effects 
of the establishment of a customs union between two countries. He concluded then that, depending on 
the size of the external tariff, the newly created customs union might lead to trade creation and trade 
diversion. The relative size of these two effects would determine whether the customs union would 
have an overall positive or negative effect on the participant countries. The creation of a customs union 
might therefore bring a once for all increase in the welfare and income of the member states. S9 Viner's 
concepts of trade creation and trade diversion are at the core of the classical theory of customs unions. 
The classical theory is not only concerned with the effects of the customs unions on the allocation of 
resources and international specialisation, but also with their impact on the exploitation of scales 
economies and on the terms of trade of the participating economies. 60 The theory assumes a perfectly 
competitive framework in which homogenous products are produced by funs that lack market power 
and incur no or few transaction costs. Another important major assumption that constitutes a limitation 
of the classical customs union theory is inter-country factor immobility. 61 
Additional explanations of the effects of European integration are offered by neo-classical theories. 
They address the inability of the Orthodox theory to explain intra-industry trade in similar products, 
even when scale economies are included. While not excluding the operation and the importance of 
comparative advantage based on factor endowments in certain sectors, new trade theories focus on 
situations in which the gains from trade stem purely from increased competition in the presence of 
scale economies and product differentiation. ' In this new framework, one can note at least four 
sources of potential gains from regional integration, in addition to any that derive solely from increased 
specialisation according to comparative advantage. First, integration resulting from lower trade barriers 
increases effective market size, giving rise to more competition, a decrease in oligopolitistic mark-ups 
and reduced market segmentation. Second, longer production runs and lower costs are encouraged by 
larger market size. In this process, some higher cost firms may be eliminated and the demand met by 
imports. Furthermore, trade expansion is accompanied by increased market size that may enable more 
products to be produced more profitably, thus generating welfare gains from increased product 
diversity. Finally, integration may permit firms to engage in more plant specialisation, thus reducing 
Molle, W., The Economics of European Integration. Theory, Practice, Policy, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1997, p. 79. 39Robson, P., The Economics of International Integration, Georger Allen and Unwin, London, 1984, p. 82. 60 Robson, The Economics of InternationalIntegration, p. 17. 
61 Robson, The Economics of International Integration, p. 82. 
ez Robson, The Economics ofInternational Integration, p. 83. 
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the number of products produced in a given plant and leading to cost reductions. "' On the other hand, 
an increased market can lead to economies of scale and hence diminish competition, suggesting that 
the effects on competition may be ambiguous. 
Given that EU membership will offer the CEECs all advantages stemming from joining the Single 
Market, special attention to the theory of common markets is required here. Furthermore, given that at 
present each CEEC is part of a partial free trade area with the EU, some references will be made to the 
impact of free trade areas on their members. As the theory of free trade areas and of single market are 
extensions of customs union theory, references to customs union theory will also be made here. So, is a 
common market a better option for the CEECs than a free trade area? 
The literature agrees that customs unions are a second-best exercise which replace one distortion with 
another. " Thus, the same effects are produced by free trade areas, but in the case of free trade areas the 
extent of trade diversion is likely to be less. This makes free trade areas more appealing from a welfare 
point of view than customs unions. "' Customs unions are also likely to be inferior to a policy of 
unilateral tariff reductions, and therefore need to be justified on other economic or non-economic 
grounds. Thus, de Mello, Panagaryia and Rodrik identify three channels through which regional 
integration could alter economic outcomes for the better. First, a regional trade agreement creates a 
larger polity which might discourage discretionary actions of particular governments. In particular, it 
would restrict the power of growth retarding political groups, unless powerful lobbies can form 
alliances across the countries. Second, when a regional agreement is set up ab initio, better choice may 
be made than at the national level, where policy makers have to contend with existing institutions that 
accommodate factional interests. Third, when participating countries have different economic 
institutions, policy-making at the regional level will entail a compromise between those institutions and 
may lead to a superior outcome for at least some of the countries. 66 Furthermore, membership of a 
preferential trade agreement such as the EU may act as a protection for the CEECs against the risk of 
more protectionist policies of the trading partners in the future. A customs union can also serve as a 
building block, rather than stumbling one for global free trade, with all positive advantages that come 
with increased trade liberalisation. 67 This is the case for the EU which expands free trade and its 
welfare benefits through the eastern enlargement. 
67 Robson, The Economics of International Integration, p. 84 
64 Einer, W., "A New Look at Economic Integration" in Jacquemin and Sapir (eds), The Internal Market , p. 
71 
0 Thirlwall, A. P., "Trade Agreements, Trade Liberalisation and Economic Growth: A Selective Survey", Paper 
for the African Development Report, 2000, p. 8 
66 de Mello, Panagaryia and Rodrik cited in Thirlwall, "Trade Agreements, Liberalisation and Growth", p. 9 67 Gros, D. and Steinherr, A., Winds of Change. Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, Longman, 
New York, 1995, p. 496 
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By extending customs theory to common market, research has already acknowledged additional 
welfare gains. Good accounts of the theory of common market are given by Robson and Molle. 
Building on the neo-classical trade theory and on the theory of international production, Molle 
concludes that integration of labour and capital markets leads to net welfare gains for the participating 
countries. ' This can act as a justification for the CEEC's desire to join the EU. Furthermore, 
integration of good markets should precede integration of capital markets as costs of protection of 
goods market are much higher under conditions of free capital flows, than under conditions of 
segmented markets. ' This observation is consistent with the process of CEECs' accession to the EU, 
which started with the gradual liberalisation of the goods market. Moreover, Molle argues that the 
international movement of capital in the form of direct investment is a substitute for goods trade in the 
case of protection on goods market, but will create trade in the case of integrated good markets. 
70 This 
finding emphasises the positive effects of trade liberalisation and of attracting foreign direct 
investment. Finally, Molle states that a common market may enhance the development of new sectors 
and extend the presence of existing ones. 7' Robson also finds that reducing barriers increases 
competition, reduces profit margins, reduces average costs of production and increases intra-EU 
market shares n Factor mobility resulting from different marginal productivities leads to factor price 
equalisation. From the point of view of the candidate countries, this can be seen as an important factor 
leading towards economic convergence with the EU. However, this can also lead to an increase in the 
income gap between the CEECs that are joining in 2004 and the remaining candidates, Bulgaria and 
Romania, making catching up more difficult. 73 On the other hand, price equalisation may be an 
advantage for the latter two countries which are likely to benefit from low labour costs for a few 
additional years, thus remaining attractive for FDI. 74 This would happen if locational theory and path 
dependency arguments were disproved. Finally, as factor mobility may not necessarily benefit each 
member country, some intra-union redistribution may be required in order for all partners to share the 
advantages of the move towards a common market. 75 For the CEECs, the structural and the cohesion 
funds will be such means of welfare redistribution that would ensure additional benefits upon EU 
accession. 
However, research also shows that extending a preferential trade area such as a free trade area or a 
customs union may have ambiguous effects and can lead to losses for both new comers and 
6' Molle, The Economics of European Integration, Theory, Practice, Policy, p. 187. 
' Molle, The Economics of European Integration, Theory, Practice, Policy, p. 187. 
70 Molle, The Economics of European Integration, Theory, Practice, Policy, p. 187. 
71 Molle, The Economics of European Integration, Theory, Practice, Policy, p. 187. 
72 Robson, The Economics ofInternational Integration, p. 95. 
7a Smith, A., The Return to Europe: The Reintegration of Eastern Europe into the European Economy, 
MacMillan in association with the School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, Basingstoke, 2000, p. 36. 
74 Bevan, A. A. and Estrin, S., "The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Transition Economies", 
Discussion Paper No. 2638, CEPR, 2000, p. 4. 
75 Robson, The Economics of International Integration, p. 76. 
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incumbents. 76 Whether membership of a FTA renders losses or gains depends on several factors. First, 
the higher the initial tariff in a given sector, the larger the favourable effect and the smaller the 
unfavourable one. Second, the lower the post-FTA tariff on extra union countries, the less likely that 
the lower priced goods of the latter will be displaced. Third, the higher the tariffs in the outside world 
on the partner, the larger will be the gain or the smaller the loss. Fourth, the greater the 
complementarity in import demands of the countries forming the FTA, the larger the gains from the 
preferential trade agreement. 77 Fifth, the larger the union, the better the chance of including the least 
cost producer and thus minimising trade diversion. 78 Finally, the gain is greater, the greater the overlap 
between partners' production bundles, as in the absence of any overlap there would be no scope for 
trade creation. Given the degree of overlap, the greater the cost difference between the partners, the 
more significant the increase in the benefits of specialisation. 79 
Is then the EU expansion likely to be beneficial for both the EU and the candidate countries? In other 
words, are the conditions set above met? They are, according to Gros and Steinherr. Thus, the external 
tariffs of the EU are lower than those of most of the Eastern European countries. Furthermore, the EU 
is a very large trading area, so it is likely that it includes low cost producers, thus minimising the 
potential for trade diversion. However, the potential trade structure of the Central European countries 
once they have joined the EU is more difficult to assess. Gros and Steinherr find only that the structure 
of exports from Poland already differs from the average within the EU while Romania has a 
completely different structure. This fording might suggest that Poland and Romania do not meet the 
conditions for a beneficial membership of the Single Market. However, a comparison between EU 
correlation coefficients of export structures of Poland and Romania on the one hand, and Ireland, 
Portugal and Greece on the other, reveals certain similarities, counter-balancing the previous 
argument. 80 
All in all, both theory and empirical evidence point towards large potential gains for both the EU and 
the CEECs as a result of enlarging the EU to the east. Furthermore, a study by Baldwin et al anticipate 
that while all European regions gain from enlargement, the CEECs will gain more in relative terms. 81 
Finally, the costs of enlargement are far offset by the benefits of enlargement and by the costs of non- 
enlargement. 82 Although the author is aware of these costs, they will not be addressed here, due to 
76 de Mello, J. et al, "The New Regionalism: A Country Perspective" in de Mello, J. and Panagariya, A. (eds. ), 
New Dimensions in Regional Integration, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. 
77 de Mello et al, "The New Regionalism: A Country Perspective". 
78 For definitions of trade diversion and creation, see Molle, The Economics of InternationalIntegration, p. 30. 
79 Winters, L. A., International Economics, Routledge, London, 1994, p. 179. 
80 Gros and Steinherr, Winds ofChange. Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, pp. 497-500. 
81 Baldwin, R. E. et al, "The Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: The Impact on the EU and on Central 
Europe", Economic Policy, No. 24,1997. 
sz For an assessment of the costs of the EU enlargement see Baldwin et al, "The Costs and Benefits of Eastern 
Enlargement "; Rollo, J., "Economic Aspects of EU Enlargement to the East" in Maresceau, M. (ed. ), Enlarging 
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word and topic constraints. The paragraphs below will briefly review the economic benefits of EU 
enlargement, mainly from the candidate countries' point of view. This discussion is necessary in order 
to pinpoint both the motivation and the impact of EU membership. These elements will then pave the 
way towards answering why Poland and Romania have evolved so differently during the accession 
process and how prospects of EU membership affected the determinants of EU accession (in chapters 
three and six). 
Assessing the benefits o enlarging the EU towards the East 
Studies on the economic benefits of the present EU enlargement build mainly on the extension of 
customs union theory to free trade areas and common markets. Thus, while the Europe Agreements 
have initiated a hub-and-spoke type partially free trade area between the EU and each candidate 
country, EU membership will give the CEECs access to the benefits of the Single Market and of the 
economic and monetary union. As a result, the importance of full EU membership for countries such as 
Poland and Romania stems not only from the benefits of joining as such, but also from the limitations 
of the institutional framework provided initially by the Europe Agreements. 
These limitations have been identified by several studies and read as follows. First, sensitive goods 
such as agricultural products, steel products, textiles and leather products remained protected in the EU 
until 1995. This protection was even more onerous for the CEECs and especially Poland and Romania, 
given that they have important comparative advantages in these sectors. S3 Second, by negotiating 
bilateral free trade agreements, the EU pursued a hub-and-spoke approach which biased competition in 
favour of the EU as long as the CEECs did not practice free trade amongst themselves. The hub-and- 
spoke approach also had the potential of deterring investment in the East by discouraging investors 
from serving the entire region. 8S Moreover, this bilateralism had the potential of creating a permanent 
disadvantage for some countries through the dynamics of locational accumulation. 86 Being an 
incomplete liberalisation, the hub-and-spoke system had the potential of leading to an smaller increase 
in growth than in the case of complete liberalisation. Finally, the hub-and-spoke bilateralism had the 
potential of artificially discouraging trade between the CEECs, unless they liberalised their trade by 
setting a free trade area themselves. 87 
the European Union. Relations between the EUand Central and Eastern Europe, Longman, London, 1997; Päun, 
L., Dobrot, G., Päslaru, D., "A adera sau a nu adera? ". Un dialog cu doi actori: Uniunea Europeanä $i Romänia, 
Paper Prepared for the Soros Foundation for an Open Society, Bucharest, 2000. 
83 Gros and Steinherr, Winds of Change. Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, p. 489. 
84 R. E. Baldwin, Towards an Integrated Europe, CEPR, London, 1994, pp. 131-132. 
Baldwin, Towards an Integrated Europe, pp. 132-134. 
86 Baldwin, Towards an Integrated Europe, pp. 134-135; Krugman, P., "Increasing Returns and Economic 
Geography", Journal of Political Economy, June, 1991. 
87 Baldwin, Towards an Integrated Europe, p. 137. 
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Although these negative effects of the hub-and-spoke approach were largely eliminated through the 
creation of the Central and Eastern European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) in 1993 and its 
expansion towards Bulgaria and Romania in 1997, one should not forget the enhanced positive effects 
that membership of the EU has in comparison with a free trade area. Thus, the EU offers more than 
free trade of goods. It offers the elimination of border controls and the legal provisions and institutional 
support necessary to ensure the durability of free trade. EU membership supposes the free movement 
of services, labour and capital, hence increased foreign direct investment. Joining the EU also supposes 
the co-ordination of economic policies and adherence to the treaty on the economic and monetary 
union. Through accession, the CEEC will also benefit from the financial support designed to accelerate 
convergence and enhance cohesion with the EU. They will equally take part in sectoral policies such as 
the common agricultural policy (CAP), scientific development, development aid and others. 88 An in- 
depth discussion of these benefits is, however, beyond the scope of this study. 
The EU enlargement will bring to the CEECs (including Poland and Romania) six sources of economic 
growth. Three stem from the standard rendition of the neo-classical theory of international trade: 
efficiency gains due to rising import competition; economies of scales effects related to EU market 
access; gains from specialisation and a rise in the range of product varieties, which allow realisation of 
a higher level of consumption and utility. Two further growth sources are suggested by recent 
additions to modern trade theory by Baldwin and Baldwin and Seghezza: growth induced by imports of 
intermediate products and technology-intensive machinery and equipment and their potential positive 
spillover effects and increasing FDI flows from the EU to the CEECs, particularly to those with 
prospects of earlier entry, as this tends to eliminate political risk for the EU and non EU investors. 90 
Finally, the structural and cohesion funds are an additional means to enhance growth in the candidate 
countries upon EU membership. 
By joining the EU, the CEECs will also benefit from the risk premium effect The risk premium effect 
can be analysed at macroeconomic and at microeconomic level. Thus, on the microeconomic side, EU 
membership constraints arbitrary trade practices and indirect tax policy changes. It also locks in well 
defined property rights and codifies competition policy and state aids policy. Through convertibility, 
open capital markets and rights of establishment, EU membership also guarantees investors the free 
use of their investment. Finally, EU ensures that CEEC-produced products have access to the EU-15 
market which accounts for 30% of world income. " On the macroeconomic side, EU membership 
Gros and Steinherr, Winds ofChange, p. 492; Rollo, "Economic Aspects of the EU Enlargement". 
Welfens, P. J. J, "Enlargement. Conflicts and Policy Options" in van Brabandt, J. M. (ed. ), Remaking Europe. 
The European Union and the Transition Countries, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, 1999. 90 Baldwin, R. E., "Measurable Dynamic Gains from Trade", Journal ofPolitical Economy, Vol. 100, No. 1, 
1992; Baldwin, R. E. and Segheaa, 1996 cited in J. M. Brabandt, Remaking Europe, p173. 91 Baldwin et al, "The Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement", p. 140; J. Rollo, "Economic Aspects of EU 
Enlargement o the East", p. 259. 
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involves participation into the monetary union, thus providing a solid hedge against inflation spurts. 
These effects are likely to enhance investors' confidence and thus contribute to attracting the FDI 
necessary for the modernisation of the transition economies. 
EU enlargement brings economic benefits not only to the CEECs, but also to the EU present member 
states. For example, the given the abundance of labour in the CEECs compared with the EU current 
member states, and the existence of systematic trade barriers in labour intensive goods such as 
clothing, textile, shoes or agricultural goods, EU enlargement can stimulate production in labour 
intensive goods in the East and discourage them in the West. This can free resources in the West, thus 
allowing them to be used in more productive activities. By specialising in sectors in which each 
country has a comparative advantage, pan-European allocation of resources can improve and may lead 
to an increase in the GDP per capita throughout the region. 93 An enlarged EU will also have an 
increased importance in the world trade and in international relations in general. 94 It will entail more 
trade and investment opportunities. All these economic benefits are likely to be higher the more 
prepared the CEECs are to withstand the competitive forces within the EU, hence the need to comply 
with the economic criteria set at the June 1993 Copenhagen European Council, as discussed in chapter 
four. The relationship between FDI and economic integration justifies the choice of FDI as a 
explanatory factor of the accession process as analysed in chapters five and three. 
The domino theory of regionalism and other negative motives for the EU enlargement 
The domino theory of regionalism, proposed by Baldwin, lies at the cross-roads between political and 
economic theories of integration. This theory posits that the current wave of regionalism stems from 
'idiosyncratic events' that are 'multiplied many times over by a domino effect'. 95 More precisely, 
Baldwin analyses the effect of the 1985 EU's decision to create a Single Market and thus renew the EU 
member states' drive towards unity. He argues that, whereas the primary motives for the creation of the 
Single Market were geopolitical and philosophical rather than purely commercial, the EU 1992 project 
created what might be called a 'political economy jealousy effect'. " Closer EU integration posed a 
threat to non-EU exporters who depended heavily on the EU market. Cheaper and easier intra-EU trade 
threatened to reduce the relative competitiveness of non-EU firms, thus harming their sales and profits. 
As a result, European non-EU exporters throughout the region called for their governments to counter 
the losses, thus pushing towards closer relations with the EU and eventually full membership. 97 
Although this theory discards the economic motives which led to the 1992 Single Market project, it 
92 Baldwin et al, "The Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement", p. 140; J. Rollo, "Economic Aspects of EU 
Enlargement to the East" p. 259. 
93 Baldwin, Towards an Integrated Europe, pp. 160-161. 
94 Baldwin, Towards an Integrated Europe, pp. 160-161. 
ss Baldwin, Towards an Integrated Europe, p. 69. 
96 Baldwin, Towards an Integrated Europe, p. 69. 
97 Baldwin, Towards an Integrated Europe, 1994, p. 71. 
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gives a good account of the benefits of avoiding exclusion, hence the negative motives for enhancing 
the process of European integration. 
The domino effect argument can be extended to the present EU enlargement. The present EU 
enlargement is largely driven by negative motives from both sides. On the one hand, the CEECs did 
not want to be deprived of access to the EU market, EU investment and of being perceived as EU 
members, hence European. Furthermore, EU membership was seen as a channel for pursuing domestic 
objectives. For example, EU has been used a 'scapegoat' for unpopular measures and will be, inter 
alia, a means to enhance growth and development through the structural funds and the price 
mechanisms. Finally, the CEECs saw no suitable alternative to EU membership. On the other hand, the 
EU member states themselves pursued further integration with the CEECs for negative reasons. They 
feared the loss of markets for trade and foreign direct investment. They also feared a rise in migration 
as a result of poverty or internal instability in the former communist countries. Finally, the EU feared 
increased social unrest in the area, should the Union have rejected the enlargement option. 98 This 
approach is relevant to the present study through its assumption that the EU enlargement is an 
inevitable process whose failure would be more costly than its accomplishment. Furthermore, this 
assumption supports the need to maintain the pace of Romania's integration into the EU and observe 
the target accession date recognised at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, as will 
be argued in chapter six. 
2.1.2 Theorising on foreign direct investment 
Having reviewed the theories on security and economic motives for European integration the following 
section offers a brief account of studies of FDI. The FDI literature can be loosely divided into two 
strands: studies dealing with the determinants of foreign investment and others dealing with the impact 
of FDI in the host economy. As both strands of literature are relevant to the present study, they will be 
briefly presented below. 
Studies of foreign direct investment determinants 
The determinants of foreign direct investment have been investigated by a vast theoretical literature. 
Most research has been conducted on developing countries, but the last decade has seen a considerable 
literature on the transition countries themselves. Reference will be made to both strands of literature, 
given that the first represented the basis for the latter. Six main approaches will be briefly reviewed 
here in order to justify the choice for Dunning's eclectic paradigm (OLI) for the theoretical framework 
of this study. A main approach to explaining international production is the survey approach This is 
" Cameron, F., "The European Union and the Challenge of Enlargement" in Maresceau, M. (ed. ), Enlarging the 
European Union, p. 251; Saryusz-Wolski, J., "Towards a Single Perspective. Economics and Politics of Eastern 
Enlargement" in Maresceau, M. (ed. ), Enlarging the European Union, p. 28. ' For a review of the survey approach, see Dunning, J. 11, "The Determinants of International Production", 
Oxford Economic Papers, Vol-25, Issue 3, Nov. 1973, p. 294. 
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based on asking investors questions about their reasons for the initial decision to produce abroad. 
Given that usually the questions are formulated in very general terms, surveys have produced a wide 
range of answers which reflect as much the respondents' interpretation of the questions as the 
determinants of the investment decision. 100 For the purpose of this study such an approach was 
inappropriate given the complex methodology and its limitations. 
The second approach to the study of FDI is capital theory. This theory focuses on capital or changes in 
capital and is essentially an extension of received capital theory. The main claim of the traditional 
theory of international capital movements is that such movements rise due to the differences in the 
levels of the interest rates between countries. Thus, capital flows across the exchanges if the margin by 
which the expected yield exceeds the cost of the capital is greater than that of projects at home. 10' 
However appropriate such an explanation is for portfolio investments, it is insufficient for FDI. At least 
two reasons can be invoked here. First, unlike portfolio investment, FDI does not imply change of 
ownership, hence invalidating the assumption of similar behavioural characteristics. Second, FDI is 
likely to be affected not only by potential returns of money capital, but also by the relative profitability 
of other inputs specific to FDI, such as entrepreneurship, technology and management expertise. 102 
Although research on capital flows has provided useful insights with a direct bearing on the investment 
behaviour of multinationals, capital theory still remains somehow limited. 103 Thus, Dunning argues that 
the questions asked by capital theory do not get to the heart of the matter. The concern of this approach 
is not to explain foreign investment or capital formation per se, but to investigate how far profit rates 
and market growth influence capital allocation. Hence, it offers a limited explanation of foreign 
investment as such, ignoring other possible explanatory variables. 104 This constituted the major 
limitation of this approach which rendered it as inappropriate for the present study. 
A third explanation of FDI is that of international economics and stems from the limitations of the 
received theory in explaining the recent level and composition level of trade. Thus, in the classical 
model of comparative advantage there is no room for multinational enterprises. With completely free 
movement of goods but immobility of factors of production within a price taking situation, there is low 
incentive for FDI. 105 However, these are no longer reasonable assumptions given the rise in FDI that 
has characterised the last twenty to forty or fifty years. The most powerful attempts to incorporate 
capital movements into trade theory have come from two directions. First, based on the Hekscher- 
Ohlin-Samuelson model, Mundell asserted that trade and capital movements are substitutes for each 
other and that the equalisation of factor-price ratios implies the equalisation of commodity price 
100 Dunning, "The Determinants of International Production", p. 294. 
101 Dunning, "The Determinants of International Production", p. 299. 
102 Stubenitsky, F. cited in Dunning, "The Determinants of International Production", pp. 299-300. 103 Spitaller, E., Stevens, Johnson cited in Dunning, "The Determinants of International Production", pp. 299-300. 104 Dunning, "The Determinants of International Production", p. 303. 
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ratios. 106 Second, changes into technology or advances in knowledge have been taken into 
consideration in the analysis. 107 Thus, beginning with Posner, attempts were made to demonstrate how 
innovations in one country may affect the comparative advantage of countries, and how the trade 
initially generated might be gradually eliminated by the recognition and imitation of innovations 
elsewhere. 10' Within this strand of literature, the product cycle model of Vernon has maybe come the 
closest to explaining the role of multinationals in this process. 109 Overall, both approaches are micro- 
oriented and differ from the received theory in two major ways. First, they are concerned with the 
behaviour of firms rather than countries. Second, they are particular, rather than general models, as 
they tend to endow innovating firms and countries with certain characteristics and subsequently 
patterns of production and trade. ' 10 The value of the trade approach lies in placing FDI amongst other 
ways of exploiting a foreign market, insight which is adopted in this study. 
A more strategic approach to FDI was offered by the game theoretic approach to industrial 
organisational In these models, comparative advantages are not considered as exogenously given. 
Multinationals are not only interested in exploiting them but rather in protecting and augmenting 
them. 112 Thus, the presence of specific assets gives rise to market imperfections which make FDI a 
credible strategy of controlling the market. 113 Hence, firms undertake FDI to improve or defend market 
shares by pre-empting competitors from doing likewise. 14 Given data restrictions this approach is not 
used by the present study. 
More recently, location theory has focused on the importance of agglomeration economies as a 
rationale for FDI. Location theory suggests that regions that are the first to attract industrial 
concentrations can generate economies of scale external to the investing firm which are difficult to 
replicate by late comers. "' The presence of technological and pecuniary externalities act as a 
centripetal force and the strong competition generated by the entry of other firms in the market act as a 
centrifugal force. Three sources of agglomeration economies were identified in empirical studies by 
105 Kindleberger, C., American Business Abroad, Yale University Press, 1969. 
106 Mundell, R. A. cited in Dunning, "The Determinants of International Production", pp. 299-300. 
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Wheeler and Mody: infrastructure, the degree of industrialisation and the existing level of FDI. 
16 The 
significance of previous foreign direct investment in attracting FDI was adopted by the present study 
for testing the path dependency hypothesis with regard to foreign direct investment. 
Finally, another strand of literature links FDI determinants with the basic motivations for undertaking 
the investment. According to these theories, resource-seeking investors set their plants where the 
necessary resources are available while rent-seeking investors favour countries where factors of 
production, especially labour, are cheap. Market seeking firms choose countries that offer a large 
domestic market and access to regional (supranational) markets. Finally, firms acting strategically may 
link one of the above considerations with the need to follow the leader or gain additional advantages. 
From such a point of view, strategic FDI is quite similar to rent-seeking FDI. 117 Although the present 
study does not distinguish between different motives for FDI, it builds on the determinants suggested 
by this strand of literature. 
Despite this significant theoretical research on FDI, there is no agreed model providing the basis for 
empirical work. 18 However, Dunning's eclectic OLI paradigm has offered a taxonomic framework for 
many empirical studies. The eclectic paradigm maintains that foreign direct investment can be 
explained by three categories of factors: ownership advantages (0) for firms to operate oversees, such 
as intangible assets; locational advantages (L) to invest in the host country rather than in the donor 
country; and benefits of internalisation (1). 119 The advantage of this theory is that it highlights the 
importance of locational advantages, including the role of the investment climate and of the 
government policies necessary to enhance FDI. The latter categories are of main interest for the present 
study, thus justifying the use of the OLI paradigm in the theoretical framework. Thus, the locational 
advantages included in the OLI paradigm refer to: spatial distribution of inputs and markets; input 
prices, quality and productivity of labour, energy, materials, components, semi-finished goods; 
transport and communication costs; control on imports, tax rates, incentives; climate for investment; 
political stability; legal, commercial and transport infrastructure; physical distance-language, culture, 
business customs; economics and R&D and marketing. 120 Furthermore, the OLI eclectic paradigm 
seems to synthesise findings of other previous theories, thus offering an all encompassing explanation 
of FDI. 
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117 Dunning, J. H., "Location and Multinational Enterprise", Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 29, 
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Overall, the FDI literature has focused on developing countries and has identified the following 
determinants of FDI: the cost structures and market and institutional characteristics of the recipient 
economy; 121 openness of the host country, international agreements on trade and investment; ' balance 
of payments constraints, restrictions on capital movements, macroeconomic performance in general in 
terms of inflation or fiscal and monetary policies; 123non-financial incentives such as basic 
infrastructure provision; 124 size of the domestic market in conjunction with prospects of growth of the 
host country; ̀ purely commercial considerations or social choice. 126 Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
a new strand of literature dealing with the FDI determinants in the CEECs has emerged, building on 
previous work. 127 The new strand of research was recognition of the specific needs and of the particular 
investment climate of the area. 128 The empirical work and the surveys conducted so far have led to a 
general consensus upon the main determinants of foreign direct investment in the CEECs. These 
factors include: domestic and potential market size, gravity factors, natural resources endowment, skills 
endowment, unit labour costs, progress in transition reforms, and economic and political stability. '29 
Within the general work on the determinants of FDI in transition economies some studies paid 
particular attention to the role of the investment climate. Research by Barrel and Holland, Meyer and 
Pind or Konings compared the good performance of advanced central European transition countries 
with the weak performance of Balkan and Soviet Union successor states which are less advanced in 
transition reforms. They concluded that the investment climate is an important determinant of FDI. 130 
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This approach will be used in this study in conducting a qualitative assessment of the investment 
climate in Poland and Romania in chapter five. 
Other studies have focused on the role of the institutional framework, and of economic reforms in 
general, in enhancing FDI. In 1993 SvetliW et al. were asking whether there was a correlation between 
the magnitude of the political change and the inflows of FDI, noting the reforms already put into place 
by top FDI destinations in the CEECs at the time. "' Later on, Scattaglia and Fischbach suggested that 
early FDI top destinations were the frontrunners of reforms. 132 Bevan at al. argued that institutions are 
providing advantages that are influencing the interactions between ownership and location advantages, 
thus enhancing FDI. 133 The EBRD Transition Report 2000 showed that there is a fairly strong 
correlation between FDI per capita and the average EBRD transition indicator with an R squared of 
0.48.134 Furthermore, by 2001, the EBRD expected FDI to flow to countries with the most 
comprehensive reforms. 135 Not only reform does open opportunities for profitable investment, but it 
diminishes risk, thus encouraging further investors. On the other hand, Buch et al. argue that at this 
stage future reforms in the candidate countries need to have substantial signalling effects in order to 
yield effects on FDI. 136 These findings have been the basis for the present study which assesses inter 
alia the impact of institutional reforms on FDI, thus enriching the debate in the literature. 
A different strand of literature which constitutes the basis for this study investigates the impact of 
supranational trade agreements on FDI. Studies by Baldwin, Barrel and Pain or Balasubramanyam et al 
conclude that membership of supranational agreements enhances FDL137 In particular, several studies 
have analysed the impact of European economic integration on foreign direct investment from outside 
and inside the EEC. Research by Scaperlanda and Balough has provided the strongest empirical 
support so far for the hypothesis that the changes occurred in the 1960s in the location of foreign direct 
investment have been deeply influenced by the formation of the European Community. 138 Moreover, 
Franko and later Pelkmans argued that during the transitional period towards the customs union, the 
EEC has seen clear shifts in the locational patterns of the subsidiaries of transnational enterprises of 
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EEC parentage. 139 Additionally, a study by Molle and Morsink concluded that there is evidence of a 
positive association between trade intensity, which is an indicator of the degree of economic 
integration, and infra-EC flows of FDI during the period 1975-1983.140 Dunning also showed that 
during the period 1958-1985 there was a sizeable increase in inta-EEC FDI. He further showed that 
both extra and infra foreign direct investment was further stimulated by the creation of the Single 
Market within the EEC. 141 The positive effect of the creation of the Single Market on foreign direct 
investment from outside the EU was also confirmed by work by UNCTAD, Balasubramanyam and 
Greenway and Aristotelous and Fountas. 142 Finally, a study by Barrel and Pain asserted that there is 
clear evidence that the Single Market Programme has raised the level of infra-EU foreign direct 
investment significantly, with investment rising more sharply than one might have otherwise expected 
in those sectors that previously had the highest barriers to cross-border market entry. '43 
More recent studies have also shown evidence of correlation between FDI and EU membership, at least 
for poor entrants. O'Farrel showed that the Irish Republic had received a considerable boost in FDI 
from joining the EEC. " Martin and Velasquez confirmed the positive impact that accession to the EU 
had on attracting investment in Spain. 145 The boost to investment in Spain as a result of accession was 
also documented by Vinals et al and by Ortega et al. 146 For Portugal and Spain, Braga de Macedo and 
Torres specifically demonstrate the decline in country risk premium following accession. 147 Finally, 
previous enlargements have increased FDI in the new member countries, both before and in the 
aftermath of joining the EU. 148 
However, the role of the prospect of EU membership in attracting foreign direct investment in the 
CEECs has been investigated only by a few studies. Buch et al. argued that during the process of 
enlargement, capital account liberalisation and other elements of economic integration should 
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contribute to higher investment into the candidate countries. 149 Baldwin anticipated in the early years 
of transition that FDI would increase at least in the CEECs that were likely to join the EU soon. He 
argued that early prospects of EU membership gave the investors some idea of the direction in which 
transition was going. 150 Investors also anticipated gains from EU membership. Finally, Bevan and 
Estrin suggested that third parties might invest in the candidate countries which form free trade areas 
with the EU to avoid tariffs on export. They also believed that enhanced growth and trade from 
economies of scale of integration provided a demand stimulant to FDI. 151 Their empirical results 
showed that some stages of the enlargement process impacted directly on FDI in the candidate 
countries and not through the risk perception of the country. 13' However, not all stages and elements of 
the accession process have been codified and used in previous empirical work, leaving a gap in the 
literature that this study aims to fill in chapter seven. Furthermore, the role of security factors on 
enhancing FDI has not been investigated and will be addressed in chapters five and seven. 
Studies of foreign direct investment impact in the host economies 
Considerable research has dealt with the impact of foreign direct investment on developed and 
developing countries and has constituted the basis for assessing the role of FDI in transition economies. 
A basic distinction between studies of FDI impact is between analysis at macroeconomic and at 
microeconomic level. As the present study deals with the effects of FDI at microeconomic level, only a 
brief reference will be made to the studies of FDI's impact at macroeconomic level. 
At macroeconomic level, the main focus has been on the FDI impact on growth and on trade. 
Blomström et at and Balasubramanyam et at have given evidence that FDI has raised the growth rate of 
many developing countries. 153 Borensztein et al also fond a positive impact of FDI on the growth of 
transition countries. 154 Furthermore, research conducted by 0' Sullivan on Ireland, Cabral on Portugal 
and Blake and Pain on the UK has shown that FDI enhances exports. 155 In the transition literature, 
Markusen and Repkine and Walsh found a strong relation between trade and foreign investment. They 
highlighted the reorientation of trade in the CEECs towards the EU which is their major source of 
19 Buch et al, "Financial Flows to Transitional Economies into an Integrated Europe", p. 90. 150 Baldwin et al, "Institution Building and the Integration of Eastern Europe", p. 139. 151 Bevan and Estrin, "The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Transition Economies", p. 6. 
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FDI. 156 FDI is thus seen as an avenue of CEECs' integration into the world economy and into the 
EU. 157 
A second strand of the FDI literature assesses the FDI impact at microeconomic level. In a study on 
developed countries, Barrel and Pain argued that foreign investors had higher propensity to undertake 
research and development (R&D) than domestic companies and hence they had higher productivity. 
158 
These results were confirmed by Hunya, Bornstein, Carlin et al, Barrel and Holland who suggested that 
FDI brings R&D, technology, management and skills in the CEECs. 159 The positive relationship 
between FDI and enterprise restructuring has also been shown in studies by the EBRD, Konings and 
Lizal and Svenjar. 160 However, the findings of some empirical studies on the FDI impact in transition 
are subject to certain criticisms. Thus, Hunya found that foreign direct investment enterprises 
had 
higher endowments of capital and higher labour productivity than domestic firms, suggesting the use of 
more recent technology. However, he could not rule out the possibility that this was related to FDI 
being concentrated in capital intensive industries. 161 Furthermore, Djankov and Hoeman found that FDI 
tends to flow to firms of above average size, initial profitability and initial labour productivity. These 
findings suggested that observed productivity improvements in the Czech Republic depend on the 
initial conditions of the firms, rather than on the transfer of new technologies and knowledge from 
investors or partner firms. 162 Furthermore, a study by Holland and Pain suggested that the FDI impact 
on total labour productivity in selected transition countries is due to more than just the initial 
conditions of the firms. 163 
The present study also acknowledges that FDI is responsible for several negative effects on the host 
country. Some of these have been identified by the literature as follows: the possibility of conflicting 
156 Markusen, J., "Trade versus Investment Liberalisation", NBER Working Paper No. 6231; Repkine, A. and 
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aims between investors and the host country; ' the lack of competitiveness of input and output 
markets, often induced by regulations within the host country; 165 the danger of over-dependency on 
FDI; 166 macroeconomic imbalances, including balance of payments and current account deficits. 167 
However, an in depth discussion of the negative effects of FDI on the host country is beyond the scope 
of this study. Overall, FDI is seen as a crucial factor for regional development and convergence of the 
CEECs with Western standards of living. 168 FDI complements domestic investment which has been 
extremely low as compared to the needs of privatisation. 169 Through its package of attributes it can 
contribute to forming market-oriented institutions and behaviour. 10 However, this impact has not yet 
been analysed by empirical research and the present study aims to fill in this gap in the literature. The 
studies reviewed in this section constitute the basis for assessing comparatively the evidence of FDI 
determinants and impact in Poland and Romania so far in chapters five and seven. 
3.1.3 Theorising on economic transition 
Since the fall of Communism in 1989 research has attempted to analyse and explain the evolution of 
economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe. There has been a vivid discussion over the nature 
of transition, whether there is a triple or a quadruple one. "' Bunce even questioned whether the CEECs 
face variations of the same process, i. e. democratisation, or totally different processes, i. e. 
democratisation v. post-communism. 'n However, up to the present there is no elaborated theory of 
transition to a market economy. 173 Furthermore, as in the early 1990s economic transition was seen as a 
process leading as quickly as possible to a market economy, there was a feeling that no theory of 
transition as such was actually needed. Instead, there was a great need for a policy approach that would 
define the strategies to establish the market in the shortest time possible and with the minimum cost. 14 
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quadruple transition see Kuzio, T., "Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple? ", Politics, Vol. 
21, No. 3,2001, pp. 168-177 and Rigby, T. H. cited in Sakwa, R., Posicommunism, Open University Press, 
Buckingham, 1999, p. 39. 
172 Bunce, V., "Should Transitologists Be Grounded? ", Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No. 1,1995, p. 1 19. 13Lavigne, M., The Economics of Transition from Socialism to Market Economy, MacMillan Press, 
London, 1995; Bal, A., "Träsäturi generale ale procesului de tranzilie la economia de pialä in trrle foste 
comuniste" in Popa, I. (co-ord. ), Tranziiie si reformä, Editura Economicä, 2001. 
174 Lavigne, The Economics of Transition, p. 249 
38 
As a result, the debate focused on the speed and sequencing of such policies. 
15 Furthermore, many 
studies have tried to account for what went wrong in transition in different countries. Thus, failures and 
delays in transition were attributed generally to a combination of factors as follows: the legacies of the 
past, a wrong evaluation of the reality due to imperfect statistics, the external constraint, technical 
errors in policies and finally, the inadequate assistance of the West. 
16 This research constitutes the 
inspiration for the matrix of determinants of transition used in this study in order to identify the factors 
that led to different paths of transition and hence on different paths in the quest for EU membership by 
Poland and Romania. 
Two main approaches to implementing economic transition emerged from this policy approach 
analysis. On the one hand, the neo-liberal or radical approach was proposed by economic advisors 
within the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. On the other hand, a more gradual, 
transformatory view, was suggested by authors such as Hausner at al, Kovacs, Grabher and Stark, Offe 
and Amin and Hausner. 1 These two strands of literature are the pillars of the debate on transition and 
will be briefly reviewed below. However, some analysts argue that, given the complex nature of 
transition and the time consuming nature of some processes compared with others, the debate between 
gradualists and proponents of shock therapy has been a waste of time and energy. 
"' Furthermore, 
practice has shown that a combination of the two approaches is the most likely approach to economic 
transition. 
The neo-liberal approach 
The neo-liberal approach was similar to an economic engineering exercise. It was based on the view 
that capitalism could be designed for the CEECs and imposed by flat. 19 It contended that the 
institutions, regulations, practices and habits associated with market economy would emerge naturally 
and quite rapidly, once the power of capital was unleashed. 18' Through this emphasis on the power and 
175 For a comprehensive overview see Balcerowicz, L., "Common Fallacies in the Debate on the Economic 
Transition in Central and Eastern Europe", EBRD Working Paper No. 11, EBRD, London, 1993; Bal, 
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own life of institutions, this approach is related with the neo-liberal institutional approach in political 
science. It was also known as the Washington Consensus, a term coined by Williamson to describe the 
policies adopted by a number of Latin American countries in the mid 1980s with the support of the 
international financial organisations. "' Friedman, Sachs and Lipton, the main proponents of this view, 
suggested a shock therapy economic programme that would include: 
a) rapid price liberalisation in order to eliminate the excessive monetary base and to internalise the 
international prices; 
b) rapid foreign trade liberalisation; 
c) substantial devaluation of the national currency and internal convertibility in order to control 
inflation and stimulate exports; 
d) hard budget constraints, including the eradication of subsidies; 
e) rapid privatisation; 
f) substantial external financing in order to cover some of the anticipated economic and social 
costs. 182 
The neo-liberal view was relatively popular amongst academics and politicians and contributed to the 
credibility of the Polish reforms at the beginning of transition. However, this approach displayed 
several important limitations. Thus, the legacy of the past and its potential impact on the success of any 
policies was largely ignored. The importance of adequate communication with the public in order to 
ensure its support for economic reforms was also underestimated. Furthermore, the technicist view of 
market institutions disregarded their complex social and political nature and the rather lengthy time 
needed for their setting. Finally, the economic and social cost of transition was underestimated greatly 
and so was the public disposition to bear this cost. 183 The shock therapy approach to transition and its 
limitations are relevant to this dissertation for the understanding of the early Polish transition and of the 
post-1996 economic reforms in Romania. The limitations of such an approach make the case for the 
need of a combination of approaches to economic transition as proposed by this study. 
The gradual approach 
The political economy of transition has challenged many of the axioms of neo-liberalism and an 
alternative policy approach to transition has emerged. The gradual or transformatory approach was 
based on the view that transition can only be a gradual process in which the market institutions would 
be introduced progressively or created through the transformation of the old ones. The gradual 
approach contended that the shocks of such a transition would be absorbed smoothly and borne easier 
by the population. This view also assumed the temporary coexistence of elements of both socialist and 
'$' Williamson, J. cited in Sakwa, R Postcommunism, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1999, p. 40 182 cited in Bal, "Träsäturi generale ale procesului de tranzilie", p. 85. 
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market economy. 184 The gradual approach was exposed to certain criticism. Thus, a gradual 
introduction of reforms had the potential to consolidate the position of those opposing them, hence 
further delaying the transformation. Furthermore, by maintaining mechanisms of the former planned 
economy, this approach prolonged the inefficiency of the previous system. Two different strands can 
be identified within the gradual approach to transition to market economy or the transformatory view: 
the institutional (including the evolutionary) stand and the dual standpoint. The main propositions of 
these standpoints and their relevance for the present study will be briefly reviewed below. 
The institutionalists 
Proponents of the institutional standpoint include McKinnon, Stiglitz, Buchanan, Brabandt, R. Boyer 
and Jackson. 185 This strand of literature maintains that institutions are crucial in transition for their 
capacity to regularise conflicting accumulation strategies. 186 This again mirrors the neo-liberal 
approach on political science. By contributing to the setting of the rules of the game, institutions 
facilitate a long term approach to economic reforms. 187 Furthermore, socio-economic change is induced 
by people in negotiation with formal and informal institutions and change is the output of neither 
voluntarist design, nor structural determinism. 188 Transparency is a necessary condition for market 
efficiency and the state is called to intervene in case of market failure. 189 The relevance of this 
approach for the present study resides in its emphasis on the role of the state and the interaction 
between institutions and population, which makes the case for including public support amongst the 
determinants of economic transition in Poland and Romania. 
The evolutionary approach 
Within the institutional approach, the evolutionary theory appears the raise the most controversy 
because of its critics within the capitalist context and because of being wrongly confused with a 
standard gradualist approach 190 This theory maintains that there is no need to destroy previous 
organisations and institutions because these can, in time, adapt to the new market conditions. "' The 
evolutionary theory of transition towards market economy was explained by Murrel in various articles. 
He recommended a 'piecemeal approach to privatisation' and opposed it to radicalism. However, he did 
not criticise the stabilisation part of the radical programmes. Instead, he advocated strict direct controls 
on the non-market sphere, i. e. on state-owned enterprises, in order not to hinder the market response 
184 Bal, "Träsäturi generale ale procesului de tranzitie", p. 85. 
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from the nascent private sector. ' A similar standpoint was also adopted by Kornai. 193 The 
evolutionary approach was subject to certain criticism. Thus, Grosfeld argued that a new institutional 
and organisational order has to be established through a radical step such as privatisation through quick 
divestiture of the state. Only then could an evolutionary process be initiated. 194 Furthermore, this 
approach does not have predictive power regarding the operation of the set market structures or of the 
remaining state-owned enterprises. 195 
The path dependency approach 
A particular strand of the evolutionary approach emphasises the existence of path dependency in 
transition. Stark and Grabber, its most forceful proponents, claimed that future forms of development 
arise out of particular trajectories or paths that have been followed in the past. In the case of transition 
economies, legacies of communism are a central component of our understanding of the possibilities 
and limitations of transition. ' Furthermore, referring to Schumpeter, Stark argued that the innovation 
that takes place in transition at organisational level is based on a recombination and rearrangement of 
the existent institutional elements. "' Additionally, Smith and Swain maintained that an understanding 
of the diversity of local responses to transition must arise from the way in which previous sets of social 
relations in place are reworked within the limits of these relations. '" However, some studies suggested 
that path dependency constraints, but does not exclude strategic choice. Thus, change is not only path 
dependent but also path shaping. 199 Overall, the approach is related to the path dependency approach in 
political science proposed by Pierson. The path dependency and path shaping approach is adopted by 
the present study. This assumes that Romania and Poland's evolution in transition so far has been to a 
large extent path dependent but that there is a large potential of a path shaping evolution as will be 
discussed in chapter seven. 
The dual (mixed) approach to transition to a market economy 
Proponents of this approach such as Chavance, Kornai, Nuti or N. N. Constantinescu assume that the 
creation of market economy is a gradual process during which elements of the previous socialist 
economic and political system coexist with the newly created market institutions. This results in the 
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creation of a mixed economy. 200 The main difficulty is that the state maintains a significant role, 
sometimes unwanted. Although there is room for state desertion through the spontaneous privatisation 
of the state owned enterprises, the proponents of this approach do not offer a clear solution to how a 
mixed economy should be managed. Most of the proposals refer to the state as managing gradual 
bankruptcies, financial restructuring and solving the problem of bad debts. 201 Wijnbergen, for example, 
also suggests that the state organises training programmes, credits restructuring plans, finances public 
infrastructure investment and supports selectively different regions. 202 
This approach to transition has faced some important criticism. Thus, Chavance advances a 'grey 
scenario' in which a rather inert state sector leads to stagnant production, low modernisation and 
continuous disinvestment. As the government avoids bankruptcies for fear of social explosion, the 
private sector is burdened by the existence of public sector which crowds it out. Social expenditures 
decrease, except for unemployment benefits, while investment is low and deterred by high taxes. All in 
all, international competitiveness in the CEECs is weakened. 203 
Despite criticisms of the dual approach to transition to a market economy, an increasing number of 
authors have been calling for an increased role of the state in administering the transition. 204 After all, 
Chavance himself suggests a 'rosy scenario' of a mixed economy in which the state would have an 
active industrial and agricultural policy, a voluntarist employment and regional policy. The state 
should also actively deal with the remaining state sector. 205 This latter positive scenario of an active 
role of the state in managing transition is the basis for the assessment of the determinants of economic 
transition in Romania and Poland conducted in chapter four and in assessing the determinants of FDI in 
chapter five. 
2.2 Combining the theoretical tools: the theoretical framework of the dissertation 
The main argument of this dissertation is that performance in the EU accession process is a result of 
the interaction between a political and an economic set of determinants. Each set of determinants, be it 
in the political or economic sphere, has the potential to constitute a vicious or a virtuous circle. 
Furthermore, each of these circles is self reinforcing and can reinforce the one in the political sphere. 
Finally, political and economic elements of the circles considered here can constitute security concerns 
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for each of the two countries analysed, as suggested in diagram IA. Until 1997, Romania seems to 
have been trapped in vicious circles in both political and economic spheres, while Poland appears to 
have enjoyed a combination of two virtuous circles since 1993. The way these two circles work and 
interact was described in chapter one and in diagram IA. 
In order to suggest ways to break the two vicious circles, this study draws on insights from different 
theories and strands of literature as reviewed in the previous section. First, in chapter three the 
recognition of the role of security factors in enlarging the EU is based on neo-realist, neo- 
institutionalist and constructivist accounts of European integration, as well as on the Copenhagen 
school. Neo-realist balance of power arguments are called upon to justify the will of the EU to enlarge 
to the east and the support Germany has given to Poland in its quest for EU membership. These 
arguments are included in chapter six when discussing the security concerns. Self (national) interest 
and the fear of new spheres of influence are invoked to partially explain Romania and Poland's drive 
for EU membership. Neo-institutionalist insights are used to explain the importance of compliance 
with the Copenhagen criteria as a condition of accession to the EU. Membership of the organisation 
entails the consolidation of certain common values as a basis for avoiding future conflicts. Hence the 
Copenhagen criteria had the merit of synthesising these values and subjecting compliance with them to 
monitoring. In diagram 1A they are represented by transition to a market economy and/or economic 
reforms. The launch of the accession negotiations with Romania and other remaining candidates in the 
aftermath of the Kosovo crisis is explained through the lenses of Constructivism and of the 
Copenhagen school. In chapter six it is argued that by calling Romania a negotiating country rather 
than a second track candidate, the EU has diminished the security concerns with regard to Romania, 
thus de-securitising it, according to the Copenhagen school terminology. Furthermore, the decision 
taken at the Helsinki European Council can be interpreted as recognition that Europe as a whole 
represents a security complex- in the words of the Copenhagen school- and hence the security of each 
country is relevant to the security of the continent as a whole. The bi-directional relationship between 
prospects of EU membership and the security concerns in the political and economic spheres is 
presented in diagram IA. 
Second, the EU enlargement towards the East can be explained based on economic and political 
economy arguments. Drawing on the neo-classical theory of economic integration, Romania and 
Poland's accession to the EU can be justified through expectations of allocation, accumulation and 
growth effects for both the EU and the two candidate countries considered. The theories of free trade 
areas and of a single market are called upon to explain the welfare gains of the enlargement, including 
the investment opportunities in the CEECs and the role of FDI in enhancing economic integration. The 
assumption that EU membership will enhance FDI in Poland and Romania draws on previous research 
on the impact of the EEC and of its previous enlargements on FDI. Furthermore, this study adopts the 
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argument that prospects of EU membership have a risk premium effect on the candidate countries, thus 
enhancing foreign investment by diminishing the security concerns, as in diagram 1A. Finally, this 
study assumes the existence of a bi-directional relationship between formal (institutional or political) 
integration and economic integration, drawing on Balassa. ' 
Third, this study also draws on Baldwin's domino theory of regionalism in maintaining that for the 
candidate countries the drive for EU membership stems partially from the costs of being excluded from 
the EU. This is especially relevant for Romania, whose membership was postponed. This study adopts 
a similar negative motivation for EU membership which maintains that for the EU itself the costs of 
excluding some CEECs are higher than the costs of inclusion. In particular, the hypothesis of a vicious 
economic circle with potential negative effects on European security in the absence of firm prospects 
of EU membership stems from this negative motivation approach to the EU membership. 
Throughout this study the analysis is conducted with reference to both the economic and political 
spheres. The interaction between politics and economics derives from studies of European integration 
and economic transition which acknowledge the relevance of political factors to the economic 
transformation of the CEECs. Drawing on the evolutionary approach to transition to a market 
economy, this study argues that there has been a strong element of path dependency in the economic 
transition so far, but that there is also a potential for a path shaping evolution. In particular, in chapter 
four, this study rejects the claim that policies are exogenous and suggests that the initial conditions had 
a strong impact on the choice of policies at the beginning of transition and hence on the path of 
economic transition. Furthermore, the assessment of the initial conditions themselves has to include 
both political and economic factors in order to capture the real magnitude of their impact. This study 
also proposes that the governments' choice of policies was affected by the internal and international 
support available as well as impeded upon them, as in diagram 1A. Drawing on both the nco-liberal 
and gradual approach to transition, the present research maintains that transition entails a mix of the 
gradual and shock therapy types of measures, according to the nature and timing of economic reforms. 
The emphasis on privatisation as a crucial element of transition to a market economy stems from the 
institutionalist approach and raises the question of the role of capital and hence FDI in economic 
transition as discussed in chapters four and five. 
The discussion of the role and impact of FDI in Poland and Romania in chapters five and seven draws 
on theoretical and empirical studies on FDI in developing and especially in transition economies. In 
particular, this study enriches the OLI paradigm by assessing the importance of institutional reforms, 
security factors and prospects of EU membership as a part of the locational factors that determine the 
decision to invest in a certain country. The assessment of the role of macroeconomic stability and of 
2 Balassa"The Theory of Economic Integration: An introduction", p. 175 
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fiscal and financial incentives in attracting FDI draws on locational factors, as suggested by the OLI 
paradigm of FDI determinants and on surveys of foreign investors. This research also contributes to the 
study of FDI impact at microeconomic level and enhances the discussion by assessing the effects of 
FDI on: a 'better life', hence internal political stability, transition to a market economy, integration into 
the EU and finally on attracting further foreign investment. In particular, this study emphasises the bi- 
directional relationships between FDI and institutional economic reform, FDI and internal stability, 
FDI and economic integration with the EU. These bi-directional relationships are part of the economic 
circle identified by this study. They also connect the economic circle with the political one through the 
impact on a better life and security concerns and indirectly on support for further reforms as suggested 
by diagram IA. In chapter seven location theory arguments are used to test the potential for path 
dependency in attracting FDI. Furthermore, the econometric model investigates the bi-directional 
relationship between FDI and institutional reforms in the CEECs, drawing on neo-institutionalist 
views. 
Finally, in chapter six this study draws on the Copenhagen school of security in order to analyse the 
complex nature of security concerns in Poland and Romania in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. It internalises the proposition that security entails several sectors, including a political and an 
economic one. Unlike the Copenhagen school, the present study emphasises the role of economic 
security amongst the five sectors proposed by Buzan et al. It also suggests that external and internal 
security concerns reinforce each other and that in the case of both Poland and especially Romania 
external security guarantees are crucial for the consolidation of internal security. EU offers such 
security guarantees not necessarily in the military sector as NATO does, but especially in the political 
and economic sector, hence EU has the potential to ensure a virtuous economic circle and a virtuous 
political one as shown in diagram 1A. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE QUEST FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
3.1 Part One: The quest for EU membership from an institutional perspective 
Chapter two has presented a brief literature review and the theoretical framework of the study. This 
chapter aims to identify the main factors that have influenced Poland and Romania's different 
progress during their quests for EU membership. Explanations are sought in both the political and 
economic spheres and in the realm of security concerns. The economic and security factors 
identified will be analysed in more depth in subsequent chapters. The progress towards EU 
membership is analysed firstly from an institutional perspective and then from an economic point 
of view. The chapter also seeks to give evidence of how the institutional framework has impacted 
on economic integration, thus identifying ways in which the political circle and the economic circle 
of determinants of the EU enlargement influence each other, as in diagram 3A(a). 
The present part deals with the institutional side of the quest for EU membership and is organised 
as follows. It first presents the theoretical framework of the chapter. It then makes a brief overview 
of the way the different questions regarding the enlargement process were answered to. Later it 
analyses the political determinants of the enlargement process. This chapter then continues with an 
assessment of the trade off between economic and security factors during the progress towards new 
stages of institutional integration with the EU. These factors are represented in diagram 3A(b). The 
analysis of the security concerns and their relationship with the accession process will be deepened 
in chapter six. The factors that have led to a certain path in transition will be discussed in chapter 
four. The first part of the present chapter ends with a brief account of the state of play in the 
accession process regarding the implementation of the acquis communautaire, the state of 
negotiations and compliance with the Copenhagen criteria by the time of the Copenhagen 
European Council of December 2002. An account of the way the accession process has answered 
the questions 'who'?, 'how'?, 'when'? is given earlier in the chapter. 
3.1.1 The theoretical framework of the chapter 
This chapter is based on the understanding that institutional and economic integration with the 
European Union have reinforced each other during the process of the EU enlargement. 
Furthermore, different stages in the institutional integration with the EU have been determined by 
factors of economic, political and security nature. The question to be investigated is what factors 
have affected Poland and Romania's quests for EU membership. In the political sphere, three main 
factors have been identified: the EU's attitude towards each candidate country considered here, also 
known as international support; each government's attitude towards accession and finally, the 
public support for EU membership. They are represented in diagram 3A. The last two factors 
represent each country's attitude towards EU membership and will be analysed under the same 
heading. In the economic sphere, the main factor identified is compliance with the Copenhagen 
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criteria in terms of transition to a market economy. This appears to be a crucial component, 
especially in the case of a 'wealthy' rather than 'healthy' approach to enlargement. ' The chapter 
discusses the role of the progress in meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria in accelerating the 
accession process and sets the stage for the analysis of the determinants of economic transition in 
chapter four. Drawing on political theories on European integration, the chapter also assumes that 
progress in the institutional integration between Poland and Romania on the one hand and the EU 
on the other was determined greatly by security factors. Security refers here not to military threats, 
but mainly to threats of economic and political nature resulting from the complex process of 
transition to democracy and a market economy. It also comprises an internal and an external 
dimension which are interconnected. The chapter draws attention to the role of security concerns 
during the present enlargement process and sets the stage for a detailed analysis of these concerns 
and their interplay with EU membership in chapter six. 
The second part of the chapter draws on economic integration theory as presented in chapter two. It 
seeks evidence of impact of the institutional framework on economic integration between Poland 
and Romania on the one hand and the EU on the other in terms of product markets and factor 
markets. Product integration corresponds to the present stage of integration between the EU and 
the candidate countries, i. e. a free (albeit imperfect) trade area. Factor markets integration 
corresponds to the stage of a common market which includes the four freedoms of movement and 
which will be achieved by the candidate member states upon full membership. However, the 
increasing level of FDI in the CEECs suggests that progress has been made in factor markets 
integration ahead of adherence to the common market. Hence, the assessment of factor integration 
and the assumption that integration in the economic sphere has the potential to enhance institutional 
integration. It is assumed that this bi-directional relationship is part of the interplay between the 
political and the economic sphere of the determinants of the EU enlargement, as in diagram 3A(a). 
An analysis of integration in terms of policies is beyond the scope of this study for reasons given 
in chapter two. Nevertheless, the study acknowledges that several steps have already been made in 
this direction, through the adoption and implementation of the acquis communautaire, the setting 
up of the accession partnerships and of joint institutions and through the efforts to meet the criteria 
for membership of the economic and monetary union upon accession. 
Finally, this study supposes that trade and investment may enhance economic reforms and thus 
speed up transition to a market economy and institutional integration with the EU. Economic 
integration, FDI and transition to a market economy create the circle of economic determinants of 
the enlargement process as in the diagram 3A(c). The interaction with the political circle of the EU 
enlargement determinants appears to be ensured by the bi-directional relationships between 
' A'wealthy' approach to enlargement emphasises the need for strict compliance with the Copenhagen 
criteria whereas a'healthy' approach to the enlargement process points towards the security motives of 
integration. For further discussion, see the following section. 
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economic and institutional integration, by security concerns which refer to both the economic and 
political sphere and by the impact of political factors on both transition and FDI. The latter two 
relationships are analysed in chapters four and five. 
Diagram 3A2 
Vicious and virtuous circles in the quest for EU membership 
ý. 2(+,.. ) 
Domestic 













The economic sphere 
a) Arrows 6 and 7' indicate bi-directional relationship between institutional and economic integration with 
the EU. 
b)Arrows 1 and 5 indicate the security and economic factors that have determined the enlargement process. 
c)Arrows 6(+), 7(+), 8(+), 5(+) indicate a virtuous circle in the economic sphere induced by the prospect of 
EU membership and its effects on economic integration with the EU. 
d)Arrows 1'(+), 2(+) and 3(+) indicate a virtuous circle in the political sphere induced by a favourable 









relationships that are addressed in chapter three 
relationships that are addressed in other chapters 
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3.1.2. The questions of enlargement: 'who'?, 'how'?, 'when'? 
The main questions that the European Union had to answer regarding the Eastern enlargement 
process were 'who', 'how' and 'when' and the answers came gradually. Thus, the signing of the 
association agreements gave partially the answer to the question 'who' by designating ten Central 
and Eastern European countries alongside Malta and Cyprus, while the Copenhagen European 
Council of June 1993 restricted the number of 'who' to those who met certain political and 
economic criteria. These criteria referred to the democratisation process, marketisation and the 
capacity to withstand competition within the EU, the adoption and the implementation of the 
acquis communautaire, as well as to the EU's readiness to enlarge. The December 1999 Helsinki 
European Council designated Turkey as a candidate and there is still room for future association 
agreements. By 2002, only twelve countries had started negotiations and thus were seriously 
considered for membership. These developments made some analysts -especially from the most 
advanced candidate countries-consider that there has been a widening of the process of 
enlargement rather than a deepening 4 Moreover, the on going democratisation and economic 
reform in South Eastern Europe led to countries such as Croatia to aspire to membership. At the 
same time, the candidature of Turkey can still be considered a sensitive issue from the EU's 
perspective. Furthermore, despite reassurances given at the Copenhagen European Council, the 
present ten plus two strategy poses certain doubts on the accession of the remaining two countries 
Romania and Bulgaria. This is because target dates have been postponed before and because the 
impact that an enlargement of ten would have on the EU and on its capability and will to enlarge is 
still uncertain. 
The question 'how' had a few answers from different perspectives. First, the cost of enlargement 
was initially estimated in the Agenda 2000 and then re-assessed at the Berlin Council. Second, the 
'differentiation' approach was adopted initially through the 1997 Avis. Then, an 'all inclusive' 
approach was promoted at Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, followed by the 
launch of accession negotiations with the remaining 'pre-ins' candidates. Third, the 2000 Nice 
Council has actually suggested a 'ten plus two' approach, designing at the same time an institutional 
framework for a fifteen plus twelve enlarged EU. The question 'how' was also answered with some 
inconsistencies. Contradictions were noted, for example, in the approach towards the accession of 
Poland. A favourite of enlargement, Poland has been strongly supported by Germany and for most 
of the decade the Eastern enlargement without Poland was inconceivable. However, during 1997- 
1999, given the slow down in reforms, the hesitant rhythm of negotiations and the increase of 
unpopularity of EU membership within the Polish public, a first enlargement without Poland 
became for the first time a viable option. Warnings were given to Poland that a first enlargement 
2 This diagram is based on diagram 1A which was presented in chapter one. 3 Phinnemore, D., "The Challenge of EU enlargement: EU and CEE perspectives" in Henderson, K. (ed. ), 
Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, UCL Press, 1999, p. 72 
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without it might be possible, should Poland not make the necessary steps to speed up reform and 
negotiations. 5 Nevertheless, the renewed commitment for EU membership expressed by the Miller 
government regained EU's support for a fist phase of the enlargement that guarantees Poland's 
entry. Poland became again a pivotal country for the next wave of enlargement .6 Verheugen even 
insisted that: 'It is absurd to discuss whether Poland would join the EU or not in a first wave'' At 
the 2002 Copenhagen European Council Poland was invited to join the EU in May 2004. 
Also regarding the question 'how', the discussion on the Eastern enlargement has been increasingly 
focused on not allowing a new division line to be drawn in Europe s Thus, at the Lisbon European 
Council of June 1992 it was announced that it was 'neither possible, nor opportune to establish 
new frontiers of the EU, whose contours will be shaped over many years to come'. 9 In 2001, Prodi, 
the president of the European Commission, underlined that'no new Iron Curtain' will be allowed. 10 
Moreover, the enlargement commissioner Verheugen has increasingly emphasised that there is only 
one enlargement of which Romania is part, but in different phases. " Overall, the approach has 
switched from a 'wealthy' to a 'healthy' enlargement, from pure calculations as in the Opinions to 
taking into consideration security concerns, within 'proper perspectives', as at the Helsinki 
European Council in December 1999.12 The shift in the debate has been also from the cost of the 
enlargement to the opportunities. 13 However, the present approach of ten plus two supports only 
partially this idea of a 'healthy' rather than 'wealthy' enlargement, as Romania, a country in a 
strategic position but implying rather a high cost, is not considered for the first phase. 
The question 'when' waited for answers for long time and at times it seemed that the target date 
kept moving forward. Polish authorities even noted: 'Poland seems to be always five years short of 
accession'. 14 Since the 1993 Copenhagen Council switched the question from 'if to 'when', there 
has been an increased pressure from the candidate countries for a firm date for accession, which 
4 Baläzs, P., "The Globalisation of the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: Symptoms and 
Consequences" in Maresceau, M. (ed. ), Enlarging the European Union. Relations between the EU and 
Central and Eastern Europe, Longman, Harlow, 1997, p. 369. 
5 Eurobserver, 27 June 2001; Central Europe, 8 March 2001. 
6 Preston, C., "Poland and EU Membership: Current Issues and Future" in Gower, J. and Redmond, J. (eds. ), 
Enlarging the European Union. They Way Forward, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000, p. 40. 9 http: //www. delpol. pl, 3 September 2001. 
B Garthon, T. Ash cited in Burant, S. R., "After NATO R. E. Baldwin et al, "The Costs and Benefits of 
Eastern Enlargement: The Impact on the EU and on Central Europe", Economic Policy, No. 24,1997. 
Enlargement", Problems of Post- Communism, Vol. 48, Issue 2,2001, p. 1. 9 de La Serre, F. and Lequesne, C., "Enlargement to the CEECs: Which Differentiation? ", in Maresceau 
(ed. ), Enlarging the European Union, p. 350. 
10 Eurobserver, 12 March 2001. 
11 Verheugen, G., News, 18 December 2001, http: //www. infoeuropa. ro. 12Saryusz -Wolski, J., "Towards a Single Perspective. Economics and Politics of Eastern Enlargement" in Maresceau (ed. ), Enlarging the European Union, p. 278 13 Gower and Redmond (eds. ), Enlarging the European Union, p. 188 14 Gower and Redmond (eds. ), Enlarging the European union, p. 179 
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was understandable. '5 A firm date was seen as a real commitment from the EU. 16 Although some 
indications were given at the Luxembourg Council in 1997, the question 'when' was answered 
only through the 2000 regular report and was confirmed at the Nice Council in December 2000. 
It was then anticipated that advanced countries could finish accession talks as soon as 2002 and 
thus join in 2004. " Until then it had been considered by the enlargement commissioner 
Verheugen that any unrealistic date would be a backfire and that: 'Nothing would be more 
dangerous than to raise countries' hope only to dash them'. 18 
On the other hand, not fixing a date meant for the candidate countries a lack of commitment. As a 
reassurance, at Nice it was envisaged that the first intake will be welcome in 2004, so that the new 
member states of the EU could take part in the parliamentary elections of the year. No specific 
deadline was advanced for Bulgaria and Romania. Up to then 2000 and 2002 had been promised 
repeatedly to the Polish government as membership dates, but it has been impossible to make this 
happen due to the lack of preparation from both sides. Furthermore, 2002 was rather optimistic, 
given that for previous accessions the negotiations lasted from one year in the case of Austria, 
Finland and Sweden, to seven years in the case of Spain and Portugal. " These hesitations led to 
continuous concerns from the Polish side over'symptoms of a slowdown of the integration process 
in Europe'. In 2000 the Polish authorities even warned that 'delaying Poland's entry beyond 2003 
would diminish Poles' readiness to endure painful market reforms and undermine their wish for 
membership' 2° These warnings underlined the security implications of further delays in accession 
and can be extrapolated to the Romanian case at present. 
Hesitations within the EU still remained regarding a commitment for 2007 as a date for 
accession of Romania and Bulgaria. Despite the enlargement commissioner Verheugen's 
recommendation, the Commission did not adopt 2007 as a target date for enlargement for 
Romania and Bulgaria, in its regular general report in October 2002. The Copenhagen 
Council also failed to provide a date, the Commission limiting itself to recognising that 
Romania has set itself a target date for accession. Lacking a firm commitment from the EU 
side, Romania needs to make sure that Romania meets all the necessary requirements in 
order to join the EU on the set date. This justifies the present study which looks at how 
is Cameron, F., "The European Union and the Challenge of Enlargement", p. 248; J. Rollo, "Economic 
Aspects of EU Enlargement to the East", M. Maresceau (ed. ), p. 253; G. Verheugen, Speeches, 21 
September 2000, http: //www. europa. eu. int 
16 Gower and Redmond (eds. ), Enlarging the European Union, p. 179 17 The Business Central Europe, January 2001 
18 Verheugen, G., "Speeches", 4 September 1999, http: //www. europa. eu. int 19 Cameron, F., "The Challenge of Enlargement: The View from Brussels. The Commission Perspective", p. 
20; Gower, J. and Henderson, K, "Future Perspectives" in Henderson, (cd. ), Back to Europe, p. 13; 
Eurobserver, 28 May 2002 
20 The IPR Strategic Business Information Database, 15 May 2000 
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different factors have affected the European enlargement so far and how they interact at 
present. 
3.1.3 The quest for membership of the European Union: the 'star' and the 'underdog' 
Since the early 1990s Poland and Romania have evolved differently in their quest for EU 
membership, due to both internal and external factors. Poland was part of the 'avant garde' Visegrad 
group who initiated new steps in the accession process, while Romania was part of the 'follow-up' 
group, who responded to external challenges and signals of the EU, avoiding exclusion rather than 
seeking inclusion. 21 Poland was for most of the period a favourite of the EU, a 'star' of the 
enlargement process, while Romania seems to be an underdog, 'stuck between Visegrad and 
22 Minsk'. Poland will join in May 2004 while Romania is likely to join only in 2007. 
The contrast between the present situation of the two countries with regard to the accession into the 
EU might lead to the wrong conclusion that Polish membership of the EU has been a'safe bet' for 
the Union from the beginning. This has not been the case. Poland is the largest and most complex 
of all candidates It is both the biggest opportunity and the biggest headache for the EU. 24 Polish 
membership of the EU poses such challenges to the Union that Preston has concluded that: 
Poland's accession to the EU 'tests EU's methodology of enlargement'. Poland is the most 
populous country with an important impact on the labour market and on the structural and cohesion 
funds. Its location is of traditional geopolitical sensitivity. It has a large agricultural sector and its 
industry has needed serious restructuring. 26 Nevertheless, the advocates of Polish membership of 
the EU have managed to turn some of these disadvantages into opportunities for the EU. Thus, the 
large population means a large market for EU products and increased investment opportunities. Its 
geographical position makes Poland a land in between Germany and Eastern Europe. Studies show 
that the threat of the agriculture and sensitive industries is less serious than it has been anticipated. 
The fear of massive immigration from the East rising from Poland's proximity to Ukraine has also 
been diluted as a result of strong border controls. 27 Overall, Polish EU membership seems to 
benefit not only Poland, but also the EU by increasing its size and weight in international affairs, 
stretching its boundaries towards east and offering new business opportunities. Poland brings a 
21 Baldzs, P., "The Globalisation of the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: Symptoms and 
Consequences" in Maresceau (ed. ), Enlarging the European Union, p. 359; Phinnemore, D., "Stuck in the 
'Grey Zone'? Fears and Frustrations in Romania's Quest for EU Membership", Paper Presented at a UACES 
Conference, April 2000. 
22 Verheijen, T., "The EU and Romania and Bulgaria: Stuck between Visegrad and Minsk" in Redmond, J. 
(ed. ), Prospective Europeans, Harvester, London, 1994, p. 151. 23 Grabbe, H. and Hughes, K, "Central and Eastern European Views on EU Enlargement: Political Debates 
and Public Opinion" in Henderson (ed. ), Back to Europe, p. 193. 24 The Financial Times, 10 January 2002, p. 18. 25 Preston, "Poland and EU Membership", p. 40. 26 Preston, "Poland and EU Membership", p. 40; The Financial Times, 10 January 2002, p. 18; The Economist, 13 January 200. 
27 Wolczuk, K. and Wolczuk, R., "Poland's Relations with Ukraine: A Challenging 'Strategic Partnership'" in 
Smith, J. and Jenkins, C. (eds. ), Through the Paper Curtain. Insiders and Outsiders in the New Europe, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2003. 
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large national and regional market, relatively skilled labour and raw materials. It offers a buffer 
zone for Germany and the Union, can enhance stability in the area and acts as 'gateway' to the 
Fast. 8 
On the other hand, Romania's generally poor economic performance has enhanced the potential 
costs for EU, as compared to the potential benefits. Romania has the lowest GDP per capita of the 
candidates, a relatively low level of restructuring and privatization which have placed it amongst 
the least favourites for EU enlargement. Furthermore, Romania's accession will lead to several 
costs for the EU, including the reallocation of the structural and cohesion funds from previous 
beneficiaries to Romania, the increase of the unemployment rate within the EU overall and 
increased costs under the Common Agricultural policy. 29 Despite these costs, Romania offers large 
trade and investment opportunities, access to a large national and regional market, cheap but 
relatively skilled labour, raw materials, access to commercial roots through the Black Sea and a 
strategic position at the cross roads between Central Europe and the Balkans. This is why Romania 
represents an asset for the EU. 
Poland's quest for integration into the European Union: the story of a 'star' 
EU's attitude towards Poland's accession to the EU 
EU's attitude towards Poland was very important for Poland's path in the accession process. It has 
changed from very supportive to demanding, even threatening, and back to supportive. Poland's 
perception within the EU also changed from the 'prodigy' of the East to the 'problem kid' who needs 
special attention and support 30 At times, EU's commitment towards Poland went so far as not to 
conceive any further steps towards integration without Poland being amongst the first to become 
members, regardless of its poor readiness and the better performances of other candidates. Other 
times, Poland was almost warned that it would not be amongst the first CEECs to become members 
of the EU, unless real progress in negotiations, in restructuring of the agriculture and of the 
sensitive industries took place. 31 However, by 2001 Poland was again considered a sine qua non 
condition of the enlargement process, a pivotal country of the process32 Despite ranking tenth 
among the candidate countries in terms of negotiations progress, implementation of the aquis 
communautaire and progress in economic reforms, at the 2002 Copenhagen European Council, 
Poland was invited to join the EU in May 2004. 
Why all this support for Poland? Leaving aside the benefits presented before, the large expatriate 
communities have contributed to an increased international awareness regarding the Polish political 
28 Cimoszewicz, W ., "Speech at the 9th Session of the Intergovernmental Conference of Accession of Poland 
to the European Union", Luxembourg, 10 June 2002. 
hup: //home. btcliclccom/polishembassy/wcimoszewicz160602. htm. 
29 Päun, L. et al, "A adera sau a nu adera? Un dialog cu doi actori: Uniunea Europeanä $i Romania", Paper 
Prepared for the Soros Foundation for an Open Society, Bucharest, 2000, pp. 397-394. 30 Eurobserver, 5 April 2001. 
31 Central Europe, 8 March 2001. 
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and economic transition. Second, the support must have been strongly embedded in the events of 
1980s, when the Solidarity Movement challenged communist rule and the system, attracting the 
sympathy of the international community. It would be also easy to trace the roots of Western 
support for Poland even earlier, in the tragic events of World War Two 33 Then, Poland was a 
victim of the Nazi occupation, despite the previous guarantees of protection given by France and 
Great Britain. It was partially this sense of guilt and the will to compensate Poland for its past 
sufferings that gave Poland a competitive advantage in comparison with the other CEECs looking 
for establishing relations with the EU. Fourth, the strategic geographical position bordering 
Germany made its case of EU membership more important as well34 Poland's most committed 
supporter for EU membership has been Germany who needed a buffer zone to the East. This issue 
will be addressed in more detail in chapter six. 
However, much of the EU's support was a reaction to Polish demands or developments, rather than 
an own initiative of the Union. For example, the Phare programme was designed to offer financial 
support to Poland and Hungary as recognition of their efforts to reform their economies before 
1989. The idea originated before the fall of the Berlin Wall and therefore Phare was an important 
political means to acknowledge the break up of the two countries with the Soviet Block. Poland 
was not only the first to be offered financial assistance- which was later extended to other CEECs- 
but was also amongst the first ex-communist countries to sign an association agreement with the 
EU and to mention membership of the EU as its goal. Ever since, Poland has constantly pushed for 
a firm date for accession. A firm date was seen by the Polish authorities as a guarantee of the EU's 
commitment and its pressure influenced greatly the EU's attitude towards Poland. 
On the other hand, there are not only net supporters of Poland with the EU. Some EU members feel 
threatened by Poland joining the Union. Austria and Germany feared the impact on their labour 
markets and were determined to negotiate protective transition periods for free movement of 
labour. 35 France was protective towards its agriculture and the funds which would be redirected to 
Poland after accession. Furthermore, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland will lose some of the 
cohesion and structural funds as a result of the Polish accession. 36 Despite these potential losers, 
Poland's accession into the EU has been generally recognised as a political imperative for the EU 37 
32 Preston, 'Poland and EU Membership", p. 40; Eurobserver, 12 March 2001. 
33 Europe, November 1996. 
34 Europe, November 1996; Freundstein, R., "Poland, Germany and the EU", International Affairs, Vol. 74, 
Issue 1,1998, p. 2. 
35 The Financial Times, 15 August 2001, p. 3. 36 Eurobserver, 28 May 2001. 
371PR Strategic Business Information Database, 13 November 2001. 
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Poland's attitude towards EUmembershtp 
EU membership has been a Polish foreign policy goal since 1989 which was pursued by all 
governments and with the support of the majority of society. 38 Poland has been at the 'avant garde' 
of the quest for returning to Europe and it actively pursued inclusion in the EU. Poland's approach 
to the EU enlargement evolved from a 'combination of myths, stereotypes, anxieties and hopes' 
towards a pragmatic attitude. Gradually not only the benefits, but also the costs of such a 
perspective were taken into consideration by the political class, interest groups and scholars. More 
specifically, once the negotiations started, the discourse changed from 'romantic declarations' to 
realist ones as trade-offs had to be done 39 As Millard put it: The devil is in details' 40 Furthermore, 
the strong support from the EU gave Poland plenty room for manoeuvre. 41 As a result of the good 
progress of the economic reforms which put Poland in the early years of transition in a position of 
superiority compared to other CEECs, Poland assumed that it would be part of the first phase of the 
enlargement 'no matter what'. 42 The Polish pursuit for European integration was thus generally 
characterised by a certain assertiveness and confidence. 43 A more flexible attitude was adopted 
only by the Miller government, once warnings were given by the EU that, unless Poland made 
enough effort to prepare itself for membership, it might not be considered for the first phase44 
EU membership was seen by the Polish authorities as a guarantee of security, a historical 
reconciliation with Germany, with a strong symbolical importance, and as a guarantee of Poland's 
returning to Europe' 45 However, as a result of its more recent pragmatic approach to enlargement, 
several criticisms appeared. One criticism was directed towards the usefulness of rapid 
implementation of the acquis communautaire. Stawarka argued that there was a risk that too rapid 
implementation of the acquis communautaire as part of the Copenhagen criteria may lead to losing 
momentum of the Polish economy's dynamic growth. 46 In 1998 gelatine, milk, steel restructuring 
and borders were all sources of controversy. 47 Some right wing parties also pointed towards the 
dangers of agricultural decline, cheap imports, cultural and religious influences and the influence of 
Germany. Disagreements also appeared over the free movement of labour, land acquisition, 
special economic zones and state subsidies. 49 Another bone of contention between Poland and the 
38 Preston, 'Poland and EU Membership", p. 53; Borowski, M., "Speech in Front of HM Parliament's Group 
for EU Enlargement", 1 July 2002, http: //home. btclickcom/polishembassy/borowski10702. htm 
39 The Economist, 31 July 1999; The Economist, 13 January 2001. 
40 Millard, F., "Polish Domestic Politics and Accession to the European Union", p. 203; The Warsaw Voice, 
22 November 1998. 
41 Grabbe, H. and Hughes, K., Enlarging the EU Eastwards, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
London, 1998, p. 193. 
42 Preston, "Poland and EU Membership", p. 40. 
43 Grabbe and Hughes, Enlarging the EUEastwards, p. 193. 
44 Preston, "Poland and EU Membership", p. 40. 
45 Grabbe and Hughes, Enlarging the EUEastwards, pp. 189-190; Preston, "Poland and EU Membership", 
40. 
Stawarska, R., "EU Enlargement from the Polish Perspective", Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, 
No. 5, December 1999, p. 822; Millard, "Polish Domestic Politics", p. 208. 47 Grabbe and Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards, p. 193. 48 Grabbe and Hughes, Enlarging the EUEastwards, p. 193. 49 The Warsaw Voice, various numbers; Borowski, "Speech", p. 2. 
56 
EU was the way the Phare funds were spent 50 Finally, there has been a feeling in Poland that the 
EU did not have a clear strategy towards the country and that it 'has given too little and demanded 
too much'. 51 Warsaw complained a lot of 'foot dragging' and hostility from Brussels 52 The Polish 
parliamentary Commission on Europe complained that relations often appeared a 'one way street': 
the EU was demanding very specific changes, while it remained always rather 'enigmatic' on the 
adaptations that the EU itself was ready to make S3 These criticisms were part of the pragmatic 
approach to the EU accession. This intense debate on the prospect of EU membership almost 
threatened to turn the virtuous circle of the political determinants of accession into a vicious one, 
with potential negative effects on the economic sphere as well. The warnings given in 2000 by the 
EU were meant to avoid such a scenario and were followed by the expression of continuos support 
by the Miller government, a positive element of the desired virtuous political circle of determinants 
of accession. 
Overall, Poland remained a 'star' of the accession process for most of the decade as a result of its 
assertive approach to membership and of the the EU's high economic and security interests in 
Poland's accession. The EU's attitude towards Poland, the Polish government's attitude towards 
accession and the public support constituted for almost of the decade a virtuous circle of political 
determinants of enlargement as presented in diagram 3A(d). When there was a danger that the 
political circle would turn into a vicious one as a result of a relaxation of the government policy 
and of a fall in public support, the EU acted as a'stick' and maintained the virtuous circle. 
Romania's quest for integration into the European Union: an 'underdog' or a 'rising star'? 
EU's attitude towards Romania 
The EU's attitude towards Romania evolved from reserved and reluctant to understanding and 
supportive, but still pragmatic. For reasons which will be reviewed below for most of the decade 
the EU seemed not to have a coherent strategy towards Romania. Instead, conjunctural events such 
as the Yugoslav wars or the Kosovo crisis led to changes in the EU's attitude . -54 These changes 
corresponded to the general move from a'wealthy' towards a 'healthy' approach to the enlargement 
process. EU's changes of attitude have had an important impact on the political and economic 
spheres and on the security of each country, as will be discussed in chapter six. 
Several factors can account for the EU's attitude towards Romania. First, the EU initially lacked 
information on Romania, maybe more than on other applicant countries ss Romania's geographical 
50 Grabbe and Hughes, Enlarging the EUEastwards, p. 193. 
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position far from the core countries of the EU and close to the Balkans, the 'powder keg' of Europe, 
further contributed to the initial lack of interest in its membership of the EU. Romania's large 
population and geographical area, large and backward agricultural sector and low GDP per capita 
made it a rather expensive candidate . -56 Slow reforms and early internal political instability also 
contributed to the reluctant attitude of the EU. Being treated as part of a group with Bulgaria, 
Romania was affected negatively by the Bulgarian economic crises in the early 1990s. 57 The wars 
in the former Yugoslavia accentuated the early perceptions of insecurity in the area and in Romania 
as will be discussed in chapter six. Additionally, Romania had insignificant lobby power with the 
members of the EU and lacked a committed supporter inside the EU comparable to what Germany 
has been for Poland. 58 The support given by France based on the shared Latin heritage and 
economic interests has not been able to counteract EU's reluctant attitude towards Romania 
resulting from internal political instability and poor compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. As 
an example, the French foreign affairs minister's proposition at the December 2000 Nice European 
Council to adopt one enlargement of twelve, rather than ten, was rejected as unrealistic by the 
enlargement commissioner Verheugen. 59 Romania was believed not to be able to get ready for 
membership by 2004 and it was argued that the Romanian and Bulgarian authorities themselves 
were not expecting their countries to join the EU in 2004.60 
The EU's approach changed from a reluctant or hesitant to a supportive one, due to the security 
concerns raised in 1999 by the Kosovo crisis. It was feared that, by depriving the candidate 
countries of the prospect of EU membership, instability may spread in South-Eastern Europe, with 
governments and public loosing faith in reforms, democracy and a market economy. The decision 
to open accession negotiations was also prompted by the need to compensate Romania for its 
contribution to the NATO military campaign in Kosovo and for its losses as a result of the embargo 
over Yugoslavia 61 After the Helsinki European Council, the EU's representative in Romania 
declared that: The EU would not spare any human or financial effort to help Romania in the 
European integration process'. 62 Although invited to open negotiations in 2000 as the other five 
remaining candidates, Romania's accession was delayed for pragmatic reasons, i. e. lack of 
compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and insufficient progress in the accession negotiations. At 
present, Romania aims to join the EU in 2007. By the end of 2004 Romania needs to achieve a 
functioning market economy, to adopt and implement the acquis communautaire and to finalise the 
accession negotiations. 2007 is the target date set unilaterally by the Romanian government in 2000 
and acknowledged by the EU at the Copenhagen European Council of 2002. Although the EU 
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seems committed to welcoming Romania in 2007, the rising numbers of applicants for 
membership, previous postponements and the impact of the first phase of enlargement may raise 
fears of further postponements. This is why it is important that Romania is offered support and 
meets all the requirements for membership in 2007. 
Romania's attitude towards the EU 
For the first decade of transition Romania gave mixed messages with regard to its goal of 
integration into the EU 63 Romania had no pro-active approach towards integration into the EU, on 
the contrary, it appeared to be passive, even defensive. ` Romania sought to avoid exclusion rather 
than seek inclusion65 This attitude was largely responsible for its slow progress during the 
accession process. By being a follower rather than an 'avant garde', Romania was placed from the 
beginning amongst the slow candidate countries and faced the danger of path dependency. 
However, since the 1997 Avis, Romania's attitude has evolved from being hesitant to being more 
demanding and assertive, albeit still reactive till 2000. This change of attitude was based on a better 
understanding of the relative importance of economic and security factors in the accession process. 
Furthermore, this more focused outlook on the EU accession process has the potential of ensuring 
membership by the target date of 2007 through its interaction with the political and economic 
determinants of accession. Several factors can be held responsible for Romania's attitude to EU 
membership so far. 
First, at the beginning of transition the political class and the public did not have enough 
understanding of the necessity of European integration. Hence, the early foreign policy was mainly 
oriented towards establishing good relationships with the neighbours, rather than towards actively 
pursuing integration into the EU, as the Visegrad Group did66 These developments proved to be 
useful later for the integration process itself, but they initially slowed down the effort towards 
accession. As the concept of sovereignty remained important for the political elite and the public 
opinion, EU membership was at the beginning seen as the only alternative to the Russian 
influence. 67 As a result, the debate in the media did not address enough the real gains and risks of 
EU membership, delaying the proper understanding of the process 68 
Second, apart from the National Strategy from Snagov in the early 1990s, there was no coherent 
Romanian strategy for European integration until 2000-69 Furthermore, the poor understanding of 
the relationship between integration into NATO and integration into the EU led to the poor success 
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of the 1997 campaign for Euro-Atlantic integration. '0 The hesitant attitude towards EU membership 
was also influenced by the lack of an early coherent strategy for economic development. As a 
result, the Avis published by the European Commission in 1997 stated that Romania was not yet 
ready to start accession negotiations. " The Medium Term Development Strategy drawn up in 2000 
constituted the basis for a more focused approach to European integration, but it originated from 
demands expressed by the EU, and not from Romania's own initiative. n This had, however, the 
potential to ensure a virtuous circle in the economic sphere, with beneficial effects on the prospects 
for EU integration, as will be seen in chapter four. 
Third, Romania relied excessively on the role of external security factors in speeding up its 
accession and neglected the importance of meeting the Copenhagen criteria. As a result, the 
qualification in a new stage of institutional integration was a 'blank cheque' most of the time. This 
was given so that the population would not lose interest and hope and therefore social strife would 
not transform the area in a zone of instability. ' Furthermore, the poor understanding of the 
relationship between economic reforms and European integration led to low enthusiasm for reforms 
and hence slow progress towards EU membership. 74 
However, there are important positive factors which have characterised Romania's quest for 
integration into the EU. First, despite the slow evolution towards membership and the painful 
economic reforms, seventy six percent of the population still supported EU membership in 2002, 
the highest support among the CEECs. 75 Furthermore, European integration is endorsed by all 
political parties, including the nationalistic Greater Romania Party. Third, there has been a constant 
increase in the public awareness of the EU issues through the technical and financial assistance 
offered. Thus, specialists and the political elite have been trained in with a better understanding of 
the process of integration into the EU. Finally, Romania remains a pole of stability in an area that 
has been considered the 'new cock-pit' of Europe at the crossroads between Central Europe, Eastern 
Europe and South Eastern Europe, therefore making it a good asset for the EU. 
All in all, Romania has been considered too big, too far, too poor, too slow in reforms and too 
passive, making it an 'underdog' of the enlargement process. The inconsistent attitude of the EU 
towards Romania had no power in creating a virtuous circle of political determinants, especially as 
the economic sphere was also trapped into a vicious circle. As economic reforms lagged behind, 
only security concerns have been able to increase Romania's prospects for EU integration so far. 
70 Pipidi, A. M., Politica Externä, Societatea Academicä Romänä, Bucure$ti, 1997. 
71 European Commission, "Opinion on Romania's Application for Membership of the European Union", 15 
July 1997. 
72 Pima Financiarä May, 1998, p. 5; Interview with Expert in Romania's Accession into the European 
Union, Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry, Department of European Integration; Interview with Expert in the European Commission Delegation, Bucharest, Romania, May 2000. 73 Interview with Expert in the European Commission Delegation, Bucharest, Romania, May 2000. 74 Interview with Expert in Romania's Accession into the European Union, European Institute, May 2000. 75 Opinion Poll conducted by WAS, 16 July 2002, http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/enlargement/romania 
60 
Thus, the supportive attitude in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis complemented by the 
government's willingness to reform had the potential to turn the vicious political circle into a 
virtuous one, with a positive impact on the economic sphere. This appears to justify Romania's 
claim to be ready to join the EU in 2007 on its own merits and possibly a status of a 'rising star'. 
Can accession on one's own merits be fostered by maintaining prospects of membership through 
considering security factors? This question will be investigated in chapter six. Furthermore, the 
impact of the prospect of EU membership on FDI and hence economic reforms will be assessed 
through the econometric model in chapter seven, in order to see the interaction with the economic 
sphere. 
3.1.4 The quest for EU membership: the interplay between security and economic factors 
This section presents chronologically how the interplay between security and economic factors has 
determined each new stage of the institutional integration of Poland and Romania with the EU. 
The initial conditions are important for signalling a possible path dependency. The 2002 situation 
is sketched in order to identify options for the future. The analysis is conducted for several stages 
corresponding to the main landmarks of the accession process relevant for this project: the 
association agreements, the Avis, the December 1999 Helsinki European Council and the 
December 2002 Copenhagen European Council. 76 
The initial conditions 
Security concerns have had the main impact on how the economic and political relations prior to 
1989 have influenced the post-1989 relations of Poland and Romania with the EU. Thus, in the 
1980s Romania was the only country from the former Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) to have established economic relations with the EU. Romania signed an agreement on 
textiles and steel in 1978 and one on trade in industrial production in 1980.77 These were part of 
Romania's acting as a dissident within the Soviet Bloc. 78 Despite this apparent comparative 
advantage in relations with the EC, human rights violations determined the suspension of these 
agreements in early 1990s 79 Moreover, the political instability in the early 1990s was conducive to 
an improvement in the EU's attitude towards Romania, making it unable to use the comparative 
advantage of prior economic and political relations with the EU S0 
On the other hand, Poland's trade prior to 1989 was heavily dependent on CMEA. Only little trade 
and investment originated from the EC and it was mainly a result of the large Polish expatriate 
76 For a further discussion on the stages of the EU enlargement see Cameron, 'The Challenge of 
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community. However, for reasons presented earlier in the chapter, the late 1980s attracted a large 
interest in Poland's economic and political development. As part of this trend the Phare programme 
was initiated in 1989 to assist financially the economic restructuring of Poland and Hungary 
initially. The signing of EU association agreements followed shortly as a sign of the EC's interest 
in the area. All in all, security factors were responsible for Romania not being able to benefit from 
its prior economic relations with the EU and for Poland's success in attracting Western support for 
transition and for returning to Europe. The openness towards the West as of 1989 seemed to prevail 
and create a potential for path shaping rather than path dependency. 
From the association agreements to the Avis 
The signing of the association agreements had both a symbolical and a practical significance for all 
parties included. The symbolical value went so far as to the Hungarian foreign ministry to admit 
that there was a race for whom out of the Visegrad group would sign the agreement first, even at 
the detriment of quality. It was believed that the association agreements represented a new 
qualitative stage in relations with the EU and that an early start would ensure a positive external 
perception. From an economic point of view, the association agreements were a means to liberalise 
trade with the EU and foster economic co-operation. From a political point of view, they were a 
way to promote political dialogue and co-operation between the CEECs and the EC, as well as to 
enhance the Community's role in ensuring the stability of the continent. 81 
The agreements were a means to acknowledge the achievements of fast reformers like Poland and 
to encourage progress in slow reformers such as Romania. Thus, the association agreement with 
Poland recognised the 'significant achievements of the Polish people in the process of fast 
transition to a new political and economic order based on the rule of law and human rights, 
including the legal and economic framework for market economy and a multiparty system with free 
and democratic elections'. 82 On the other hand, the association agreement with Romania 
acknowledged 'the opportunity for a new relationship offered by the emergence of new democracy 
in Romania' and the 'need to continue and complete, with the assistance of the Community, 
Romania's transition towards a new political and economic system which respects the rule of law 
and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, operates a multi-party 
system with free and democratic elections, and provides for economic liberalisation in order to 
establish a market economy. i83 It was, in fact, the only agreement which included this political 
dimension, showing the problems of the Romanian society. 84 The EU recognised the role of the 
new agreement in 'establishing and enhancing in Europe a system of stability based on co- 
80 Verheijen, "The EU and Romania and Bulgaria", p. 164. s1 European Commission, http: //europa eu. int/comm/enlargemendpasleurope agr. htm s2 European Commission, http: //europa. eu. int/comm/enlargement/pas/europe agr. htm 83 European Commission, http: //europa. eu. intlcomm/enlargemen /pasleurope agr. hhn s4 L. Päun et at "A adera sau a nu adera? ", p. 382 
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operation, with the Community as one of the comerstones'. 85 It further stated 'the Community's 
willingness to provide decisive support for the implementation of reform and to help Romania cope 
with the economic and social consequences of structural readjustment'. 86 These stipulations 
enforced the concern with the economic and political development in Romania and emphasised the 
fact that the association agreement was an expression of trust and support, mostly a political sign. 87 
While Poland was amongst the first CEECs to negotiate and sign an association agreement in 
December 1991, Romania only did so more than one year later, in February 1993. The late start of 
Romania's quest for EU integration can be attributed to several factors, some from the security 
realm: the political instability which characterised Romania in the early 1990s, the Yugoslavian 
and the Macedonian crises, internal problems of the EU over competencies in trade, the fear 
induced by the negotiations with the Visegrad group that the EU would have to give further 
concessions. 88 Given its progress in economic reforms and its assertiveness in its relations with the 
EU, Poland saw the Europe Agreement as a means to 'enshrine' its aim of EU membership. On the 
other hand, Romania perceived the agreement as a means to 'enter the sanctuary of the European 
Community after three years of isolation' and to bring Romania back in 'the new architecture of 
Europe which is constructed from the Community's initiative'. 89 It was considered to provide a 
'better image of Romania's place within Europe and better perspectives' 90 It was a sign that 
Romania 'got out of an interference and unstable area to join a system of alliances set up to 
safeguard democracy and to ensure prosperity of these peoples'. 91 This new step was considered by 
the foreign affairs minister of the time as rather late, but it was also believed that Romania had the 
potential to recuperate this delay. 2 This reception by the Romanian authorities was also a 
recognition of Romania's early economic and political problems which hindered its efforts to 
return to Europe. It equally acknowledged the economic and political benefits of the association 
agreement with the EU. 
The association agreements had not only a symbolical and a political value, but were driven greatly 
by economic motives. They answered the need to exploit the new trade and investment 
opportunities which emerged with the fall of Communism and the dissolution of the CMEA. The 
trade part of the association agreements provided for the establishment of an industrial (imperfect) 
free trade area, the existing agricultural policy preventing liberalisation from fully extending to 
agricultural goods. The trade agreements were constructed on the two main premises of stand still 
and asymmetry in favour of Poland and Romania respectively. The latter meant that the EU would 
lower its customs duties faster, thus allowing faster access to its market. The principle mainly 
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concerned industrial goods and to sensitive products special rules were devised, combining 
quantitative restrictions and varying tariff rates. 93 Although the agreements had certain limitations 
that were already discussed in chapter two, they set the framework for trade liberalisation and 
economic co-operation, thus fostering trade, co-operation, economic growth and FDI. Despite the 
limitations acknowledged in chapter two, the association agreements created the conditions for a 
potential virtuous circle of development. Evidence of impact of the institutional framework on 
economic integration of Poland and respectively Romania will be given in the second part of this 
chapter and in chapter seven. 
From the Avis to the Helsinki European Council 
The next important stage in the enlargement process was the presentation of the Avis by the 
European Commission in July 1997.94 Again Romania and Poland were strictly differentiated. 
While the Avis on Poland relied on accomplishments and facts, the one on Romania expressed trust 
in the future. While Poland was recommended to begin negotiations, Romania received an 
unfavourable Opinion reflecting its poor economic and political performance. As a result, Romania 
was not recommended to be part of the first wave of accession. The Avis was part of the 'wealthy' 
approach to the EU enlargement in which progress towards a new stage of the accession process 
was made on the basis of strict compliance with the Copenhagen criteria rather than on security 
concerns. It acted as a'carrot' for Poland and as a'stick' for Romania. 
The Opinion stated that Poland was a democratic country with a stable institutional system acting 
in accordance with existing laws, respecting human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities. 95 
Poland followed proper justice and home affairs policies, especially on international crime, drug 
trafficking, cross-border migrations and border controls . 
96 Its market economy was perceived as 
working effectively, prices and trade being largely liberalised, and its economy successfully 
stabilised. However, major state-owned enterprises were perceived as still presenting a great 
problem. Agriculture still required a substantial overhaul. Overall, the Commission concluded: 
'Poland can be regarded as a functioning market economy'. 97 It 'should be well able to cope with 
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competitive pressure and market forces within the Union in the medium term'. 98 Negotiations were 
started in 1998, showing that Poland was on the right track to membership of the EU. This positive 
attitude of the EU had the potential to reinforce the virtuous circle of political determinants of 
accession with a further positive impact on the economic sphere . 
Although EU's attitude towards Poland was generally positive, the reaction towards the Opinion 
was moderate. The first reaction was of relief of Poland being considered as part of the better' 
rather than one of the 'worse' countries, as it was invited to open accession negotiations straight 
away. ' However, academics argued that the areas where the EU had made specific demands were 
'of greater benefits to Western Europe rather than to Poland'. 100 The Commission's Avis also 
appeared to set standards that not even the member states would actually meet, as in the case of 
freedom of the press. 101 Furthermore, it was argued that the criteria of membership were set too 
vaguely and that there was poor understanding about their weighting or relative priority. 102 These 
criticisms were part of the Polish bold attitude towards the EU described earlier. As a result, the 
Opinion sharpened the public debate within Poland. The more palpable the prospect of membership 
became, the more pragmatic the Polish approach towards EU membership was becoming with a 
potential to turn the virtuous circle of political determinants of accession into a vicious one. 
On the other hand, the Commission was quite damning about Romania, despite expressing some 
trust in the new power. With regard to the political criteria, the Avis stated: 'Current improvements 
following the arrival in power of a new government make it possible to conclude that Romania is 
on the way to satisfying the political criteria set by the European Council at Copenhagen'. 103 Then, 
the Opinion stated that Romania 'has made progress recently towards improving the competitive 
capacity of its economy, notably by addressing major distortions such as low energy prices, by 
accelerating privatisation, and by beginning to liquidate loss-making state owned firms'. 104 The 
document concluded though that Romania was not a market economy and 'would face serious 
difficulties to cope with the competitive pressures and market forces within the Union in the 
medium-tenn'. 105 Progress in implementing the White Paper was also limited. In the Commission's 
opinion, the Romanian government had 'neither transposed, nor taken on the essential elements of 
the acquis as regards the internal market'. 106 
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All in all, the Opinion emphasised the primordial role of compliance with the Copenhagen criteria 
in progressing towards EU membership. However, aware of the potential negative security 
consequences of such a decision, the European Commission continued to express encouragement 
and support for the Romanian authorities. The head of the European Commission Delegation in 
Romania at the time argued that 'Romania was not rejected'. Romania was '[still] part of the 
enlargement process which comprised more stages' but 'had to recuperate a lot and prepare with 
regard to the next wave of negotiations'. '°7 The enlargement commissioner also explained: "The EU 
is waiting to see whether the Romanian government will accomplish what they have promised. If 
the economic promises are to be put into practice, Romania can be taken into consideration for 
negotiations'. 108 As further encouragement, the president of the European Commission emphasised 
that there was no connection between the countries with which the Union started negotiations and 
the number of countries which will eventually join the EU. 109 This may be a warning at present. 
This 'wealthy' approach to the EU enlargement was received with strong criticism by the Romanian 
authorities and led to a more assertive attitude towards accession, driven by the fear of exclusion. 
The Avis acted as a'carrot' for the Polish authorities and as a'stick' for the Romanian government. 
The latter was forced to adopt a more committed attitude on both economic reforms and the process 
of European integration, in order to avoid maintaining a vicious circle of political determinants of 
accession in the absence of international support. Thus, unhappy with the Avis, the Romanian 
authorities lobbied the member states' governments before the December 1997 Luxembourg 
European Council with the aim to ensure that the EU would conduct an 'all inclusive' accession 
process. 110 In November 1997 the Romanian government circulated a paper to all EU governments 
in which they argued that differentiation in enlargement would distort trade. The report also 
claimed that the two wave approach would lead to discrimination in terms of financial transfers, 
so that the six countries of the first group would obtain much more from the European budget in 
the period 2000-2005 than the other six. Furthermore, it was argued that such a discrimination 
would cause a massive migration of foreign investment to the first wave countries. It was thus 
suggested that enlargement was made more inclusive by enhancing the importance of the European 
Conference, the accession partnerships and the annual review of progress for each candidate. "' 
Partially as a result of this more assertive attitude of Romania, at the Luxembourg European 
Council it was declared that the enlargement process would be 'all inclusive'. It was also decided 
that the progress of the candidate countries towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria would be 
assessed yearly though regular reports drawn by the European Commission. These were designed 
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to form the basis for the decision to start accession negotiations with the remaining candidates in 
the near future. However, in 1999 the regular reports formed only partially the basis for the 
decision to open accession negotiations with the remaining six candidates. The opening of 
negotiations recommended by the Helsinki European Council was driven greatly by security 
concerns raised by the Kosovo crisis which will be addressed below. Furthermore, the opening of 
accession negotiations appears to have impacted on the economic and political circle of 
determinants of Romania's accession into the EU and on perceptions of security, as will be seen 
in chapter six. 
From Helsinki to Copenhagen 
The Kosovo crisis emphasised once again the security dimension of the European integration 
process. It was again obvious that'peace and stability across Europe are not yet a matter of fact but 
they must be maintained in some areas and achieved in others'. 112 It also became obvious that EU 
enlargement was the most effective means that the EU had of upholding its shared values across 
Europe. ' 13 Other means, such as the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe or the accession 
partnerships had already been deployed, but a more comprehensive and determined approach was 
needed. Moreover, the evolution of economic reforms adopted in most of the applicant countries 
and the social strife that followed in some of these countries drew attention towards the cost of 
delaying the new stages of the integration process. A new vision of enlargement was needed. In the 
words of Prodi, the president of the European Commission at the time: We need a political vision, 
not a technocratic one. We need to set a genuine enlargement strategy looking beyond accession to 
our life together in the enlarged family of European nations'. 114 
The security motives for the new stage in the institutional integration with the EU had been 
acknowledged since early 1999. The Romanian representatives to the EU-Romania Association 
Council in April 1999 had already pleaded in favour of opening accession negotiations with all 
CEE applicant states. Although Romania's ambassador to the EU had recognised that the country 
was not yet ready for accession and that it would not expect membership any time soon, it was 
believed that negotiations would send an important political message that Romania was not being 
left outside. ' 15 The Polish president Kwasniewski also warned that: 'If admission of new members 
would be considerably delayed, this could bring in the candidate countries social distrust and lack 
of support for the efforts towards membership'. 16 The European Commission made public its 
evaluation of the progress registered by the candidate countries and made recommendations to the 
Helsinki European Council to open negotiations with the countries that 'already fulfilled the 
112 The Business Central Europe, February 2000. 
113 The Business Central Europe, February 2000. 
114 Prodi, R., "Speech to the European Parliament Strasbourg", 14 September 1999, 
http: //www. europa. eu. int/rapid/stardcgi/guesten. ksh? p action. 
115 ORourke, B., "Endnote: EU, East European Candidates Review Progress", RFE/RL Newsline, 6 May 
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political criteria and that proved themselves ready to take the measures to meet the economic 
criteria as well. " 17 The recommendation to open negotiations was 'a recognition of the widely 
recognised need to accelerate the enlargement process as a result of the changes in the European 
political arena, especially after Kosovo'. " A 'healthy' rather than 'wealthy' approach to 
enlargement was initiated. 
Romania was recommended to start accession negotiations, despite the concern expressed in the 
Commission's Composite Report of October 1999, which noted that: 'All candidates except 
Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania are considered to be functioning market economies... 
The economic situation in Romania is very worrying and sustained efforts will be needed to put a 
functioning market economy in place ... 
Romania [does] not meet either economic criterion. 
Regrettably, the situation in Romania has, at best, stabilised compared with last year. There are, 
however, exceptions. The situation of over 100,000 children in institutionalised care in Romania 
has seriously deteriorated, with the Government failing to act in time to ensure that adequate 
funding was provided for the children. This is an issue of human rights and the Romanian 
Government needs to continue to give it the political priority which it urgently requires. Romania 
has a mixed record in legislative approximation, with good progress in certain areas offset by 
delays in others... The capacities of the administration and the judiciary in Romania remain 
weak'. 19 
By being invited to open accession negotiations Romania was morally compensated for the losses 
incurred as a result of the embargo against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis. Romania was also 
rewarded for its involvement in NATO's military campaign. It was equally believed that the 
opening of negotiations 'would consolidate the rhythm and the consistency of reforms'. 120 The 
Commission further hoped that the opening of negotiations would contribute to achieving national 
consensus, not only regarding the final goal of membership of the EU, but also with respect to the 
means to be followed to attain this objectivei121 Moreover, the new stage in the integration process 
meant that new funds were provided by the EU, some of them invested in feasibility projects or 
in infrastructure which are an important means for attracting foreign investors. 122 Despite this 
political decision on the enlargement process, the economic criterion remained a priority for the 
EU. In its recommendation, the Commission suggested that the Romanian government 'should use 
this unique opportunity [given by the opening of accession negotiations] to progress on the line of a 
116 Kwasniewski, A., "Press Conference in Paris at the French Institute of International Relations IFRI", 
cited by Radio RomaniaActualitäfi, 3 November 1999. 
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120 Fotiadis, http: //www. infoeuropa. ro, January 2000. 
121 Fotiadis, http: //www. infoeuropa. ro, January 2000. 
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coherent and ambitious economic and structural reform'' The EU representative to the EU also 
emphasised that bringing the economy to a stage with economic growth would contribute to attract 
FDI, create new jobs and improvement in the living standards. These would diminish the 
differences between Romania and the other candidate countries better situated in the race for 
integration. 124 Moreover, the enlargement commissioner Verheugen invited investors to Romania 
by saying that the country was a safe and good place to invest in. 125 
As a result of the recommendations made at the Helsinki Romania opened accession negotiations 
with the EU in five chapters in February 2000.126 Some analysts argue that these fields were not of 
special importance with regard to reform and therefore the impact of the opening of negotiations on 
progress towards EU membership was relatively small. 127 Nevertheless, the opening of negotiations 
was an important political sign, a positive message which gave Romania an 'aim, a target to go 
towards. '128 It underlined EU's trust in Romania's efforts to implement economic reforms and 
enhanced Romania's motivation for pursuing further economic reforms. 129 
Since Helsinki, each country's progress towards EU membership continued to be assessed by the 
regular reports drawn by the European Commission. The institutional framework of the 
enlargement process consisted of the accession partnership, accession conference, regular reports 
and the process of accession negotiations. The positive circles of political determinants of 
accession were threatened by developments in 2000, when criticisms towards both Poland and 
Romania were expressed. Thus, in a report drawn for the European Parliament, Baroness Nicholson 
threatened to ask for the cessation of accession negotiations as a result of poor conditions in the 
children care institutions, corruption and inadequate reform of public administration. 130 However, 
the tone of the regular report drawn by the European Commission was less threatening, albeit still 
critical. Romania was the only country not praised for its efforts and that was not even close to 
meeting the economic criteria. 131 This was partially a result of 2000 being an electoral year and of 
the previous democratic governments having been 'lost' in intra-coalition squabbling. The report 
signalled once again the danger of a vicious circle of political factors that could induce a vicious 
circle of economic determinants. 
Poland also faced the possibility of a negative circle of political determinants of accession in 2000 
when, for the first time, was warned of possible exclusion from a first phase of enlargement. 
123 Fotiadis, http: //www. infoeuropa. ro, January 2000. 
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Poland was placed amongst the second group of countries which had progressed the most in 
adjusting their national economies and law to European standards. Poland was criticised over 
agriculture, environmental protection and steel and fishing industries. 132 Worries were also 
expressed over a too high inflation, high current account deficit and growing unemployment . 
133 
Finally, concerns were articulated regarding a lasting paralysis of Polish courts, prison and customs 
services, the brutality of police and insufficient action against organised crime and corruption. '34 
These warnings led to increased efforts by the post-2001 Miller government to ensure that Poland 
met the Copenhagen criteria and made the progress in accession negotiations necessary for early 
membership. A virtuous circle of political factors was reinforced with the potential to enforce an 
economic virtuous circle. 
The Copenhagen European Council: back to a'wealthy' approach to enlargement? 
Almost ten years on from expressing its commitment to enlarge, at the 2002 Copenhagen European 
Council the EU invited ten candidate countries to join in May 2004. This ten plus two approach had 
already been adopted soon after Helsinki and had been confirmed at the 2000 Nice European 
Council. On that occasion, the proposition of an enlargement of twelve put forward by the French 
foreign affairs ministry was rejected by the enlargement commissioner Verheugen. The invitation 
addressed at Copenhagen was largely based on compliance with the Copenhagen criteria reflected 
in the regular reports, on progress in accession negotiations and on commitment to fmalise them by 
the end of 2002. One can also argue that by 2002 the enlargement had become inevitable and hence 
to a certain extent security factors have once again influenced the timing of enlargement. As 
previously argued, perpetual postponement of the enlargement date posed the danger of 
governments loosing support for reforms and people turning against democracy and market 
reforms. These fears were enhanced by the results of the early 2000s elections in some CEECs 
which saw the rise of extremist parties and potentially brought closer the date of enlargement. 
Nevertheless, the approach to enlargement remained largely 'wealthy' rather than 'healthy'. Bulgaria 
and Romania were delayed until they meet the Copenhagen criteria and conclude the accession 
negotiations. Furthermore, at Copenhagen the EU failed to commit itself to welcoming the two 
remaining countries by the proposed date of 2007 and only pledged to support them technically and 
financially in their aim to meet this target. The 'Road Map'( was designed to guide Romania and 
Bulgaria in their preparations for membership by 2007 and increased financial assistance was 
offered under the framework of the partnership for accession. The state of the adoption and 
implementation of the acquis, of accession negotiations and compliance with the Copenhagen 
criteria are proof that security concerns still acted again as the engine of enlargement process, this 
time for Poland itself. Ranked the tenth in terms of overall preparations for membership, Poland 
was invited to join nevertheless. The invitation for membership was based on loose, rather than 
132 The Warsaw Voice, 19 November 2000. 
133 The Warsaw Voice, 19 November 2000. 
70 
strict compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. Its preparation for membership by December 2002 
is presented comparatively with Romania in order to illustrate this point. 
At the time of the Copenhagen European Council, Poland had closed twenty seven chapters out of 
thirty and was still negotiating the conditions for chapters on competition, agriculture and 
budgetary and financial conditions. 13S Furthermore, the European Commission's Report on 2002 
noted that, although Poland generally met the commitments made in the negotiations, delays had 
occurred in the areas of agriculture, fisheries, environment, issues which had yet to be addressed. '36 
Besides these, other problematic chapters had been the free movement of labour and the 
liberalisation of capital. By the Copenhagen European Council, Romania had opened all chapters 
of negotiations, except for three: free movement of services, agriculture and financial and 
budgetary provisions. 137 Romania had closed only thirteen: company law, fisheries, statistics, social 
policy, SMEs, education and training, science and research, external relations, CFSP and 
institutions. 138 Given the large number of the remaining chapters to be negotiated by Romania and 
the uncertainties implied by the first phase of accession, Romania pleaded towards the European 
Commission in October 2002 that the results of negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania would not 
be undermined by the first phase of enlargement. 139 Criticisms were also addressed with regard to 
the implementation of the acquis communautaire in Poland. Thus, the 2002 regular report stated 
that: 'Since the Opinion, Poland's progress has been characterised by a slow start and a subsequent 
acceleration in respect of the adoption of legislation. As a consequence, the vast majority of the 
acquis is now in place, although in some sectors there are considerable gaps in the necessary 
implementing legislation, for example, in the veterinary, environment and food safety areas. There 
has been a knock on effect in terms of administrative capacity which has progressed since the 
Opinion, but not to the same extent as legislative alignment'. 140 Similar conclusions were drawn for 
Romania. In the same 2002 Strategy Report, the European Commission noted that: 'Since the 
1997 Opinion, Romania has made steady progress with the acquis. However, in many areas, there 
has been an increasing gap between progress in legal transposition and the limited ability of the 
Romanian administration to implement and enforce the newly adopted legislation! 
The limitations of Poland's preparation for EU membership presented in the 2002 regular report 
prior to the decision to invite it to join underline once again the fact that the Copenhagen criteria 
are just guidelines and their interpretation is very important. Thus, while the 2002 report 
acknowledged that Poland should be able to meet the obligations of a EU member state at the 
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beginning of 2004, corruption was identified as a cause for serious concern. It was suggested that 
efforts are needed to ensure concrete results for the comprehensive strategy to combat this problem. 
The Commission also recommended that Poland continued the present path of reforms in order to 
be able to cope with competitive forces inside the Union. Improvements were suggested to fiscal 
policy through the implementation of government's new expenditure norm at all levels of 
government as part of a more broadly based structural reform of public finances. Completion of 
restructuring and privatisation in heavy industry, the financial sector, energy distribution and 
agriculture are needed. The report also recommended that bankruptcy procedures and land registry 
should be improved and that Central Bank independence should be preserved in order to ensure 
macroeconomic stability and investor confidence. 141 Poland should also urgently deal with delays 
in preparations for membership, particularly in agriculture, fisheries and environmental 
protection. 142 Romania's lack of preparedness for EU membership by 2004 was also acknowledged 
in the 2002 report and constituted the basis for Romania not being considered for the first phase of 
enlargement. The European Commission noted that Romania fulfilled the political criteria and has 
continued to make significant progress towards being a functioning market economy, for which 
prospects have improved. Nevertheless, Romania remained the only candidate not yet a functioning 
market economy. 143 
Overall, to some extent, security factors continue to be the engine of the enlargement process rather 
than strict calculations and technical details. This approach should be further extended for 
supporting membership of Romania and Bulgaria so that the Eastern enlargement fulfils its aim of 
promoting stability and prosperity in Europe and of repairing the injustice of the Yalta agreement. 
14' European Commission, "Strategy Paper 2002", p. 66. '42 European Commission, "Strategy Paper 2002", p. 65. 143 European Commission, "Strategy Paper 2002", p. 70. 
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3.2 Part Two: Evidence of economic integration with the European Union 
The previous part has examined the factors underpinning Poland and Romania's evolutions towards 
institutional integration with the European Union. The present part gives evidence of economic 
integration achieved during their quests for full EU membership. Economic integration is assessed 
comparatively with the progress in institutional integration with the EU. The hypothesis tested is 
whether the institutional framework of EU enlargement has fostered economic integration between 
Poland and Romania on the one hand and the EU on the other. It is assumed that this increased 
economic integration will further enhance FDI and FDI would enhance economic reforms and lead 
to EU membership. This would complete the economic circle of determinants of the EU accession 
process introduced in chapter one. The latter two relationships will be assessed in chapters five and 
seven. A virtuous economic circle of determinants would enhance the political circle and would 
finally contribute to full membership. The time series range mainly from 1990 to 2001. Other 
periods of time are used for comparative reasons. 
3.2.1 Methodological considerations and hypotheses 
The present study is at the cross roads between ex-ante and ex-post studies. It is not an ex-post 
study because economic integration with the EU is not completed. Furthermore, the anti-monde 
(alternative path, way or reality) is difficult to construct because the time period before 1989 was 
structurally different from the present one and the economic relations between the two countries 
considered and the EU were scarce. Evidence of economic integration is given by trade and FDI 
flows between Poland and Romania on the one hand, and the EU on the other. Although migration 
has occurred and is an expression of the four freedoms of the Single Market to be acquired upon 
EU membership, the analysis of migration is beyond the scope of this study for several reasons. 
First, the Europe agreements do not provide for free movement of labour and hence limit the scope 
of migration. Second, a large amount of labour migration was not among the objectives of the EU 
in the first place'. '49 Third, the interest of this study is in the role and determinants of FDI in the 
context of the process of economic transition and enlargement of the European Union, hence the 
interest in FDI and in trade, which can be a determinant or a result of FDI. An in depth analysis of 
integration in terms of policy is also beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, such an analysis 
would not be relevant, given that the CEECs only form an (imperfect) free trade area with the EU 
and are not yet part of the Single Market. 
As stated in the theoretical framework of the chapter, economic integration is likely to be enhanced 
by the institutional integration with the European Union. 15' The institutional framework of the 
accession process has been gradually built through different European Council Councils as a result 
of changes within the Eastern European countries, within the EU or within the international arena. 
149 Molle., The Economics of European Integration: Theory, Practice, Policy, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1997, 
p6. 150 Winter{; A! "Britain in Europe: a Survey of Quantitative Trade Studies" in Jacquemin, A. and Sapir, A. (eds. ), The European Internal Market, Trade and Competition, O. U. P., Oxford, 1991, p. 122. 
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This framework was reviewed in the first part of this chapter and is shown in brief in the table 
below. Each new stage in the institutional integration with the EU has represented a political sign 
for the candidate countries, with a potential impact on factor integration through the impact on the 
security concerns or the country image, an important FDI. This impact will be investigated in 
chapter seven through the econometric model. Trade, however, is likely to be less sensitive to 
political signs and more dependent on economic determinants, including the degree of 
liberalisation. 151 This is why changes in trade are assumed to be sensitive to the entering into force 
of the Europe agreements and to the expiry of the transition periods, rather than the start of 
accession negotiations, for example. 
Table 3.2.1. Stages in institutional integration with the European Union 
Stage in European Integration Code Poland Romania Hungary Bulgaria 
Signing of the TCA 1 09/1989 05/1991 09/1988 05/1990 
Signing of the EA 2 12/1991 02/1993 12/1991 03/1993 
Application for membership 3 04/1994 06/1995 03/1994 12/1995 
Announcement of AN 
1-14 4 12/ 1997 12/1999 12/ 1997 12/1999 
Starting of AN 5 03/ 1998 03/2000 03/ 1998 03/2000 
Accession to be achieved by 6 05/2004 01/2007 05/2004 01/2007 
Source: Piening, C., The European Union in WorldAfjairs, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 
1997, p. 55; http: //curopa. cu. int/comm/cnlargcmcnt/pas/curopc. _pgr. 
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Source: As per Table 3.2.1. 
The comparisons between Poland and Romania are put into perspective by using Hungary and 
Bulgaria, countries which had a comparable track in the institutional accession process. Thus, 
before the 1999 Helsinki European Council, Hungary and Poland were fast track countries (as of 
the 1997 Avis), while Bulgaria and Romania have been part of the so called 'second wave' of 
enlargement. Then, the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 opened the prospect of 
151 For a more comprehensive account of models on trade determinants see Thirlwall, A. P., "International 
Agreements, Liberalisation and Economic Growth", Paper for the African Development Report, 2000 
15 The Trade and Co-operation Agreement 
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154 Accession negotiations 
74 
accession for all the candidates by starting negotiations regardless of the initial position in the first 
or second wave (appendix 3.1. A). This made it possible for the former 'laggards' to catch up with 
the other candidates in terms of preparation for membership in an attempt to avoid path 
dependency. At the 2002 Copenhagen European Council, Poland and Hungary were invited to join 
the EU in May 2004, while the EU also recognised that Romania and Bulgaria aimed for 
membership in 2007. There continues to be a lag of three years between the two countries, 
indicating different degrees of institutional integration with the EU. 
As a proxy for the anti-monde (alternative path), comparisons are made with EU member states at 
present, or closely before and closely after achieving EU membership. All comparisons rely on the 
assumption that the participation of a country in international or regional trade depends on factors 
such as: 
a) the size of the country- for large countries external trade counts for 20% of the GDP while 
for small countries the ratio is of 60% of the GDP; 
b) the level of development of the country, including the structure of the economy. 
Portugal and Spain have been chosen from the EU member states as being the closest to Romania 
and Poland in terms of size, level of development and structure of the economy. Thus, in 2001 
Spain had a GDP at exchange rate prices of Euro bn 651 and Portugal had a GDP at exchange rate 
prices of Euro bn 122. Poland had a GDP of Euro bn 196.7 and Romania of Euro bn 44.4.1S5 This 
makes Romania comparable with Portugal and Poland with Spain, but yet there are important 
differences in terms of the structure of the economy, which might be considered limitations of the 
comparison. 
In order to give evidence of economic integration between Poland and Romania on the one hand 
and the EU on the other, the indicators mentioned below will be used with the following 
interpretations and hypotheses: 
a) The balance of trade with the EU and the ratio of trade with the EU in GDP. The former 
indicates the direction of trade, while the latter reveals the openness towards the EU or the 
degree of economic integration. An improvement in the trade balance and an increased 
openness towards the EU are expected to correspond to improvements in the economic climate 
and to increasing institutional and economic integration with the EU. 
b) The annual growth of total imports and exports and the annual growth of imports and exports 
with the EU for the period 1990-2000. It is expected that trade with the EU has grown faster 
than the total trade of the respective country, signifying an increasing economic integration. 
155 Eurostat, "Eurostat Yearbook. 2003", http: //europa. eu. intlcomm/eurostat. 
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c) The ratio of trade with the EU in total trade. It is anticipated that the ratio has increased and 
reached a level comparable with present EU member states of around 60% for countries with 
higher economic integration. '56 
d) The share of exports and imports to and from the candidate countries in total exports and 
imports of the EU. This shows how important trade partners the candidate countries are for the 
EU. It is expected that the ratio is similar to the one of Portugal and Spain prior to membership. 
e) The FDI annual inflows and the stock for each year. It is expected that FDI originates mainly 
from the EU indicating an increased degree of factor markets integration. 
The dates which may constitute structural breaks are 1992 for Poland and 1993 for Romania, 
corresponding to the entering into force of the interim agreements that accompanied the Europe 
agreements. Also, the expiry of the four and six years transition periods for sensitive exports to the 
EU can constitute important structural breaks for the levels of exports or total trade. This would be 
consistent with the hypothesis that the institutional framework has impacted upon the degree of 
integration in terms of trade between the EU, on the one hand, and Poland and Romania on the 
other. The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Evidence of trade integration is given 
from the candidate countries perspective and from the EU's stand. Second, evidence of factor 
markets integration is provided with data on FDI in Poland and Romania. Finally, the chapter 
presents the conclusions drawn from analysing the factors that have underpinned the EU 
enlargement process and from evidence of economic integration with the EU. 
3.2.2 Product market integration from the candidate countries' perspective 
Trade balance and total trade with the EU in GDP 
Economic relations between the candidate countries and the EU are summarised in the trade 
balance and in the ratio of total trade with the EU in their GDP. The trade balance indicates the 
direction of trade while the trade ratio in the GDP assesses the openness of the economy towards 
the EU. 
Table 3.2.2. Trade balance with the EU (bn euro) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Bulgaria -0.39 -0.36 -0.28 -0.48 -0.33 -0.21 0 0.24 -0.1 -0.61 -0.39 Na 
Romania 0.35 0.11 -0.48 -0.71 -0.1 -0.31 -0.85 -0.58 -1.3 -0.5 -1.1 -0.9 
Poland 1 . 1.79 -1.24 -2.65 -2.19 -3.04 -7.58 -10.85 -12 -11.4 -10.5 -8.9 
I Hungary -0.02 -0.09 -0.36 -1.57 -2.01 -1.12 -1.18 -1.95 -2.2 -1.3 . 1.1 0.3 
ource: Eurostat, "External and Intra-European Union Trade, Monthly Statistics", No. 12,1996, p. 40-41; 
European Commission, Regular Reports, http: //www. europa. eu. intlcommlenlargemendcandidate. him. 
Table 3.2.2 shows that both countries have registered a negative trade balance with the EU, proving 
that they have represented markets for EU exports rather than source of EU imports. Liberalisation 
156 Genberg, H. and de Simone, F. N., "Regional Integration Agreements and Macroeconomic Discipline" in 
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indeed led in early 1990s to an increase in consumer goods imports and towards mid-1990s to 
increase in capital goods imports associated with FDI. The higher deficits of Poland are correlated 
with the size of the economy. The structural breaks in the early 1990s correspond roughly to the 
signing of the trade and co-operation agreement (1991 for Romania) and to the signing of the 
Europe agreements (1993 for Romania and 1991 for Poland). This indicates an anticipation effect 
which supports the idea that the prospect of EU membership has had a positive effect on the 
candidate countries. Since 1998 there has been an improvement in Poland's trade balance with the 
EU. This might be related to export growth as a result of FDI bringing new technology and know 
how in highly competitive and export oriented industries. Similar improvements are seen in 
Romania in 1999,2000 and 2001, also possibly related to growth in FDI generated exports. 
Table 3.2.3 shows that the ratio of trade with the EU in the GDP of three of the candidate countries 
considered has converged towards a ratio of circa 12%, except for Hungary. A similar trend was 
noticed in the trade of member states of the EU during the process of integration, thus confirming 
the increasing degree of integration with the EU displayed by the CEECs considered. "' Data for 
1994-2000 indicates different ratios for candidates and respectively the EU members. Only 
Hungary seems to have reached a comparable figure with Spain by 2000. The higher figure for 
Portugal is consistent with the smaller GDP, as compared to Spain, and the contrast with Romania 
suggests that there is still room for trade integration between Romania and the EU. Given that trade 
liberalisation between the candidate countries and the EU was asymmetrical, a better indication of 
its impact on trade is given by analysing imports and exports separately. 
Table 3.2.3. Ratio of trade (exports +imports) with the EU in GDP 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Bulgaria 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 
Romania 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.12 
Poland 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 
Hungary Na 0.12 0.21 0.27 0.32 0.33 0.35 
Spain 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.28 0.32 
Portugal 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 
ýource: Eurostat, External and Intra-European Union Trade, Monthly Statistics, No. 12,1996, p. 40-41; 
Eurostat, External and Infra-European Union Trade, Monthly Statistics, 6, Vol. 2,1999, p. 2; Eurostat, 
Eurostat Yearbook 2002, p. 5. 
Imports 
The CEECs were from the beginning a potential market for EU products, given the non-saturated 
internal markets inherited from the Communist period and the structure of the economy, deficient 
in consumer goods industries. Romania was the most extreme case of deprivation of consumer 
goods, while Poland is the largest market in the region relative to both population and GDP. Hence, 
it is expected that there has been a substantial surge in imports from the EU and an increase of 
openness to the EU reflected in an increase of the ratio of EU imports in GDP. Imports will be 
157 Molle, W., The Economics of European Integration, Theory, Practice, Policy. 
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affected not only by trade liberalisation, but also by the GDP of importing countries and by the real 
exchange rate. An increase in the absolute volume of imports would be thus a reflection of positive 
economic growth in the candidate country considered and of cheaper foreign goods relative to 
domestic ones when expressed in domestic currency. An increase in the absolute volume of imports 
can suggest both trade creation and trade diversion but the data available makes difficult the 
measurement of these effects. A faster growth of imports from the EU than imports from the third 
parties could indicate trade reorientation from third parties towards the EU, hence increasing 
integration with the EU. 
Table 3.2.4. Imports from the EU before 1990 (bn euro) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Bulgaria 0.81 1.00 1.05 1.14 1.25 1.63 1.47 1.45 1.40 1.47 
Romania 1.77 1.76 1.10 0.91 1.05 1.15 0.99 0.65 0.61 0.69 
Poland 2.89 2.33 2.09 2.11 2.43 2.73 2.39 2.33 2.76 3.95 
Hungary 1.62 1.99 1.99 1.99 2.21 2.49 2.45 2.37 2.35 2.99 
Source: Eurostat, Statistical Yearbook. Recapitulation 1958-1989,1990, pp. 44-45. 
Table 3.2.5. Imports from the EU (bn euro) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Bulgaria 1.03 1.17 1.26 1.49 1.75 2.05 1.70 1.85 1.98 2.51 3.12 Na 
Romania 1.33 1.44 1.99 2.51 2.90 3.7 4.44 5.01 6.1 6.3 8.7 10.2 
Poland 5.01 8.90 9.22 11.11 12.32 15.29 19.83 25.06 28.1 28.9 33.6 35.4 
Hungary 3.76 4.69 5.28 6.45 8.07 8.73 9.99 13.58 16.7 18.6 23.0 23.6 
Po/Ro 3.76 6.18 4.63 4.42 4.24 4.13 4.46 5.00 4.60 4.58 3.10 3.47 
Source: Eurostat, External and Intro European Union Trade, Monthly Statistics, No. 12,1996, p. 40-41; 
European Commission, Regular Reports, http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/enlargemendcandidate. htm. 
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Source: As per Tables 3.2.4 and 3.2.5. 
The tables and the graph above show that before 1989 Romanian imports from the EU were falling. 
The figure represents an index of imports from the EU with 1989 as a basis. This trend intensified 




country by enhancing exports and decreasing imports. On the other hand, Poland's imports from the 
EU increased towards the end of the period, as a result of early attempts to restructure the economy 
through importing capital goods. The greater absolute imports for Poland are also a reflection of the 
Polish economy's larger size in terms of GDP. In 1990, Romania's imports from the EU doubled as 
a result of the relaxation of the government's policies in terms of imports and of the importance 
attached now to consumer goods imports especially. The figure above shows that after 1990 
imports from the EU have been much higher in absolute terms in both countries. Moreover, there 
was an increase from 1980 to 2000 of almost nine times in Romania and more than ten times in 
Poland. There seems to be a limited relation between the absolute level of imports and the entering 
into force of the association agreements. In the case of Romania this might be a result of the 
increase in imports prior to liberalisation, which simply filled in the void left by the Communist 
regime, making the structural break earlier. This can be considered an anticipation effect of the 
agreement, rather than a direct consequence. Furthermore, in some products the liberalisation was 
only partial, hence the limited impact at the time. 
In order to make more meaningful comparisons between the countries, the degree of economic 
integration between Romania and Poland on the one hand and the EU on the other is analysed by 
the ratio of imports from the EU in GDP, also known as the Vamvakidis index of integration. 158 
The table below shows that in terms of openness towards the EU, the gap between Romania and 
Poland is closing. The ratio of imports from the EU to GDP was double for Poland in 1994 as 
compared to Romania, while in 2000 the respective ratios were 10% for Poland and 7% for 
Romania. This trend is consistent with patterns of trade with the EU by member states whose ratio 
of trade with the EU tends to converge during the integration process. 159 This suggests that the 
candidate countries considered here experience an increasing integration with the EU. The smaller 
size of Portugal is reflected in a higher ratio of imports from the EU in GDP, as compared to Spain. 
The differences between the candidate countries and the EU member states result from their 
different degrees of integration with the EU. 
Table 3.2.6. Imports from the EU in GDP 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 000 
Bulgaria ). 04 
. 04 . 04 . 04 . 04 ). 05 . 06 
Romania 
. 03 . 03 . 04 . 04 . 05 . 06 ). 07 Poland 
. 06 . 
07 
. 
08 ). 09 
. 




a . 11 . 11 . 15 . 17 . 17 . 20 Spain 
. 12 ). 13 . 14 . 14 . 16 . 15 . 18 Portugal 
. 22 ). 22 . 24 . 25 . 26 . 27 . 28 
Source: Eurostat, External and Intra-European Union Trade, Monthly Statistics, No. 12,1996, p. 40-41; 
Eurostat, Statistics in Focus. External Trade, 6-2/1999, p. 2; Eurostat, Statistics in Focus. External 
Trade, 3/1998; p. 2; European Commission, Regular Reports; Eurostat, Eurostat Yearbook 2002, p. 5. 
158 Vamvakidis cited in Thirlwall, A. P., "International Agreements, Liberalisation and Economic Growth", 
p. 19. 
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The question is now whether since 1989 imports from the EU have increased more rapidly than the 
total imports of the countries considered, thus indicating a reorientation of trade. Table 3.2.7 and 
figure 3.2.3 show that Poland's imports from the EU grew initially less than its total imports, as a 
sign of its initial relative dependence on the former Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) market. However, since 1996 imports from the EU have grown faster than Poland's total 
imports. This suggests an increased economic integration with the Union and a reorientation of 
trade from non-EU sources. The increase may be related to the surge in FDI from the EU, thus 
indicating complementarity between trade and FDI. Romania's imports from the EU (expressed in 
Euro at market exchange rates) have increased more than its total imports, with the exception of 
1995. In relative terms, Romania was more dependent on imports from the EU. This might be 
related to its relative independence from the CMEA, relatively little trade with the Black See 
Economic Co-operation Organisation (BSEC) and delayed membership of the Central Free Trade 
Association (CEFTA). Poland, on the other hand, achieved early membership of CEFTA and was 
relatively dependent on trade with former members of the CMEA. In both countries, towards the 
end of the period, imports from the EU increased slower than their total imports, pointing towards a 
possible diversification of imports from other markets or towards a EU market saturation. 
Table 3.2.7. Evolution of annual growth of total imports v. imports from the EU 
91/90 92/91 93/92 94/93 95/94 96/93 97/96 98/97 99/98 00/99 
Poland (total) 0.03 0.06 0.18 0.36 0.34 0.28 0.14 0.11 -0.03 0.33 
Poland (EU) 0.78 0.04 0.20 0.11 0.24 0.30 0.27 0.12 0.02 0.16 
Romania (total) -0.04 0.16 0.05 0.1 0.44 0.12 0.07 0.04 -0.15 0.41 
Romania (EU) 0.08 0.38 0.26 0.16 0.28 0.2 0.13 0.22 0.03 0.38 








Figure 3.2.3. Annual growth of imports from the EU v. total Imports 
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Source: As per Table 3.2.7. 
The annual growth rate of imports from the EU seems to be higher in the early years of transition. 
Indeed the EA (1991) led to a higher growth of imports from the EU than total imports in Poland. 
159 Molle, W., The Economics of European Integration, Theory, Practice, Policy. 
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In Romania the higher increase of imports from the EU than total imports appears to be a 
consequence of the TCA (signed in 1991 with effects showing in 1992) and in anticipation of the 
EA (signed in 1993). Overall, the data captures both an anticipation effect and a structural shift 
impact. This would explain why several years around the data of the implementation of the Europe 
agreements have seen high rates of annual growth of imports from the EU. 
The analysis will now refer to the ratio of imports from the EU in the total imports of the candidate 
countries. The hypothesis is that the ratio of trade with the EU in the total trade of Romania and 
Poland increased towards meeting a similar size to the present comparable member states and that 
it has evolved similarly to former comparable candidate countries for EU membership, i. e. Spain 
and Portugal. 
Table 3.2.8. Ratio of imports from the EU in total imports (%) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Bulgaria 30.07 33.33 25.40 35.64 35.86 29.20 27.76 34.01 44.9 48.6 44.0 Na 
Romania 28.55 31.65 37.32 45.33 38.97 36.03 43.85 53.73 42.73 62.81 60.33 57.0 
Poland 23.15 53.49 53.11 72.29 58.71 51.36 65.02 87.51 61.19 67.0 63.20 61.4 
Hungary 28.89 38.79 42.58 70.47 61.82 52.06 61.01 64.05 73.8 70.77 66.03 58.0 
Spain 62.3 62.8 63.3 65.0 66.4 68.5 69.3 66.0 70.7 68.7 66.4 67.0 
Portugal 72.0 74.9 76.6 74.5 73.5 74.0 76.3 76.3 78.1 78.1 75.1 75.1 
ounce: Eurostat, Eurostat Yearbook 2002, p. 5; Eurostat, Eurostat Yearbook 2003, p. 188. 
The table shows an anticipatory effect for Romania with a larger share of imports from the EU in 
the years prior to or corresponding to the signing of the TCA (1991) and of the EA (1993). For 
Poland one can see both an anticipatory effect of the EA and an increase in the ratio as a 
consequence of the EA (1991). Furthermore, there has been an overall increase of the ratio between 
1990 and 2001 and a stabilisation at a level of approximately 60%. This level is similar to the share 
of imports from the EU in total imports of Spain. At this level, Poland and Romania are almost as 
integrated as present EU member states. The higher figure for Portugal is related to the smaller size 
of the economy and emphasises the comparatively lower degree of integration of Romania, also a 
smaller economy compared to Poland. 
Source: As per Table 3.2.8. 
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The ratios of trade with the EU in the early 1990s are different for Poland and Romania in 
comparison with Spain and Portugal, due to several factors: the sizes of the countries, their 
different economic development and the different degrees of integration with the EU. A more 
meaningful comparison can be drawn with Spain and Portugal prior to membership and closely 
after joining the Union. Both Spain and Portugal joined in 1986. There are, however, limitations to 
this comparison, due to different international conditions at the time, as well as particular features 
of each country. 
Table 3.2.9. Ratio of imports from the EU in total imports of Spain and Portugal prior to or 
closely after EU membership (%) 
Countries 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Spain 38.3 33.3 40.3 62.3 67.6 
Portugal 48.6 48.7 48.9 72.0 73.9 
Source: Eurostat, External and Intra-European Union Trade, Monthly Statistics, No. 12,1996, p. 21; 
Eurostat, Eurostat Yearbook 2003, p. 188. 
The ratio of imports from the EU in total imports of Spain has increased prior to membership thus 
indicating an anticipatory effect. Furthermore, both countries have seen an increase in the ratio as a 
result of full membership, indicating that membership does indeed bring benefits in terms of 
increased bilateral trade. However, Poland and Romania have already reached a ratio higher than 
the one Spain had one year prior to joining the EU. This shows that along with developments in the 
institutional integration with the EU Poland and Romania have increased trade integration with the 
EU, thus having already benefited in economic terms from this process. 
Exports 
The Europe Agreements have provided that the EU would open its non-sensitive markets virtually 
immediately, but for sensitive industrial markets the abolition of tariffs and qualitative restrictions 
on imports would take from four to six years. The EU would offer concessions, but nothing like 
free trade in agriculture. 160 The structural break years are likely to be 1992,1996 and 1998 for 
Poland and 1993,1997 and 1999 for Romania, corresponding to . the entering 
into force of the 
agreements and to the end of the transitory periods. Exports will also vary with the real exchange 
rate and the GDP of the importing countries. The higher the GDP, the higher are likely to be the 
exports. Furthermore, exports to the EU will be higher, the cheaper the Polish products are 
compared to the EU ones expressed in Euro. This would suggest that industries in the candidate 
countries have become competitive as a result of economic reforms. However, due to data 
availability and topic constraints, the focus lies here on the effects of institutional factors. The 
hypothesis is that exports to the EU increased in absolute terms compared with the pre-1989 period 
and faster than total exports. It is also expected that the ratio of the exports to the EU in GDP of 
Poland and Romania has increased and converged with values of other CEECs. It is equally 
160 Piening, C., The European Union in WorldAffairs, p. 59. 
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anticipated that the ratio of exports to the EU in the total trade of each candidate country has 
reached values comparable to the EU member states during their quests for EU membership. 
Table 3.2.10. Exports to the EU prior to 1990 (bn euro) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Bulgaria 0.31 0.58 0.63 0.58 0.56 0.59 0.55 0.52 0.46 0.53 
Romania 1.83 1.97 1.90 1.90 3.06 2.91 2.48 2.43 2.23 2.54 
Poland 2.80 2.12 2.36 2.53 3.46 3.57 2.95 2.90 3.36 3.86 
Hungary 1.43 1.48 1.56 1.70 1.88 2.01 1.89 2.00 2.15 2.58 
Source: Eurostat, Statistical Yearbook. Recapitulation 1958-1989,1990, pp. 44-45. 
Table 3.2.11. Exports to the EU since 1990 (bn euro) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 20110 2001 
Bulgaria 0.64 0.81 0.98 1.01 1.42 1.84 1.70 2.09 1.88 1.90 2.73 3.4 
Romania 1.68 1.55 1.51 1.80 2.80 3.39 3.59 4.43 4.8 5.8 7.6 9.3 
Poland 6.01 7.11 798 8.46 10.13 12.25 12.23 14.21 16.1 17.5 23.1 26.5 
Hungary 3.74 4.60 4.92 4.88 6.06 7.61 8.81 11.63 14.5 17.3 21.9 24.1 
Po/ Ro 358 4.58 5.28 4.7 3.62 3.61 3.41 3.20 3.35 3.01 3.03 2.84 
Source: Eurostat, External and Intra-European Union Trade, Monthly Statistics, No. 12,1996, p. 40- 
41; Eurostat, Statistics in Focus. External Trade, 6-2/1999, p. 2; 3/1998, p. 2; European Commission, Regular 
Reports. 
Romania's exports to the EU decreased in 1990 as they were recalculated according to the needs of 
the internal market. Romanian exports overtook the level of 1989 only in 1994, shortly after the 
Europe Agreement came into force. On the contrary, Poland's exports have risen since 1986, its 
economy being exposed to economic reforms much earlier than the Romanian one. Polish exports 
continued to rise after 1990. The gap is closing, but Romania is still exporting to the EU less than 
one third than Poland. This suggests that there are different degrees of competitiveness of industry 
in Poland and Romania, as a result of different progress in economic reforms. The difference in 
competitiveness of the two economies can also be seen from the export structure as shown in 
chapter five. 161 Normalising the exports to GDP, similar ratios for Poland and Romania are found, 
with a slight improvement for Romania since 1999. The exports for 1999 must have captured the 
effects of the first large FDI inflows in Romania since 1998. The ratios for Portugal and Spain are, 
nevertheless, much higher than for Poland and Romania, consistent with their status of full EU 
members, as opposed to the one of candidates for EU membership. This may reflect the lower 
competitiveness of the candidate countries and the still limited access to the EU markets through 
exports. 
161 See also Smith, A., "Economic and Trade Relations Between the European Former Communist States 
and the States of Western Europe" in Smith, J. and Jenkins, C. (eds. ), Through the Paper Curtain. Insiders 
and Outsiders in the New Europe, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2003, pp. 24-27. 
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Source: As per 2. s 3.10 and 3.2.11. 
Table 3.2.12. Exports to the EU in GDP 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 000 
Bulgaria ). 03 ). 02 ). 04 ). 05 ). 04 ). 04 . 04 
Romania . 03 . 01 
). 03 . 04 . 04 . 05 . 
03 
Poland . 
0S . O1 . 
OS ). 05 ). 05 ). 05 ). OS 
I iungary a . 01 . 10 . 
12 . 13 . 16 . 15 
Spain . 10 . 11 . 12 . 12 . 13 . 12 . 
14 
Portugal 1 16 . 17 . 18 . 18 . 18 . 18 . 18 
Source: Eurostat, Eurostat Yearbook 2002, p. 5; Eurostat, Euroslat Yearbook 2003, p. 188. 
The question is now whether exports to the EU have increased faster than the total exports of the 
countries considered, thus indicating a reorientation towards the EU market. The following table 
and figure present data for annual growth of exports to the EU and the annual growth of total 
exports. Table 3.2.13 shows that since 1994, Romania's exports to the EU have increased more than 
its total exports, suggesting an increased economic integration with the EU. On the other hand, the 
same trend was registered in Poland only since 1997. In 2000, a diversification of export markets 
appears for both Poland and Romania, as suggested by the higher annual increase in total exports 
rather than exports to the EU. This could be also due to EU market saturation and to a deterioration 
of the real exchange rate. 
Table 3.2.13. Evolution of annual growth of total exports vs. exports to the EU 
91/90 92/91 93/92 94/93 95/94 96/95 97/96 98/97 99/98 00/99 01/00 
Poland (total) -0.19 0.09 -0.03 0.26 0.33 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.33 Na 
Poland (EU) 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.20 0.21 0 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.32 0.21 
Romania (total) 0.03 0.23 0.14 0.24 0.29 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.09 0.41 Na 
Romania (EU) -0.08 -0.03 0.04 0.56 0.21 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.20 0.32 0.22 
Source: Eurostat, Eurostat Yearbook 2002, p. 5. 
Table 3.2.13 also shows that the annual growth of exports to the EU of both Poland and Romania 
has been higher in years corresponding to the entering into force of the association agreements and 
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to the expiry of the transitory periods. This suggests that economic integration in terms of exports 
has been affected inter alia by the institutional integration with the European Union. Hence, the EU 
association process has the potential to influence not only the political circle of determinants 
considered by this study, but also the economic sphere. This will be discussed in chapters six and 
seven. 
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Source: As per Table 3.2.13. 
The degree of trade integration between the EU and the candidate countries can also be captured by 
the ratios of exports to the EU in total exports, data which is presented in the following table and 
figure. Since 1993 (the year of the signing of the EA) Romania has seen a continuous increase in 
the ratio of exports to the EU in its total exports, suggesting an increasing economic integration 
with the EU. For Poland there is a larger variation which suggests that, besides the EU market, 
Poland has had other important trading partners such as CEFTA. Both ratios have stabilised 
towards 70%, similar to Spain, indicating that the two candidate countries considered are as 
integrated in terms of product markets with the EU as present member states. 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Bulgaria 18.69 23.08 19.76 24.16 29.10 26.21 27.76 38.43 49.6 50.1 52.1 54.8 
Romania 36.07 34.07 28.32 32.51 37.62 55.66 56.44 59.22 65.04 72.04 66.90 68.0 
Poland 27.76 42.73 45.97 55.05 48.27 69.96 63.70 62.51 63.96 68.04 67.15 69.2 
Hungary 28.74 38.05 39.68 53.32 46.42 77.41 70.36 68.93 70.73 73.67 70.0 74.0 
Spain 67.6 69.3 68.5 64.3 66.6 67.9 67.8 68.3 71.1 71.2 70.3 71.4 
Portugal 81.2 82.4 81.4 79.9 80.0 80.1 80.6 80.8 82.0 83.2 80.3 80.1 


























Source: As per Table 3.2.14. 
Table 3.2.14 also shows that there was a large discrepancy between the ratios corresponding to the 
candidates and the ones corresponding to the member states at the beginning of the 1990s. This 
reflects the different levels of economic integration between the candidate countries and the EU, on 
the one hand, and between the EU member states on the other. However, the data regarding 
previous accessions shows a similar evolution of the candidate countries towards full integration 
with the EU. What about the degree of integration of Spain and Portugal prior to membership? 
Table 3.2.15. Ratio of exports to the EU in total exports of Spain and Portugal prior to or 
closely after EU membership (%) 
Countries 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Spain 50.8 54.1 55.3 67.6 67.3 
Portugal 63.6 65.7 68.7 81.2 80.1 
Source: Eurostat, External and Intra-European Union Trade. Statistical Yearbook 1958-1996,1996, p. 21; 
Eurostat, Eurostat Yearbook 2003, p. 188. 
Spain and Portugal joined the EU in 1986. Prior to accession and while preparing for accession, 
only approximately 50% of Spanish exports were directed towards the EU market. However, as a 
member of the EU, Spain exports circa 68% of its total exports to the European Union. This is 
comparable to the value for Poland and Romania at present. Portugal has seen a steeper increase in 
the ratio of exports to the EU in total exports after joining, suggesting a positive effect of 
membership. The higher figure for Portugal is consistent with it being a smaller economy than 
Spain. This data suggests that Poland and Romania are already integrated in terms of exports as 
Spain after joining the EU. 
To sum up, from the candidates' perspective, the EU has become an increasingly important trade 
partner both in terms of exports and imports. This reflects a continuous process of economic 
integration similar or even more advanced than the one experienced by comparable previous 
candidate countries such as Spain and Portugal. Furthermore, at present, both Poland and Romania 
are almost as integrated with the EU in terms of trade as comparable member states, suggesting that 
86 
they have already benefited from closer integration with the EU. This confirms the hypothesis that 
some of the added benefits of EU membership will be in security terms and factor markets 
integration. 
3.2.3 Product market integration from the EU's perspective 
It is useful to assess not only how important trade partner is the EU for the CEECs, but also how 
important trade partners for the EU these countries are becoming. This is because it is anticipated 
that the EU expansion will benefit both the CEECs and the EU. As stated in the theoretical 
framework, the higher the trade between future members of a customs union (here common 
market), the higher the likely benefits of joining for each party. The hypothesis is that the share of 
trade of Poland and Romania with the EU in the total trade of the EU increased towards meeting a 
similar size to the present comparable member states and that it evolved similarly to former 
comparable candidates for EU membership. 
Table 3.2.16. Share of EU trade with the candidate countries in total EU trade (%) 
Imports 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Hungary 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 
Poland 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 
Romania 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.9 
Exports 
Hungary 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 
Poland 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 
Romania 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.6 
Sourcc: Eurostat, Eurostat Yearbook 2002, p. 10. 
Table 3.2.17. Share of trade with Spain and Portugal in total EU trade prior to EU 
membership (%) 
Imports 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 198$ 
Spain 3.0 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.8 4.2 
Portugal 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 
Exports 
Spain 3.5 3.3 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.9 
Portugal 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.1 
Source: Eurostat, External and Intra-European Union Trade. Statistical Yearbook 1986, p. 5,24. 
Data on both imports and exports presented above shows that, from the EU's the point of view, 
Poland and Romania are not yet as integrated as Spain and Portugal prior to achieving EU 
membership. This confirms the findings of previous studies that the economic benefits of the EU 
enlargement are likely to be relatively higher for the candidate countries than for the EU. From this 
point of view, it is crucial that Romania meets the requirements of EU membership as soon as 
possible in order to use the momentum of the enlargement process and avoid further delays that 
might appear as a result of other applications for membership, external factors in general or internal 
factors of the European Union. 
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3.2.4 Factor integration. Foreign direct investment 
The remaining section deals with factor integration. Since 1989 there has been an important surge 
in the FDI in the CEECs. Moreover, EU member states are the most important investors in terms of 
volume and number of businesses established. This is a result of economic determinants, as well as 
of geographic proximity, cultural ties or developments in the process of accession to the European 
Union by the candidate countries, as will be seen in chapter seven. FDI is important because it is a 
sign of factor markets integration, corresponding to the stage of a common market. Furthermore, 
FDI has a potential positive impact on economic reforms and progress in EU integration as 
illustrated in diagram 3A. This will be investigated in chapters five and seven. Evidence of factor 
integration between Poland and Romania on the one hand and the EU on the other is given here 
through FDI annual flows and stocks. Other indicators of FDI participation in the economy are 
offered in chapter five, part two. 
The table and the figure below show the difference between Poland and Romania in terms of FDI 
annual inflows. While in Poland there has been a constant increase in the annual inflows until the 
late 1990s, Romania had a downturn in 1996. This was a year in which the government was 
focused on the electoral campaign and investors adopted a 'wait-and-see' attitude. A significant 
surge in the FDI level was seen only as a result of increased confidence in the post-1996 
democratic government. It was also due to decisive measures in privatisation and improving the 
investment climate in general, including macroeconomic stability. A consistent trend has been 
registered in Romania since 1996 and the post-2000 Nästase government is committed to further 
privatisation and economic reforms. The increased FDI annual inflows in Romania between 1998 
and 2001 indicates that the country is catching up with other candidates regarding factor 
integration with the EU. 
Table 3.2.18. Evolution of FDI flow in CEECs (run. USD 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Bulgaria 13 56 42 40 105 90 109 505 401 700 975 800 
Hungary 300 1,651 1,471 2,339 1,147 4,453 1,983 2,085 1,935 1,500 1,650 1,650 
Poland 89 100 300 1,715 1,875 3,659 4,498 4,908 6,365 6,500 9,338 8,000 
Romania 18 37 77 94 341 419 263 1,215 2,031 1,000 1,009 1,500 
Source: EBRD, Investment Profile. Poland, EBRD, London, 2001, p. 2; EBRD, Investment Profile. Romania, 
EBRD, London, 2001. 
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Source: As per Table 3.2.18. 
The higher level of FDI stock in Poland suggests a higher degree of economic integration with the 
EU. This is valid, despite a comparable ratio of FDI from the EU in the total FDI. Thus, in Poland 
63.8% of the total FDI comes from the EU and in Romania 56.8% of total investors are from the 
EU. 162 The difference in the degree of economic integration in terms of FDI stock is consistent with 
Poland being invited to join in 2004 and Romania aiming for membership only in 2007. 
Furthermore, the discrepancy between FDI (both annual levels and stocks) suggests a difference in 
the FDI determinants and potentially a different impact of FDI, issues which will be assessed in 
chapters five and seven. 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
Chapter three has identified the factors that have contributed to the different evolutions of Poland 
and Romania in their quests for EU membership, by referring to the political and economic spheres 
and to the security concerns identified in chapter one. It also set the stage for an investigation of the 
determinants of economic transition and of the security concerns that seemed to have constituted 
the brakes on and respectively the engine of the present enlargement of the EU. The analysis 
distinguished between institutional and economic integration and gave evidence of integration in 
terms of product and factor markets between Poland and Romania, on the one hand, and the EU, on 
the other. It also tested whether the institutional framework of the enlargement process had an 
impact on the trade integration. The impact of the institutional integration on FDI and hence factor 
integration will be assessed quantitatively in chapter seven. The relationship between the elements 
of the economic circle will be also assessed in chapter seven. Several conclusions were drawn as 
follows. 
Each country's progress in institutional integration with the EU was affected by factors in the 
political and economic spheres and by security concerns. In the political sphere, Poland's assertive 
attitude towards EU membership enhanced the EU's generally supportive attitude and the public 
support, creating a virtuous political circle of determinants of accession for most of the decade. 
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When public support was low and the governmental approach less enthusiastic, warnings from the 
EU had a 'stick' effect that recreated the virtuous political circle of the EU accession determinants. 
On the other hand, Romania's hesitant approach to EU membership was met with equal hesitance 
by the EU for most of the decade, creating a vicious circle of determinants, despite a very 
supportive attitude from the public at large. As a result of security concerns, the EU's more 
supportive attitude in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis induced a virtuous political circle in 
conjunction with the new government's more active, rather than reactive attitude towards EU 
membership. 
In the economic sphere, progress to a market economy and hence economic reforms remained the 
main determinants of progress of the institutional integration with the EU. This was the case 
especially when the European Union adopted a 'wealthy' rather than a 'healthy' approach to the 
enlargement process. Poland's status as a market economy was crucial for its early accession while 
Romania's failure to achieve a functioning market economy by 2000 and 2002 led to its accession 
being delayed till 2007. The importance of marketisation in the process of accession to the EU led 
to the investigation of the factors that have affected transition to a market economy in both Poland 
and Romania in chapter four. 
The analysis further revealed that during the accession process there has been a trade off between 
economic criteria and security concerns. The relative importance of the two motives determined 
two different approaches also known as the 'wealthy' and the 'healthy' approach to the EU 
enlargement. When economic calculations prevailed the approach was considered 'wealthy', while 
security concerns became the engine of enlargement during the 'healthy' approach. Thus, 
immediately after the Kosovo crisis the EU's attitude towards enlargement changed from a 
'wealthy' towards a'healthy' one. However, prospects for more stability in South Eastern Europe 
as a result of democratisation have changed again the balance between security concerns and 
economic factors suggesting a possible return to the healthy approach, as defined at the beginning 
of the chapter. This is why, as long as the enlargement process is not yet completed, it is still 
important to investigate the factors that underpin this process and that are likely to ensure 
Romania's successful membership in 2007. An in-depth analysis of the security concerns is 
conducted in chapter six. 
Finally, this chapter has given evidence of increased product and factor markets integration 
between Poland and the EU and Romania and the EU. The analysis has revealed that the ratio of 
trade with the EU in the total trade of the candidate countries considered has already reached 
figures comparable with present EU member states and with previous candidates for membership 
during their quests for accession. The ratio of trade with the EU in GDP has also converged in the 
candidate countries similar to developments in the member states during this integration process. 
162 WIIW, Handbook of Statistics, CDROM. 
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The same was true for imports and exports. The data also suggested that trade with the EU 
increased more in the years surrounding the dates of implementation of the association agreements 
and of expiry of the transitory periods. There is enough evidence to support the hypothesis that 
both Poland and Romania act like member states in terms of trade integration and hence EU 
enlargement will benefit both the EU and Poland and Romania. Given that their relative importance 
for the EU market is still lower than the importance of comparable former candidates such as Spain 
and Portugal it is important to emphasise that the benefits of this enlargement are registered not 
only in economic terms but also in security terms for both the EU and the candidates, as will be 
seen in chapter six. 
The chapter has further provided evidence of increased factor integration with Poland having a 
higher degree of integration represented by a higher FDI annual inflows and a higher FDI stock. As 
the candidate countries still represent a free (imperfect) trade area with the EU, rather than a 
common market, the chapter has concluded that product market integration has been achieved 
ahead of the institutional integration with the EU. This suggests that factor integration is likely to 
foster further institutional integration, thus illustrating the bi-directional relationship between 
institutional and economic integration. This hypothesis is tested in chapter seven. Furthermore, the 
impact of institutional integration on factor integration is also tested through the econometric 
model on the FDI determinants constructed in chapter seven. Having identified progress to a 
market economy as a necessary condition for EU accession, chapter four investigates the factors 
that have led to Poland and Romania's different paths in transition to a market economy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN POLAND AND 
ROMANIA 
Chapter three has identified the main political, economic and security factors leading to Poland and 
Romania's progress in formal integration with the Union. The chapter also presented evidence of 
product and factor integration and of the impact that institutional integration with the EU has had 
on product markets integration. This chapter focuses on the factors that have determined the 
process of transition to a market economy and draws lessons from the first decade of transition. 
Assessing the determinants of transition is important because achieving a market economy is a 
condition sine qua non of joining the European Union, as suggested in chapter three. Furthermore, 
progress in transition and economic reforms represent both a condition and a result of FDI, an 
element of economic integration identified in chapter three. This bi-directional relationship 
between economic reforms and FDI will be assessed in chapters five and seven. Furthermore, the 
success of economic reforms impacts upon the internal stability of the country and hence on 
security concerns and the prospects for EU integration, as will be seen in chapter six. 
The first aim of this chapter is to identify the elements which led to the different paths and results 
of transition in Poland and Romania between 1990 and 2002. The comparison of economic 
transition is achieved by using determinants from both the economic and political spheres, which 
include: the initial conditions, governments' attitude towards reforms, the internal support for 
reforms, the role of international organisations and the policy mix (or economic reforms). The 
second aim of the chapter is to draw lessons from the experience of the two countries which could 
be used in the completion of the transition to a market economy in Romania. 
The chapter is organised as follows. It first sets out the theoretical framework by referring to the 
theoretical framework of the dissertation. It then analyses comparatively the impact of each 
determinant considered on the path and results of transition. The chapter concludes with the lessons 
learned from the first decade of transition in Poland and Romania. 
4.1 The theoretical framework of the chapter 
This study builds on previous research which explains the path and results of transition in the 
CEECs through the impact of the initial conditions, the economic policy, domestic political 
developments, economic outcomes and external factors. ' It distinguishes between factors in the 
economic and the political sphere and shows how they interact in determining the pace and results 
of transition. In the political sphere three factors similar to the ones affecting progress towards EU 
1 Aslund, A., "Lessons of the First Four Years of Systemic Change in Eastern Europe", Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1,1994, pp. 22-38; Balcerowicz, L. and Gelb, A., "flow to Stabilise- 
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membership are considered. These include: governments' attitude towards reform, the popular 
support for economic reforms and the international financial and technical assistance. In the 
economic sphere the main determinant of transition to a market economy is the policy mix adopted 
by the successive governments as suggested by the diagram below. 
Diagram 4A 


















The economic sphere 
a) Arrows 1,2 and 3 indicate a virtuous circle in the political sphere induced by external support. Arrows 4 
and 4" indicate how a virtuous or vicious political circle can influence and be influenced by the economic 
circle through the policy mix (or economic reforms). 
Legend: 
º relationships that are addressed in chapter four 
------ No. 
relationships that are addressed in other chapters 
Policy Lessons from Early Reformers", Transition, Vol. 5, No. 6,1994, pp. 3-4; Sachs, J., "Russia's Struggle 
with Stabilisation, Transition, Vol. 5, No. 5,1994, pp. 7-10. 
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In order to test the hypothesis of path dependency in transition the study assesses the impact of the 
initial conditions on: the choice of policy, governments' attitude towards reform, internal and 
international support. This study challenges the previous findings that differences in performance 
in transition are a result of differences in structural reforms, rather than in the initial conditions and 
maintains that the initial conditions have led to path dependency in the early transition period. 2 This 
chapter also draws on studies which acknowledge that there is potential for both path dependency 
and path shaping 3 It challenges the assumption that policies are totally controlled by the 
government and that international support is totally uncontrollable. 4 It is argued that international 
support is greatly affected by the governments' attitude towards reform and by the public support 
for reforms. The analysis agrees though with the assumption that the initial conditions are 
uncontrolled, and that they have influenced greatly the initial choice of economic policies. 5 The bi- 
directional relationships assumed in this study are part of the interplay between the political and 
economic spheres considered here. Furthermore, they suggest ways in which the political circle can 
reinforce itself or reinforce the circle in the economic sphere. 
4.2 The initial conditions 
There has been a continuous debate on the extent to which the initial conditions have been offset by 
other factors. Early studies of transition or of economic growth in the CEECs have shown that the 
impact of the initial conditions has been offset by the choice of economic policies. The policy mix 
seemed to be more important than the starting point. 6 However, the choice of policies depended on 
the initial conditions of transition, thus making difficult a total separation of the two and a fair 
assessment of the role of policies in determining transition. Moreover, countries like Romania and 
Bulgaria, which were amongst the less reformist in the Soviet block, remained the laggards of 
transition, being incapable of catching up with the leaders. This signalled the danger of path 
dependency in transition. A study by Falcetti et al which initially supported the decisive role of 
policies was later amended. It then concluded that in terms of achieving economic growth and 
economic reforms, it was probably safe to say that the CEECs have not yet defied the odds of 
initial conditions. 7 
2 See Berg, A. cited in Balcerowicz, L., Post- Communist Transition: Some Lessons, IEA, London, 2002, p. 
43. 
3 Smith, A. and Swain, A., "Regulating and Institutionalising Capitalisms" in Pickles, J. and Smith, A. 
(eds. ), Theorising Transition, Routledge, London, 1998, p. 27. 
4 Balcerowicz, L., Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, CEU, London, 1995, p. 169. S See Havrylyshyn, O. and Wolf, T., "Growth in Transition Countries, 1990- 1998: Main Lessons" in 
Havrylyshyn, O. and Nsouli, S. (eds. ), A Decade of Transition: Achievements and Challenges, IMF, 2001 6 EBRD, Transition Report, EBRD, London, 1994, p. 12; Camdessus, M., "Achievements and Prospects after 
Ten Years of Transition, Opening Remarks at a Conference on Transition", IMF, 1, February, 1999; 
Falcetti, E., Raisear, M. and Sanfey, P. "Defying the Odds: the Initial Conditions, Reforms and Growth in 
the First Decade of Transition", EBRD Working Paper No. 55, EBRD, London, 2000. 
Falcetti, E., Raisear, M. and Sanfey, P. "Defying the Odds: the Initial Conditions, Reforms and Growth in 
the First Decade of Transition"; Falcetti, E., Raisear, M. and Sanfey, P. "Defying the Odds?: The Initial 
Conditions, Reforms and Growth in the First Decade of Transition", EBRD Working Paper 55, EBRD, 
London, 2002, p. 21. 
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The initial conditions of 1989 appear to have had an important impact on the path and results of 
transition in both Poland and Romania. Moreover, their interdependence with other determinants of 
transition makes them more influential than initially thought. This justifies an overview of the 
initial conditions as part of assessing the determinants of the path and of the results of transition to 
a market economy. Moreover, the assessment of initial conditions is a thread running throughout 
the entire dissertation. Their impact on progress towards EU membership was investigated in 
chapter three. Chapter five refers to the starting point regarding the investment climate, while 
chapter six acknowledges the importance of security concerns at the initial point of transition. 
Finally, chapter seven introduces the EBRD composite index of initial conditions in the 
econometric modelling of the determinants of FDI and of economic reforms, in order to test the 
hypothesis of path dependency. 
In 1989 the common ground of the ex-communist CEECs was smaller then would appear at a first 
glance. The shared economic and political system was not identical, and Poland and Romania 
displayed considerable differences. These already gave a considerable comparative advantage to 
Poland, as will be seen below. The EBRD composite index of initial conditions -ranging from -0.4 
to 3.5- reflects this difference, while a qualitative analysis reveals an even higher contrast between 
Poland and Romania The index is 1.7 for Romania and 1.9 for Poland, with values ranging from - 
0.4 to 3.2 and higher values representing a better situation. 8 The index is derived from a factor 
analysis and represents a weighted average of measures for: the level of development, trade 
dependence on CMEA, macroeconomic disequilibria, distance to the EU, natural resource 
endowments, market elements and state capacity. 9 However, several political and institutional 
factors are left aside and thus a more nuanced qualitative analysis of the initial conditions is 
required, as below. Moreover, a close analysis shows that the factors included in this index varied 
widely between the countries in transition and between Romania and Poland in particular. 10 It is 
then possible that, due to methodological limitations, the composite index has overlooked some of 
these differences. 
The present study analyses the impact of initial conditions on transition by using two subcategories: 
the state of the economy and of the nation and the institutional framework. These are indicators of 
the preparedness of each country to embark on transition to a market economy. Thus, the state of 
the economy and nation are important prerequisites for the choice of policies, be they of a gradual 
or shock therapy type. Furthermore, the institutional framework can act as a catalyst for the 
8 Snoy, B., "How Successful Transition is Paving the Way for EU Enlargement. a View Based on EBRD 
Indicators", Paper Presented at the Seventh Biennial International Conference organised by the European 
Community Studies Association (ESCA), May 3 I-June 2001, Madison, Wisconsin, USA, p. 12. 
9 Snoy, "How Successful Transition is Paving the Way for EU Enlargement. a View Based on EBRD 
Indicators", p. 12. 
10 Camdessus, M., "Achievements and Prospects after Ten Years of Transition, Opening Remarks at a 
Conference on Transition", p. 4; Däianu, D., "Where Are Post-Communist Countries Heading to? ", CEROPE 
Working Paper, http: //www. cerope. ro. 
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adoption of a market economy. Using these two subcategories, the present chapter offers a brief 
overview of initial conditions in Poland and Romania which reveals a much better initial situation 
in Poland than in Romania. This appears to indicate that the better Polish performance in transition 
and accession to the EU is partially a result of path dependency, as defined in chapter two. 
4.2.1 The state of the economy and of the nation 
In 1989 Poland was in a deep economic crisis. " Poland had more difficult economic challenges 
than its neighbouring countries. Previous attempts to reform the system had not proven to be 
successful enough. 12 Hyper inflation, a high budget deficit, the discontinuation of repayment of 
foreign debt, the lack of a clear financial policy, decreasing economic output and falling domestic 
demand made Poland a country with a high economic instability. The increase in the index of 
consumer prices of 639.5% in 1989 was 1,000 times greater than in Romania. 13 In 1989, the 
external debt of USD 40.2 billion was a heavy burden compared with Romania, which had paid off 
all its debts and had managed to accumulate a net reserve of USD1.3 billion in the same year. 14 
There was hidden unemployment in Poland, despite the official figure of 1% at the end of the year. 
Most companies were overstaffed and labour productivity was low. 15 A similar situation was faced 
by Romania. 16 The structure of capital investment in Poland was in many cases unsuitable for 
market needs and most of the firms lacked a market strategy. The dark situation of the economy 
was similar to a patient who needed a shock, an observation which gave the name to the reform 
programme adopted by Balcerowicz, the finance minister in 1989. The high inflation needed rapid 
stabilisation policies. The high external debt ensured the interest of the international financial 
organisations in a quick and successful transformation to a market economy, so that remaining 
debts could be repaid. International support was a major contributing factor to the early design of 
policies. The economic crisis also made it clear to the population that major reforms were needed. 17 
To a certain extent the population was ready to accept drastic reforms in order to see an overall 
improvement in the economy and in their standard of living. There were, however, signs that this 
support would not last long. The social structure was rather peculiar from the point of view of the 
transition towards a capitalist, market economy. The numerically largest social group, the workers, 
was the product of socialist industrialisation. Paradoxically, they were also the ones who had 
organised the strikes, supported and co-organised by intellectuals from the opposition, thus 
undermining socialism. This gave the workers a kind of 'romantic aura' and enshrined the various 
" Balcerowicz, Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, p. 293. 
'2 De Broek, M. and Koen, V. The 'Soaring Eagle': Anatomy of the Polish Take off in the 1990s, International 
Monetary Fund, 2000, p. 4. 
13 EBRD, Transition Report, 1994, p. 165.166. 
14 EBRD, Transition Report, 1994, p. 165-166. 
is EBRD, Transition Report, 1994, p. 165-166. 
16 EBRD, Transition Report, 1994, p. 165. 
17 For a discussion on the choice for shock therapy and on the internal debates in Poland in the early 1990s, 
see also Spiro, N., The Politics of Economic transition: Shock Therapy in Poland, 1990-1991, UKC Ph. D. 
Thesis, UKC, 1998. 
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forms of protest which later acted as brakes on reforms. When workers faced the negative 
consequences of transition, including actual or potential unemployment, they vociferously opposed 
reforms. '$ Similarly, the farmers had considered themselves the preservers of private property and 
thus a 'privileged' class of transition. On the other hand, they were amongst the ones negatively 
affected by the liberalisation of prices and the adjustment of tax rates at the beginning of transition, 
despite initial short run gains. 19 All in all, this social and economic structure had an important 
impact on the public support for transition and indirectly on the policy mix adopted by the Polish 
governments. The crisis called for radical reforms, but the volatile public support acted as a brake 
later on and induced a change of approach in 1993, when the election was won by post- 
communists. 
On the other hand, the Romanian economy was the product of the most orthodox Communism in 
Europe. Resources were allocated almost exclusively on political criteria, through commands and 
party orders, through arbitrary and voluntary actions, totally disregarding the market and any 
potential entrepreneurial spirit 20 Forty five years of semi-autarkic industrialisation placed emphasis 
on heavy industry that even by the standard of communist economics may be considered unusually 
strong? ' The energy sector was overgrown and the tertiary one was ncglected. 22 Industrialisation 
had been propelled by a high investment ratio, officially estimated at 24.3% in 1951-1953,33.3% 
in 1976-1980 and 27.9% in 1981-1985.23 However, the incapacity of the system to cope with 
increased complexity and its inability to assimilate and generate technological progress led to a fall 
in output in the late 1980s, reaching a growth rate of -5.3% in 1989 as opposed to only -1.4% in 
Poland the same year. This was accompanied by a strong bias towards low value added industrial 
goods, which led to a deterioration of the terms of trade . 
25 The effort to pay the foreign debt, 
actually a suss generis shock therapy, accentuated the decline in the competitiveness of the 
economy, exacerbated imbalances between sectors, increased shortages and generally lowered the 
welfare of the population 26 The fixed capital of the Romanian industry was reduced by nearly 
40%, leaving little room for fast recovery. 27 Although the government was trying to control 
inflation and unemployment, scarcities in all goods indicated the crisis. 28 
'8 Balcerowicz, Transformationfrom Socialism to Capitalism, p. 294. 
19 Balcerowicz, Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, p. 295. 
20 Constantinescu, N. N., Reformä 'i redresare eeonomicä, Editura Economicä, Bueure$ti, 1995, p. 60. 21 Montias, J. M., "The Romanian Economy: A Survey of Current Problems", European Economy, No. 2, 
1991, p. 179. 
22 Constantinescu, Reformäfi redresare economicä, p. 61. 
z3 Montias, "The Romanian Economy: A Survey of Current Problems", p. 179. 
24 EBRD, 1994, p. 165-166. 
25 Däianu, "Where Are Post-Communist Countries Heading to? ", p. 8. 
26 Däianu, "Where Are Post-Communist Countries Heading to? ", p. 9. 
27 Montias, "The Romanian Economy: A Survey of Current Problems", p. 180. 
28 Montias, "The Romanian Economy: A Survey of Current Problems", p. 180. 
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This disastrous state of the economy led to an equally disastrous state in the standard of living of 
the population 29 Romanians had one of the lowest GDP per capita in the CEECs 30 Furthermore, 
the communist legacy led to a large gap between demand and supply reflected by the fact that only 
14 bani of 1 leu currency had corresponding goods and services on the market 31 Electricity, 
heating, housing, food and consumer goods shortages brought the Romanian population to a 
situation of starvation and frustration. Thus, the burden of the past did not leave much room for a 
shock therapy economic programme. There was rather a need for a shock therapy for the 
population itself, so the choice made in the end by the post-1989 governments was to 'resuscitate' 
the Romanian people rather than the dying economy. The economy had still some resources for 
survival, as will be seen later on. 32 As a result, the first economic measures were directed towards 
increasing the standard of living, rather than to promoting reforms in the economy. This delay 
lessened the international support available and thus failed to ensure a virtuous political circle of 
determinants of transition and accession to the EU in the early years of transition. 
4.2.2 The institutional framework 
Further differences in the initial conditions of Poland and Romania occurred in the institutional 
framework. 33 By institutional framework one understands political and economic structures capable 
or not of supporting and maintaining the momentum for the transition to a market economy. 
There were considerable differences in the institutional framework in both the political and 
economic spheres in Poland and Romania. In the political sphere, Poland has fully benefited from 
having preserved or created key institutions such as the family, the trade unions, the church and the 
press. 4 Furthermore, since the late 1970s 'democratic opposition' had been organised in Poland 
through the Committee for Defence of Workers (KOR). Moreover, civil society was created by 
intellectuals as an alternative to state power, with the aim of gradually promoting reform in the 
cultural and civic field 35 Although challenging the leading role of the party or of the Soviet Union 
was out of question in the early 1980s, the civic society formed was a basis for a new political class 
and for the democratisation of Poland. The creation of the Solidarity Movement was also an 
important step towards political emancipation and democracy. Nine years later, Poland held semi- 
free elections in June 1989, and was the first eastern European country to embark on 
democratisation. 
29 Constantinescu, Reformä, ci redresare economicä, p. 61. 
30 Däianu, "Where Are Post-Communist Countries Heading to? ", p. 8. 
31 Däianu, "Where Are Post-Communist Countries Heading to? ", p. 8. 
32 Stolojan, T., "Policy Making in Romania", Paper at a World Bank Conference in Romania, World Bank, 
Bucharest, 1999. 
33 Camdesus, "Achievements and Prospects after Ten Years of Transition, Opening Remarks at a Conference 
on Transition", p. 5. 
34 Camdessus, "Achievements and Prospects after Ten Years of Transition, Opening Remarks at a 
Conference on Transition", p. 6. 
35 Rie, "Post-Communist Polish Economic Reform: A Class Analysis", p. 4. 
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On the other hand, Romania experienced one of the most oppressive communist dictatorships. Civil 
society hardly existed and thus one of the main ingredients for the development of a capitalist 
system was missing. Moreover, church and religion were prosecuted and trade unions, which were 
the engine of change in Poland, were only 'puppets' in Romania. The regime did not allow 
alternatives to the power of the communist party. There had been only a few revolts expressing the 
unpopularity of the system but were quickly oppressed. Thus, revolt of the miners in the Jiu Valley 
in 1977 and that of the workers in the Tractorul Factory in Bra$ov in 1987 did not have any larger 
impact on society. Overall, the emerging leaders, the media and the population lacked knowledge 
about the principles of democracy and the market economy. This situation made change in 
Romanian society less radical and slower. 36 Romania ended Communism through a violent 
revolution in December 1989, with numerous human victims and proceeded into free elections in 
May 1990 and in May 1992. Until 1996 there was no real change of power, as will be discussed 
in more detail in chapter six. A more in-depth analysis of these institutional political factors is, 
however, beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
The institutional framework in the economic sphere equally was different in the two countries. The 
Polish economy had certain elements of a market economy promoted through previous attempts at 
reform. 37 First, the workers' councils established in state-owned companies in 1981 were powerful 
and were able to decide on dividend distribution, profit sharing or director nomination. 38 Despite 
certain negative effects as a result of postponing the privatisation process, workers' councils 
induced a certain change in mentality through cultivating entrepreneurship which was vital for the 
new economic system. 39 Second, in 1989 78 % of the arable land was privately owned and private 
companies had already been accepted through law since 1987.40 The share of the private sector in 
the GDP was 28.6% and by 1989 there were already 16,905 commercial companies in Poland, out 
of which 429 used foreign capita141 Also, the private sector share in employment was already 
46.2% in 1989.42 These elements of private ownership and entrepreneurship constituted a very 
good basis for transition to a market economy in Poland. 
On the other hand, prior to 1989 policies in the Romanian economy were mainly politicised. The 
freedom allowed to state companies was minimal and the principles of self-financing and profit 
making were only marginal in the economy. The New Economic Mechanism' (NEM) introduced in 
1978, which was supposed to give more decision making power to enterprises, had failed. During 
the 1980s NEM had become a huge bureaucracy, with institutionalised forms that gave a false 
36 Stolojan, "Policy Making in Romania", p. 4. 
37 Balcerowicz, Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, p. 316. 
38 Balcerowicz, Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, p. 273. 
39 Balcerowicz, Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, p. 294. 
40 Balcerowicz, Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, p. 316. 
41 EBRD, 1994, p. 165. 
42 De Brock, and Koen, The 'Soaring Eagle', p. 17. 
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image of enterprise and public participation in decision making. 3 Private property and 
entrepreneurship were hardly present. In Romania, under Ceau$escu the private non-agricultural 
sector was practically non-existent, and no data regarding the private sector share in GDP or 
employment is available for Romania. 44 The structure of industry had a strong bias towards 
gigantic units, with no regard for small and medium enterprises45 This initial economic situation 
considerably slowed down the process of transition to a market economy by providing a poor 
economic framework for economic reforms. 
To sum up, different initial conditions have determined to a large extent the policies that the first 
post-1989 governments envisaged thus placing Romania and Poland on different transition paths. 
Society was more open, less oppressed and the standard of living was higher in Poland than in 
communist Romania. These, together with the deep crisis in the economy, elements of capitalism 
and democratisation and the international support, were good conditions for the implementation of 
the shock therapy in Poland. On the other hand, the initial conditions in Romania were more 
conducive to a gradual approach. The economic system was indeed in crisis but it seemed to have 
some resources for survival. The Romanian population, however, had no more energy for shock 
therapy reforms. In a way, they had already faced a shock therapy through Ceausescu's strategy to 
pay the external debt over the previous five years. As a result, the Romanian people were expecting 
a rapid improvement in their standard of living, rather than radical economic reforms with a further 
negative impact on their quality of life. This, together with the poor institutional framework, led to 
a gradual approach to reforms and to low external support, hence a vicious circle in the political 
sphere. 
4.3 The governments' attitude towards reform 
A second element which has influenced the path and results of transition was the governments' 
attitude towards reform. This is part of the political sphere of determinants of accession and was 
determined by several factors, as will be discussed below. First, the exposure to democratic 
procedures and market thinking prior to 1989 was different in the two countries. This constituted an 
important comparative advantage for Poland in giving a direction to the change envisaged, as 
discussed above. The previous attempts to reform the system in 1956,1970 and the 1980s made 
Poland more open, more susceptible to change and gave a clearer image of what transition should 
be like as This comparative advantage kept Poland at the forefront of reform for a few more years. 
On the other hand, the Romanian revolution was one against Communism, and was not specifically 
pro-Capitalism. Consequently, in 1989 there was no clear blueprint for the change needed in the 
Romanian economy and society and this slowed down reforms. 
43 Stolojan, "Policy Making in Romania", p. 4. 
44 Jeffries, I., Socialist Economies and the Transition towards the Market. A Guide, Routlcdge, London, 
1993, p. 455. 
45 Däianu, "Where Are Post-Communist Countries Heading to? ", p. 8. 
46 ZUkrOWSka, "Poland: The Short Cut to Reform Proved Possible", p. 2 and Ric, "Post-Communist Polish 
Economic Reform: A Class Analysis", p. 9. 
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Second, reform in the political sphere interacted differently with reform in the economic sphere. 
Poland solved the dilemma of what should be transformed first, the political or the economic life of 
the country, by having the first push from the political sphere. The setting up of the Solidarity 
Movement in 1980 marked the birth of a new political class which was the engine of change in 
both the national and international aspects of the economy. Its accession to power in 1989 as a 
result of the Round Tables agreement, albeit limited, was the start of the shock therapy reforms. 47 
Furthermore, the 1990 presidential election and the 1991 parliamentary election results were a good 
signal for the international community, a guarantee of the break with the past. Only political 
change could determine significant changes in the economic sphere. Moreover, only a government 
which is legitimate has the moral right to require sacrifices. 48 On the other hand, by 1989 there was 
no new political class in Romania which could promote the genuine spirit of democracy and of a 
market economy. Change within the ruling political class was slow. Until May 1990, when the first 
free elections were held, there was neither enough time, nor enough resources for the opposition 
groups to develop and win the elections. The accession to power of post-communists in both 
elections of 1990 and 1992 determined a gradual approach to economic reforms and decreased the 
external credibility of Romania's break with the past. All in all, economic reforms were slowed 
down by the lack of progress in democratisation, an interplay which will be further discussed in 
chapter six. 
Third, there were different degrees to which the continuity of reforms was ensured in each country. 
In Poland policy making was relatively steady, despite the succession of unstable coalitions and 
minority governments which characterised the first decade of transition 49 In the early years of 
transition the IMF almost requested that Balcerowicz remained in charge with reforms as a 
guarantee of their continuity. None of the Polish governments have turned its back on privatisation, 
deregulation or EU membership S0 On the other hand, Romania suffered from stop-and-go policies 
and successive governments gave in to public pressure or to electoral interests. 51 Electoral cycles 
have typically been occasions for populist measures. 52 However, towards the late 1990s 
governments in both countries have learned to resist pressures and persevere with reforms, despite 
short term political interests. Thus, in 2000 the Isärescu government largely maintained the 
austerity measures necessary for macroeconomic stabilisation despite the electoral pressures. S3 The 
47 For a discussion on the choice for shock therapy and on the internal debates in Poland in the early 1990s, 
see also Spiro, N., The Politics ofEconomic transition: Shcok Therapy in Poland, 1990-1991, UKC Ph. D. 
Thesis, UKC, 1998. 
48 Winiecki, J., p. 810. 
49 The Economist, 27 October 2001, p. 6. 
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same dedication to reforms was shown by the group of liberals at the SLD's heart who managed to 
persuade the party to vote against a rise in teachers' salary, just before the Polish parliamentary 
election in 2001 sa 
Fourth, there were different degrees to which the countries applied 'exceptional politics' in the early 
stages of transition and consequently used the 'finite window of opportunity created by a populace 
that was longing for economic change in the aftermath of social and political upheaval'. 55 The 1989 
window of opportunity was used fully by Balcerowicz. He introduced a rapid reform programme 
which inevitably had negative effects on the population but achieved a thorough improvement in 
the macroeconomic situation. The bold approach to reforms also earned international credibility for 
Poland. Although the shock therapy programme led to popular unrest and the return of the post- 
communists through the 1993 elections, it constituted a solid basis for the subsequent, gradual 
reforms such as privatisation. 6 The full use of the first window of opportunity set Poland on the 
path to achieving economic growth and to a certain extent it started a self fulfilling prophecy of 
success, setting Poland on a virtuous economic circle. 
On the other hand, Romania lost two windows of opportunity: December 1989 and November 
1996 s' In 1989 there was a huge enthusiasm in the population for breaking with Communism. The 
revolution brought into the streets hundreds of people who wanted democracy and to see their 
standard of living improved as soon as possible. However, there had been so much suffering in the 
last years of the Ceau§escu regime, that the high short term costs of rapid reforms were not 
favoured. Moreover, the political power which emerged during the 1989 revolution under Iliescu, a 
former communist official, was supported by many cx-communist nomenklatura members. They 
were not ready to make a clear break from the communist economic and political methods and 
thinking. A gradual approach to reforms was adopted. Although Iliescu was part of a reformist 
movement of the party, a kind of Gorbachev, he was mainly perceived both internally and 
externally as a communist. This resulted in low international support for Romania and low 
credibility of reforms, reinforcing the vicious political and economic circles of Romania's post 
1989 early evolution. 
The second window of opportunity lost by Romania was in 1996. Then the democratic forces 
organised under the Democratic Convention of Romania won both the parliamentary and the 
presidential elections. This change of power secured important international credibility for 
54 The Economist, 27 October 2001, p. 7. 
55 Camdessus, "Achievements and Prospects after Ten Years of Transition, Opening Remarks at a 
Conference on Transition". 
56 Ric, "Post-Communist Polish Economic Reform: A Class Analysis". 
57 Däianu, "Where Are Post-Communist Countries Heading to? ", p. 2; Jackson, "Political Incredibility and 
Bureaucratic Transition in Romania", p. 553; Stolojan, "Policy Making in Romania", p. 4. 
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Romania 58 However, the new Romanian government was not able to maintain this support and to 
answer to the optimism of the population through real reform. Instead, a struggle for political 
power and influence characterised the following years. Government reshuffles took place at least 
once a year thus inducing stop-and-go policies, undermining political stability, the credibility of the 
government and the pace of economic reforms . 
59 A vicious political circle was maintained thus 
slowing the change of the economic vicious circle into a virtuous one, despite some progress in 
reforms and an increase in FDI. These developments prevented the creation of a full virtuous 
political circle in Romania in 1997. 
Finally, a third window of opportunity appeared in 2000. Given the threat that Vadim Tudor, the 
leader of the nationalistic Greater Romania Party, would become the president of Romania, the 
2000 victory of the post-communist Ion Iliescu can be considered a window of opportunity which 
this time was won. The threat of nationalism and of further slowdown in the process of EU 
integration enhanced the government's determination to implement real economic reforms. It was 
strongly believed that the future of transition relied on the measures promoted by the 2000 Ndstase 
government. The importance of using the window of opportunity presented by the election was 
finally acknowledged by the ruling class in Romania. Moreover, the economic results achieved so 
far by the post 2000 governments' policies support the idea of a window of opportunity this time 
well utilised. Further success of the reforms will depend on whether the government continues to 
have the necessary public and external support, ensuring a virtuous political circle with a positive 
impact on the economic circle. 
To sum up, the governments' attitude towards reform had a great impact upon the continuity, 
comprehensiveness and effectiveness of policies implemented in transition. The openness towards 
democracy and the market economy prior to 1989 has given a comparative advantage to Poland, 
placing it at the forefront of reforms. Electoral cycles have been occasions for populist measures 
and for changes of governments which led, especially in Romania at early stages, to policy 
changes. Finally, the way governments have used the early windows of opportunity such as the 
revolutions and the change of power was crucial in the results of reforms. Public and international 
support were also important in maintaining governments' attitude towards reform and international 
support, as will be discussed below. 
4.4 The popular support for reform 
Public support has influenced the initial and subsequent choices of policies, as well as the 
continuity, comprehensiveness, coherence and credibility of reforms. It has acted both as a catalyst 
58 Phinnemore, D., "Stuck in the 'Grey Zone'? - Fears and Frustrations in Romania's Quest for EU 
membership", Paper Presented at a UACES Conference, April 2000. 
59 Däianu, "Where Are Post-Communist Countries Heading to? ", p. 2; Cosca, "Panel Discussion: Structural 
Change and Macroeconomic Policies"; Jackson, "Political Incredibility and Bureaucratic Transition in 
Romania", p. 553. 
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for and a brake on reforms, by affecting governments' attitude towards reform, the international 
support and the policy mix. So, how did public support influence the path and results of transition? 
First, the initial high public support for radical reforms was a catalyst for the implementation and 
early success of the Polish shock therapy programme. On the other hand, in 1989 the low 
enthusiasm of the Romanian population to bear the short term costs of transition led to the choice 
by the first post revolution government of making gradual reforms. The attempt of the Roman 
government to introduce a radical reform package in 1991 was stopped by the street protests of the 
miners. They feared the unemployment that would result from the closure of the mines and they 
demonstrated in Bucharest asking for the resignation of the PM. Giving in to the pressure from the 
public, the reshuffled Romanian government slowed down economic reforms. 6° 
Second, public support for democracy or economic reforms has impacted upon the external 
credibility and support for the government. In the early 1990s public demonstrations were a test for 
the democratic maturity of the Romanian ruling class. The University Square protests against the 
return to power of the post-communists were severely suppressed by the authorities. Many of the 
participants were jailed, thus putting under question the respect of human rights in Romania. 
Similar doubts over democracy in Romania were raised by the miners' violence in Bucharest on 
13-15 June 1991. Popular unrest and the non democratic measures taken by the government led to 
the stopping of international financial and diplomatic support for the Romanian authorities, on 
human rights grounds. The EEC stopped the negotiation of the association agreement and Pharc 
funding. Other international financial institutions did the same 61 This led to a further slowdown in 
the economic reforms initiated by the Romanian government. The frequent protests in Poland in the 
early 1990s also created an image of political instability. This was seen, however, as a by-product 
of the radical reforms implemented, and not as a sign of opposition to market economy or 
democracy. Hence, it did not have a negative effect on the international support offered to Poland. 
Third, public support for reforms has been rather volatile in the first decade of transition, both in 
Romania and Poland, thus affecting governments' attitude towards reform. This was due to several 
factors. Reforms were seen as a guarantor of a better life, but the early results of transition were a 
fall in production, increased inflation, rising unemployment and an overall deterioration of the 
quality of life, regardless of the type of policies applied. The cost was borne unevenly by the 
population, creating losers and winners of transition. 62 This discrepancy between expectations and 
reality made public support for a certain government or type of policies short lived 63 This led to 
several government reshuffles in both countries and to changes of power through elections. 
Between 1990 and 2002 the pendulum of power swung between right and left and Poland was ruled 
60 Stolojan, "Policy Making in Romania", p. 10. 
61 The Guardian, 12 November 1991. 
62 Balcerowicz, Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, p. 263. 
63 Gomulka, p. 91. 
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by nine prime ministers, one of whom served twice64 Up to the present Romania also changed 
seven prime ministers. However, popular unrest has affected to different extents the continuity and 
comprehensiveness of reforms. In Romania many policy changes were made as a result of pressure 
by trade unions, transforming the policies into stop-and-go policies 65 On the other hand, successive 
governments in Poland have maintained a fairly unitary approach to reform, thus ensuring positive 
results66 The Polish authorities proved more resilient to strikes and popular unrest. Furthermore, 
the leaders were prepared to fall from power for adopting the right, but unpopular policies, rather 
than to sacrifice reforms for the sake of their own portfolio. 67 
Finally, public support for reforms was expressed through the mechanism of free elections and thus 
determined a change in the policy mix. It sanctioned reforms that were both too fast and too slow 
reforms. The negative results of the shock therapy on the standard of living of Poles led to the 
election of post-communists in 1993 and the adoption of more gradual policies with regard to 
privatisation. On the other hand, the disillusionment of the Romanian population with the results of 
the post-1996 democratic governments led to the rise of the nationalistic Greater Romania Party, 
the return of post-communists and the adoption of a more radical package of macroeconomic and 
microeconomic reforms. A similar trend was noticed in Polish politics at the 2001 election 68 The 
return of post-communists in Poland also gave a new impetus to reforms and to preparations for EU 
membership, enhancing a political virtuous circle in Poland. 
To sum up, popular support has had an important effect on the policy mix, the governments' 
attitude towards reform, external support and hence on the path and results of transition in general. 
Public support has influenced greatly the pace, the continuity, the comprehensiveness and 
credibility of economic reforms and more so in Romania than in Poland. Both rapid and gradual 
reforms create public discontent, but slow reforms, or no reforms at all, are bound to produce 
higher dissatisfaction or 'social fatigue', as in Romania. It is, thus, imperative that governments 
pursue measures to diminish social fatigue and to ensure public backing for their policies. 
International factors are equally important in creating and maintaining support for economic 
reforms as will be discussed below. 
4.5 The role of international organisations 
The path and results of transition depended to a great extent on support from the international 
organisations such as the European Union, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank 
64 The Economist, 27 October 2001, p. 6. 
65 DAianu, "Where Are Post-Communist Countries Heading to? ", p. 2; Jackson, "Political Incredibility and 
Bureaucratic Transition in Romania", p. 553; Stolojan, "Policy Making in Romania", Paper at a World Bank 
Conference in Romania, p. 4. 
66 The Economist, 27 October 2001, p. 6; Balcerowicz, Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, p. 322; 
European Commission, "2002 Regular Report on Poland's Progress towards Accession", p. 36-38 67 Interview with Expert at the European Commission Delegation in Bucharest, Romania, 2000. 
68 Elections around the world, Elections in Poland, http: //www. electionworld. org/election/poland. htm. 
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or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The present section will 
mainly refer to the impact of the international financial institutions (IFIs) mentioned above. The 
importance of the accession process in providing motivation and assistance for economic reforms 
will be discussed in chapter six. 
The role of the IFIs in supporting economic reforms has been largely acknowledged by academics 
and practitioners and can be synthesised in three main points. First, the IFIs have provided financial 
means for the implementation of the macro-stabilisation and privatisation policies, as well as for 
easing the cost of transition 69 Macroeconomic multilateral financing was offered, the lenders 
including the IMF. The IFIs provided Poland a stabilisation fund in 1990 to help establish currency 
convertibility. 70 This was a main element for the success of the shock therapy in increasing the 
number of private companies in the trade sector which became an engine of growth in the early 
1990s in the Polish economy. 71 Furthermore, full currency convertibility was an important 
incentive for foreign investors in Poland and the lack thereof has constituted a deterrent to FDI in 
Romania. 72 For example, the IFIs also offered special balance of payments financing, which 
comprised debt write-offs, rescheduling and concessionary restructuring. Poland has benefited 
greatly from this type of assistance 3 The IMF was essential for the resolution of Poland's debt 
restructuring talks with the commercial banks. 74 Debt restructuring was an important condition for 
fostering FDI. The World Bank and the EBRD also financed specific projects on concessionary 
terms and participated in privatisation in both countries. 's Finally, the IFIs provided funds for the 
establishment of social safety nets necessary in order to attenuate the costs of transition. 76 
Second, the IMF and the World Bank have had an important structural impact in the Romanian and 
Polish economies. Training, consultancy and macro-economic policy advice were given to 
governments and civil servants. " For example, the shock therapy program applied in Poland was 
designed in co-operation with IMF representatives. IMF consultancy was also given for the 1991 
and 1997 macroeconomic stabilisation programmes applied in Romania. The IMF consultancy has 
ensured a relative policy continuity in transition and the economic and political conditions set by 
the IFIs in the release the financial support acted as landmarks of the reform programmes. ' The 
69 Lavigne, M, The Economics of Transition from Socialist Economy to Market Economy, MacMillan, 
London, 1995, p. 234. 
70 Mohammed, A. A., "The Role of International Financial Institutions", Hardt, P. and Kaufman, R. F. (eds. ), 
East- Central European Economies in Transition, M. E. Sharpe, New York, 1995, p. 199. 
71 Balcerowicz, Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, p. 239. 
72 European Commission, "Opinion on Poland's Application for Membership of the European Union", July 
1997, p. 27. 
73 Mohammed, "The Role of International Financial Institutions", p. 193. 
74 Balcerowicz, Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, p. 235. 
75 Mohammed, "The Role of International Financial Institutions", p. 201. 
76 Mohammed, "The Role of International Financial Institutions", p. 201. 
77 Lavigne, The Economics of Transition, p. 234; Mohammed, "The Role of International Financial 
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106 
IMF support was equally a measure of the credibility of the reforms. As a result, more credibility 
was given to rapid than to gradual reforms. 
Third, the IMF structural loans were a green light for credit from other financial institutions and 
for FDL79 The fact that Romania had not met the IMF requirements in the early 1990s was 
reflected in the low credibility for its reforms and low FDI inflows, at least up to 2000. On the 
other hand, the IMF initial support for economic reforms in Poland ensured high external 
credibility and further financial, technical and diplomatic support for transition and accession into 
the EU. Furthermore, the small number of standby agreements with Poland to the present is a 
strong sign of the early recovery of the Polish economy and of its capability of obtaining finance 
through other means. Moreover, the participation of the EBRD and the World Bank in privatisation 
can be seen as a guarantee of a good investment, thus attracting private foreign investors. 80 
Despite their generally positive impact on economic reforms, the technical and financial assistance 
from international organisations had certain limitations. A thorough assessment of these limitations 
is beyond the scope of this study but a few references will be made, nevertheless. First, the very 
concept of assistance has been rather ambiguous. For example, technical assistance was at times 
inadequate, provided by individuals or institutions who did not have enough knowledge of 
transition countries or just wanted to learn about business opportunities in the area. 8' Second, the 
financial means deployed for helping the CEECs were not sufficient, nor was the FDI induced by 
these. 82 The grant element in the assistance has been very low, there has been a huge gap between 
commitments and actual disbursements, and the credits offered generated further indebtedness. In 
Romania, the accumulation of foreign debts towards the late 1990s posed a threat in terms of 
inability to pay and this acted as a deterrent to FDI. 63 Third, assistance has been tied or 
conditional. 84 IMF conditionality is binding and shows a lack of flexibility. For example, in 1990 
the IMF warned Poland of the withdrawal of support should inflation rise again. 85 In 1994 concerns 
were expressed by the Polish authorities that loans would be lost should privatisation be further 
delayed. 86 Between 1997 and 1999 the same conditionality led in Romania to an increased feeling 
that economic policy was devised outside the country. 87 The lack of flexibility of the IMF 
agreements combined with the incapability of several Romanian governments to fulfil the criteria 
79 Mohammed, "The Role of International Financial Institutions", p. 193, p. 197; The Guardian, 8 March 
1993. 
80 Interview with Expert in Foreign Direct Investment in the CEECs, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
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for obtaining financing led to several instalments being either annulled, or delayed. 88 This had an 
important negative impact on the course of macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reforms in 
Romania, as well as on the governments' external credibility. Fourth, there were shortcomings 
related to the administrative conditions and red tape required to release the funding, and there 
seemed to be a lack of an overall vision in the assistance offered to the CEECs. 89 Finally, the 
agreements with the international organisations did not address long run issues which had, 
however, a negative impact on people. Amongst such issues were the management of joint 
enterprises or the restructuring of the state-owned enterprises which could not be privatised. 90 
Some of the limitations of the IFIs intervention were addressed towards the end of the decade inter 
alia through the promotion of measures aimed at economic growth rather than simply 
macroeconomic stabilisation 91 
To sum up, despite certain limitations, the international financial organisations have had a largely 
positive impact on economic reforms. They have not only provided capital for government and 
investors and landmarks for reforms, but have equally increased the external credibility of the 
recipient countries. Poland has benefited greatly from the credibility given by the IMF at the 
beginning of transition whilst Romania's frequent failure to meet the criteria set by the IMF 
accentuated the negative perception of the country. External support for Poland contributed 
towards a virtuous political circle of determinants of transition and accession for most of the 
decade, while the lesser support for Romania and Romania's failure to meet the set criteria had a 
smaller potential for creating a virtuous political circle of determinants of transition and accession 
to the EU. As a result, Romania was in a vicious political circle until 1996. 
4.6 The policy mix 
Several studies of the determinants of transition to a market economy have concluded that the main 
differences between the transformation of the candidate countries were due to different policy 
measures as discussed in chapter two. However, this hypothesis seems to be contradicted by the 
successful transformation of both Hungary and Poland resulting from different policy mixes. 
Furthermore, the interplay between the policy mix, the initial conditions, the public support for 
reform and the international assistance seems to suggest that policy mixes alone cannot explain the 
variety of results in transition so far. The following section presents a brief analysis of the main 
policy mixes applied in Poland and Romania by various governments since 1989, aiming to capture 
the elements which have favoured Poland's early achievement of a market economy as defined by 
the Copenhagen criteria of 1993. These criteria included: liberalisation of prices, liberalisation of 
88 EBRD, Investment Profile. Romania, London, 2001, p. 8. 
89 Lavigne, The Economics of Transition, p. 238. 
90 Stolojan, "Policy Making in Romania", p. 7. 
91 Bal, A., "Träsäturi generale ale procesului de tranzijie la economia dc pia(ä In järile foste comuniste" in 
Popa, I. (co-ord. ), Tranzi fie si reformä, Editura Economicä, Bucurc$ti, 2001, p. 31. 
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trade, stabilisation of the economy, reform of the financial sector, patterns of ownership, quality of 
human and physical capital, quality of infrastructure and establishment of free trade . 
92 
Three periods are considered: 1990 to 1997,1997 to 2000 and 2000 to 2002. These correspond 
roughly to the alternation in Romanian politics between the post-communists, the Christian 
democrats and the post-communists revamped as social democrats. With the exception of 1989- 
1993, when Solidarity formed the governments in Poland, the alternation between post-communists 
and democrats in Poland corresponded to the alternation in Romania. The Polish post-1989 
transformation started with an impressive programme of shock therapy aimed at stabilising the 
economy. This approach adopted by the fmance minister Balccrowicz set the tone and the pace of 
Polish transition but had to be abandoned due to loss of popular support. Between 1993 and 1997 
the shock therapy was followed by a gradual approach to privatisation under post-communists. In 
1997, the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), the heir of Solidarity, launched comprehensive 
reforms at the expense of some macroeconomic imbalances. The return of post-communists in 
2001 led to emphasis on growth and job creation. For most of the transition period, Poland has 
been the 'Eastern European tiger', with impressive economic growth and increasing FDI annual 
inflows. However, towards 2000, Poland faced a slowdown and now Poland is making efforts to 
achieve economic recovery. 
On the other hand, Romania started with a gradual approach and a search for macroeconomic 
stabilisation between 1990 and 1996. Between 1997 and 2000 the Romanian governments launched 
a shock therapy macroeconomic stabilisation programme and started the deep restructuring of the 
economy. Prudent macroeconomic policies, deep restructuring, economic growth and social 
protection have been promoted since 2000. Faced with the alternation of boom and bust for most of 
the decade, Romania is finally on an ascending path of economic growth and is making efforts to 
maintain the pace of restructuring in order to complete the transition to a market economy by 2004. 
So, what were the main policies which determined this economic performance in each country? 
4.6.1 Two initial approaches to economic reforms: the Polish shock therapy and the 
Romanian gradual approach 
The shock therapy initiated in Poland was formulated by the first post-1989 finance minister and 
deputy prime minister, Balcerowicz, with the support of the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank 93 The package was also known as the 'Big Bang'. Its main policies were presented in 
chapter two and in appendix 4A94 The motivation of such a radical programme lay in several 
92 European Commission, "The Accession Criteria", http: //www. europa. eu. int 
93 Bal, "Träsäturi generale ale procesului de tranzilie", p. 91; Balcerowicz, Transformation from Socialism to 
Capitalism, pp. 295-297. 
94 The main policies which formed the shock therapy applied by the Balcerowicz government in Poland in 
1989 were: rapid price liberalisation in order to eliminate the excess of monetary supply and to internalise 
international prices; immediate openness towards foreign trade and FDI in order to eliminate the excess 
demand and to expose industries to foreign competition inducing a better allocation of resources; 
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factors. First, the previous gradual attempts to reform the system in 1980,1981-1982 and 1988 had 
proven unsuccessful. The system could not be reformed, a radical transformation was needed. 
Second, the shortages and hyperinflation needed tough monetary and fiscal policies to stabilise the 
economy. Third, the structure of the system was the main cause of shortages and inflation through a 
vast misallocation of resources and thus a fundamental institutional transformation was needed. 
Fourth, the interplay between liberalisation, macroeconomic stabilisation and institutional change 
required a strong co-ordination of these policies. Fifth, psychological research also shows that 
people adapt better to radical changes rather than gradual ones, so a radical policy was preferred. 
Any delay or gradual approach would have accentuated the disequilibria and postponed indefinitely 
the deep restructuring of the economy, as happened in Romania. Finally, the period of 
extraordinary politics, when people tend to work for the common good in the aftermath of a change 
of such magnitude as the fall of Communism, tends to be short95 
However, experience has shown that this type of approach had several limitations. First, it ignored 
the inertia of the economic and political environment in transition. This was determined by the 
divergent interests of members of the ruling class and of the population, as well as by the lack of 
transparency of information. Second, the time frame was misperceived and it was wrongly 
supposed that social and economic processes can take place overnight. There was a huge gap 
between the expectations of the population in terms of increasing the standard of living and the 
early results of the shock therapy, which actually led to a worsening of living conditions. Third, the 
social and economic costs of such an approach had been seriously underestimated. " Thus, initially 
the shock therapy led to a fall in output and investment, a higher budget deficit, an increase in 
inflation and in unemployment and a drop in the standard of living 97 Strikes and government 
reshuffles became common place and ultimately led to a change in power in 1993 and subsequently 
a more gradual approach to reforms. 
convertibility of the national currency after a substantial devaluation to be used as an anti-inflationary anchor 
and instrument for stimulating exports; fiscal austerity, including subsidy cuts in order to balance the budget, 
diminish inflationary pressure and require enterprises to restructure; launch of rapid privatisation plans in 
order to determine a change in ownership and the creation of an entrepreneurial class conducive to increased 
efficiency, productivity and economic growth; financial and advisory support from the main international 
financial institutions to ensure the financial resources and the credibility necessary for reforms. (See Dal, 
"Träsäturi generale ale procesului de tuanzipe", p. 85; Sachs, J. and Zinnes, E., "The Gains from Privatization 
in Transition Economies: Is 'Change of Ownership! Enough? ", C4ER Discussion Paper No. 63, February 
2000, p. 1. ) To stop the inflationary spiral two anchors were used: fixed exchange rates and wage controls. 
The strategy also provided for the reduction and the restructuring of the foreign debt, as well as for a social 
safety net. A stabilisation fund of USD 2 billion was immediately made available by the IMF in support of 
the reform package. (See Balcerowicz, Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, p. 296; Mohammed, 
"The Role of International Financial Institutions", p. 199. ) 
95 Balcerowicz, L., Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, p. 307 and p. 320. 
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Despite its high short run cost in terms of the standard of living of the population, the shock 
therapy implemented in Poland has had several positive effects. This positive impact was 
accentuated by the fact that the main provisions of reforms were continued by the post-Balccrowicz 
governments until 1993.98 For example, although the 1992 Olszewski government favoured a 
relaxation of the previous governments' stringent policies, they recognised the importance of 
retaining the confidence of the IMF and thus no other major alterations to previous reforms were 
made99 The 1992 Olszewski government only switched the emphasis from tightening inflation to 
halting recession through investment in state enterprises and encouraging exports. 100 the shock 
therapy programme eliminated the queues and shortages which had characterised the last years of 
communism. It achieved macroeconomic stabilisation, thus laying the foundations for attracting 
FDI and enhancing institution restructuring. It led to a huge improvement in the structure of 
relative prices and incentives for exports, input saving and quality enhancing innovations. 101 It 
encouraged the growth of the private sector which became an engine for economic growth in 
subsequent periods. 102 Furthermore, the debt restructuring and the macroeconomic stabilisation 
achieved under the program were part of the necessary conditions for attracting foreign direct 
investors. Finally, the program was accompanied by a prolific legislative programme which 
enhanced institution building, thus improving the investment climate. 103 Above all, the shock 
therapy program gained credibility and support for Poland by showing that the country was 
determined to break with the past and embark on irreversible reforms. This contributed to 
maintaining financial support from the international financial organisations and support by EU 
member states for Poland's integration into the European Union. It set the country on an 
irreversible path of transition, subsequent reforms benefiting from these early results. It created the 
conditions for a political virtuous circle which then enhanced the virtuous economic one. 
Furthermore, the shock therapy created the conditions for a full virtuous economic circle starting in 
1993. 
The anticipated elections of 1993 brought into power a coalition between the Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD) and the Peasant Party (PSL). They were both pro-market economy but PSL was 
advocating more government intervention in the economy. The programme proposed by PM 
Pawlak aimed to achieve a reduction in unemployment, an increase in welfare spending, low 
interest rates to encourage investment and an increase in the debt relief to industry to accelerate 
restructuring of the economy-104 Despite numerous governments reshuffles and regardless of an 
increased debate over privatisation between 1993 and 1997, the continuity of economic reforms 
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was ensured through the 'Strategy for Poland' adopted in 1994. This strategy was aimed at export 
and investment led growth, continued disinflation and sound public finance. The comprehensive 
reforms envisaged ranged from reorganisation and decentralisation of public administration to the 
integration of the shadow economy into the official one. 105 The 'Package 2000' adopted thereafter 
focused on the requirements of EU accession and more specifically on the need for greater fiscal 
discipline and the channelling of national savings into investment. 106 
These policies were successful in bringing macroeconomic stabilisation and an end to recession. 
The Polish economy which started to grow in 1992 returned to its pre-transition output level in 
1995 and by 1997 was still growing strongly. 107 Furthermore, the budget deficit had been reduced 
to just below 3% of nominal GDP. Thus, in its 'Opinion' on Poland's progress in preparing for EU 
membership, the European Commission considered that: 'In 1997 the policy framework for 
maintaining macroeconomic stability was largely into place'. 108 Furthermore, by 1997 privatisation 
was on its way. However, the main engine of privatisation and growth were the newly created 
enterprises, rather than the formal privatisation of state assets. This growth in new private 
enterprises was facilitated by the liberal rules on establishing a business, modest tax incentives, 
decentralised trade policy and currency convertibility. 109 Further discussion about the privatisation 
process will be included in chapter five in the larger context of the investment climate. All these 
achievements by the time of the 1997 elections set the stage for more comprehensive reforms in the 
Polish economy and society. They also placed Poland amongst the frontrunncrs of economic 
transition, a fact reflected in the'Opinion' and in the recommendation by the European Commission 
that Poland would start accession negotiations as part of the then fast track candidates for EU 
enlargement. 
On the other hand, given the initial conditions described previously, Romania adopted initially a 
gradual programme of reforms. Furthermore, the first measures taken by the post-1989 Romanian 
government were meant to improve the standard of living of the population. Not only did they not 
start any sort of economic reform, but they worsened the economic conditions of the country. First, 
the high demand for consumer goods which the Romanian population had been much deprived of 
during the last ten years led to a large increase in imports and a severe reduction of exports. This 
consumption boost was financed primarily by dis-saving and the depletion of foreign exchange 
reserves. 110 Furthermore, high imports spurred inflation and increased the budget deficit. Second, 
the government put an end to the rationing of electricity for households and continued to subsidise 
it. This was achieved at the expense of companies which saw cuts in their electricity supplies and 
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1997, p. 33. 
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thus had to cut their production. Furthermore, by subsiding electricity the waste of resources 
continued. "' Third, the introduction of a five-day working week led to a further decrease in 
output. "2 Fourth, by accepting an increase in wages in the absence of an increase in output, 
inflation was fuelled, leading to macroeconomic instability and a further deterioration of the 
standard of living. Overall, while busy trying to improve the life of the population, the post-1989 
Romanian governments achieved the opposite. These policies determined a vicious circle of 
economic development which then impacted on the political circle. 
This rapid deterioration of the economy was the justification for a stabilisation plan supported by 
the IMF which was introduced at the start of 1991. This programme implied that liberalisation 
would take place in several phases and that stabilisation through monetary and fiscal policies would 
be moderate rather than strict. Price controls and trade restrictions were abolished gradually. The 
exchange rate was still not unified. Subsidies were gradually eliminated through a policy of hard 
budget constraints and monetary policy was directed towards positive interest rates. Privatisation 
was planned to take place in several phases, including large and small scale privatisation. The 
programme was meant to be supported through external sources of finance which would contribute 
to the modernisation of the economy. The programme also aimed to cover the social cost as soon as 
they occurred. 113 
The motivation for this gradual approach to reforms lay in several factors. First, given the poor 
state of the nation, the priority of the first post-1989 Romanian government was to increase the 
standard of living of the population rather than to take drastic measures regarding the economy. As 
a result, there were no serious attempts to deal with the macroeconomic imbalances before 
November 1990. Second, as Roman's attempt to introduce radical reforms filed, it was assumed 
that a transformation over a longer period of time would 'tame' the costs of the process and 
economic reforms would gain more supporters. Furthermore, there was no real change of power 
until the elections of 1996 and no political class with a genuine pro-market thinking. This made 
difficult the design and application of a revolutionary economic strategy such as the one suggested 
by Balcerowicz at the beginning of transition. The attempts of Roman to introduce radical reforms 
met popular protests. Moreover, the economy still had some reserves that would sustain populist 
measures in the short run. The crisis of the economy was still contained: inflation and 
unemployment were hidden, there was no foreign debt. Furthermore, foreign reserves and some 
'soft' loans from international organisations could be used to create an impression of a better life, 
but only in the short run. ' 14 Additionally, the government gave in to the pressure of the population 
when more radical reforms were proposed. Finally, the two parliamentary and presidential elections 
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in May 1990 and May 1992 interfered with the course of reforms by increasing the bias towards 
populist measures. 
Despite potential benefits, the gradualist approach ignored several factors. First, by disregarding 
the interaction between liberalisation, macroeconomic stabilisation and institutional change, this 
approach perpetuated the disequilibrium in the economy and failed to ensure superior economic 
mechanisms. "' Second, the slow change consolidated the position of those who opposed it, making 
the pace of reforms even slower. The position of managers and employees in loss making 
companies was strengthened and their say in blocking the privatisation or the closing down of 
factories. A delay in the restructuring of the mining sector made worse the situation of the miners. 
This resulted in further protests such as the ones in 1991 which led to the fall of the Roman 
government. ' 16 Third, with no quick positive visible results, this approach perpetuated a negative 
image externally. This limited the support of international institutions available and thus lessened 
its impact on enhancing economic reforms and potentially creating a virtuous circle of economic 
development. 
However, the IMF-based reform programme did not manage to stop inflation. It also brought to 
surface several growing tensions in the system. There were insufficient inflows of foreign capital to 
compensate for the low levels of domestic savings. The overvalued official exchange rate 
discouraged exports. The artificially low prices for energy and raw materials encouraged their over- 
consumption. Many exporters and importers found a way out by making barter deals, which 
introduced an implicit exchange rate into the functioning of the economy. Although this rate 
mitigated the pernicious effects of an overvaluation, it entailed considerable information and 
transaction costs. Moreover, capital flight and insufficient exports were becoming a matter of 
serious concern. Ameliorative measures were taken in the spring of 1992 through the increase of 
interest rates and of the refinancing rate of the National Bank. Furthermore, the exchange rate was 
devalued substantially and exporters were granted full retention rights, thus encouraging the 
repatriation of capital and trust in policy makers. "' Moreover, the economy was confronted with a 
growing disequilibrium: increased inflation and budget deficit, the accumulation of foreign debt, a 
severe fall in output and a deterioration of the terms of trade. ' 18 
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A change of policy was needed. A policy breakthrough was made in 1993-1994, when a more 
strict monetary and fiscal policy was adopted. 119 The results of these measures were much as 
expected. Inflation fell to an annual rate of 62% in 1994 (December on December) and there was a 
large reduction in the trade deficit. 120 Furthermore, the economy absorbed the shock of high 
positive real interest rates and of the exchange rate unification and there was no decline in 
output. 121 A major lapse of the strategy was, nevertheless, a more clear definition of property rights 
under privatisation. This could have had a very important impact on the size of capital inflows and 
the scope and intensity of restructuring. 122 The lack of deep restructuring led to only a fragile 
growth between 1995 and 1996 and to Romania relapsing into inflation. By the end of 1996 several 
worrying tendencies had emerged: a sharp rise in the trade and current account deficits, great 
distortions in relative prices, a continuous depreciation of the national currency, a rapidly 
increasing foreign debt, an increase in the unemployment rate and a consolidation of the grey 
economy. 123 By 1995, only little institutional change had appeared either through spontaneous 
processes such as massive land privatisation and the emergence of small private companies or 
through measures from above initiated by the government. These will be discussed in more detail 
in chapter five. 
To sum up, by applying a shock therapy programme, Poland eliminated many of the distortions 
inherited from the previous system, achieving macroeconomic stabilisation and the start of 
restructuring of the economy. Rapid price liberalisation led to one inflationary shock rather than to 
several ones, full convertibility encouraged exports and hence economic growth, while the cut in 
subsidies forced firms to restructure and become increasingly competitive. A permissive legislative 
framework encouraged small private enterprises which became the engine of economic growth. 
Foreign investment contributed to privatisation and economic growth. On the other hand, the 
perpetual macroeconomic disequilibrium in the Romanian economy was largely induced by the 
incoherent policies, gradual liberalisation and the slow restructuring. As a result of the gradual 
price liberalisation, inflationary shocks spread over long periods, required high interest rates and 
hence discouraged investment. Lack of currency convertibility acted as a barrier to trade and 
slowed down the activity of the private sector. The persistence of subsidies maintained wasteful 
accumulation of debts. These, together with the arrears accumulated over time, constituted one of the most 
persistent brakes to the restructuring of the economy. (Ruhl, C., "Panel Discussion: Structural Change and 
Macroeconomic Policies", Romania 2000.10 Years of Transition", 2000). 
19 This included a dramatic rise in the nominal interest rate which led to positive real interest rates; a 
substantial devaluation in several stages of the official inter bank market exchange rate which lowered it to 
more or less to the value prevailing on the grey market, thus considerably reducing the entry costs for those 
in need of foreign exchange; a strict control of the monetary base led to a reduced rate of money creation; 
Finally, a tighter fiscal stance aiming towards a lower budget deficit, when corrected for the removal of some 
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practices and budget deficits and delayed the restructuring of the enterprises. The gradual approach 
to reforms consolidated the inconsistencies inherited from the communist system and delayed the 
transition to a market a economy in Romania. It also induced low credibility and little international 
support for the government. 
4.6.2 The democratic governments of 1997- 2000 
Between 1997 and 2000 both countries were run by centre-right governments. The electoral 
victories of Solidarity Election Action and of the Democratic Convention of Romania were seen 
with much optimism, both externally and internally. Bold reforms were expected, as well as a new 
impetus in the quest for EU membership in Romania. However, in neither country did results meet 
expectations, as will be seen below. 
The 1997 Polish elections brought to power a coalition of the Solidarity Election Action (AWS) 
and Freedom Union (UW) run by PM Buzek. With the macroeconomic policy framework in place, 
the Buzek government launched four giant reforms aimed at making the economy more efficient 
and more accountable. These reforms dealt with education, health care, local government and 
pensions. They were bold, but also caused short term economic pain and the public 'found them 
difficult to swallow in one gulp'' Moreover, the record was mixed. The health care reform was 
considered a failure to the extent that a 'reform of the health reforms' was needed. The changes 
made in education and in the local government were a partial success whilst the most successful 
was the reform of the pension system. ' These reforms were meant to ameliorate the budget deficit 
and to create conditions for sustainable endogenous economic growth by affecting supply side 
factors. The AWS government also imposed some restructuring on the sickest sectors of the 
economy, but not enough. The beginning of the reforms of the coal sector led to a fall in coal 
mining employment, from a peak of 420,000 to 145,000. However, experts thought that the 
industry should have lost another 70,000 before it could claim to be restructured. ' Moreover, out 
of the forty mines resulting from mergers, only one was privatiscd. 127 In the steel sector the mergers 
of the least productive mills were postponed, thus keeping the mills inefficicnt. 128 Poland's failure 
to reform its steel mills caused rows with the EU. While a new Polish law had placed strict 
limitations on direct state aid, it had not yet stopped public sector companies from receiving help 
via tax and social-security write-offs. ' This threatened to turn the political virtuous circle of 
determinants of transition and of EU accession into a vicious one. 
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Some of the positive results of the AWS government were a rapid increase in exports and in FDI, a 
reduced trade deficit, increased competitiveness and productivity. 130 Poland continued to be the 
'tiger' of Central Europe for the first years of the AWS government and to attract FDI, with a peak 
in 1998. However, a slow down in growth and increased disequilibria such as high unemployment 
and a high budget deficit characterised the end of the Buzek governmcnti131 Already in 2000 the 
growth rate fell to 4% and a further fall to 2% was anticipated, the worst since Poland had emerged 
from the shock therapy. This slow down was partially due to cyclical factors, domestic and 
external, partially to economic policy mistakes. 132 
Poland was affected. by the slowdown in the US and Europe, particularly in Germany which 
accounts for two thirds of her exports. Furthermore, Russia's financial meltdown caused also 
significant damage. Internally, the fall in consumer confidence reduced economic growth. "' On the 
other hand, the consensus over monetary and fiscal policies had weakcned. 134 Thus, the slowdown 
in investment was a result of high interest rates, a deep reduction in the preferential treatment for 
investors and a reduction in real depreciation write-offs. Another mistake was the policy of 
excessive limitations in domestic demand. Furthermore, the reduced competitiveness of the Polish 
manufacturing sector led to the appreciation of the zloty and restrictive credit rates in a situation 
when foreign entities relied on cheaper outside fmancing. 135 Finally, the Buzck government was 
accused of low efficiency of tax collection and the outflow of public funds to areas not controlled 
by the government or the parliament. 136 
The high budget deficit was partially a result of the AWS government and partially due to the left 
wing administration between 1993 and 1997.137 Poland still had one of the most generous social 
benefits system, spread thickly and widely, a legacy of the communist system not dealt with well 
enough by former governments. Furthermore, the 2000 parliament had added recklessly to 
spending. All these had led to an awkward stand off with the Central Bank, whose governor, 
Balcerowicz, insisted that interest rates should stay high until politicians could demonstrate fiscally 
responsible behaviour. 138 
The third disequilibrium was growing unemployment, from 10% of the workforce in 1998 to 16 % 
in 2001.139 The labour market was under pressure from two sides. As a result of firms trying to 
boost productivity and of job-protection clauses in privatisation contracts coming to expiry date, 
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workers were laid off. Besides, some more job seekers were coming on to the market. These were 
the baby boomers of the early 1980s resulting from the imposition of the martial law. Increased 
unemployment was not only a social concern, a further strain on the budget and a sign of 
deterioration of the standard of living, but it was equally an alarming factor as regarded Poland's 
accession to the EU. Member states such as Germany and Austria were concerned that unemployed 
would flood their labour markets, thus making a strong argument for long periods of transition for 
the freedom of movement of labour. 140 This shows again how reforms affected EU membership 
and how the CEECs needed EU's support in order to ensure both political and an economic 
virtuous circle of development. 
As a result, Poland was placed the tenth amongst the leading candidates for EU membership. 
Moreover, in 2000 there was for the first time talk of a possible first round of EU enlargement 
without Poland, as pointed out in chapter three. The 2000 Regular Report on Poland noted that 'a 
new momentum in reforms and in progress towards EU membership' was nccdcd. 141 It was a signal 
that the virtuous economic circle needed a new impetus in order to remain a virtuous one, rather 
than to change into a vicious one. This new momentum appeared with the parliamentary elections 
of 2001 when the post-communists led by Miller won and formed the new government. The 
measures taken by the Miller government and the results so far will be discussed later. 
How did the Romanian democratic governments of 1996-2000 deal with economic reforms? Given 
that the pre-1996 gradual policies had failed to ensure macroeconomic stability and institutional 
restructuring, in 1997 the Ciorbea government implemented a more radical reform program with 
the technical and financial support of the IMF and the World Bank. The most important challenge 
of the program was to pursue all policies in parallel and fully, a lesson learned from the previous 
attempts at reform. The main policies included: rapid privatisation of the former state owned 
enterprises; the liberalisation of the foreign exchange market and of other prices which were still 
administratively regulated; the cessation of subsidies, except for mining and agriculture; the 
creation of efficient markets, including the capital and land markets; macroeconomic stabilisation 
through a tight fiscal policy and a monetary policy which allowed a free flotation of the national 
currency; the provision of safety nets for those most affected by reforms. 142 Fifty enterprises per 
week were to be privatised. The restructuring of monopolies such as water and energy was a 
priority. Bank restructuring and privatisation was also crucial. The inter-enterprise arrears were to 
be eliminated . 
14' By letting the currency float freely it was expected that exports would become 
more competitive and thus boost economic growth. Furthermore, by freeing the remaining 
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controlled prices a better reallocation of resources was anticipated and a push towards restructuring 
was envisaged. The cessation or reduction of subsidies was meant to diminish the budget deficit 
and to put pressure on firms to restructure. It was however, considered that agriculture and mining 
would still need protection for social reasons. The creation of efficient markets was a central point 
in accelerating transition to a market economy, with potential spillover of ects. Both markets were 
necessary in fostering investment and especially FDI, with anticipated positive results on the 
institutional transformation. A 10% reduction of the government bureaucracy and a reduction of 
health and research and development budgets were accompanied by an increase in government 
revenues through the rise of certain taxes. The safety nets for those most affected by reforms were 
meant to eliminate the risk of social unrest that would lead to abandoning the reforms. 
Unfortunately, the government lacked a long term perspective in this mattcr. '4' 
The results of the 1997 macroeconomic stabilisation shock programme were mixed and can be 
interpreted as the beginning of a second transformational reccssion. 143 On the positive side, the 
foreign exchange market began to function properly. The consolidated budget deficit was reduced 
to 3.7% of the GDP. The current account deficit shrank from 7.2% to 6.6% of GDP and the Central 
Bank's foreign exchange reserves soared to about USD 2 bn. 146 On the negative side, inflation did 
not fall, but reached a rate of 151%. GDP fell by -6.6%, much more than the expected -2%. 147 The 
large contraction of real credit considerably lowered the prospects for many small and medium- 
sized companies and it was a major factor in the fall of output. Finally, the high austerity led to a 
further expansion of the underground economy, which in turn led to demands for further fiscal 
relaxation! " All in all, the macroeconomic mix was not well balanced and the supply side 
response had been greatly overestimated. The loss of public support affected negatively the 
consistency and results of reforms, delaying the appearance of a strong virtuous circle in the 
political sphere. 
Although the government pledged to privatise fifty enterprises per week, privatisation was delayed 
for several reasons. The post 1996 government was affected by internal squabbling and conflicts of 
interests which led to several reshuffles and thus impeded the continuity of reforms. The inter- 
enterprises arrears and the debts towards the state budget were deterrents to privatisation of the 
former state owned enterprises. The slow reforms in the banking system further delayed the 
improvement of payments. The fear of unemployment made privatisation contracts include clauses 
forbidding lay-offs, thus limiting the freedom of the new owners and the attractiveness of the sales 
in the first places. The privatisation of the energy sector, the hard-core of the economy, was 
politically sensitive and thus its delay maintained the resources misallocation within the economy. 
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Furthermore, the increased fiscal burden, corruption, bureaucracy and the expensive credits were 
not appropriate conditions for job creation by small and medium enterprises. Finally, the 
macroeconomic situation and the business climate in general were not conducive to FDI. 149 A 
break-through was made, however, in 1998. Following a more thorough understanding of the need 
to restructure in order to create the basis for lasting macroeconomic stabilisation and as a result of 
negative assessments by the EU, the Romanian government intensified the efforts to privatise large 
former state owned enterprises and achieved a few good deals with foreign investors. These 
included the sale of the national car manufacturer to Renault and the privatisation of the National 
Telecommunication Company. 150 Further discussion on the evolution of privatisation will be 
contained in chapter five, part one. 
Economic recovery started during the Isärescu govemment. 151 Building on the results of the shock 
therapy applied in 1997 and on the new impetus in privatisation, this government focused primarily 
on promoting export led economic growth. The reforms proposed were part of the 'Medium Term 
Economic Strategy' which was in tune with the requirements of EU membership. Furthermore, the 
strategy was the subject of public debate and was endorsed by all political parties, thus promising a 
certain continuity of reforms, regardless of the results of the parliamentary elections of 2000. Strict 
financial discipline, an attractive business climate and appropriate rewards for work were the key 
directions of the programme. 152 For more details, see also appendix 4A. Overall, the investment 
climate began to improve under the Isärescu government. 153 Although the macroeconomic situation 
was still fragile and inflation had increased, there were signs of gradual improvement. The large 
reduction in the current account deficit, the full and timely repayment of all external obligations 
and the rebuilding of the official reserves were considered important achievements by the Regular 
Report of the European Commission. ' Furthermore, the revival of exports and real GDP growth in 
the first half of 2000 were encouraging signs that recent policy efforts had a positive impact on the 
economy. However, the Report also noted that the authorities' ambitious plans to accelerate the 
privatisation and restructuring of the large loss-making public companies had proven difficult to 
implement. It was considered that the business investment climate was still affected by legal, 
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political and economic uncertainty, a non-functioning financial system and unclear property rights, 
factors which had deterred foreign investors. '55 
To sum up, Poland and Romania's policies between 1997 and 2000 were determined greatly by the 
results of previous reform measures, by each governments' own agenda, as well as by public and 
international support. Having achieved macroeconomic stability, Poland was now ready for more 
comprehensive reforms, for enhancing exports and attracting FDI. Despite reshuffles and political 
bickering, Poland remained until 1998 the 'tiger' of Central and Eastern Europe and attracted in 
1998 a record level of FDI. However, due to the poor co-ordination of reforms, several 
disequilibria resulted and compromised the virtuous economic of development towards the end of 
the period. Given its half way reforms at the beginning of transition, Romania still needed to 
stabilise the economy through a shock therapy type programme which led to a second 
transformational recession. By complementing the macroeconomic stabilisation programme with a 
bold privatisation programme, the government aimed to speed up marketisation and accession to 
the EU, thus creating the conditions for a future virtuous economic circle. The emergence of a full 
political circle was postponed partially due to the coalition infighting and the fall in support for 
radical reforms towards the end of the period. However, the Isärescu government managed to foster 
economic growth in 2000 by applying strict financial discipline, encouraging exports and 
improving the investment climate. This has formed the basis for a virtuous circle of economic 
development. FDI became an engine of privatisation and of economic development and attracting 
FDI became the main priority of the government as will be discussed in chapter five. 
4.6.3 Post-communists back into power: 2001 onwards 
The SLD government run by Miller came to power in Poland when the economy was slowing 
down. Already in 2000 the growth rate had fallen to 4% and a further fall to 2% was anticipated, 
the worst since Poland had emerged from the shock therapy. 136 Moreover, disequilibria such as a 
high budget deficit and high unemployment represented serious challenges. Thus, the objectives of 
the Miller government were to bring the budget under control and to create jobs. His programme 
called for the state to stimulate investment and the modernisation of the economy and could be 
summed up in four words: support, assistance, subsidies and guarantccs. ls1 The main way to reduce 
the budget deficit was by streamlining down the state, starting with the state agencies funded by the 
state but outside the control of government. Cutting social benefits was not favoured as that would 
drag down growth even further. Cutting taxes on businesses and increasing the flexibility of the 
labour markets were meant to spur economic growth. 158 The Miller government considered that a 
remedy for high unemployment was the use of public funds to protect and create new jobs. The 
introduction of tax breaks, of a system for the revaluation and depreciation of fixed assets and of 
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additional incentives were meant to guarantee a stable flow of foreign capital in the form of both 
direct and portfolio investments. 159 The SLD also vowed to concentrate its privatisation efforts on 
heavy industry. This was expected to boost the budget both by generating revenue and by removing 
the need for further subsidies. In the absence of strategic investors, stock market listing was 
considered an alternative for some companies. 160 Important conditions for overcoming the crisis 
were a better co-ordination of monetary and economic policies, further reductions of interest rates 
in line with European standard. A change was planned in privatisation by moving away from the 
practice whereby profitable companies were privatised and the loss making ones continued to be 
subsidised. 161 So, how did this programme work in practice? 
The situation in 2002 was mixed. After the fall in economic growth experienced in 2001,2002 can 
be considered a year of slow economic recovery characterised by an increase in industrial 
production, a low inflation and an improved balance of trade. 
162 Data from the National Bank of 
Poland (NBP) shows that from June to September the GDP grew by 1.9% mainly as a result of 
increased domestic demand and exports. 163 However, much of the domestic consumption was based 
on previous savings, thus making the prospect of permanent recovery in Poland less likely. 
164 
Compared to 2001 revenues from privatisation dropped tremendously and so did the FDI inflow. 
This was partly because the privatisation process was close to completion. There were, 
nevertheless, prospects of a future increase to a level of USD 8 bn in 2005.165 Entrepreneurs 
considered 2002 a positive year but an European economic survey noticed a deterioration of the 
investment climate. Furthermore on the positive side, export sales increased while unemployment 
decreased slightly. Finally, there were prospects for growth for 2003 and favourable forecasts for 
industrial production while exports showed that the economy was overcoming stagnation. 166For a 
synthetic account of the policies pursued and their results, see also appendix 4A. 
In Romania, the change of government through the 2000 elections did not lead to any fundamental 
modification of the ultimate goals of the economic policy. These were strongly restated through the 
approval of Romania's first pre-accession economic programme in mid-2001 and the conclusion of 
a new IMF agreement in October 2001.167 Thus, the governmental economic program for 2001- 
2004 pledged to create conditions for securing economic growth, achieving macroeconomic 
stability and improving the investment climate. An average yearly growth rate of the GDP of 4.5- 
6% was envisaged during 2001-2004 by attracting foreign resources, especially FDI. 168 The 
159 See The Warsaw Voice, 13 January 2002. 
160 The Economist, 27 October 2001, p. 14. 
161 The Warsaw Voice, 13 January 2002. 
162 The Warsaw Voice, 19 December 2002. 
163 The Warsaw Voice, 19 December 2002. 
164 The Warsaw Voice, 19 December 2002. 
165 The Warsaw Voice, 19 December 2002. 
166 The Warsaw Voice, 19 December 2002. 
167 European Commission, "Strategy Paper 2002", http: //www. europa. eu. int, p. 42. 
168 Guvernul Romaniei, "Programul de Guvemare", http: //www. gov. ro, 2000, p. 2. 
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consolidation of macroeconomic stability was planned through structural reform and financial 
discipline. The aim was to diminish the budget deficit, to develop the domestic market, to 
encourage domestic production and speed up the privatization process. Efficiency and transparency 
were promoted in privatisation, as well as support for small and medium sized enterprises. The 
government also aimed for proper management of the public debt and of the current account deficit 
in order to gradually curb inflation to one digit by 2004. The improvement of the business climate 
was envisaged through providing a proper economic, financial and legal framework. 169 How did 
this work in practice? 
A more balanced policy mix was adopted as a result of improved co-ordination among ministries 
and between the government and the Central Bank. 170 The Commission stated in its 2002 Report 
that: 'Some significant gains on macroeconomic stabilisation have been achieved over the last 
years. A more appropriate mix is decreasing inflation, while the growth has resumed and the 
external position remains sustainable. Considerable progress has been made on the creation of 
necessary market institutions. The ongoing overhaul of the banking sector, the successive 
improvements in the supervisory and regulatory framework for the financial markets and the 
advances in privatisation have progressively tightened enterprises financial discipline. Price and 
trade liberalisation, coupled with a significant adjustment of energy tariffs and important reforms of 
the tax system have set the stage for a more efficient allocation of resources. Restructuring is 
advancing in a number of sectors . '171 The 2002 
Commission report further noted that 'this progress, 
however, has not yet led to a significant acceleration in structural reforms, leading inter alia to 
delays in disbursements from the IMF'. un 
To sum up, the 2000 slowdown of the Polish economy was a result of both cyclical internal and 
external factors and of certain policy mistakes. FDI fell due to privatisation being almost 
completed. A new commitment to a closer co-ordination of policies, financial discipline and job 
creation has the potential to foster economic growth, reinforcing the virtuous circle of economic 
development. Investment remains the engine of growth, be it private or public, foreign or domestic. 
The role of FDI and the policies to attract FDI will be discussed in chapter five. In Romania, a 
better co-ordination of policies, an emphasis on economic growth and on promoting investment 
though an attractive business climate, more determination to progress towards membership of the 
EU, a more supportive external environment and the knowledge that there is no more time to be 
wasted in transition have led to an improvement of prospects for the Romanian economy during the 
present Nästase government. This contributed towards placing Romania on a virtuous circle of 
economic development. 
169 Guvernul Romaniei, "Programul de Guvernare", http: //www. gov. ro, 2000, p. 2. 
170 European Commission, "Strategy Paper 2002", p. 42. 
171 European Commission, "Strategy Paper 2002", p. 70. 
172 European Commission, "Strategy Paper 2002", p. 42. 
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4.7 Conclusion: Lessons from over a decade of economic transition 
Chapter four has analysed the main determinants of the path and results of transition in Poland and 
Romania by referring to both the political and economic spheres identified in chapter one and 
represented graphically in diagram 4A. This assessment was needed because progress in economic 
transition has been a necessary condition for the progress in the EU accession process as shown in 
chapter three. In the political sphere, the governments' attitude towards reform, the public support 
and the international assistance are the main factors that have influenced the policy mix adopted 
and hence the economic outcomes. Furthermore, these factors interact with each other and have the 
potential to create either a virtuous or a vicious circle that impacts on the economic sphere through 
its influence on the policy mix, as shown in diagram 4A(a). A governments' positive attitude 
towards reform attracts international support which can contribute to ensuring public support as 
well, hence a radical policy mix. These political factors are similar to the ones identified in chapter 
three as political determinants of the accession process. In the economic sphere, economic reforms 
or the policy mix represent a condition for both transition and accession to the EU, as will be seen 
in chapters five and seven. They are affected and affect the political factors. They also interact with 
the factors in the economic sphere considered in this study: the level of FDI and of economic 
integration with the EU in general. These factors are shown in diagram 4A. A radical policy mix 
attracts international support but can shorten the public support. On the other hand, a credible 
programme of reforms can enhance FDI and trade, hence economic integration with the EU. Both 
political and economic factors depend greatly on the initial conditions that can create a strong 
potential for path dependency. Chapter four has also identified the need to attract FDI in order to 
complete privatisation and hence marketisation. The impact of the policy mix on attracting FDI is 
discussed in chapter five as part of the assessment of the investment climate in Poland and 
Romania. On the other hand, the impact of FDI on transition to a market economy and economic 
integration with the EU is discussed in chapter five, part two. Chapter three part two has also 
identified FDI as an element of economic integration with the EU while the impact of trade level 
integration with the EU on FDI will be assessed in chapter seven through the econometric model. 
The comparison between the Polish and the Romanian experience during the first decade of 
economic transformation suggests certain possible conditions for successful transition to a market 
economy. Moreover, certain lessons can be learned by Romania in order to complete the transition 
to a market economy. First, the initial conditions have been more influential than initially thought 
and have created a certain potential for path dependency. They have greatly determined the initial 
public support for economic reforms, the governments' attitude towards reform, the external 
assistance and hence the policy mix adopted. Not only was the level of economic crisis in each 
country important, but also the state of the nation, the democratic experience prior to 1989 and the 
existence of an economic institutional framework that could foster a quick transition towards 
market economy. A realistic assessment of the initial conditions is crucial for the design of the 
most appropriate policies. Furthermore, the results of transition so far have to be interpreted 
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relative to the initial conditions of each country, taking in consideration the path dependency and 
the path shaping potential of each country. 
Each government's attitude towards reform has acted as the driving force of the transition process 
and has influenced the policy mix, the public and the international support for economic reforms. 
However, contrary to other opinions, governments' attitude towards reform has been subject to 
influence from the other political factors and from the initial conditions. Public support led to 
changes of governments and in each government's attitude towards reform. International support 
acted as a catalyst and thus enhanced governments' willingness to transform the economy. All in 
all, it was necessary that political class had a good understanding of the initial and final points of 
transition and a good vision of the aims of the process. It was important for governments to have a 
clear blueprint of the processes involved, their sequencing, interconnectedness and costs of 
transition. "u Furthermore, policies needed to be credible, continuous and implemented by 
accountable and professional teams. 174 It was important that windows of opportunity such as 
revolutions or elections were used to apply the necessary reforms for the economy that could have 
high costs in the short run but high benefits in the long run. 175 Finally, the government should 
ensure the support of the public and of international organisations in order to maintain a virtuous 
political circle with a positive impact on the economic sphere. 
Public support for economic reforms is a necessary condition for their continuity, success and 
credibility. However, popular support has been volatile and has acted at times as a brake rather than 
a catalyst for transition. It has also exacerbated the perceptions of internal insecurity with negative 
influence on the accession process as will be discussed in chapter six. Given this volatility, it was 
necessary for governments to use the windows of opportunity of elections to pursue firm 
reforms. 16 Furthermore, it was important that the authorities correctly informed the population 
about the timing and extent of the transition costs so that the gap between expectations and realities 
and the scope for protests could be diminished. Safety nets for the most affected segments of the 
population should ensure that the standard of living is not dropping below the acceptance level, 
thus decreasing the danger of popular unrest. Finally, the 'social fatigue' with reforms can be 
counteracted by providing strong long term rewards for high short terms costs. A main measure of 
these rewards is the prospect of EU membership. The role of the EU in providing a prize for the 
efforts of transition is discussed in chapter six and assessed quantitatively in chapter seven. 
173 Constantinescu, Reformä, ci redresare economicä, p. 246; Adumiträccsci, D. and Niculcscu, N. G., Post- 
Socialist Romanian Economy. Where to? How? Why, Editura Economics, Bucurc$ti, 1999, p. 87. 
174 Stolojan, "Policy Making in Romania", p. 12; Däianu, "Where Are Post-Communist Countries Heading 
to? ", p. 13; Adumiträcesei and Niculescu, Post- Socialist Romanian Economy. p. 88; Balccrowicz, Post. 
Communist Transition: Some Lessons, 2002, p. 48. 
175 Balcerowicz, Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, p. 311. 
176 Balccrowicz, Transformation from Socialism to Capitalism, p. 312; Constantincscu, Reforms , cl redresare 
economicä, p. 248. 
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The financial and technical support offered by the international organisations has played an 
important catalytic role in transition. The IMF's early support for the shock therapy programme in 
Poland enhanced the credibility of reforms and provided financing for macroeconomic 
stabilisation, a sine qua non condition for the success of the programme. The Polish debt 
rescheduling constituted an important condition for attracting FDI while financing by the World 
Bank, the EU and the EBRD has speeded up privatisation. For Romania, the IMF conditionality 
acted as a guarantee of a certain continuity in reforms but the inability of the Romanian authorities 
to meet the set requirements led to a loss of credibility of reforms and delays or annulments of 
IMF payments. The IFIs contribution to privatisation especially since 1997 has contributed towards 
the emergence of a virtuous circle in the political sphere. The EU's support and the prospect of EU 
membership have also affected positively the progress of transition by providing motivation for 
economic reforms, financial means and technical assistance. The role of the EU in enhancing 
security and FDI in Poland and Romania will be further investigated in chapters six and seven. 
More investment is needed and enhanced co-operation with the IFIs and their requirements. Loans 
should be geared towards the real needs of reforms, including ensuring social safety nets, funding 
human capital improvement and comprehensive reforms in areas such as pensions and education. 
Investments in infrastructure and in the privatisation of large enterprises should be complemented 
by credits and development funds for small and medium enterprises. The IFIs' assistance has to 
continue to contribute towards attracting FDI. 
Finally, the policy mix has had a crucial influence on the pace of transition and has been greatly 
affected by the political factors considered here. The initial conditions, the public support, the 
governments' attitude towards reform and the international backing have led to the early adoption 
of a radical programme in Poland and of a gradual one in Romania. Furthermore, the results of 
these early policy mixes have impacted not only on the subsequent choices of policies, but also on 
public support, the governments' attitude towards reform and on international support. In Poland, 
the 1989 shock therapy programme lost popular support and led to the election of post-communists 
in 1993, hence a change in the governments' attitude towards reform and in the policy mix. In 
Romania, the failure of the post-communists to achieve credible results through the gradual 
approach to reforms led to the election in 1996 of the Democratic Convention of Romania, an 
increased international support and the adoption of a shock therapy type macroeconomic 
stabilisation programme accompanied by the start of a deep restructuring of the economy. These 
changes contributed towards changing the vicious circles in the political and economic spheres into 
ambiguous circles and later virtuous circles. 
Regarding the policy mix, the analysis has concluded that despite short term negative effects on the 
standard of living of the population, a radical macroeconomic stabilisation was preferable to a 
gradual one which postponed both the stabilisation and the restructuring of the economy. It was 
important that macro-stabilisation and liberalisation were accompanied by restructuring and 
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promotion of economic growth. Privatisation needed to be not be an aim in itself, but to encourage 
ownership forms that increased efficiency and encouraged the creation of a significant middle and 
managerial class. '77Restructuring and closing the loss making former state owned enterprises 
needed to be a priority of the government. This has had the potential to decrease government 
expenditure through the cutting of subsidies and increase revenues through the privatisation price. 
Furthermore, restructuring leads to a more efficient reallocation of resources and to economic 
growth. A slow restructuring can compromise macroeconomic stability and hence deep 
restructuring is recommended with the contribution of FDI. "$ 
It was necessary that the restructuring of industry and services was based on new technologies 
while FDI can be an important means for increasing efficiency and productivity. '" Internal 
accumulation of capital was equally necessary and it was important that small and medium 
enterprises were supported and well promoted. 180 Simple, transparent and low taxation may ensure 
high rates of investment, domestic consumption and an incorporation of the grey economy into the 
official one. Furthermore, an increase in the tax basis can maintain the necessary revenues for the 
budget, thus diminishing fears of high budget deficits and increased inflation through lax monetary 
policies. Low interest rates may encourage credit expansion for both large investors and small and 
medium enterprises, provided that the economy is liberalised and stabilised. It was important that 
reform programmes catered not only for short run objectives, but equally included directions for 
long term development. It was necessary that strategies to enhance economic growth in the long 
run were designed, together with commercial policies and the development of strategic industries. 
Export competitiveness needed to be encouraged through specific industrial policies. The role of 
foreign direct investment in reforms had to be clearly defined and coherent measures designed in 
order to foster foreign direct investment. This issue will be addressed in chapter five. 
177 Constantinescu, Reformä , ci redresare economicä, p. 89. 178 DAianu, "Where Are Post-Communist Countries Heading to? ", p. 22. 
179 Bal, "Träsäturi generale ale procesului dc tranzitie", p. 117; N. Stern, "The Future of Economic 
Transition", EBRD Working Paper No. 30,1998, pp. 12-13. 
180 Bal, "Träsäturi generale ale procesului de tranzitie la economia de piatä In tärile foste comuniste"; 
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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN POLAND AND ROMANIA 
5.1 Part one: The investment climate 
Chapter four has analysed comparatively the experience of economic transition in Poland and Romania 
by assessing the interplay between the initial conditions, governments' attitude towards economic 
reforms, the internal support for reforms, the assistance by international organisations and the policy 
mix. It has offered a comparative assessment of the main policies pursued in three different periods. 
Furthermore, it identified FDI as a necessary means of privatisation. Lessons for completing economic 
transition in Romania were drawn, and the need to encourage further FDI in both countries was 
emphasised. 
This chapter is structured in two parts. Part one assesses comparatively the investment climate in 
Poland and Romania, while part two investigates the impact that FDI has had so far in each country. 
By assessing the FDI impact on transition to a market economy and economic integration with the EU, 
this chapter concludes the analysis of the determinants of economic transition in Poland and Romania. 
This chapter also investigates whether FDI can lead to a virtuous circle in the economic sphere as in 
diagram 5A(a). The first aim of this part is to assess the extent to which political factors have 
influenced FDI related policies in Poland and Romania, thus exemplifying the interplay between the 
political and the economic spheres assumed in this study. The second aim of this first part is to 
investigate the FDI related policies implemented in each country and their impact on the investment 
climate. While other locational factors such as geographical position or natural resources are given, 
policies are determined by governments and therefore include a certain scope for change. The policies 
analysed are: macroeconomic stabilisation, privatisation and FDI promotional policies (in a broad 
sense). A comprehensive quantitative assessment of the FDI determinants in the ten CEECs candidate 
for EU membership will be conducted in chapter seven. 
The second part of this chapter aims to investigate the impact that FDI has had so far in Poland and 
Romania. The impact is assessed at four interdependent levels, each related to one clement of the 
political or economic circle identified in this study: transition to a market economy or economic 
reforms, integration with the EU, standard of living and thus internal security concerns and finally, 
FDI. These elements are presented in diagram 5A. The FDI impact on enhancing further FDI is likely 
to give an indication of the extent to which a potential virtuous circle can become self-fulfilling. 
Lessons are drawn regarding the best ways to attract FDI and to enhance its impact in the host 
economy. - 
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Diagram 5. A1 
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a) Arrows 6,7,8,5 and 8 and 6', 7', 8,5 show two alternative virtuous circles in the economic sphere 
induced by FDI. 
b) Arrows 5 and 5' synthesise the bi-directional relationship between economic reforms and FDI which 
creates a strong potential for path dependency in attracting FDI, economic transition and in accession to 
the EU. 
c) Arrows 1,2,3,4 show how a virtuous political circle induces an economic virtuous circle by creating 




relationships that are addressed in chapter five 
relationships that are addressed in other chapters 
t This diagram draws on diagram 1A as presented in chapter one. 
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5.1.1. The theoretical framework of the chapter 
FDI is a necessary means for completing economic transition in Poland and Romania. Furthermore, 
through its impact on economic reforms and economic integration with the EU, FDI is likely to induce 
a virtuous circle of economic development, while the lack thereof is likely to determine a vicious 
circle, as identified by this study. That is why creating an attractive investment climate has become a 
major goal of governments of transition countries. The role of other factors aside, the scope and 
impact of FDI so far is to a certain degree an expression of the extent to which governments have 
applied the right mix of economic policies in general, and FDI specific policies in particular, to attract 
the right type of investors. 
Investors tend to be motivated mainly by market-expansion, rent-seeking or a combination of the two. 
While aggregate level data cannot distinguish precisely between the two reasons for FDI, several 
surveys on investors in Poland and Romania identify both market size and low costs as prime motives 
for targeting these economics. ' If both countries offer low costs and relatively large markets in terms of 
population, which are the other factors which determine FDI? These factors constitute the investment 
climate and are part of the locational advantages identified by Dunning's OLI paradigm which was 
introduced in chapter two. As ownership advantages do not depend on the host country, they arc not 
part of this assessment. Location and internalisation incentives are considered in chapter seven which 
makes a quantitative analysis of the determinants of FDI in Poland and Romania within the framework 
of ten CEECs candidates for EU membership. The qualitative analysis conducted in this chapter is 
based on the role played by location factors within the OLI paradigm, and within these, on the role of 
government policies in creating an attractive investment climate. 
There is no generally agreed definition of what actually constitutes the investment climate. The closest 
to giving a definition is the 1998 EBRD Transition Report' which states that: 'An investment climate 
conducive to FDI goes beyond macroeconomic stability and the non-discriminatory treatment to 
foreign investors. Foreign investment requires an ability to exercise corporate governance without 
arbitrary bureaucratic interference, a transparent regulatory and legal environment, effective markets 
and sound financial institutions. i3 Policy papers and reports generally refer to several components as 
part of the investment climate. Thus, the EBRD'Investment Profile' usually refers to investment policy 
and incentives, taxation, privatisation and restructuring, markets and trade. 4 Furthermore, the country 
image and the country risk capture the overall quality of the investment climate. The focus here will be 
2 ECE, East West Investment News, No. 3,1995, p. 12; Denula, I., Investiliile sträine directe, I3ditura Economicä, 
1998, p. 94; WIR, Climatul investilional din Romdnia, Bucure§ti, December 1996, p. 21; The Warsaw Voice, 8 
April 2001. 
3 EBRD, Transition Repor4 EBRD, London, 1998, p. 82. 
4 EBRD, Investment Profile. Romania, 2001, EBRD, London, p. 2. 
133 
on macroeconomic stabilisation, privatisation, promotional policies and on the country image. Some of 
the remaining factors will be considered in chapter seven. 
Why does this study emphasise the investment climate and policies to improve it? First, the 
investment climate is part of the locational factors from the OLI paradigm presented in chapter two. 
Second, the investment climate is a dynamic concept and thus there is enough scope for changes 
through specific policies which are country determined. It is this variability of policies which is likely 
to account for the differences in the volume and the impact of the FDI in Poland and Romania. It is 
also this policy flexibility which is likely to offer solutions for enhancing further FDI. Third, other 
locational factors are difficult to quantify very accurately or are results of changes within the main 
economic policies considered. Finally, the relationship between FDI and the policies considered is bi- 
directional, represented in diagram 5A(b). Thus, the assessment of the role of government policies in 
enhancing FDI is part of the analysis of the vicious circle identified by this study. 
This study assumes that a 'visible' rather than an 'invisible hand' is needed in transition economics in 
general and in attracting FDI in particular. This assumption relics on several reasons. First, it is 
important that FDI contributes to the pursuit of the general economic policy of each country with a 
positive impact on economic transition, integration into the EU and achieving better standard of living. 
Specific policies can attract the investors most likely to generate a positive impact on the host 
economy. Second, the CEECs compete amongst each other in attracting foreign investors and therefore 
specific policies can contribute towards creating an increased attractiveness of the investment climate. 
Finally, the complexity of the transition process requires the setting of several priorities. This is the 
case, for example, with the need to attract FDI in infrastructure as a way to enhance the attractiveness 
of each country. 
Three main types of government policies that can help create an attractive investment climate and thus 
enhance FDI and its potential impact on the economy, will be considered here: macroeconomic 
policies, institution building and promotional policies. The borders between these types of policies arc 
blurred, but a distinction is necessary in order to identify the main effects of each of these policies. As 
an evaluation of the first two policy types has been the object of chapter four, the present chapter 
focuses on the role of these policies in creating a business climate conducive to FDI. First, the 
government has a leading role in ensuring the liberalisation of the economy in terms of prices, trade 
and investment and administers the results of this process though macroeconomic stabilisation policies. 
Second, the government has a significant say in defining the role of FDI in the economy through the 
institution building process. 5 Hence, the chosen path of privatisation influences the type and nature of 
5 UNCTAD, World Investment Report, UNCTAD, Geneva, 2000, p. 165; Kalotay, K., "The Contribution of FDI 
Revisited", Journal of World Investment, Vol. 2, No. 2,2001, p. 262. 
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potential FDI involvement and gives a sign of government's commitment to market cconomy. 6 
Although institution building refers to more than privatisation, in this chapter the focus lies on the 
privatisation policy mixes. A broader definition of institution building is adopted in part two of the 
present chapter and in chapter seven. 7 For example, part two refers to bank reforms as part of the 
institution building, this time focusing on the FDI impact. In the econometric model in chapter seven 
institutional reforms encompass not only large and small scale privatisation, but also competition 
policy, banking reforms, enterprise restructuring and the development of stock markets as quantified 
by the EBRD transition indicators. Third, the state ensures the legislative framework for investment 
and can apply active policies for attracting and promoting FDI. 8 These polices include marketing the 
country as an attractive destination of FDI, creating institutions which support investors and granting 
financial, fiscal and other incentives which typically divert investment from other destinations. 9 
Finally, as chapter four has argued with regard to policies in general, the FDI related policy mix is 
likely to have been influenced by factors in the political sphere such as the government's attitude 
towards reform, the public support and the international organisations. This study claims that there is a 
continuous interplay between the political and the economic spheres, so the impact of political factors 
on governmental policies, and hence the investment climate, will be assessed. This approach is 
justified equally by the fact that the public and the official attitudes towards FDI are part of the risk 
assessment and hence of the country image, an important determinant of FDI, as will be seen in the last 
section of this part. 
5.1.2 Foreign direct investment determinants in the political sphere 
Openness towards FDI is a positive signal for foreign investors and is a condition for pursuing policies 
which enhance the attractiveness of the investment climate. In Poland and Romania the government's 
attitude towards FDI has improved throughout the first decade of transition and has been subject to 
influences from both internal and external factors. Furthermore, the initial openness towards FDI has 
impacted upon the way FDI was perceived both by the public and officials. Elections, public 
perceptions and constraints by international organisations have affected the pace or the scope of the 
three main policies considered: macroeconomic stabilisation, privatisation and FDI promotion. This 
subsection aims to reveal how the official and the public attitude, the initial openness towards FDI and 
the international organisations have interacted and affected the mix of FDI related policies. A similar 
6 Barrell, R. and Holland, D., "FDI and Enterprise Restructuring in Central Europe", Economics of Transition, 
Vol. 8, No. 2,2000, p. 484; Lavigne, M., The Economics of Transition from Socialism to Market Economy, 
MacMillan Press, London, 1995. 
The World Bank includes in institution building: legislation and its enforcement, financial institutions, 
governmental reforms, education and health and openness to trade and foreign investment. (cited in Grabbe, H. 
and Hughes, K., Eastward Enlargement of the EU, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1997). 
BMah, J. S. and Tamulaitis, D., "Investment Incentives in the Central and Eastern European Transition 
Economies", Journal of World Investment, Vol. 1, No. 1, July 2000, p. 1; Bonciu, Atragerea ¢i monitorizarea 
investiliilor sträine directe, Editura $tiintificä, Bucure$ti, 1997, p. 25; Mazilu, A., Transnalionalele 
Competitivitatea. O perspectivä Est European, Editura Economicä, Bucurc ti, 1999, p. 245. 
135 
matrix of determinants was used in chapters three and four and in the theoretical framework of the 
dissertation. 
The initial conditions 
Openness towards FDI was part of the Washington Consensus which made the blueprint of economic 
reforms, a 'mantra' of the donor community centred around Washington and presented in chapter two. 10 
These policies were adopted initially by Poland and were implemented subsequently in different 
manners in other transition countries as pre-conditions for obtaining financing from the international 
organisations, as discussed in chapter four. Despite the international agreement over the CEECs's need 
for FDI, attracting foreign investment has been a relatively contested issue in both Poland and 
Romania. However, at the beginning of transition Poland seemed more open, while the Romanian 
officials seemed to be reluctant towards foreign investment. Thus, in 1990 the Polish government was 
already planning to encourage private investment by allowing for repatriation of profits, tax holidays 
and union-free work places. Moreover, the Polish authorities claimed support from the international 
community for the reduction of the foreign debt as a means of assisting the balance of payments and 
encouraging FDI. " 
In Romania, the initial official attitude towards FDI involvement in the economy was negative. In 
1990, officials said that the country would have no need of foreign capital if the next administration 
succeeded in modernising the economy and retraining the workforce. 12 This rhetoric showed very poor 
understanding of the needs of an economy with a poor financial system and scarce domestic capital. 
Some investment was welcome in small-scale private enterprise, but the state would retain its control 
on the levers of economic power and no foreign investor would have more than 49% of a Romanian 
enterprise. The government slogan was: We want control in Romania'. " This attitude was not 
conducive to active policies to promote and attract foreign investment that would have perhaps 
significant impact in the Romanian economy. Meanwhile, the positive Polish attitude towards FDI was 
a good start but was affected greatly by subsequent factors, as will be seen below. 
The official attitude towards FDI 
During elections, political interests clashed and the issue of FDI was used as a 'political weapon'. 
However, the official attitude towards foreign investment has improved over time in both countries. 
The fear of serving international capital interests, rather than domestic ones, was used by the 
opposition parties in the 1991 Polish elections. These accusations gained even more supporters after 
9 Bonciu, Atragerea, si monitorizarea investi/iilorsirgine directe, pp. 25-26,31,54. 
10 Sachs, J., Zinnes, C., Y. Eliat, "Benchmarldng Competitiveness in Transition Economics", CAER 11 Discussion 
Paper 62, February 2000, p. 1. 
" The Guardian, 21 December 1990. 
12 The Guardian, 31 January 1990. 
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the 1993 elections, given that the radical reforms had already led to a fall in the standard of living. The 
new PM at the time accused the previous government of acting against the national interest by selling 
the 'family silver'. 14 This contributed to a serious slow down in the privatisation process so that the 
mass privatisation bill was only approved in 1995.15 After the change of mood of 1995, the post-1997 
democratic government with a pro-business coalition partner, Freedom Union, was then expected to 
increase the FDI inflows. Indeed in 1998 Poland became the main destination for FDI in Central 
Europe with USD 6.3 bn. inflow. " Furthermore, the Polish Government had already in 1998 a coherent 
plan for privatisation and attracting FDI up to 2001. The medium term economic strategy, designed by 
the ministry of economy in October 1999, mentioned FDI as one of the factors and conditions of 
development. " Finally, the post-2001 Miller government pledged to encourage FDI through improving 
the business climate. 18 
On the other hand, the first declaration on the desirability of FDI in Romania was made in the electoral 
year 1992.19 Later, the need for FDI was emphasised by the Democratic Convention (CDR) in the 
electoral campaign in 1996. The Ciorbea government made specific reference to FDI as a means for 
pursuing privatisation and generating economic growth . 
2' Finally, in the 2000 Romanian parliamentary 
elections the issues of the so called 'strategic privatisations' of the former government and of the need 
for a new start in privatisation were central. " These privatisations included enterprises from the hard- 
core of the economy i. e. the energy sector, the post services, the airlines, the railways, the insurance 
companies and the main banks, including the Commercial Romanian Bank, one of the most successful 
Romanian banks. It was considered that they were completed in haste and questions were raised 
regarding the suitability of investors and the quality of the privatisation deals 22 In 2001, more concrete 
plans have been envisaged by the Nästase government to increase the supply able to meet an increasing 
demand for investment. 23 However, the post-election actions did not always keep up with the promises. 
Thus, Romania did not have a coherent policy for attracting FDI after the 1996 elections, despite the 
encouraging electoral campaign. 24 
13 The Guardian, 31 January 1990. 
14 The Economist, 23 January 1993; The Guardian, 12 November 1993. 
's EBRD, Transition Report, 2001, p. 179. 
16 Paliwoda, S. J. et al, "Analysing Poland's Tiger' Status Economy', European Business Journal, 1998, vol. 10, 
21; WIIW, Handbook ofStatistics, CDROM, p. 448. 'Ministry 
of Economy, "A Conception of the Medium Term Development of the Country Until the Year 2002", 
Warsaw, 13 October 1999, http: //www. cup. gimplstrulaur. 
18 The Warsaw Voice, 13 January 2002. 
19 Interview with Expert in FDI in Romania, Romanian Development Agency, Bucharest, 2000. 
20 Piala Financiard, 3 March 2000, p. 19; Särbu, R,. "Chestiunea Zilei", ProTV May 2000; Radu SCirbu was at 
the time the director of the State Ownership Fund in Romania. 
21 Adevänd, 5 Noiembrie 2000. 
zz Adeväni l Economic, 19-25 Ianuarie 2000. 
23 Guvernul Romäniei, "Programul de guvernare", 2000, http: //www. gov ro, p. 2. 
24 Interview with Expert in FDI in Romania, Romanian Development Agency, 2000. 
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The role of public opinion 
The public mood was influenced by politicians, nationalistic feelings and by an increased gap in 
welfare. ' In 1990 We won't sell the country' was a popular slogan in Romania. Workers were 
demonstrating against returning expatriates wanting to take control over the country. 26 A similar 
attitude was seen later in Poland. A survey conducted in Poland in February 1992 found out that, for 
the first time, more than half of those questioned were against faster privatisation, opening domestic 
markets to domestic goods and welcoming foreign capital. 27 Moreover, letters were sent in 1992 by the 
general public to Balcerowicz, the finance minister of the time and the father of shock therapy, 
accusing him of 'serving everyone, from international capital to Satan'. 28 Nationalistic feelings were 
also responsible for the negative attitude in Poland surrounding the privatisation of the banks 29 These 
nationalistic feelings led to the exclusion of foreign investors from the privatisation of the last four 
Polish state owned banks. 30 
Not only did public opinion influence policies and hence FDI, but FDI influenced public opinion. The 
more advanced the involvement of FDI in the economy, the more realistic became public opinion 
regarding the benefits, the limitations and the desirability of FDI. For example, in Poland, an opinion 
poll shows that there has been an increase in the percentage of those who oppose FDI from 17% in 
1996 to 33% in 2001. FDI is no longer a 'rosy dream', but a rcality. 31 Many Poles arc present or former 
employees of foreign companies or have relatives who work for foreign investors. They have 
experienced both positive and negative situations related to FDI which made their judgement more 
'realistic'. The scale of FDI in Poland today is also impressive. While in 1995 the annual FDI inflow 
was a mere USD 23 bn., in 1999 foreign investors brought USD 8 bn., increasing the annual flow 
more than three times. 32 
Overall, the results of public opinion polls in Poland show a generally positive but realistic attitude 
towards FDI. This appears to contribute to the increased attractiveness of the Polish market as a 
destination for FDI and to enhance the positive impact of investment in economy. The author is not 
aware of any similar polls conducted up to the present in the Romanian society. The main expectations 
and fears about FDI in Poland are presented in the table below. 
u The Economist, 23 January 1993. 
'b The Guardian, 31 January 1990; Paliwoda et al, "Analysing Poland's Tiger' Status Economy", p. 3. 27 The Guardian, 6 February 1992, p. 10. 
The Guardian, 6 February 1992, p. 10. 
The Banker, November 1998, P. S. 
30 The Warsaw Voice, 23 June 2002. 
31 WIR, Climatul investilional din Romania, p. 21 
32 The Warsaw Voice, 8 April 2001. 
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Table 5.1.1. FDI: expectations v. fears 
Expectations about FDI Fears about FBI 
Upgrading of technology (560/6) Collapse of competing Polish companies (74%4) 
Creation of new jobs (49%) Buying Polish land (66%) 
Better supply Buying national property (63%) 
Improved quality of goods and services Making Poland dependent on foreign capital (58 %) 
Rise in qualifications of Polish employees Taking over Polish enterprises (57%) 
Eliminating the gap between Poland and developed countries 
Source: Opinion poll, The Warsaw Voice, 8 April 2001. 
It seems that the fears can explain partially the slow pace of privatisation of some of the former state 
owned companies and the reluctant liberalisation of the real estate regime. The table also identifies 
unemployment as one of the problems of transition and the role that FDI is expected to play in 
diminishing it. A mixed record of FDI, and economic transition in general, has been responsible for the 
mixed public feeling. Furthermore, this mixed record raises some concerns regarding the place FDI 
should be assigned in the economic transition and economic development of Poland and Romania. 
Over-reliance on FDI is, after all, dangerous and therefore encouragement of domestic savings and 
investment should be an equal concern of the government. The mixed but overall positive record of 
FDI impact in Poland and Romania so far will be assessed in part two of this chapter through 
quantitative and qualitative evidence. These fears about FDI in Poland can be partially explained by the 
public's false perception of foreign investors' motives. The table below shows that the public 
underestimates the role of prospects for economic growth, market size or quality of labour in foreign 
investors' decision to invest in Poland. Instead, the Polish public suspects investors of being drawn by 
rent seeking motives and thus being attracted mainly by low labour costs, easy profits, tax exemptions 
and tax breaks. 
Table 5.1.2. Motives for FDI: public perception v. firms' motives 
Public perception of motives for FDI Motives for F DI 
1. Labour costs I. Prospects for economic growth 
2. Easy profits 2. Labour costs 
3. Tax exemptions and breaks 3. Size of the Polish market 
... Access to a 
larger Eastern European market 4. Labour supply 
11. Prospects for economic growth 5. Reduction in production costs 
Source: Opinion Poll, The Warsaw Voice, 8 April 2001. 
33 The opinion polls were conducted by the CBOS polling centre and were commissioned by the PAIZ. 
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Table 5.13. FDI in different sectors: aspirations v. statistics 
Where should FDI be directed to? (Poll-1999) Where lithe largest FD12 (Statistics-1999) 
Automotive industry industry (50.2%) 
Electronic industry Financial intermediation (22.4%) 
Roads construction Wholesale, retail trade (9.7%) 
Environmental protection Construction (3.3%) 
Health services Transport and telecommunications (3.4 %) 
Where should FDI be forbidden" or limited"? I lotcls and restaurants (l. 2%) 
Arms industry" Real estate, renting and business activities (0.3%) 
I Services** Agriculture (0.1%) 
Agriculture** 
Source: The Warsaw Voice, 8 April 2001; WILW, p. 451. 
Table 5.1.3 shows that further differences arise between aspirations of FDI distribution across sectors 
and statistics. This table can be interpreted in several ways. First, there is a certain degree of agreement 
between public opinion and statistics. Indeed, industry attracts the most FDI. Then, agriculture 
attracted the lowest investment, consistent with the public's disliking of FDI in agriculture. On the 
other hand, participation in services e. g. fmancial intermediation has taken place despite negative 
opinions about it. This trend coincides with the earlier mentioned nationalist feelings regarding the 
acceptance of FDI in privatisation of the banks. Furthermore, the poll identifies very well a gap 
between the needs of the society and the interests of investors. Road construction is indeed a priority 
and this has been recently acknowledged by the Polish government and the EBRD as part of their 
strategies for development. However, this is less of a priority for private investors, which led to the 
high contribution of EBRD in this domain in both countrics. 34 Overall, public opinion perception on 
FDI can partially explain the slow liberalisation of certain sectors of the economy and thus the slow 
inflow of FDI in these fields. Public opinion seems to have had an important impact on the 
government's attitude towards FDI and hence on the FDI related policies implemented. Furthermore, 
FDI seems to influence the official and the public opinion, thus enhancing the circle of political 
determinants of FDI, transition and accession to the EU. 
The role of international organisations 
The international financial institutions and the EU have increasingly referred to FDI as a necessity for 
economic transition. Encouraging FDI was one of the main aims included in the preamble of the 
association agreement signed by Romania and Poland with the EU and then reinforced by the 
accession partnerships drawn in 1999'' FDI was also included in the Medium Term Economic 
Strategy elaborated by the Romanian Government in 2000. FDI was considered one important source 
34 EBRD, "Poland. Strategy Overview"; EBRD, "Romania. Strategy Overview", http: //www. ebrd. com/country 
index 
35 European Commission, "Association Agreement. Poland"; European Commission, "Association Agreement. 
Romania"; European Commission, "Accession Partnership 1999. Poland ", p. 4; European Commission, 
"Accession Partnership 1999Romania ", p. 4; http: //www. europa. eu. indcomm/enlargementldwn . 
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of economic growth and the strategy aimed at improving the business climate in order to attract 
increased investment. -6 Poland included FDI in its medium term development strategy in 1999 and in 
its governmental programmes ever since. 37 Furthermore, in a workshop organised by consultants of the 
Agency for International Development at Harvard, the representatives of the Romanian government 
were urged to focus more on FDI for the money it brings, technology, access to markets, ability to 
upgrade and restructuring of the enterprises. 38 These are only a few examples on how the international 
organisations have maintained the debate upon the role of FDI in the two countries. However, the role 
of international organisations in enhancing FDI in Poland and Romania goes beyond the rhetorical 
level as discussed in chapter four. The involvement of the IFIs in economic transition has been 
considered a green light for foreign investors and a sign of credibility of internal reforms, thus acting as 
a positive element within the investment climate. Furthermore, the involvement of the World Bank and 
the EBRD in the privatisation process has further fostered FDI contributing towards a virtuous circle in 
the economic sphere as in diagram 5A 39 
To sum up, the official and public attitude towards foreign investment has improved since the 
beginning of transition, but has also become more realistic. Elections, public debates and international 
organisations have been catalysts for the official attitude towards FDI and thus impacted upon the role 
FDI has been assigned in reforms and on the FDI related policies adopted. A reluctant official attitude 
towards FDI in Romania in the early years of transition has impacted upon the pace and scope of FDI 
related policies and hence on FDI. Although the initially positive attitude of the Polish government 
towards FDI was accompanied by some spells of negative public attitude, it formed the basis of 
effective policies able to attract foreign investment. The public attitude has also changed towards being 
more supportive but also more 'realistic'. Furthermore, the international support has played an 
important role in enhancing a potentially virtuous circle in the political sphere with a positive effect on 
the economic sphere, as in diagram 5A(c). All these political factors have affected the policies pursued 
and hence each country's attractiveness to foreign investors. 
5.1.3 Foreign direct investment determinants in the economic sphere 
Macroeconomic stabilisation: a necessary condition for FDI 
Three types of policies will be discussed as part of the FDI determinants in the economic sphere: 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies, privatisation and promotional policies. They are part of the 
investment climate as defined in an earlier section and imply an active role of the government. Thus, a 
36 Adevärul Economic, 9-15 Februarie 2000, p. 2. 
37 Ministry of Economy, "A Conception of the Medium Term Development of the Country Until the Year 2002" 
38 Gordon, L. (ed), Economic Policy Reform for Sustainable Development in Romania, CAER It Discussion 
Paper No. 8,1998, p. 9. 
39 Interview with Expert in FDI in Romania, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London, 2002. 
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stable macroeconomic situation constitutes a necessary condition for an attractive investment climate. 40 
Macroeconomic stability can be judged from one criterion i. e. inflation rate, two criteria i. e. inflation 
rate and the budget deficit, or in broader terms. There are six conditions of macroeconomic stability 
which will be used to address the macroeconomic determinants of FDI in Poland and Romania: end of 
recession, a low inflation, a stable exchange rate, a low unemployment rate, a balanced state budget 
and a positive balance of the current account. 41 How do these affect FDI? 
Any assessment of the FDI macroeconomic determinants has to acknowledge that the relationship is 
bi-directional. Part of the underlying assumption of this study is that FDI is determined and determines 
the level of economic reforms, as part of the circle of economic factors shown in diagram 5A(b). For 
example, on the one hand, previous growth or prospects for growth of the host market represent an 
incentive for investors as part of the assessment of the market size and growth. On the other hand, 
potential positive effects of FDI on economic growth justify the choice of host countries to attract FDI 
by providing an attractive investment climate. Furthermore, macroeconomic stability cannot be 
maintained without restructuring, and thus contribution from FDI. Thus, FDI has been used to balance 
widening current account and budget deficits. 42 Moreover, through its contribution to enterprise 
restructuring, FDI leads to more efficient resource allocation and thus limits the scope of inflation. 
These are only a few examples of the bi-directional relationship between FDI and macroeconomic 
stability. The impact of macroeconomic stability on FDI is discussed in the following paragraphs. Data 
for these macroeconomic indicators is presented in table 5.1.4 for both Poland and Romania. Foreign 
debt, the presence of full convertibility and FDI are added to complete the survey of FDI and 
macroeconomic determinants of FDI. 
Economic growth is an indicator of market growth and thus an important FDI determinant for market 
seeking investors, usually recognised by the literature and surveys. ' Furthermore, economic growth 
can be a measure of the success of economic reforms and possibly of previous FDI impact on the 
economy. However, the evidence from the first decade of transition is ambivalent. First, early 
recessional transformations have deterred FDI in both Romania and Poland while later, increasing 
40 de Mello L., Jr. and Hussain, K., "International Capital Mobility in Developing Countries", Journal of 
International Money and Finance, January 1999; Krkoska, L., "FDI Financing of Capital Formation in Central 
and Eastern Europe", EBRD Working Paper No. 67, December 2001, p3. 
41 Kolodko , G. 
W. cited in Bal, A., "Träsäturi genorale ale prooesului de tranzitie la economia dc piatä In prile 
foste comuniste" in Popa, I. (co-ord. ), Tranzilie si reformd, Editura Economicä, 2001, p. 107; Andreff, W. 
"Inertiile economice ale tranzitici" in Popa, I. (co-ord. ), p. 12. 
42 Calvo, G., "Capital Flows in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence and Policy Options", IMF Working Paper 
No. 57,1995, p. l . 43 Bhasin, A. et at, "Assessing the Sustainability of FDI Flows", World Bank, International Economics 
Department 1994; The Warsaw Voice, 8 April 2001; WIR, Climatul intiestilional din Romänia. 
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levels of FDI in Poland correspond to years of positive economic growth. ' Second, positive growth 
between 1993 and 1996 did not attract considerable investment in Romania, despite a permissible 
legislation, as will be shown in a later section. This was partially due to the slow progress in 
privatisation and thus to few attractive investment opportunities. This lack of investment was also 
partially due to other macroeconomic imbalances and to a general lack of interest from investors 
greatly devoted to closer and more attractive destinations in Central Europe. Finally, negative growth 
did not discourage FDI in Romania between 1997 and 1999. The explanation for this phenomenon 
appears to be threefold. First, FDI was driven greatly by an attractive offer as a result of a boost in the 
privatisation programme by the newly formed government. Second, rent seeking investors might have 
been attracted by prospects for low wages during a recession 45 Third, market seeking investors must 
have anticipated a rapid recovery after a short recessional transformation induced by the shock therapy 
type liberalisation and stabilisation programme applied by the Ciorbca government. Overall, economic 
growth is a necessary but insufficient condition for FDI. Its impact on FDI is ambivalent and has to be 
assessed in the context of other macrococonomic, microcconomic and political indicators, as shown in 
chapter seven. 
High inflation or price instability generally deter FDI. 46 Table 5.1.4 suggests that the higher level of 
FDI in Poland is associated with an overall lower level of inflation than in Romania. Furthermore, 
Polish inflation has fallen up to 1999. However, in 1997 a high level of FDI was attracted in Romania 
despite an average annual increase in prices of 154.8%. This can be explained through the relative 
importance of other factors, such as privatisation and targeting, which have contributed to the surge in 
FDI in Romania in 1997 and afterwards. Furthermore, the high inflation of 1997 was a result of the 
completion of liberalisation of prices and inflation was expected to fall with the adjustment of the 
economy as a result of the stabilisation package. Finally, wage inflation can be an indication of the 
dynamism of an economy, thus accompanying economic growth. 
Currency instability and currency inconvertibility affect negatively the investment climate by creating 
uncertainty regarding the profits or limiting the scope of profits repatriation 47 Table 5.1.4 shows a 
steady depreciation of the nominal exchange rate correlated with a falling inflation in Poland. 
Romania, on the other hand, has faced relatively more abrupt changes in both the exchange rate and 
44 Hunya, G. , "The Role of FDI 
in Economic Recovery and Transformation", Comment Prepared for the Joint 
LSE-WIIWConference: Reconstruction and Integration in Southeast Europe: Economic Aspects, Vienna, 12-13 
November 1999, p. 1. 
45 Voinea, L., "Revisiting FDI Patterns in Transition. The Case of Romania", Paper Preparedfor EACES 
Conference, May 2002, p-6- 
' Svetlidid, M., Artisien, P. and Rojec, M., "FDI in Central and Eastern Europe: An Overview" in Svetlidid, M., 
Artisien, P. and Rojec, M. (eds. ), FDI in Central and Eastern Europe, Basingstoke, St. Martin's Press, 1993, p. 5; 
Rogoff, K. and Reinhart, C., "FDI to Africa: The Role of Price Stability and Currency Instability", LIIF Working 
Paper No. 10,2003, p. 10; Lim, E. -G., "Determinants of, and the Relationship between FDI and Growth: A 
Summary of the Recent Literature", IMF Working Paper No. 175,2001, p. 14. 
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inflation, suggesting higher currency instability, thus deterring foreign investors. Furthermore, full 
current account convertibility was achieved in Romania only in 1998, compared with June 1995 in 
Poland. 48 This data is consistent with Poland having attracted higher annual inflows of FDI, suggesting 
that currency convertibility is an important determinant of FDI. Currency convertibility is reflected by 
one of the EBRD indicators which is used in chapter seven in the construction of the 
stabilisation/liberalisation index. Data constraints limit the analysis of the trends in the real exchange 
rate which would have been more appropriate as part of the FDI determinants. 
The influence of unemployment on FDI is more ambiguous. First, a high unemployment rate suggests 
possibly a low level of wages. This could be an attractive clement of the investment climate in so far 
as it does not reflect a poor skills level. It may also indicate that there is labour force which awaits to 
take up employment or that wages have been maintained over the equilibrium level. Furthermore, an 
already high level of unemployment in Poland suggests that there might be concerns regarding further 
shedding off from former state owned enterprises acquired by foreign investors and subject to post- 
privatisation restructuring. Thus, in both Poland and Romania clauses regarding post-privatisation 
levels of unemployment have been common place, reducing to some extent the attractiveness of certain 
investment offers. Finally, a low level of unemployment in Romania is a sign of slow restructuring so 
far, putting thus the pressure of firing employees on the new owners. This would make a low rate of 
unemployment act as a deterrent to FDI. 
Finally, the necessity of financing high current account deficits leads governments to adopt a more 
active policy to attract FD09 In the absence of FDI, these high deficits can induce a vicious circle. 
Thus, Romania has faced an increase in the current account deficit since 1995 which, in the absence of 
substantial FDI, has led to a constant increase in foreign debt. This in turn limited the attractiveness for 
investors and the scope of the facilities the government could grant to foreign investors. After two 
years of high current account deficits, Romania attracted in 1997 a considerable amount of FDI for the 
first time since the beginning of transition. However, some FDI can be responsible for increased 
current account deficits by causing increased imports of raw materials and equipment. In Poland, high 
levels of FDI were accompanied by high current account deficits, especially since 1996. Furthermore, 
the high budget deficit in 1998 forced the Romanian authorities to cancel the fiscal facilities initially 
offered in order to attract large investors such as Renault, thus influencing negatively the business 
climate. 50 
47 SvetlidiL, Artisien and Rojec, FDI in Central and Eastern Europe, p. 5. 
48 EBRD, Transition Report, 2001, p. 179,183. 
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In 2001 both countries registered positive economic growth. Unemployment was more worrying in 
Poland, while a higher budget deficit in Romania indicated the need for attracting further FDI. A high 
current account deficit for Poland also suggests that exports should be enhanced, possibly through FDI. 
Inflation remained a relative concern for Romania which registered a consumer prices index of 32%. To 
sum up, macroeconomic stability is a necessary though not sufficient condition for attracting FDI. Data 
for Poland shows that early stabilisation of inflation has created the conditions for subsequent foreign 
investment inflows. Furthermore, the lower attractiveness of Romania was consistent with higher 
levels of inflation and higher economic instability in general, as shown by Munteanu. 51 However, 
additional factors are needed to explain the scope and the dynamics of FDI. Amongst these factors, the 
pace and method of privatisation play a central role, as will be discussed below. Moreover, the 
interaction between stabilisation and privatisation in determining FDI will be assessed quantitatively in 
chapter seven along with assessing the role of security and European integration factors. 
Privatisation: an engine of FDI 
The relationship between privatisation and FDI is complex. On the one hand, privatisation has become 
the main drive of FDI in transition countries. 52 Green field investment aside, FDI was mainly directed 
towards buying former state owned enterprises which were privatised. On the other hand, FDI has not 
always been the dominant form of privatisation. FDI prevailed only when sales to strategic investors 
prevailed in comparison with voucher privatisation. 53 In Poland and Romania changes within the mix 
of privatisation policies have impacted upon the timing and scope of FDI, as will be seen below. 
The mix of privatisation methods was fairly similar in Poland and Romania and was subject to internal 
and external pressures. In both countries, motivation for privatisation has evolved from a rather 
idealistic and ethical approach to a more realistic and economics based approach, i. e. from social and 
distributional considerations, to increasing state revenues and improving corporate governance. S4 
Poland started privatisation gradually, but once started it proceeded smoothly and successfully. 55 On 
the other hand, Romania suffered from inconsistency of policies and, when a bold privatisation 
programme was initiated in 1997, coalition infighting slowed down its application. Hence, the results 
of these similar privatisation mixes were very different. This was not only due to the pace and scope of 
privatisation, but also to the different investment demand. Some factors which might have affected the 
S' Munteanu, C., "On the Determinants of FDI", Working Paper. Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest. 
1991. 
52 Beyer, J., "Please Invest in Our Country. How Successful Were the Tax Incentives for Foreign Investment in 
Transition Countries? ", Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2, July 2002, p. 191; EBRD, 
Transition Report, 2000, p. 63; Hunya, G. "International Competitiveness. Impacts on FDI in CEECs", W111V 
Research Reports No. 268, August 2000; Hunya, G., "Recent FDI Trends, Policies and Challenges in South East 
European Countries", WIIW Research Reports No. 273, December 2000; Voinea, L., "Revisiting FDI Patterns in 
Transition. The Case of Romania", Paper Prepared for EACES Conference, May 2002. 
53 EBRD, Transition Report, 2000, p. 64. 
54 Hunya, "Recent FDI Trends, Policies and Challenges in South Eastern European Countries", p. 10. 
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investment demand include promotional policies in a broad sense and macroeconomic policies which 
are discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, the impact of security and European integration factors on 
enhancing FDI is assessed in chapter seven through the econometric model. 
In both countries the early phase of transition was dominated by direct privatisation and attempts to 
achieve mass privatisation. Direct privatisation (in a broad sense) targeted ownership of small and 
medium-sized enterprises and had two main components in Poland: first, liquidation (in the narrow 
sense) through which the firm was dissolved, its assets sold to private entrepreneurs and the firm 
ceased to be a legal entity; second, direct privatisation (in a narrow sense) through which firms were 
converted into joint-stock companies whose ownership can be transferred in three ways: sale of assets; 
transfer of assets to a company so that a company with State Treasury and private person participation 
will result; and leasing of assets to an employee company. According to the OECD, these two 
methods were practically reserved for insiders, hence foreign participation was minor. Furthermore, 
Jarosz found a total of only 61 enterprises privatised by the direct methods where foreign investors 
participated 57 Wlodarczyk estimated the number at some 80 for the period 1990-1997, i. e. no more 
than 5% of all enterprises privatised in this way. S8 
Between 1993 and 1996 the prevailing privatisation method for small and medium-sized enterprises in 
Romania was Management and Employees Buy Outs (MEBO) S9 This gave priority to management 
and employees in acquiring the shares of their company and thus limited the potential involvement of 
outsiders, including FDI. Further limitations appeared when managers tried to prevent employees from 
trading their shares. Furthermore, when trading shares was possible, outsiders became reluctant to buy 
shares in companies with significant insider ownership and also operating in an environment with 
underdeveloped corporate law and disclosure rules 60 Similar limitations were faced in Poland as a 
result of MEBO. Thus, as a consequence of a strong lobby by the trade unions and of strong powers of 
workers' councils, management and employee participation was encouraged by each privatisation route 
in Poland. MEBO was part of the direct privatisation method as shown above. Furthermore, the 1995 
mass privatisation programme provided for an average 15% share to be given to the workers of the 512 
state owned companies involved. 61 Moreover, in the capital privatisation method employees were first 
offered 20% of the equity at half price and finally 15% of the assets, free of charge. 62 Employees 
ss OECD, Economic Surveys. Poland, OECD, Paris, 2001, p. 81. 
s6 Schöllmann, W., "Foreign Participation in Privatisation: What Does it Mean? Empirical Evidence from the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland" Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 13, No. 3,2001, pp. 379-380. 
s' Jarosz cited in Schöllmann, "Foreign Participation in Privatisation", p. 384. 
ss Wlodarczyk cited in Schöllmann, "Foreign Participation in Privatisation", p. 384. 
9Voinea, "Revisiting FDI Patterns in Transition. The Case of Romania", p. 5. 
Voinea, "Revisiting FDI Patterns in Transition. The Case of Romania", p. 5; OECD, Economic Surveys. 
Romania, 1998, p. 64. 
61 Schöllmann, "Foreign Participation in Privatisation", p. 38 1. 
62 Schöllmann, "Foreign Participation in Privatisation", p. 381. 
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tended to oppose further investments that could diminish their control over the enterprise. Hence, this 
important employee participation in privatisation constituted a continuous brake on further 
privatisation and on FDI. 
Also in Poland, mass privatisation was only indirectly open to foreign investors' participation. In 1997 
sizeable or even controlling stakes had been offered to outside strategic investors in 93 portfolio 
companies. Foreign investors participated in the privatisation of only 32 of these companies, a share of 
34%. 63 This shows that emphasis on mass privatisation rather than capital privatisation has slowed 
FDI. It has, nevertheless, constituted the basis for more efficient privatisation methods. Romania also 
applied a comprehensive mass privatisation programme in 1995, after increased pressure for reforms 
by the World Bank and the IMF. The forthcoming 1996 elections constituted another important push 
factor. 64 This voucher-type assets distribution concerned nearly 4,000 companies whose shares were 
previously managed by the five private ownership funds established alongside the State Ownership 
Fund (SOF) 65 However, this scheme raised huge administrative problems and made privatisation even 
more difficult. By 1998, only 18.7% of the shares of the mass privatised companies w ere transferred, 
the state maintaining a majority stake in most of the companies included in the programme. Weighted 
by capital, only 7.8% of the companies were more than 50% privatiscd. 66 Furthermore, corporate 
governance problems appeared as a result of the high dispersion of capital and an unofficial capital 
market was created. Mass privatisation in Romania became, however, a necessary condition for the 
adoption of more effective methods of privatisation. Foreign investors participation was then 
encouraged in the privatisation of the remaining shares administered by the SOF, now the Authority for 
Privatisation and Management of the State Ownership (APAPS)67 
By 1996, increasing budget and balance of payments deficits determined a switch towards sales to 
strategic investors in both Poland and Romania. Part of capital privatisation in Poland, this method 
concerned large enterprises which had been previously transformed into joint companies. It mainly 
consisted of public offers, tenders of public invitations to negotiations. " Although employee 
participation was equally encouraged, the emphasis this time was on strategic investors, including 
foreign ones. Capital privatisation has thus generated yearly more than 50% of total revenues from 
privatisation. 69 This bigger role of capital privatisation has at least a twofold explanation. First, this 
method concerns large enterprises and therefore can be expected to raise higher revenue per enterprise. 
Schöllmann, "Foreign Participation in Privatisation", p. 382. 
64 The Economist, 10 June 1995. 
65Earle, J. S. and Telegdy, A., "The Results of Mass Privatisation in Romania: A First Empirical Study", 
Economics of Transition, Volume 6, No. 2,1998, p. 318. 
Earle and Telegdy, "The Results of Mass Privatisation in Romania: A First Empirical Study", p. 329. 
s' APAPS, Privatisation Trends in Romania and Opportunities for Foreign Investors, 2002, p. 7. 
Schallmann, "Foreign Participation in Privatisation", p. 384. 
69 Schallmann, "Foreign Participation in Privatisation", p. 384. 
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Second, a strong position of company insiders in the direct privatisation was likely to impose lower 
prices and thus an overall lower level of investment. 70 The data below shows Polish privatisation 
revenues according to different methods applied. Statistical data on the last line of the table shows that 
foreign participation in capital privatisation has been substantial, generating more than 50% of the 
revenue. Furthermore, table 5.1.6 shows that capital privatisation has been the prevalent method in 
terms of number of companies privatised in Poland. 
Table 5.1.5. Polish privatisation revenue (PZL mn) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 91-98 
Total 171 484 780 1,595 2,642 3,749 6,338 7,069 23,028 
Lease, liquidation and rent 46 172 287 323 406 973 359 447 3,013 
Capital privatisation 125 309 439 847 1,714 1,945 3,254 5,102 13,735 
Privatisation of banks 0 4 54 425 521 831 2,925 1,518 6,278 
Foreign capital in capital 
privatisation (percentage) 71 
85.9 98.2 77.0 66.0 77.3 65.8 An Na Na 
Source: OECD, Economic Surmys. Poland, OECD, Paris, 2000, p. 175. 
Table 5.1.6. Evolution of the privatisation process in Poland 
Number of companies privatised (totally 
or partially) during the year (total) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Direct privatisation 182 293 232 238 109 189 181 149 151 
Capital privatisation 28 23 47 36 26 24 44 16 87 
Liquidation 19 67 100 117 93 167 114 75 57 
Source: PAIZ, The Polish PHvatisation Process, 28 June 2000. 
In Poland there has been a considerable slow down in privatisation since 2001. This was partially due 
to remaining companies being the least competitive ones, in sensitive industries such as coal, steel, 
energy or chemical industry. 'Z The slowdown was equally due to corruption and to the complicated 
privatisation process which includes substantial consultation with social partners. 73 Further slowdown 
in privatisation will possibly be determined by the need to restructure some of the remaining 
companies before privatising them. 74 Finally, limits to FDI participation in privatisation have been 
recently imposed in Poland by restricting bank privatisation to domestic investors. " This shows how 
political factors can negatively affect FDI related policies, thus potentially inducing a vicious economic 
circle. This is why international support and a positive government's attitude are very important. It is 
equally important that the policies implemented ensure high public support through a positive impact 
70 Schöllmann, "Foreign Participation in Privatisation", p. 381. 
71 Schöllmann, "Foreign Participation in Privatisation", p. 382. 
n OECD, Economic Surveys. Poland, OECD, Paris, 2002, p. 123. 
73 OECD, Economic Surveys. Poland, 2002, p. 123. 
74 OECD, Economic Surveys. Poland, 2002, p. 117-122. 
75 The Warsaw Voice, 23 June 2002. 
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on the standard of living of the population. FDI impact in this respect will be assessed in part two of 
this chapter. 
In Romania, the poor results of previous privatisation methods and the pressure for reforms in order to 
progress towards EU membership led to direct sales being predominant in the period 1996-2000 as 
shown in table 5.1.7. The post-1996 Ciorbea government pledged to sell fifty enterprises per week in 
an attempt to increase the pace of privatisation. 76 Foreign investors were, however, constrained by pre- 
set prices which some times made the offers unattractive. Moreover, corruption, lack of transparency as 
well as high debts and arrears of the enterprises on offer led to a generally low interest from foreign 
investors and a low level of transactions. A change of strategy was needed. Direct sales negotiations 
were complemented by auctions and sales on the capital market in order to eliminate disputes over the 
privatisation price. Furthermore, the 2002 law for the acceleration of privatisation specifically allowed 
for privatisation at market price, rather than administered prices, and provided for the writing off of 
debts and arrears in order to make privatisation more attractive to foreign investors. 71 The government 
even introduced a programme of privatisation for 1 Euro. Despite certain criticism of such low prices, 
this method can boost the privatisation of very indebted and thus unattractive companies. The 
transaction is, however, subject to post-privatisation investment and/or job creation commitments. 78 
This appears to be an acceptable compromise to break the vicious circle of high debts, lack of 
restructuring, higher debts and thus lower prospects for investment in these unattractive enterprises. 
The low transaction price aims to increase the attractiveness of such enterprises to foreign investors 
while the post-privatisation commitments aim to ensure that restructuring occurs with minimum costs 
for the employees. This policy is meant to ensure a virtuous political circle. 
A summary of the privatisation methods used in Romania is given in table 5.1.7. This shows that 
privatisation in Romania picked up between 1996 and 2000. Although the two countries have applied a 
similar mix of privatisation methods, this has led to different results. These depended not only on the 
investment supply through the privatisation process, but also on the investment demand which was 
affected greatly by other factors, including the investment climate, geographical position, or the 
prospect of EU membership. Moreover, FDI was not only directed towards privatisation, but also took 
the form of green field investment. Thus, Poland has increasingly attracted green field investment in 
the special economic zones. On the other hand, Romania mainly attracted green field investment near 
the western border in processing industries. ' In the event of completion or slow down in privatisation 
of former state owned enterprises, FDI should be increasingly directed towards green field investment. 
76 Gordon, (ed), Economic PolicyReformforSustainable Development in Romania, p. 6. 
77 OECD, Economic Surveys. Romania, OECD, Paris, 2002, p. 85. 
78 OECD, Economic Surveys. Romania, 2002, p. 86. 
79 G. Hunya, "FDI in South Eastern Europe in Early 2000s", WIIW, A study commissioned by the Austrian 
Ministry of Economy and Labour, 2001, p. 7. 
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In this way FDI impact in transition economies will continue beyond the end of the change of 
ownership of former state owned enterprises. 
Table 5.1.7. Evolution of the privatisation process in Romania 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Number of companies privatised during the 
year (total) 
265 604 648 1,388 1,304 1,267 1,834 1,341 127 
MEBO 261 519 43 14 
Direct negotiations 4 85 605 1,007 1,064 244 1,337 1,235 19 
Auctions 455 231 991 92 
Sales on the capital market 9 32 64 106 16 
Companies sold to foreign investors 1 1 3 4 44 96 83 38 no 
Proceeds from sale to foreign investors- USD 
mit 
2 3.9 15 15.5 403.8 608.1 57.1 7 na 
Source: OECD, Economic Suweys. Romania, 2002. p. 64. 
The impact of privatisation on FDI can be assessed not only based on the mix of privatisation methods 
applied, but also from the point of view of economic sectors opened to FDI. Table 5.1.8 suggests late 
liberalisation for most of the infrastructure sectors, despite infrastructure being considered a key 
element of an attractive business location. The liberalisation in telecommunications or banking is 
consistent with high levels of FDI registered between 1998 and 1999, both in Poland and Romania. 
Furthermore, the late liberalisation of these sectors is consistent with the initial attitude of authorities in 
both countries that these sectors had strategic importance. The data in the following table refers to the 
years when some sectors were opened to FDI access, and not necessarily to the years w%-hen the first 
foreign investment occurred. For example, Telecomunikacja Polska was offered for privatisation in 
1998, but France Telecom only invested in 1999. However, from the point of view of FDI 
determinants, the date of openness seems more relevant. The gap between this date and the first serious 
investment that occurred can be considered a measure of the country's attractiveness for investors or of 
the government's commitment for reforms. Thus, in Romania, the largest privatisation in the steel 
industry only occurred in 2000, with the sale of SIDEX to the Indian-UK ISPAT, despite an early 
liberalisation in 1997. Similarly, Petrom and Tarom have not been yet privatised. Finally, the most 
sensitive sectors in both economies are steel, mining and energy in general. In Poland, as a result of 
previous problems regarding the privatisation of the main companies in these fields, the government 
has now pledged to undertake the restructuring before privatisation would go furthcr. 80 Although 
Romania seemed to have liberalised certain sectors earlier than Poland, this did not have a significant 
effect on the level of FDI, suggesting that other factors are also important. 
80 EBRD, Investment Profile. Poland 2001, p. 25. 
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Table 5.1.8. Openness towards FDI 
Openness towards FD1 In former state owned enterprises (SO Es) Poland Romania 
Banking 1998: Pekso Group 1998: Romanian 
Development Bank 
Insurance 1998: PZU 2000: Omniasig 
Telecommunications 1998: Telcoomunikaoja Polska 1998: Romtelcoom 
Energy sector Oil 2001: Ratincria Gdanska 1999: Pctrom 
Coal 1998: two coal mines 
Gas 2002: PGNIG 20110: Romgaz and 
SNP Pctrom 
Airlines 1998: LOT 2001: Tarom 
Steel sector 1999: hula Katowice 1997: Otclinox 
Railways 2002 Strategic sector 
Sources: EBRD, Investment Profile. Poland, 2001, pp. 25-30; EBRD, Investment Profile. Romania, 2001, pp. 15- 
21 
To sum up, privatisation has constituted a main engine for FDI in both Poland and Romania. However, 
despite similar mixes of privatisation methods the two countries have attracted considerably different 
volumes of foreign investment. This can be explained by the different pace and commitment to 
privatisation and by the internal and external political developments of each country. Furthermore, 
institution building in general, rather than privatisation alone, was different in the two countries and 
had a different effect, as will be shown in chapter seven. This also shows that policies alone are not 
able to explain the inflow of FDI. Furthermore, investment supply is not sufficient in explaining FDI. 
One has to analyse equally the investment demand and the factors which determine it. Some of these 
determinants of investment demand considered in this chapter arc the macroeconomic factors and the 
policies to promote and attract FDI. While the former ones have already been discussed, the later will 
be addressed below. Furthermore, investment demand is likely to depend on factors specific to 
investing countries or firms or on the country image and implicitly on security concerns, as 
investigated in chapter seven. 
Policies to attrad and promote FDI: how effective? 
In order to increase the FDI level, countries increasingly use FDI specific policies. " These promotional 
policies (in a broad sense) are part of the general economic policy of a country and can be classified as 
policies to attract and policies to promote FDI (in a narrow sense). While promoting FDI is mainly a 
marketing exercise, attracting FDI nowadays includes increasingly fiscal and financial incentives for 
investors in general or foreign investors in particular. 82 Financial benefits are usually preferred by 
developed countries and include subsidies for investment, training, development of the infrastructure, 
81 UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2000, p. 6. 
82 Mazilu, Transnalionalele si Competitivitatea; Bonciu, Atragerea# monitorizarea investillilorst nine directe, 
p. 52. 
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and credits with preferential interest. 83 Fiscal benefits are especially used by developing countries in 
Asia, Africa or Eastern Europe. They include: tax holidays, tax exemptions, preferential taxes, low 
export or import taxes. Both types of incentives are more accepted in practice than in theory and their 
impact is difficult to assess, according to UNCTAD. 84 Moreover, the more recent trends of FDI 
diversion from Poland to Czech Republic support the possible effectiveness and attractiveness of such 
policies. 85 So, what is Poland and Romania's experience in attracting and promoting FDI so far and 
what lessons can be learned from these examples? 
First, experience shows that fiscal and financial incentives are necessary but not sufficient for attracting 
FDL86 They have to be correlated with the general economic policy of the country, with privatisation 
and with macro-stabilisation measures. 87 Moreover, promoting FDI too early, before the environment 
is sufficiently reformed, is a mistake. Investors once disappointed arc difficult to bring back. " Thus, 
Romania granted in 1991 important fiscal facilities, ranging from custom duties and value added tax 
(VAT) exemptions to tax on profit exemption for a period between two and five years depending on 
the activity. "' However, balance of payment constraints and limited convertibility of the national 
currency did not allow, for example, for total repatriation of profit, a situation which deterred potential 
large investors. 90 Furthermore, these incentives encouraged disloyal investors. They created so called 
'canned companies' which only operated until the period for fiscal facilities expired 91 The same 
restriction to Romania's capability to grant incentives occurred in 1999. The large foreign debt 
accumulated by 1999 and the need to service it made the Romanian government suspend all the 
supplementary fiscal facilities introduced in 1998 in order to attract investors such as Renault. 92 This 
led to legislation in Romania being perceived as unpredictable, further deterring FDI. These 
developments also raised the question over the positive impact of incentives on economic growth and 
thus further measures were seen as necessary in order to increase the multiplier effect of foreign 
investment. 93 Furthermore, this initial negative experience with FDI led to targeting according to the 
size of investment. 
84 UNCTAD cited in Bonciu, Atragerea, ci monitorizarea investiliilor strdine directe, p. 52; Subsequent research 
shows that breaks have limited impact. 
ss The Financial Times, 4 March 2002; The Warsaw Voice, 14 June 2002. 
aß Beyer, "Please Invest in Our Country", p. 191. 
87 Bonciu, Atragerea # monitorizarea investiliilorstrdine directe, p. 54; Wells, . cited in Gordon, L. (ed), Economic Policy Reform for Sustainable Development in Romania, p. 34. 
ss Wells, L. cited in Gordon, L. (ed), Economic Policy Reform for Sustainable Development In Romania, p. 34. 
89 RDA, Romanian Investment Review, September-October 1999, pp. 4-5. 
90 RDA, Romanian Investment Review, September -October 1999, pp. 4-5. 
91 RDA, Romanian Investment Review, September -October 1999, pp. 4-5. 
92 EBRD, Romania. Investment Profile, 2001. 
93 RDA, Romanian Investment Review, September -October 1999, pp. 4-5. 
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Second, the use of financial and fiscal incentives can reflect a certain role that the government assigns 
to FDI within the economic development of the country. In the literature this is called targeting. 94 The 
government draws certain priorities in terms of size of investment, sectors of the economy or 
geographical areas and uses financial or fiscal incentives packages to direct the investors accordingly. 
Poor, volatile or contradicting legislative framework can, however, have adverse effects as proved in 
Romania. Moreover, the credibility of the government is important in making investors consider the 
incentives. 95 The targeting method used by each country was a result of a learning by doing process. 
Previous patterns of FDI led both countries to adopting new targeting methods, as will be shown 
below. 
Targeting according to the size of investment 
Drawing on the experience of early years of transition when fiscal facilities mainly encouraged small 
and some times disloyal investors, the Romanian government has increasingly targeted according to 
the size of investment. The minimum contribution varied from large to small and medium investors. It 
also became more realistic in what was considered investment with a significant impact through the 
spill over effect on the rest of the economy. The figure thus ranged from over USD 50 million in 
1994 to USD 350,000 in 1997, to USD 50 million in 1999 and to only USD 1 million in 2001. The 
Law No. 332/2001 targeted investments over USD 1 mn which can contribute to the modernisation of 
the economic infrastructure, the creation of jobs and can have spill over effects on the economy. ' It 
also provided that special conditions for investment of over USD 10 million may be subject to 
negotiations with the Department for Foreign Investors 98 This provision for negotiations for further 
incentives prevented further legislation instability and left enough room for flexibility in dealing with 
large investors. However, in Poland, facilities granted previously on individual basis to investors such 
as General Motors have constituted indirectly barriers to other potential investors. ' This shows that 
individual facilities can distort markets and thus have to be used cautiously, as they bear significant 
negative effects. 
In recognition of its efficiency, a similar method of targeting has been recently adopted in Poland. The 
Polish version is, however, more comprehensive, aiming to encourage not only large investments, but 
also job creation, technology transfer and environmentally friendly technologies. This way of targeting 
can ensure the Polish economy high returns in exchange for the costs initially involved by fiscal and 
financial incentives. Thus, according to the Law on Financial Support for Investment of 2002, foreign 
94 Mazilu, p. 245. 
9s Interview with Expert in FDI in Romania, EBRD, London, 2002. 
Bonciu, Atragerea ¢i monitorizarea investgiilorsträine directe, "New Investment Law", InvestRomania, 
hiip: //www. investromania. ro/magazine/last issue. 
97 Ministry of Development and Prognosis, Romania. Executive Summary, 2002, p. 19. 
98 Bonciu, "New Investment Law. " 
154 
investors in Poland may obtain different types of grants provided that they invest, employ, train their 
employees, develop the infrastructure and implement new, environment friendly technologies. 100 This 
type of targeting aims to ensure a high quality of investment with a visible positive impact on the 
economy. The time constraints put to investors are a means to diminish the risk of investment 
relocation, thus attempting to induce long lasting effects. 
Overall, there are several advantages and downsides of targeting according to the size of investment. 
On the one hand, large investments have a potentially higher impact on the economy though the 
infusion of technology, know-how, employment opportunities, sales and integration in world economy. 
They are more resilient to crises and can induce reinvestment. Furthermore, targeting large investments 
is consistent with encouraging FDI participation in the privatisation of the former SOEs, often still 
large entities needing immediate restructuring. On the other hand, by granting large investors 
incentives such as tax holidays, the budget lacks important resources. This is why it is important that a 
stable macroeconomic situation is achieved prior to granting such facilities. Furthermore, by 
conditioning some facilities on performance, employment or financing criteria set for the foreign 
investors, authorities are likely to balance the initial loss resulting from facilities with future gains from 
the investment itself. 
Targeting according to the field ofactivity 
An alternative targeting method is encouraging investment in a certain field of activity. Governments 
can specifically grant incentives for investment in certain fields or exclude fields of activity from 
granting incentives. Such an attitude was adopted by the Romanian government in 1991 when it 
switched focus from trade and catering to industry and through the Urgency Government Ordinance 
No. 67/1999. This did not grant any incentives to companies from trade, banking and service sectors in 
an attempt to boost the privatisation of the hard-core of the economy i. e. steel, aluminium or energy 
producers. 10' The same discrimination was made through the law No. 3322001 which excluded from 
incentives the financial, banking and insurance sectors as well as those regulated by special provisions 
such as in ammunitions or drugs-10' While such a decision is justified by the need to encourage 
restructuring of important sectors of the economy, financial and banking restructuring should to be top 
priorities of the governments due to the potential spill over effect on other sectors of activity. 103 Again, 
Poland has used a similar method of targeting, combined though with targeting according to 
geographical distribution as will be shown below. 
99 Voinea, "Revisiting FDI Patterns in Transition. The Case of Romania", p. 7. 
100 PAIZ, http. 11ivww. paiz. pl. 
101 RDA, Romanian Investment Review, November-December, 1999, Bucharest, p. 3. 
1°2 Bonciu, "New Investment Law". 
103 Bevan, A. A., Estrin, S. and Grabbe, Ii, "The Impact of EU Accession Prospects on FDI Inflows to Central 
and Eastern Europe", Policy Paper No. 6,200 1. 
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Targeting according to geographical distribution 
In Poland, targeting was achieved through the creation of special economic zones (SEZs) which offer 
privileges to foreign companies. This type of targeting combined the need to help certain areas cope 
with the hardship of transition with the aim of improving the structure of the Polish economy and 
trade. 104 The SEZs were meant to create new jobs and encourage better use of industrial assets and 
infrastructure, to foster exports and trigger economic growth. 105 Moreover, some were located in areas 
close to the border so that they would enhance exports, or in the proximity of airports, European 
transport corridors or university centres, so that they made best use of infrastructure. 106 The basic law 
for the establishment and operation of SEZs in Poland was passed in 1994 when the economy was 
already stabilised. This timing was an important pre-requisite for success of the SEZs. The law called 
for preferential treatment and tax breaks for potential investors. "" By the end of 2000 there w ere 
seventeen special economic zones in Poland of which fifteen were active. 108 These had an important 
impact on the regional development in Poland but a discussion on this topic is beyond the scope of this 
study. 
How successful were the SEZs in attracting FDI? A thorough evaluation of the impact of the SEZs on 
FDI is beyond the scope of this study. However, several trends can be identified, Thus, despite early 
cautious perceptions on the possible success of the SEZs, experience has shown that incentives have 
initiated economic growth in these arcas. 109 The SEZs also led to an improvement in the structure of 
the Polish economy. The techno-parks of Cracow and Mazovia arc oriented towards the development 
of ultramodern technologies. The Moldin technopark is focused inter alia on electrical, chemical, 
precision machinery and motor industries as well as food processing»0 Another positive impact of the 
SEZs was the incentive for green field projects, which makes foreign capital inflows less dependent on 
the progress of privatisation. Thus, by 1998 in the Euro-Park Miclec almost half of the thirty six 
projects were green field projects. 111 
Despite the generally acknowledged beneficial effect of the SEZs, there was a certain debate as to their 
desirability. First, the SEZs were accused of being 'a symptom of state interventionism', jeopardising 
104 The Warsaw Voice, 19 April 1998. 
105 The Warsaw Voice, 28 March 1999. 
106 The Warsaw Voice, 30 July 2000. 
107 The fiscal facilities granted to investors in the special economic zones in Poland through the 1994 law are: 
partial or complete exemption from income tax on business activities in the zones -for 10 years- a 50 % 
exemption for the next 10 years- and from corporate income tax; the possibility to classify some capital 
investment expenses as revenue; exemption from taxes and local fees for land, buildings and structures within the 
zone. (See EBRD, Investment Profile. Poland, EBRD, London, 2001, p. 10). 
108 EBRD, Investment Profile. Poland, 2001, p. 10. 
log The Warsaw Voice, 19 April 1998. 
110 The Warsaw Voice, 26 October 1997. 
111 The Warsaw Voice, 28 March 1999. 
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the tax base and thus negatively affecting the budget. 12 Second, they did not comply with the EU 
regulation on public assistance. Progress towards EU membership and the necessity to adopt and apply 
the acquis communautaire made the existence of SEZs questionable. After a heated debate, in an 
attempt to comply with the EU recommendations, it was agreed in June 1999 to liquidate the zones 
such as Modlin which had been formally established but had not started operation yet. By 2002, further 
compromises had been made by Poland in order to comply with EU requirements regarding state 
assistance and competition. "' These changes restricted the general incentives granted, but enabled the 
local governments to exempt, for example, real estate taxes or to impose them. Public assistance in 
forms of subsidies, tax relief and bonuses for creating new jobs were still part of the incentive packages 
for investment in the SEZs. 14 By 2002, investors, including the ones located in the special economic 
zones were eligible for fiscal and financial incentives as presented in the tables 5.1.9 and 5.1.10. 
Romania attempted as early as 1992 to foster the role of free zones in attracting FDI. Some of them 
were active before 1989 and by December 1999 six free zones were active: Bräila, Constanla-Basarabi 
Sud, Curtici, Galati, Giurgiu, Sulina. "s These zones provided several facilities to investors. 16 The 
relatively reduced size of these areas and their geographical position led to a modest impact on the 
economy. '17 The idea of stimulating FDI in certain geographical areas through financial and fiscal 
incentives was not, however, abandoned. The UGO 24/1998 established twenty two zones that have 
been declared 'disadvantaged' zones. "8 Companies established in these areas are granted a set of fiscal 
incentives. 119 These facilities led to the danger of fiscal evasion and therefore the government has 
increased its monitoring on these areas. Furthermore, the lack of appropriate infrastructure and means 
of communication makes investment in these areas relatively unattractive. Recently the necessary 
112 The Warsaw Voice, 26 October 1997; The Warsaw Voice, 19 April 1998. 
113 PAIZ Newsletter, 29 July 2002. 
114 The Warsaw Voice, 30 July 2000. 
115 RDA, Romanian Investment Review, November-December, 1999, Bucharest, p. 3. 
116 The fiscal facilities granted to investors in the free zones in Romania were: lease or rent of the land to 
Romanian or foreign natural or legal persons for a period of maximum 50 years; exemption of payment of 
customs duties or customs for means of transports, goods or other assets introduced or taken out of the zones; 
exemption from the payment of the VAT, excise and profit tax for the activities conducted in the free zones for 
the entire duration of their activity. (See RDA, Romanian Investment Review, November-December, 1999, p. 3) 
117 Interview, Expert in FDI in Romania, The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, London, 2002. 
118 RDA, Romanian Investment Review, November-December, 1999, Bucharest, p. 3. 
119 The fiscal facilities granted to companies set up in the disadvantaged zones in Romania were: complete 
reimbursement of customs duties for machinery, equipment, installations, tools, means of transport (except for 
vehicles), know-how, other depreciable assets imported with the view of making and carrying investments in the 
zone; complete reimbursement of the customs duties for the imported materials, spare parts and/or constituent 
parts, necessary for the achievement of an own production in disadvantaged zone; exemption from the payment 
of the profit tax, for the duration of existence of the disadvantaged zone; exemption from the payment of the 
taxes levied for the change of the destination or for the exclusion from the agricultural circuit of land intended for 
the achievement of investment; ranting with priority of certain amounts from the Special Fund for Development 
placed at the disposal of Government of Romania, for the stimulation of export activity; guarantees for foreign 
credits; financing of special programs; financing of investment projects in which the state is a co-participant to 
the registered share capital. (See RDA, Romanian Investment Review, November -December, 1999, Bucharest, p. 
3). 
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legislation framework was built in Romania for setting up industrial parks. They arc aimed at 
developing the infrastructure and encouraging the production of sofware. 120 It is still too early to 
assess the success of these new forms of incentives. However, pressure from the EU regarding state 
assistance is threatening their existence in the Romanian economy, as has happened in Poland. 
Romania seems to increasingly adopt similar policies to Poland with the aim to enhance its 
attractiveness for foreign investors. However, it appears that factors other than the incentives 
themselves have determined the main differences in each country's capability of attracting FDI. In 
order to investigate the importance of these other factors a quantitative analysis is conducted in chapter 
seven. A comparison among the general incentives given in Poland and Romania is provided in the 
following tables. The data shows a prevalence of fiscal incentives for Romania and an increased offer 
of financial incentives by the Polish government. In Poland, this targeting method signals a switch 
from simply attracting FDI to rewarding FDI. While fiscal measures diminish the local and central 
government revenues from the beginning, thus increasing the budget deficits, financial measures 
include budgetary contributions, provided that certain standard arc met by investors. However, this 
increased government spending might not be consistent with the acute need to cut the increasing 
budget deficit. On the other hand, income and local tax exemptions seem to be the preferred fiscal 
incentives in the SEZ in Poland. Income tax relief is a positive measure in so far as it encourages 
enterprises to report their profits. Otherwise, they will be tempted to keep them down, so that paid 
income tax is reduced. Furthermore, local tax exemptions eliminate unfair competition between 
different areas based on fiscal policies. 
Table 5.1.9. Fiscal and financial incentives in Poland and Romania as of 2002 
Fiscal Incentives Poland Romania 
Exemptions from impost duties and fees on imported capital Yes Yes 
Delayed VAT for imports of components Yes 
Accelerated depreciation Yes Yes 
Possibility to carry forward losses Yes Yes 
Additional fiscal incentives in SEZs or free zones 
Corporate tax holidays 
Special deductions 
Local tax exemptions 
Financial incentives 
Grants for 25 % of investment outlays 
Grants for job creation (4,000 euro per job created) 
Grants for investment related to infrastructure development 
Grants for employee training (1,150 euro per employee) 
Grants for hiring unemployed 










Source: PAIZ, http: //www. paizgov. pl; Ministry of Development and Prognosis, Romania. Lrecutive Summary, 
2002, p. 19; Mah and Tamulaitis, "Investment Incentives", p. 233. 
120 Guvenul Romäniei. Ministerul DezvoltArii $i Prognozei, Progrrrmul 'Parcuri Industrtale', p. 3. 
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Table 5.1.10. Other incentives in Poland and Romania as of 2002 
Other incentives 
Special institutional support 
Programmes to support small and medium -sized firms 
Priority investment projects 
Free trade areas and warehouses 














Source: Mah and Tamulaitis, "Investment Incentives", p. 237, updated. 
The relevance of the incentives offered by Romania is to a certain extent debatable. Thus, there is a 
vast legislation which encourages different types of investment by offering in the end very similar 
packages of incentives. This increases the legislative burden without producing qualitatively different 
results. Furthermore, the lack of transparency has encouraged corruption while the legislative 
instability has deterred investors during the first half of transition. Moreover, there is a strong emphasis 
on import duties exemptions. Then, the possibility to carry out losses is probably a way of avoiding 
paying income tax. Additionally, delayed payments of VAT are in the opinion of some investors just 
another legislative gimmick which creates more confusion and burcaucracy. 121 Finally, early incentives 
were not accompanied by enough efforts for economic reforms, thus making the focus on tax 
incentives insufficient for attracting FDI. '22 
Promotional policies and the coup image 
Attracting FDI through incentives should be complemented by a strong promotional effort. With the 
increasing competition between the CEECs in attracting FDI, country image is ever more important. So 
far Poland has benefited from an important international lobby and an incisive marketing strategy 
which helped it overcome the difficulties of early transition. When Poland was a politically unstable 
country in the early 1990s it lay behind Hungary and the Czech Republic in terms of FDI levels. 
However, when Poland became a frontrunner of the EU accession process or a'tigcr of Eastern Europe 
with continuous high economic growth rates, Poland attracted increasing inflows of foreign 
investment. Furthermore, the country received a positive country risk assessment after the rescheduling 
and the cancelling of parts of its foreign debt, thus increasing its attractiveness for foreign investors. A 
generally positive country image has worked as an important factor attracting FDI in Poland, 
enhancing both a positive political circle and an economic one. 
Romania, on the other hand, slipped into a vicious circle. The early political instability and the lack of 
consistent or serious economic reforms led to slow progress in the transition, the EU accession process 
121 Adevärul Economic, 4-10 October 2000, p. 25. 
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and in attracting foreign investment. Furthermore, after a peak in 1998, FDI fell again in 1999 as a 
result of mixed factors including the perception of high risk as a result of the Kosovo crisis. Guarantees 
for future EU membership given at the Helsinki Council and a bold new reform package have ensured 
stable levels of FDI since 2000, although much lower than the 1998 level. All in all, Romania has had 
poor lobby initiatives and its image outside the country has been poorly reflected. " This lack of 
accurate information and the relatively poor progress of Romania in transition has contributed to the 
low interest from investors for the Romanian enterprises offered for privatisation. This is why the 
present government has emphasised the role of promotional activities and has included them amongst 
the priorities in its economic and investment policy. 124 Furthermore, in 2001 the Romanian premier 
Nästase commissioned the two main agencies Moody's and Standard and Poor's to issue a new rating 
for Romania. This now reflects the recent progress made in reforms, thus creating a more accurate 
image of Romania as an increasingly attractive investment destination. The outlook on the country is 
now stable. 
To sum up, an attractive offer of fiscal and financial incentives may complement the provision of a 
stable macroeconomic environment and of attractive privatisation opportunities. However, in the 
absence of these two preliminary conditions, incentives can have a negative effect in the economy and 
attract the wrong kind of investors. Furthermore, targeting ensures a certain control over the type and 
geographical spread of investment and on its potential impact in the economy. A mix of targeting 
methods is preferable, but its effects are still difficult to assess. Moreover, the impact of fiscal and 
financial incentives depends on the transparency, stability and enforcement of the laws and on the 
quality of assistance for investors. Finally, an adequate promotional campaign is important in ensuring 
foreign investors' interest in the destination country. Country image remains a crucial determinant of 
FDI but depends on factors other than just a promotional campaign. Successful economic reforms, 
internal and external political stability or the prospect of EU membership are elements of the country 
image that are likely to influence the investment climate and hence FDI. These will be further 
discussed in chapter seven. 
5.1.4 An overall assessment of the investment climate in Poland and Romania 
A comparison of the investment climate in Poland and Romania would be incomplete without referring 
to deterrents to investment identified by investors' surveys and studies of international organisations 
such as the EBRD and the World Bank. Thus, the table which follows suggests that in 2001 political 
instability was still a cause of concern for investment in Romania mentioned by 71% of the 
respondents. This is consistent with findings by Lucas and Ferris ct at which maintain that political risk 
122 See also Ferris, S. P., Thomson, G. R. and Valsan, C., "FDI in an Emerging Market Economy. The Case of 
Romania", Eastern European Economics, Vol. 32, No. 4, July- August 1994, p. 82. 123 Alahdad, Z., PmTV, Aprilie 2000; Interview with Expert in Privatisation in Romania, Bucharest, 2000. 
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has a negative effect on the investment climate. 125 Furthermore, elements of economic instability such 
as national currency depreciation and inflation constituted the most important barriers for foreign 
investors, even more than political risk. " Shortcomings related to legislation instability, fiscal 
regulation, corruption and infrastructure in general are also high deterrents of FDI in Romania. 127 
These seem to counter act to an extent the potential positive effect of attractive fiscal facilities. 
Moreover, this overview of deterrents to FDI in Poland and Romania seems to indicate the need to alter 
certain government policies in order to improve the investment climate and thus enhance FDI. In 
Poland the deterrents mentioned by investors are mainly of administrative nature, proving that the 
economic and political conditions for attracting FDI have been ensured through an adequate policy 
mix. 
Table 5.1.11. Deterrents to FDI in Poland and Romania 
Poland Romania 
1. Look of system cohesion (44%) 1. National currency depreciation (9119) 
2. Uneven application of laws by authorities (39.6%) 2 Inflation (90%) 
3. Administration procedures for building permissions (36.7%) 3. Legislative instability (86%) 
4. Real estate acquisition (34.5%) 4. Fiscal regulations (85%) 
5. Corruption (8490) 
6. Taxes (84%) 
7. Inappropriate infrastructure (75%) 
8. Ambiguous commercial legislation (74%) 
9. Political instability (71%) 
Sources: PAIZ, 1999 und World Bank-. 200 1, 
124 Guvemul Romäniei, "Programul de guvernare", p. 5. 
125 Lucas, R., "Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? ", American Economic Review, Vol. 80, 
1990, p. 92; Ferris, Thomson and Valsan, "FDI in an Emerging Market Economy. The Case of Romania", p. 81. 126 See also Munteanu, "On the Determinants of FDI". 
127 See also Ferris, Thomson and Valsan, "FDI in an Emerging Market Economy. The Case of Romania", p. 93. 
Data as in a poll conducted by PAIZ in 1999. 
Data as in a study conducted by the World Bank in 2001. 
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5.2 Part two: Evidence of the scope and impact of foreign direct investment in Poland and 
Romania 
The previous part of the chapter has assessed the role of political factors and policies in improving 
the investment climate in Poland and Romania. This part of chapter five gives evidence of FDI 
impact at microeconomic level, i. e. on marketisation, integration into the world economy and with 
the EU, better standards of living for the population and on FDI itself. These types of impact are 
greatly interconnected and correspond to the elements of the vicious circles identified by this 
dissertation in the case of Romania in the early 1990s: poor economic reforms (hence slow 
marketisation), poor prospects for EU membership, internal instability, low FDI and thus slow 
economic reform. Here the analysis acknowledges that the relationship between FDI on the one 
hand and reforms on the other (policies or marketisation) is bi-directional, as represented in 
diagram 5A(b). The reverse of this relationship has already been assessed in part one. Moreover, 
FDI is both an indicator and a means of integration with the EU, as chapter three has identified. 
Additionally, by assessing the FDI impact on a better life, the chapter analyses the role of FDI in 
ensuring support for a market economy and EU integration and implicitly positive perceptions of 
security, as defined in chapter six. Finally, by assessing the FDI impact on FDI, this chapter tests 
the hypothesis of path dependency put forward in chapter one. This hypothesis will be tested 
quantitatively in chapter seven. 
5.2.1 On foreign direct investment and transition to a market economy 
FDI, a means of privatisation 
The contribution of FDI to transition to a market economy will be analysed from three angles: as a 
sourcing factor, as a means of modernisation and as a means of structural change. FDI has been an 
important means of privatisation, thus contributing to markctisation. ' However, the relationship 
between FDI and privatisation is bi-directional and relatively complex. On the one hand, progress 
of privatisation has acted as an incentive for foreign investors by showing that the host country is 
devoted to promoting and respecting private ownership and by offering complementing investment 
opportunities. This direction of the relationship between FDI and privatisation was analysed in part 
one of this chapter. On the other hand, FDI enhances privatisation by accelerating the sales of 
former SOEs for which there was not enough financing from other sources. Thus, foreign 
investment has complemented domestic savings which in periods of recession or high inflation 
were relatively 1ow. 2 Studies reveal that in the CEECs foreign investment has contributed to a 
larger extent to capital formation compared to domestic credit and capital market financing. 3 
1 Hunya, "International Competitiveness. Impacts on FDI in CEECs", . 4. 2 Barrell and Holland, "Foreign Direct Investment and Enterprise Restructuring", p. 478; Mazilu, 
Transnajionalele , ci Competitivitatea; Ferris, Thomson and Valsan, "FDI in an Emerging Market Economy. 
The Case of Romania", pp. 81-95; Kroska, L., "Foreign Direct Investment Financing of Capital Formation in 
Central and Eastern Europe"; Hunya, G., "International Competitiveness. Impacts on FDI in CEECs". 
3 Krkoska, "Foreign Direct Investment Financing of Capital Formation", p. 18. 
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Nevertheless, FDI has not only contributed towards the privatisation of the former state owned 
enterprises. FDI has been also directed towards small and medium joint ventures or other forms of 
green field investment. This makes the total flow of foreign investment not correspond to the 
revenues from privatisation. Nevertheless, FDI, including green field investment, contributes 
towards marketisation. 
In order to illustrate the scope of FDI in Poland and Romania and its role in privatisation, the 
following indicators will be used: 
a) The annual inflows of FDI: They show the variability of foreign investment through time and 
suggest a certain trend for each country, possibly related to changes within the investment climate. 
High levels of FDI are likely to generate a higher impact on the economy, but the impact depends 
also on the FDI size relative to population and GDP. 
b) FDI per capita: Through its magnitude, this indicator indicates the scope for potential FDI 
impact in each economy. The higher the FDI per capita, the higher the potential impact is likely to 
be. 
c) FDI annual inflows as a percentage of GDP: This indicator suggests the contribution of FDI to 
the national domestic product. The higher the percentage, the higher the contribution of FDI is 
likely to be. However, similar figures for this indicator could result from a high level of FDI and a 
high GDP, as in the case of Poland, or low FDI and low GDP, as in the case of Romania, thus 
making the comparison difficult. 
d) FDI as a percentage of gross capital formation: This indicator demonstrates the importance of 
FDI as a financing option. A high value would be consistent with the lack of domestic capital and 
the need for FDI in financing privatisation and markctisation in general. 
e) The EBRD index of large scale privatisation: Although this is not a very accurate measurement 
of the FDI impact in the economy, a higher indicator can be a result of a higher contribution of 
foreign investment to the privatisation process. 
f) The percentage of private sector in GDP and employment: Although the private sector includes 
companies other than foreign owned ones, these indicators give a measure of the role private 
property, including the one with foreign participation, plays in the economy as a whole. 
The annual inflows of FDI and the FDI per capita data for Poland and Romania indicate a potential 
higher impact in Poland. In terms of FDI per capita, the gap between the two countries has 
decreased since 1996, suggesting that Romania is in the process of catching up with Poland, but the 
difference is still striking. 
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Table 5.2.1. Foreign direct investment annual inflow (USD mn) 
FDlannual Inflows 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Poland 10 117 290 580 542 1,134 2,741 3,041 4,966 6,348 7,528 5,397 
Romania Na 40 77 94 341 419 263 1,224 2,040 1,025 1,040 1,137 
Source: EBRD, Investment Profile. Poland, 2001, p. 8; EBRD, Investment Profile. Romania, 200 1, p. 11; 
W11W, p. 448. 











H. 1 1-11r 
TLO, 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Years 
Sourcc: As per table 5.2.1. 
Table 5.2.2. Scale of per capita foreign investment inflows (USD) 
FDI /capita 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 20110 2001 
Poland 2 8 18 44 49 96 117 127 165 194 258 221 
Romania Na 2 3.5 4 IS 18 13 53 89 45 45 67 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report, 200 1. 
Table 5.2.3. Evolution of FDI ratio of GDP (%) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Poland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03 
Romania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Source: Business Central Europe Statistics, http: //www. bcemag. com/ bcedb/history. ldc; EBRD, Country 
Profile, 2001; World Bank, lIDI Database. 
The evolution of FDI inflows since 1990 shows a significant late and slow start for Romania which 
by 1993 merely attained the level of Poland in 1991. Poland itself had a modest inflow compared 
with Hungary and the Czech Republic, due to its high foreign debt and internal political instability. 
However, Poland has faced a constant increase in the first years of transition, doubling the level 
each year till 1993. By then the 1993 elections brought in power a post-communist government 
which revived the nationalist debate over foreign investment and thus caused a slowdown in 
privatisation, as discussed in part one. The new boost at privatisation in 1995, combined with the 
Na stands for not available. 
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macro-economic stability achieved through the shock therapy programme, triggered increased FDI 
in Poland ever since. 
For Romania, significant foreign investment inflows have only occurred since 1997, after the 
change of power through the 1996 elections. 1998 represented a peak with the sale of the 
Romanian National Telecommunications company and the Development Romanian Bank. A 
slowdown occurred in 1999 due to the negative risk ratings in view of the deadline for the 
repayment of the foreign debt and due to the Kosovo crisis as discussed in part onc. 5 Although an 
electoral year in Romania, 2000 did not show a spectacular slowdown in privatisation and the 
beginning of accession negotiations with the EU must have been a significant signal for investors 
to keep their interest in the country, thus keeping the level of FDI similar to the previous year. 
Furthermore, some investments registered in 2000 resulted from deals concluded the previous year. 
This impact will be further assessed in chapter seven through the econometric modelling. A further 
increase in the FDI inflows was marked by the first year of the new government which made a 
serious pledge for vast privatisation and promotion of FDI, but whose credibility relied on keeping 
these promises. Poland has enjoyed a constant increase in FDI annual inflows, with almost 
spectacular rises between 1998 and 2000, but 2001 has already seen a slowdown. This was due to 
privatisation coming to a close and to tendencies of nationalisation. This points to the need for a 
strategy to attract more green field investment in order to maintain the level of foreign investment. 6 
Data for FDI as a percentage of gross capital formation also suggests an increased role of foreign 
investment in Romania since 1998, with a peak in 1999. Poland, on the other hand, had already 
experienced a large FDI contribution to capital formation by 1996, which is consistent with the 
positive Opinion it received in 1997 from the EU and the invitation to open the accession 
negotiations. 
Table 5.2.4. Foreign investment inflows as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital formation (%) 
FI)1 % In GFCF 1995 1996 1997 199l 1999 2000 
Poland 5.2 15.5 15.1 14.5 15.9 17.8 
Romania 2.7 5.5 3.3 16.3 19.0 16.6 
Sourcc: UNCTAD, II brld Investment Report, 2001. 
The impact of FDI on ownership transformation can be captured by the EBRD index of large scale 
privatisation. The relationship between these indicators is bi-directional and the reverse relationship 
was considered indirectly in part one as part of the investment climate and will be used in chapter 
seven. The index ranks from 1 to 4.7 and shows again significant differences between Poland and 
Romania. Between 1996 and 1999 Romania was still in the band 2, i. e. comprehensive scheme 
5 EBRD, Romania Investment Profile, 2000, p. 10. 
6 EBRD, Transition Report, 2001, p. 53. 
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almost ready for implementation with some sales completed. ' On the other hand, Poland entered 
band 3 in 1994 with more than 25% of large scale enterprise assets in private hands or in the 
process of being privatised but possibly with major unresolved issues regarding corporate 
governance! The post-1997 democratic governments in both countries seem to have had an 
important positive impact on the progress in large scale privatisation. Moreover, in Romania, stable 
FDI inflows since 1999 have led to further progress in privatisation reflected in a higher EBRD 
index, similar to Poland at present. A basic regression run by the author shows that FDI explains 
53% of the progress in large scale privatisation in the CEECs, with a positive coefficient of 0.45. 
However, the scatter plots in appendix 5.2. A indicate only a feeble positive relationship between 
FDI and LSP. 
Table 5.2.5. EBRD index of large scale privatisation (values from 1 to 4.70) 
EBRD Index of large 
scale privatiz 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Poland 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Romania 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.3 
Sourcc: E13RD, Transition Report, 2(X) 1, pp. 180-184. 
Finally, the FDI impact can be related to the evolution of the private sector in the economy. 
Indicators such as the share of the private sector in employment and production show the extent of 
transformation to a market economy, triggered partially by foreign investment. Thus, by 1999 the 
private sector share in GDP in Poland was 65% as opposed to 60% in Romania. However, the 
change since 1991 is more impressive in Romania. The share increased 2.4 times while in Poland 
the increase is only 1.62 times. This shows that initial conditions are very important in determining 
the outcome of policies and that Romania has the potential to catch up. The stagnation of the 
indicator for both countries for three years after 1997, in fact a turning point for both privatisation 
and foreign investment, can be explained through the slowdown of economic gromh in the case of 
Poland and its already relatively large private sector and through the negative growth in the case 
of Romania. The share of private sector in employment shows a potentially higher FDI impact in 
Poland than in Romania. In Romania there seems to be an impact since 1999. One has to note 
though that Poland also has higher unemployment rates due to the lower share of state owned 
enterprises in employment. 
Table 5.2.6. Private sector share of GDP (%) 
Private sector 
share in GDP 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Poland 30 40.0 45.0 50.0 55.0 60.0 60.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 70.0 Na 
Romania na 25.0 25.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 55.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 Na 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report, 200 1, pp. 180-184. 
7 EBRD, Transition Report, 2001, pp. 180-184. 
8 EBRD, Transition Report, 2001, pp. 180-184. 
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Table 5.2.7. Private sector share of employment (%) 
Private sector 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
share in 
employment 
Poland Na Na 54.0 57.0 59.0 61.4 63.0 66.7 69.2 70.9 72.0 Na 
Romania Na Na 41.0 44.0 49.0 51.0 52.0 58.0 62.0 Na Na Na 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report, 2001, pp. 180-184. 
To sum up, there is evidence of FDI contribution to markctisation as an element of privatisation in 
both Poland and Romania. Higher levels of FDI annual inflows and FDI per capita in Poland are 
likely to generate an overall higher impact in the economy. This is consistent with Poland being 
more advanced in large scale privatisation and with the private sector being responsible for a larger 
share of both GDP and employment than in Romania. Finally, FDI is not only participating in the 
privatisation of the former state owned enterprises, but is equally responsible for green field 
investment. The encouragement of green field investment is crucial for FDI levels to be maintained 
after privatisation is completed. 
FDI, a means of modernisation 
The traditional literature on foreign investment identifies its potential impact on economic 
modernisation through the input of research and development (R&D), technology, management 
techniques and skills. ' Poland and Romania have inherited from the communist system industries 
with old technologies which needed updating in order to keep up with increased competition in 
international trade. Moreover, the race for EU membership and the need to resist to competitive 
pressures from inside the Union made modernisation an even more acute necessity. 1° Kalotay 
found a positive relationship between participation of FDI in privatisation and efficiency gains. " 
Moreover, FDI impact on restructuring is likely to be higher than the effects of other methods of 
privatisation which lead to dispersion of ownership and thus less incentives for improved 
governance and overall performance of the enterprise. 12 It is, however, likely that firms bought by 
foreign investors have already been subject to restructuring or had better performances in the first 
place, thus reinforcing a certain path dependency. Furthermore, the impact on restructuring 
depends greatly on the sector where the investment is made. For example, while an investment in 
the automotive industry is likely to induce a significant increase in labour productivity, investment 
9 Hunya, "International Competitiveness. Impacts on FDI in CEECs", p. 4; Borcnsztcin, M., "Post- 
Privatisation Enterprise Restructuring", Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 13, No. 2,2001, p. 197; Carlin, W., 
Estrin, S. and Schaffer, M., "Measuring Progress in Transition and towards EU Accession: A Comparison of 
Manufacturing Firms in Poland, Romania and Spain", EBRD Working Paper No. 40,1999, p. 8; Barrcll, R. 
and Holland, D., p. 480; Smith, A., "Economic and Trade Relations Between the European Former 
Communist States and the States of Western Europe" in Smith, J. and Jenkins, C. (eds. ), Through the Paper 
Curtain. Insiders and Outsiders in the New Europe, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 
2003, p. 30. 
10 See Smith, "Economic and Trade Relations Between the European Former Communist States and the 
States of Western Europe", p. 28. 
11 Kalotay, "The Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment Revisited", p. 26 1. 
12 Hunya, "Recent FDI Trends, Policies and Challenges in South East European Countries", p. 11. 
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in banking has a less significant impact on labour productivity. Finally, this impact on restructuring 
is not restricted to the enterprises acquired or set up by foreign investors. It spills over 
into 
domestic firms through increased competition, thus accelerating economic reforms. 13 
Evidence of FDI impact on modernisation is given based on the indicators below, followed by 
some concrete examples: 
a) R&D activities: Higher values of R&D activities are likely to be a result of foreign investors' 
activities, given the pressure on government expenditure during transition. 
b) The EBRD index of enterprise reform: Although enterprise reform has not been exclusively 
determined by foreign investment, it is likely that higher FDI is associated with higher values of 
this indicator. 
c) Shares of foreign investment enterprises in main indicators of manufacturing companies: 
A high 
share in investments, sales and export sales can indicate a positive impact on a firm's 
modernisation. 
d) Labour productivity: An increase in overall productivity is likely to be associated with higher 
productivity of firms with foreign participation. The effect would also be seen as a result of spill 
over on domestic firms through competition, integration of production or better training of 
migratory employees. 
An empirical study by Carlin et al finds that in Polish firms training and R&D activities are as 
significant as in Spanish ones and much more significant than in the Romanian ones. 
" This is 
consistent with aggregate data on R& D. This is also consistent with the higher FDI in Poland than 
in Romania and with the overall better economic performance of the Polish economy which allows 
the state and the private sector to spend more on R&D. In this context, one may assume that part of 
the variation of the EBRD enterprise restructuring index is due to foreign investment, as a sign of 
FDI impact on enterprise restructuring. However, the data below does not entirely support this 
hypothesis. The fact that no improvement in the index is seen in either country since 1993, despite 
a continuous rise in FDI, is intriguing. On the one hand, it defies expectations, on the other hand, it 
is consistent with the findings of Boscaiu et at on FDI impact on Romania. They found no 
significant difference between foreign owned and domestic owned private firms in terms of 
efficiency and labour productivity. They only confirmed that private firms had better performance 
than state owned ones, regardless of the provenance of their capital. 's Similar results were reached 
by Konings with regard to Romania, although he found a significant impact of foreign ownership 
13 Barrell, R and Pain, N., "Foreign investment, Technological Change and Economic Gro«1h within 
Europe", Economic Journal, Vol. 107,1997, p. 177. 
14 Carlin, Estrin and Schaffer, "Measuring Progress in Transition and towards EU Accession", p. S. 
is Boscaiu et at, "Impactul comertului exterior $i investitiilor stdrine directe asupra productivitAtii in industria 
prelucrätoare. Cazul Romäniei", Working Paper, CEROPE, Bucharest, 2001, p. 3. 
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on labour productivity in Poland. 16 Two explanations can be put forward for this. First, FDI is still 
too small and too new in Romania to have a significant impact. Second, in Romania the foreign 
owned sector has a bipolar structure, including the best performance firms and low performance 
ones. 17 This polarisation might be due to the targeting methods used by the Romanian government 
and the long period of unstable investment climate which must have attracted the wrong type of 
investors, as discussed in part one. A simple regression shows that FDI annual inflows explain only 
36% of the variation of the index of enterprise reform with a low coefficient of 0.28. Furthermore, 
the scatter plots in appendix 5.2. A indicate a positive, yet feeble relationship between FDI and 
enterprise restructuring. 
Table 5.2.8. EBRD index of enterprise reform (values from 1 to 4.70) 
EBRDindex of 
enterprise reform 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Poland 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Romania 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Sourcc: EBRD, Transition Report, 2(X) 1, pp. 180-184. 
Furthermore, the lack of change of the EBRD enterprise restructuring index in both countries and 
the apparent lack of correlation with FDI can be explained in several ways. First, enterprise 
restructuring is not instantaneous. Time is needed for its effects to appear. Moreover, some foreign 
investors still have commitments for restructuring-related investment to be observed as part of 
post-privatisation contracts. Second, there are still large sectors, both in Poland and Romania, 
which have not yet been privatised, due to lack of restructuring. These include the coal and the 
steel sectors and pose the problem of path dependency. The situation of non-restructured 
companies keeps deteriorating as investors are not interested and thus not contributing to their 
restructuring. This concern has made the Miller government reconsider the strategy towards the 
steel and coal sector and propose state intervention, despite limitations by EU regulations on state 
aid. '8 Third, the FDI impact on enterprise reform depends partially on the level of integration of 
FDI related firms in the host economy. Finally, the EBRD index of enterprise restructuring has 
certain definitional limitations and thus is not able to capture the extent of the FDI impact. The 
broad definition of the indicator and the large spectrum of restructuring as such make quantifying 
the process rather difficult. Alternative indicators are suggested below to capture the impact of FDI 
on modernisation. 
The effect of FDI on modernisation has to be assessed through more accurate measurements, such 
as the share of foreign investment enterprises in main indicators of manufacturing companies. The 
16 Konings, J., "Effects of Direct Foreign Investment on Domestic Finns: Evidence from Firm Lcvcl Panel 
Data in Emerging Economies", WVDJ Working Paper No. 344; UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2000, 
5. 
1' Boscaiu et al, p. 3. 
18 OECD, Economic Surveys. Poland, OECD, Paris, 2002, p. 117-122. 
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following table shows the evolution of indicators such as the share in equity capital, employment, 
investments, sales and export sales in selected years between 1996 and 2000. In Poland all 
indicators rose between 1.5 times as, in the case of equity capital, and 2.33 times, as in the case of 
sales. On the other hand, the levels attained in Romania in 1998 at these indicators were only' of 
Polish levels for 1996, suggesting an important gap. 
Tables 5.2.9a and 5.2.9b. Share of foreign investment enterprises in main indicators of 
manufacturing companies, 1996- 2000 (%) 
Equity capital Employment Investments Salta Export sales 
1996 1998 1996 1998 1996 1998 1996 1998 1996 1998 
Poland 29.3 43.2 12.0 26.0 30.0 51.0 17.4 40.6 26.3 52.4 
Romania Na Na Na 7.8 Na 23.1 Na 14.1 Na 13.4 
Source: Hunya, "Recent FDI Trends, Policies and Challenges in South East European Countries", p. 12. 
Equity capital Employment Investments Sales Export sales 
1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 
Poland 50.5 Na 29.4 Na 63.1 Na 49.0 Na 59.8 Na 
Romania 36.5 43.0 21.0 25.2 43.9 Na 33.9 38.6 33.4 43.9 
Source: I. Dumitriu and G. Hunya, "Economic Restructuring through FDI in Romania", 7' EACES 
Conference, 6-8 June, Forli, Italy. 
The data above suggests that in 1998 foreign companies in Poland were investing the same overall 
amount as domestic ones and were more export oriented. This suggests a higher impact on the 
economy as a whole compared with Romania. The lower share in employment is consistent with 
domestic firms still being the main employers in the economy. The lower figures for Romania are 
consistent with a lower FDI and thus a lower impact so far. Further data for 1999 and 2000 shows 
that in Romania there has been an increase in the participation of foreign owned firms in 
employment, investment, sales and exports sales, the figures reaching comparative levels with 
Poland in 1998. These evolutions indicate that the gap between the two countries is reducing. It is 
also consistent with a surge in FDI in Romania since 1998 and positive economic growth since 
2000. This appears to imply that there is a scope for further improvements in foreign investment 
participation and its impact in the Romanian economy. Furthermore, the increased share in export 
sales in both countries appears to be a measurement of increased competitiveness on external 
markets as a result of modernisation. This is also a sign of increasing integration into the world 
economy. 
Regarding the factor content of exports to the EU, Smith finds that there is an increasing gap 
between the candidate countries. He uses three categories developed by Wolfmayr-Schnitzer which 
divide manufacturing goods into: products that predominantly embody human-capital-intensive 
processes; products that embody resource-intensive processes; and products that embody labour- 
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intensive processes. 19 Thus, Poland, and to a larger extent the other Central European economics, 
exports a higher share of human-capital intensive manufacturing products (34.5%) than, for 
example, Romania (with 16.6%) and a lower share of labour-intensive products (42.3% v. 65.2%). 20 
This suggests that Poland is more convergent with the EU, partially as a result of FDI, and can 
substantially benefit in terms of income and employment from trading with the EU. Its relatively 
lower convergence compared with Hungary or the Czech Republic is explained by a large domestic 
and regional market which did not put enough pressure on changing the structure of trade. 21 On the 
other hand, Romania may have problems in increasing its trade with the EU, should it maintain its 
dependence on labour-intensive products. Romania is likely to face pressures for protection from 
existing producers of labour-intensive goods, for which demand is increasing more slowly than for 
human-capital-intensive goods. 22 
An overall indicator of FDI impact on modernisation can be considered labour productivity. 23 An 
increase in labour productivity is either specific to the foreign owned firm or results from spill- 
over effects on domestic investors. The impact depends, however, on the scctoral distribution of 
FDI and on competitive pressures within the sectors most favoured by foreign investors. Thus, data 
for 1992-1999 shows that the change in labour productivity in manufacturing in Poland was 178.8 
in 1999 (with 1992 as a basis), while in Romania the percentage was of 158.9 24 The change in 
Romania was higher than in most other countries in transition, except for Hungary and Poland. 
This can be due partially to the initial conditions of the Romanian economy which was 
characterised by obsolete capital, hence a low productivity starting point in the first place. 
Furthermore, data on Poland shows that the productivity gap between foreign owned and domestic 
firms has increased from 1.5 to 1.9 in the 1994-1998 period. 25 A similar opinion was developed by 
Konings who found that foreign owned firms have better productivity than domestic or state owned 
ones. On the other hand, the aggregate level data above does not entirely contradict Konings' 
conclusion on the lack of such an ownership effect in the case of Romania 26 
There are several concrete examples of how foreign investment impacts on modernisation in both 
Poland and Romania, including product improvement. ' To take only a few cases, since 
19 Wolfmayr- Schnitzer, Y. cited in Smith, "Economic and Trade Relations Between the European Former 
Communist States and the States of Western Europc"p. 27. 
20 See Smith, "Economic and Trade Relations Between the European Former Communist States and the 
States of Western Europe", p. 27. 
21 Smith, "Economic and Trade Relations Between the European Former Communist States and the States of 
Western Europe", p. 31. 
22 See Smith, "Economic and Trade Relations Between the European Former Communist States and the 
States of Western Europe", pp. 25-26. 
23 EBRD, Transition Report, 2000, p. 79. 
24 Kalotay, "The Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment Revisited", p. 272. 
25 Hunya, "International Competitiveness. Impacts on FDI in CEECs", p. 20. 
26 Konings, "The Effects of Direct Foreign Investment on Domestic Finns", p. 5. 
27 Hunya, "Recent FDI Trends, Policies and Challenges in South East European Countries", p. 14. 
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Rometelecom was taken over by OTE, the Greek telephony operator, there has been a significant 
expansion and improvement of the efficiency and quality of its services. During 2000 alone, 
Romtelecom successfully installed 420,000 new telephone lines and completed the digitalisation of 
55% of the whole network. An important priority was the connection of isolated and economically 
underprivileged towns into the network. 28 This was, however, accompanied by higher tariffs and 
firings 29 In Poland, the brewery sector has been largely modernised by foreign investors leading to 
a sales increase by 7% year-on-year in the first ten months of 2000.30 Moreover, the presence of 
foreign investors has contributed to the strengthening of the banking sector. Thus, three banks from 
Poland figure among the ten major banks in Central and Eastern Europe in a ranking presented by 
British monthly The Banker. These banks are Pekao S. A., the largest in terms of own funds, PKO 
BP S. A., with the largest assets, and Bank Handlowy. 31 Similarly, in 2000, the Romanian 
Development Bank- the second largest commercial bank in Romania in which Societo Generale has 
bought 51% of shares- was designated by The Banker as the best bank in Romania. This was an 
acknowledgement of the improvement in service quality and efficiency resulting through 
privatisation. 32 However, there have been cases in both Poland and Romania when foreign 
investors registered losses or acquired the companies to scrap and sell them, thus indicating a 
certain negative effect on modernisation. 
To sum up, there is evidence of stronger impact on modernisation in Poland than in Romania with 
some indications of catching up potential for the latter. Furthermore, the impact of foreign 
investment on modernisation is subject to certain constraints. First, there is the danger that the 
companies chosen for privatisation were more competitive in the first place, thus making the 
assessment of FDI impact more difficult. Second, the overall impact of FDI on modernisation of 
the host economy depends to a large extent on the sectoral distribution and on the degree of 
integration with the economy as a whole. There is already evidence that some foreign firms arc 
strongly integrated, thus impacting on other industries up or down stream. This was the case of 
Daewoo in Romania whose production was 58% integrated. 33 Third, the impact on domestic firms 
is ambiguous. On the one hand, FDI can induce spill over and healthy competition leading to 
modernisation in the domestic firms. On the other hand, increased competition can lead to 
bankruptcies in the domestic sector if there is not enough flexibility to adapt. Finally, the FDI 
impact on modernisation depends not only on the initial investment, but also on the post- 
privatisation commitments of investors and thus necessitates time to occur. In Romania, the still 
low level of FDI appears to be responsible for the insignificant difference between foreign 
28 EBRD, Investment Profile. Romania, 2001, p. 17. 
29 Hunya, "Recent FDI Trends, Policies and Challenges in South East European Countries", p. 15. 
3o EBRD, Investment Profile. Poland, 2001, p. 17. 
31 EBRD, Investment Profile. Poland, 2001, p. 36. 
32 EBRD, Investment Profile. Romania, 2001, p. 27. 
33 EBRD, Investment Profile. Romania 2001, p. 17. 
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investors and domestic investors in terms of labour productivity and for the still modest 
contribution to employment, investment, sales and export sales. 
FDI, a means of structural change 
Foreign investment induces not only enterprise restructuring, but also restructuring of the entire 
economy. Through technology inflow and market access, FDI can increase the ability of firms in 
the host country to adjust to market developments and technological change. Furthermore, the 
specialisation of foreign affiliates can differ from the domestic ones and thus FDI shifts the 
production structure. 35 Both countries have inherited from the communist system an economy with 
a high contribution of industry and agriculture to GDP and a relative low share of the tertiary 
sector. Furthermore, the requirements of transition to a market economy have included a deep 
restructuring of the tertiary sector. Thus, reforms in banking, transport and telecommunications 
infrastructure, whole trade and retail trade were crucial for the performance of the economy as a 
whole and for ensuring a positive investment climate. They needed, nevertheless, an important 
inflow of capital and FDI has partially contributed as a means of privatisation, a modernising factor 
and a factor of structural change. Given that once again the relationship between structural change 
and FDI is bi-directional, the analysis has to be taken with caution. Furthermore, the level of FDI in 
industry is still around 50% of all investment. The change in the GDP structure of the Polish and 
Romanian economy can be associated with foreign investment, especially judging from the 
statistics on the sectoral distribution of FDI. Moreover, evidence can be given for the improvement 
in the quality of services in both countries. The level of bank restructuring will be used to assess 
the impact of foreign investment on the tertiary sector. 
The impact of foreign investment on structural change will be assessed starting from the following 
data: 
a) The GDP structure: This is likely to show a switch from industry and agriculture to the tertiary 
sector and a correlation with the share of FDI in different sectors of the economy. 
b) The FDI distribution in different sectors of the economy and the largest investors: FDI may be 
directed towards sectors with already proven comparative advantage as well as explore new sectors 
previously undeveloped. The bias towards new sectors is likely to create a structural change in the 
economy. 
c) The number of foreign banks and the index of bank restructuring: They give an indication of the 
depth of structural change within the tertiary sector. 
Data on structural change of the economy supports the idea of an increase in the role of the tertiary 
sector at the expense of industry and agriculture. Thus, in 2000 66% of GDP came from the tertiary 
34 Hunya, "Recent FDI Trends, Policies and Challenges in South East European Countries", p. 14. 
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sector in Poland and 46.6% in Romania, at the expense of industry, whose contribution in Poland 
shrank from 40.2% in 1991 to 29% in 2000. The higher share of tertiary sector in Poland is 
consistent with relatively higher levels of FDI in the financial sector and a decline in the share of 
agriculture in GDP. Although high levels of FDI have been attracted into industry as a whole in 
both countries, large loss making enterprises not yet privatised have contributed to the fall of the 
share of industry in GDP. Finally, differences in the sector service between the two countries can 
be determined by differences between low value and high value added services. 
The data on sectoral distribution of foreign investment shows that the tertiary sector has attracted 
roughly half of the total investment in both Poland and Romania, thus supporting the hypothesis 
that FDI has been a means of structural economic change. In both countries FDI has been mainly 
directed to industry, especially automotive industry. The main difference resides though in the 
distribution of the remaining FDI. The second largest investment share is in the financial sector in 
Poland, i. e. 22.4 %, which is much larger than the investment in the same sector in Romania. In 
Romania, the second destination for FDI has been whole sale and retail trade. This indicates a 
lesser impact at microeconomic level in Romania than in Poland. In Poland, FDI directed towards 
the financial system has improved the quality of the business environment and the efficiency of 
enterprises, thus potentially attracting further FDI. Since 1999, privatisation-lcd investment has 
been attracted in Poland in telecommunications and banking. In Romania, telecommunications 
attracted the main investors in 1998 through the privatisation of Romtelecom and the investment by 
OTE-Greece, which bought 35% of the shares. 36 Data on FDI stock by activities in Poland and 
Romania and largest investors as of 2002 is provided in appendix 5.2. B. 
Table 5.2.10. GDP structure in Poland and Romania (%) 
GDP structure In 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Poland 
Share of industry in 40.2 34.0 329 32.2 29.2 27.1 28.1 28.1 28.2 29.0 
GDP 
Share of agriculture In 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.2 6.4 6.0 5.7 5.5 5.2 5.0 
GDP 
Share of tertiary sector 53.0 59.3 60.5 61.6 64.4 66.9 66.2 66.4 67.6 66.0 
in GDP 
GDP structure In 
Romania 
Share of Industry in 37.9 38.3 33.8 36.2 32.9 34.2 35.6 27.5 27.8 27.6 
GDP 
Share of agriculture in 18.9 19.0 21.0 19.9 19.8 19.1 18.8 14.5 13.9 11.4 
GDP % 
Share of tertiary sector 43.2 42.7 45.2 43.9 57.3 46.7 45.6 58.0 58.3 46.6 
In GDP 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report, 2001. Do. 180-1 84 and own calcu lations. 
35 Hunya, "International Competitiveness. Impacts on FDI in CEECs", p. 4. 
36 EBRD, Investment Profile. Romania, 2001, p. 17. 
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Figure 5.2.3. FDI stock In Romania by activities 
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Statistics show further differences between foreign participation in banking privatisation in Poland 
and Romania. The higher number of banks in Poland suggests higher competition and thus higher 
positive impact on the economy as a whole. Moreover, in Poland the accumulated value of 
investments recorded in the financial sector by the end of June 2000 amounted to more than USD 
9.2 billion, i. e. 23.7 % of the overall inflow of direct investments. 31 FDI accounts in Poland for 
70% of the total assets in the domestic market banking sector as compared to only 52.6 % in 
Romania. 52 Amongst the investors in the banking sector in Poland one can note Unicredito Italiano 
with USD 1,042 million purchase of 50.09% of Pekao, Bayerishe Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG- 
Germany with USD 1,000 million stakes in Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy and in Wielkopolski 
49 PAIZ, FDI in Poland http: //www. paiz. pl 
50 W11W, p. 450 
51 EBRD, Investment Profile. Poland, 2001, p. 9 
52 EBRD, Investment Profile. Poland, 2001, p. 37; EBRD, Investment Profile. Romania, 2001, p. 26 
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Bank Rolniczy, Citibank-USA with USD 986.6 million. 0 These are all established banks likely to 
have a significant impact on service quality within the banking system in Poland. 
Table 5.2.11. Number of banks (of which foreign owned) 
Number ofbanks (of 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
which foreign owned) 
Poland Na Na 87 82 81 81 83 83 77 74 
10 11 18 (25) (29) (31) 39 (47) 
Romania Na Na Na 20 24 31 33 36 34 33 
3 6 (8) (13) 16 19 21 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report, 2000, pp. 250-256. 
Indeed, privatisation and FDI in the service sector has triggered improved performance. Foreign 
banks are bringing in new products and services for corporate and individual customers and 
contributing to technological upgrading. 1 The impact in the banking system is shown by the EBRD 
index of banking restructuring. Poland has scored 3.3 since 1998 with however, a better starting 
point than Romania, i. e. 2.0 in 1991 in comparison with 1.0. Moreover, the gap between the two 
countries decreased from 1.0 in 1991 to 0.6 in 1999. The improvement between 1998 and 1999 in 
the Romanian economy is superior to the change in the Polish one, showing that there the sector is 
on a positive trend. However, the performance of the Romanian banking system is still modest 
according to the EBRD report and in 1997 it suffered severe drawbacks. The score of 2.7 shows 
that significant liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocation has been made but that there is a 
limited use of directed credit and or interest rate ceilings in Romania. 42 On the other hand, Poland 
is in a superior band, scoring 3.3 since 1998. This signifies that substantial progress has been made 
in the establishment of bank solvency and of frameworks for prudential supervision and regulation. 
There is full interest rate liberalisation with low preferential access to cheap refinancing, significant 
lending to private enterprises and significant presence of private banks. a3 
Table 5.2.12. EBRD index of banking sector reform (values from 1 to 4.70) 
EBRD Index of 1991 1992 1993 1991 1995 1996 1997 19911 1999 2000 2001 
banking sector 
reform 
Poland 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Romania 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report, 2001, p. 180-184. 
To sum up, there is evidence of structural change of the Polish and Romanian economy in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms and FDI may be an explanatory factor. Thus, there has been a 
high increase in the share of the tertiary in GDP in both countries, which is consistent with almost 
half of foreign investment being attracted in this sector. However, this trend is likely to be 
counterbalanced by an increase in the role of industry. An investment climate improved by a 
40 EBRD, Investment Profile. Poland 2001, p. 37. 
41 The Banker, April, 2000, p. 57. 
42 EBRD, Transition Report, 2001, p. 180-181. 
43 EBRD, Transition Report, 2001, p. 180-183. 
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restructured tertiary sector, combined with further privatisation of hard-core sectors of the economy 
such as steel, coal or energy can lead towards further investment in industry. The higher investment 
in the banking system in Poland is likely to be responsible for the higher share of tertiary in GDP, 
as well as for a better performance in banking, in attracting further investment and in improving the 
economy in general. The higher share of tertiary can still be sustained through further liberalisation 
of fields such as transport or telecommunications. 
5.2.2 On foreign direct investment and integration with the European Union 
The relationship between FDI and integration into the EU is also bi-directional. Thus, prospect of 
EU membership improves the investment climate and thus fosters FDI in the candidate countries. 
This hypothesis has been introduced in part one and will be tested in chapter seven through 
econometric modelling. Furthermore, levels of foreign investment are evidence of increased 
economic integration and represent means to enhance institutional integration, as suggested in 
chapter three part two. Finally, FDI can foster further integration with the EU as will be seen below 
and as represented in diagram 5A(a). So, how does FDI foster integration with the EU? First, 
foreign investment enhances privatisation and thus marketisation which is a condition of EU 
membership. This channel of the FDI impact on integration with the EU has been analysed earlier 
by considering FDI a means of privatisation and a modernisation factor. Second, increased 
investment from the EU contributes to a positive lobby for Romania's accession into the EU from 
business and political EU circles. The role of the EU's attitude in enhancing the prospect of EU 
membership has been assessed in chapter three and is represented graphically in diagram 3A in 
chapter three. Third, improvements in productivity and underlying services can increasingly lead to 
privatised firms being incorporated into regional and global networks of transnational corporations 
and thus enhance trade. 44 Evidence of integration with the EU as a whole has been given in chapter 
three, part two. This section gives evidence using firm level data. 
Firm level data and studies suggest that foreign owned firms are increasingly trading with the EU 
and thus contribute to increased economic integration. ' Thus, the FDI impact on trade has been 
proven by Markusen et al. ' The contribution of FDI to Poland and Romania's integration into the 
world economy in general and into the European Union in particular will be assessed based on the 
following indicators: 
a) Exports and imports by foreign owned firms: They show the propensity to import and export of 
foreign owned firms and thus their integration into the world economy. 
44 Kalotay, "The Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment Revisited", p. 262; UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report, 2000, p. 53. 
45 Hunya, "International Competitiveness. Impacts on FDI in CEECs", p. 7. 
46 Markusen et al cited in Krkoska, "Foreign Direct Investment Financing of Capital Formation", p. 3. 
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b) The share of trade with non-transition countries: It shows the re-orientation of trade after the 
dismantlement of the former Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), possibly correlated 
with the countries of origin of foreign investment. 
c) The sources of foreign investment in both Poland and Romania: They show the level of 
integration with the EU member states through investment. 
The level of the CEECs' integration into the global and the EU economy has increased since early 
1990s. In a study on the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, Rojec showed that by 
mid-1990s integration was less than half completed. Only one third of the foreign firms were 
integrated in the investing network at that time. 47 However, a 2001 study by Kaminski and 
Smarzynska argued that Poland is increasingly taking part in global production and distribution 
networks through FDI inflows. Domanski found that FDI decreased the competitiveness gap 
between Poland and the EU48 Smith argues that there is a correlation between FDI and export 
performance of countries in transition. 49 Data for 1998 shows an increased export share of foreign 
firms in total exports in 1998 as compared to 1996.50 Furthermore, table 5.2.13 shows that foreign 
owned firms (FOFs) have been more dynamic than domestic ones (DFs), both in exports and 
imports. Between 1994 and 1998 exports by foreign owned firms increased approximately 4 times, 
while exports by locally owned firms merely increased 1.07 times. FOFs increased their imports 3 
times, while imports by DFs rose only approximately 1.5 times during the same period. Both local 
and foreign owned Polish firms are import oriented, but the ratio of exports to imports is higher in 
domestic firms, 67% v. 53.8%. These higher relative imports can be related to increased imports of 
capital goods by foreign firms as part of their contribution to the modernisation of economy or 
needed due to the standardisation of production. Boscaiu et al found that in Romania foreign 
ownership was associated with high export value, while state ownership was associated with a low 
export volume. 51 Furthermore, 38% of sales and 44% of exports originate from foreign affiliates. 52 
The same study argued that frequency and intensity of export activities arc maximal for foreign 
owned firms. However, a high propensity to import has been identified at the same time which is 
consistent with the assumption that foreign firms are responsible for increased imports of capital 
47 Rojec, M. cited in Kalotay, "The Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment Revisited", p. 267. 
48Domanski, B., "Industrial Change and FDI in the Postsocialist Economy. The Case of Poland", European 
Urban and Regional Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, April 2003, p. 99. 
49 Smith, A., The Return to Europe: The Reintegration of Eastern Europe into the European Economy, 
MacMillan in association with the School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, Basingstoke, 2000, 
0182. Kaminski, B. and Smarzynska, B., "Integration into Global Production and Distribution Networks through 
FDI: The Case of Poland", Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 13, No. 3,2001, p. 282. 
51 Boscaiu et al, "Impactul comertului exterior, p. 12-13. 
52 Hunya, G., "FDI in South Eastern Europe in Early 2000s", WIIW, A Study Commissioned by the Austrian 
Ministry ofEconomy and Labour, 2001, p. 7. 
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goods and primary materials. " These are, nevertheless, signs of increased integration into the 
global economy. 
Table 5.2.13. Exports and imports of foreign owned and locally owned firms (USD mn. ), 
Poland 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Exports 
Foreign owned firms 3,609 7,770 9.267 11,047 13,528 
Locally owned firms 13,577 13,084 15,120 14,644 14.661 
Imports 
Foreign owned firms 7,101 10,738 15,674 21,120 24,122 
Locally owned firms 14,331 18,260 21,418 21,133 21,878 
Foreign owned firms' share In total exports 21 34 38 43 48 
Foreign owned firms' share In total Imports 33 37 42 50 53 
Ratio of exports to imports 
Foreign owned firms 50.8 72.2 59.1 52.3 53.8 
Locally owned firms 94.7 82.6 70.6 69.3 67.0 
All firms 80.2 78.8 65.7 60.8 60.0 
Source: Foreign Trade Research Institute cited in Kaminski and Smarzynska, "Integration into Global 
Production", p. 275. 
In terms of geographical distribution, Carlin et al found that in Poland the export activity of state 
enterprises did not appear to be dominated by a legacy of trade links with former Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countrics. '" In Poland, 1993 constituted a peak for non- 
transition trade partners, with a declining importance ever since until 1999, when the trend changed 
again. The decrease from 1993-1999 can be explained partially through the recession in some 
Western countries and through the increased trade within CEFTA, a regional integration scheme 
meant to enhance trade and co-operation and prepare the members for full integration into the EU, 
as in chapter six. Data on the trade distribution shows that in Romania the share of trade with non- 
transition countries in total trade has increased from 65.8% in 1991 to 89.5% in 1999, pointing to a 
decreasing importance of the former CMEA links. This trend in the geographical orientation of 
trade can be partially associated with increased levels of foreign investments from non-transitional 
countries which have either been complemented by imports, or have generated increased exports. 
Table 5.2.14. Share of total trade with non-transition countries ( %) 
Share of total trade 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
with non-transition 
countries 
Poland 83.2 84.4 87.7 86.3 82.3 79.3 75.5 74.7 79.3 81.1 
Romania 65.8 74.8 84.4 86.2 88.8 88.9 86.5 88.0 89.5 87.5 
53 Boscaiu et al, pp. 12-13. 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report, 2(X) 1, p. 180,184. 
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Data on the origin countries of FDI provided in appendix 5.2. B and in the figures below shows that 
the majority of investment in both countries originates from EU member states, thus suggesting an 
increased integration with the EU. In both countries the main investors come from the EU, except 
for the US in Poland and Cyprus in Romania. The US investment in Poland can be explained 
through the large expatriate community in the US, the strong lobby and the traditional affiliation 
with the US. The Cypriot investment in Romania may have three possible explanations: a shared 
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To sum up, there is strong evidence of increased integration of foreign owned firms in international 
trade and especially with the EU. The share of foreign owned firms in both exports and imports has 
increased in both Poland and Romania, showing a continuous integration into the world economy, 
with a higher level for Poland. Although it is difficult to dissociate integration in the world trade 
from integration into the EU, an increased share of trade with non-transitional countries and a high 
share of EU member states in investment suggests a trend towards higher integration into the EU 
than integration with other countries. This is consistent with both countries being candidates for EM 
20% 
72 PAIZ, Foreign investment in Poland, 2001 
" WIIW cited in G. Hunya, FD/ in South Eastern Europe in Early 2000s, p. 14; PAIZ, http: //www. paiz. pl 
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membership and with the analysis conducted in chapter three. Furthermore, FDI triggers trade as 
suggested by firm level data, but the reverse causality is also possible, as part of the stages of a 
firm's production internationalisation. This relationship will be assessed quantitatively in chapter 
seven. 
5.2.3 On foreign direct investment and a better life 
Why assess the impact of FDI on a better life? Here are just a few reasons. First, the fall of 
Communism was driven by people's hope for freedom and a better standard of living. Market 
economy and EU membership were seen as means to achieve these goals. Can foreign investment 
improve the chances of a better life, while contributing to achievement of market economy and 
integration into the EU? Second, transition to a market economy and integration into the European 
Union are subject to popular support as it has been argued in chapters three and four. This depends 
on the extent to which they deliver, or at least are perceived as potentially delivering a better 
standard of living. Consequently, by improving the standard of living, FDI could enhance popular 
support for reforms, diminish the security concerns and thus enhance the prospect of EU 
membership. This would ensure two virtuous circles in the economic and political spheres as in 
diagram 5A (a and c). Finally, a better living would mean less protests, more political stability and 
thus an improved investment climate capable of further attracting FDI and reinforcing a virtuous 
circle of economic development. The role of internal stability in enhancing the virtuous political 
circle will be further examined in chapters six and seven. 
The FDI impact on a better life will be assessed through a set of indicators which include: 
a) GDP per capita as an aggregate indicator of wealth; 
b) average monthly earnings, as a proxy for standards of living; 
c) level of unemployment; 
d) training opportunities and skills improvement; 
e) standards of work as promoted by EU legislation; 
f) consumer choice. 
Data for GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate between 1991 and 1999 in 
table 5.2.15 shows a significant improvement in Poland, with USD 3,987 in 1999, almost double 
that in 1991. This is a good measurement of the success of reforms and contributes to increasing 
convergence between Poland and the EU. In Romania, in 1995 the level of GDP per capita was the 
same as in 1991, while in 1999 it only increased by approximately USD 300. This reflects the 
stagnation of reforms in Romania and the fact that the population supports the cost of both 
transition and integration into the EU, with yet rather low benefits. The fact that there is still a high 
level of grey economy in Romania not captured in the official statistics of GDP does not change 
dramatically the gap between the two countries. 
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Table 5.2.15. GDP per capita at PPP exchange rate (USD) 
GDP per capita 
(in USD dollars) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Poland Na 2,037 2,197 2,234 2,399 3,085 3,483 3,511 4,066 3,987 4,108 4,736 
Romania Na 1,245 859 1,158 1,323 1,243 1,290 1,395 1,845 1,515 1,644 1,772 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report, 2001, p. 180,184. 
A second impact in terms of an improved standard of living is the increase in wages for the 
employees of foreign owned enterprises and the spill over effect on wages in general. " Dochia 
found in a study on the performance of private enterprises in Romania that employees of private 
companies earned more than those working for the state ones. 56 however, this largely depends on 
the sector of activity and on the progress in privatisation. Comparable wages are in agriculture, 
construction and managerial or intellectual occupations while real estate employees, technicians 
and clerical staff earn more in the private sector than in the public one. However, the improvement 
in earnings in the private sector, including foreign firms, is still modest in comparison with the 
expectations and is still far from the EU average. 57 
Table 5.2.16 shows that the average salary per worker per economy and the GDP per capita levels 
have increased in both Poland and Romania since early 1990s. However, through setting high 
wages and increasing labour productivity foreign investors are likely to increase unemployment, 
thus affecting negatively the standards of living. " Furthermore, an increase in wages offered by 
foreign firms accentuated the inequality of Polish society in which the so called losers of transition 
are confronted with lower earnings. 
Table 5.2.16. Average gross monthly wages 
Wages compared at current exchange 
rates (USD per month) 
Wager compared at PPPs 
(USD per month) 
1994 1995 1996 1994 1995 1996 
Poland 241 300 331 502 534 518 
Romania 86 104 104 255 285 305 
ource: OECD, Economic Surveys. Romania, 1998, p. 125. 
The impact of FDI on unemployment is ambiguous. First, improved technology and increased 
productivity lead to increased unemployment. Furthermore, before many enterprises could be sold 
they had to be restructured, including firing of excess labour. Additionally, foreign owned 
enterprises usually proceed cautiously in shedding excess labour for at least two possible reasons. 
In some cases they were constrained by explicit or implicit employment guarantees in the 
55 Borensztein, "Post-Privatisation Enterprise Restructuring", p. 197. 
56 Dochia, A., "New Private Firm Contributions to the Structural Change in the Romanian Economy", 
CEROPE, Working Paper No. 12,2000, p. 10. 
57 OECD, Economic Surveys. Romania, February 1998, p. 129. 
58 UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2000, UNCTAD, Geneva, p. 181. 
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privatisation contracts. In other cases they were concerned about hostile public opinion concerning 
foreigners' purchases of former state owned enterprises. 59 Finally, through the creation of green 
field enterprises foreign investment contributes to absorbing excess labour by creating new jobs 
while privatised and state-owned enterprises continue to contract 60 
A study by Bilsen and Konings showed that job creation was disproportionately concentrated in 
green field enterprises, while job destruction is high in the state and privatised firms. Moreover, 
privatised firms have higher job destruction than the state owned ones. 61 These results can be 
extrapolated to foreign firms without, however, being able to make any inference on the difference 
between these and the domestic owned ones. Research shows that Polish state and privatised firms 
still stand out from their Romanian counterparts through their propensity to hoard labour. In 
Romania, there is still some labour hoarding in the state sector but not elsewhere. 62 This might be a 
result of the remaining relative high percentage of state sector in Romania and of the low share of 
green field enterprises in total private ownership. 
However, these results are only indirectly related to the FDI impact on unemployment, as there is a 
large representation of domestic owned firms in both countries. The same restrictions apply to the 
aggregate data presented below, which suggests increased unemployment for the early stage of 
transition and restructuring in Romania. A steeper surge was registered in Poland in the period 
1991-1994 and was the social price of the shock therapy which later led to a gradual approach to 
privatisation by subsequent governments. The effects of the Russian financial crisis and a second 
wave of restructuring of the hard-core of the economy, i. e. the energy sector, especially mining, arc 
amongst the causes for the increasing unemployment in 1998 and 1999 in Poland. The recession 
and a second attempt to boost privatisation are responsible for the increase in unemployment in 
Romania in 1998 and 1999. The decrease in 2000 and 2001 can be considered a belated effect of 
FDI and of the social policies applied by the Nästase government in 2001. The high unemployment 
rate is a downside of economic transition and FDI in Poland. Furthermore, it emphasises the need 
to increase efforts to encourage job creation in small and medium enterprises and to foster further 
green field foreign investment as has been the aim of the Miller government. 
59 Borensztein, "Post-Privatisation Enterprise Restructuring", p. 197; UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 
2000, p. 197. 
60 Carlin, Estrin and Schaffer, "Measuring Progress in Transition and towards EU Accession", p. 8. 61 Bilsen, V. and Konings, J., "Job Creation, Job Destruction and Growth of Newly Established, Privatised 
and State-Owned Enterprises in Transition Economies: Survey Evidence from Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania", WDI Working Paper No. 106, November, 1997, p. 3,9. 
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Table 5.2.17. Unemployment rate (% of labour force) 
Unemployment 
of labour force) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1 1998 1999 2000 
eat. 
2001 
Poland 6.1 11.8 13.6 16.4 16.0 14.9 13.2 10.3 10.4 13.1 15.0 14.0 
Romania Na 3.0 8.2 10.4 10.9 9.5 6.6 7.4 10.4 11.5 10.5 9.9 
Source: EBRD, Investment Profile. Poland, 2001, p. 8; EBRD, Investment Profile. Romania, 2001, p. 10; 
EBRD, Transition Report 1999, pp. 252-257. 
FDI is equally known for its positive impact on labour skills through increased training 
opportunities, superior management and the input of know-how. These skills transfer not only to 
employees of the foreign companies, but also spill over to domestic enterprises through labour 
mobility or through competition. 63 Furthermore, as seen in part one, Poland has increasingly used 
fiscal incentives for investors who are willing to train their employees, thus encouraging 
improvements of the labour force. In the long run, these improvements of the labour force are 
likely to increase the potential output of the economy. 
Despite the opinion that some foreign investors tend to exploit their employees, FDI can indirectly 
ensure a better standard of living through the impact on labour legislation and compliance with the 
acquis communautaire. By upholding the acquis communautaire, Western investors tend to 
enhance its enforcement, also contributing to progress towards membership of the EU. Thus, Estrin 
et al found that compliance with the equal pay directive was uniformly high across Poland, 
Romania and Spain, comparing state-owned enterprises, green field and privatised companies. 
Compliance with the working time directive is high in Eastern European countries- with over three 
quarters of firms reporting compliance- but still lower than in Spain. Green field firms in Poland 
seem to comply less while in Romania, compliance levels are uniform across the three types of 
companies, but at a lower level than for Poland. In meeting the occupational safety directive, the 
Polish firms report the same level of compliance as Spanish ones, while Romanian firms have been 
well behind them. However, new start-ups in Romania show higher compliance levels than state 
owned enterprises 6a These results are consistent with Romania being far more behind in the race 
for EU membership and in enforcing the acquis communautaire. They also suggest a higher 
positive impact in Poland. 
Finally, the impact of FDI on a better life can be assessed through the increase in the quality, 
quantity and choice of consumer products. Given that prior to 1989 the market lacked even basic 
consumer products and trade related services were very poor, investment in the retail business is a 
sign of significant improvements in the standard of living of the population. Thus, statistical data 
on Poland shows that FDI in Poland has been rapid and extensive and that foreign retailers control 
now 10-12% of the total retail market in Poland. Poland has now 95 hyper-markets with at least 
62 Carlin, Estrin and Schaffer, "Measuring Progress in Transition and towards EU Acccssion", p. 8. 63 Borensztein, "Post-Privatisation Enterprise Restructuring", p. 197. 
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2,500 square meters of sales area, 730 supermarkets with over 400-2,499 square meters of sales 
area, and 936 discount retail outlets. Moreover, hypermarkets share about 22% of the total retail 
market. 65 Companies such as Nestle, Coca Cola, McDonald's, Carrefour are common places in 
both countries ensuring improved service quality 66 
To sum up, FDI has increasingly led to a better life in both countries, but the quantification of this 
effect is still difficult. On the one hand, there has been an increase in GDP per capita, monthly 
wages, equality of pay and labour force skills, but there has also been an increase in unemployment 
and regional disparities, partially related to the restructuring needed to attract investors. Green field 
investment should be promoted in order to offset the job destruction resulting at times from the 
privatisation led investment. 
5.2.4 Foreign direct investment on foreign direct investment 
The impact of FDI on attracting further FDI is important for assessing a possible path dependency 
in Poland and Romania. This hypothesis was put forward in chapter one. There arc two main 
channels through which investment can induce further FDI and thus reinforce a virtuous circle of 
economic development, transition to a market economy, improved standard of living, internal and 
external stability and integration into the EU. First, FDI gives a positive signal to other investors 
about the investment climate of the host country as a positive clement of the country image and the 
assessment of the country risk. Furthermore, figures of past levels of FDI can be used in FDI 
promotional campaigns, as in the case of Poland. Second, present investors can decide to reinvest 
their profits in an enterprise, sector or economy which have proven profitable. 67 Evidence of this 
possible impact will be given below. However, negative effects may occur when FDI crowds out 
domestic investment 68 
So, is there evidence that FDI has determined further FDI so far? First, data shows that most of the 
CEECs have been successful so far, by international standards, in keeping an important share of the 
profits derived from foreign investments in the form of reinvested earnings. For the years 1993- 
1998,48% of the profits made by foreign owned companies in Poland were retained as opposed to 
61%, the Central and Eastern European average. 69 Similarly, a poll conducted in Romania in 2001 
by the consultancy firm KPMG suggests that more than 60% of foreign investors wanted to 
reinvest their profits in Romania in 2002.70 Second, foreign firms are generally more active in 
64 Carlin, Estrin and Schaffer, "Measuring Progress in Transition and towards EU Accession", p. 12. 
63 EBRD, Investment Profile. Poland, 2001, p. 15. 
66 EBRD, Investment Profile. Poland, 2001, p. 15; EBRD, Investment Profile. Romania, 2001. 
67 Hallam, "Poland's Tiger Economy", European Business Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2,1999, p. 72. 68 UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2000, p. 53. 
69 Kalotay, "The Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment Revisited", p. 276. 
70Adevärul Economic, 2001. 
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investment than domestic ones. " However, a study by Carlin et al found that Romanian private 
enterprises, foreign owned included, had much lower investment rates than Polish ones which 
actually exceeded the investment rates in the Spanish companies. Thus, Polish enterprises appeared 
to be engaged in 'deep restructuring' whereas the Romanian ones were still in the earlier phase of 
'reactive' low-investment restructuring. 72 These results arc consistent with the macroeconomic 
stability being not yet perceived as lasting in the Romanian economy and thus investors being more 
reluctant to reinvest their profits. 
To sum up, within a stable macroeconomic framework, FDI has the potential to attract further FDI, 
thus reinforcing a virtuous circle of economic development. Hence, it is important that efforts are 
made not only to attract foreign investment, but also to maintain and encourage post-privatisation 
investment and reinvestment of profits in general. The extent to which previous FDI determines 
present FDI will be further assessed in chapter seven. 
5.2.5 Conclusion 
Chapter five has analysed the FDI determinants in Poland and Romania by referring to the political 
and economic spheres identified in chapter one. It also provided evidence of FDI impact on 
transition to a market economy, integration with the EU, a better life and attracting further 
investment. These are elements of the economic and political circles whose interaction have 
influenced the accession process. This qualitative analysis set the background for a quantitative 
assessment of FDI determinants and impact in chapter seven. The aim of the analysis was to 
identify the role that FDI can play in the transition and the EU accession process and to define the 
conditions needed for attracting the necessary investment in Poland and Romania. Several 
conclusions were drawn. 
First, the attractiveness of the investment climate in each country depended not only on the policies 
pursued by the government, but also on the extent to which these policies were influenced by the 
political sphere. A positive attitude of the Polish government towards FDI since the early 1990s 
contributed to the adoption of several FDI enhancing policies, hence the steady growth of FDI 
inflows since 1990. This positive attitude was enhanced by the support of international 
organisations and counterbalanced the temporary loss of public enthusiasm for FDI. Hence, a 
virtuous circle of political factors was ensured in the early years of transition. Although the 1993 
elections saw a slow down in privatisation, this did not lead towards a negative circle given the 
reinforcing power of the economic sphere, now on a virtuous path. By 1997 the political virtuous 
circle was ensured by the government's renewed positive attitude towards FDI that enhanced the 
economic sphere through bold FDI related policies. In Romania on the other hand, the hesitant 
71 Hunya, "International Competitiveness. Impacts on FDI in CEECs", p. 28. 
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governmental attitude towards FDI in the early transition was complemented by low public 
enthusiasm, thus creating a vicious political circle. This enhanced and was enhanced by the vicious 
circle in the economic sphere resulting from the hesitant reforms applied by the government. The 
vicious circles in the political and economic spheres were perpetuated until 1996 when elements of 
virtuous circles appeared: a more determined attitude from the government, a more enthusiastic 
public support, increased support from the international organisations and a new impetus in the FDI 
related policies. Although the positive elements in the political sphere were rather short lived, a 
virtuous economic circle was enhanced and maintained. Furthermore, in 2000 the political virtuous 
circle was enhanced through increased governmental commitment and through enhanced external 
support deriving from the opening of accession negotiations with the EU. 
Second, the government plays a crucial role in enhancing the attractiveness of the investment 
climate through the macroeconomic policies conducted, the privatisation mix adopted and the 
promotional policies implemented. Macroeconomic stability represents a necessary condition for 
attracting FDI. Thus, the early stabilisation of the Polish economy contributed greatly to the steady 
increase in FDI while Romania's failure to stabilise the economy by 1996 constituted a constant 
deterrent for large investors. This also partially explains why a similar policy mix in privatisation 
led to different results in the Polish and Romanian economy. Privatisation represents the engine of 
investment flows and a change of focus towards direct sales to investors rather than MEBO or mass 
privatisation has led to increased inflows in both countries. However, the success of privatisation 
has depended not only on the investment supply but also on the investment demand. This was 
sensitive to factors other than progress in privatisation which will be further analysed in chapter 
seven. Fiscal and financial facilities can enhance the attractiveness of the investment climate, 
provided that the economy is stabilised. They can stimulate green field investment, thus ensuring 
investment flows after privatisation is completed. They are thus a complement and not a substitute 
for the other types of policies discussed. Furthermore, facilities can be used in order to enhance the 
positive impact of the FDI on the host economy. 
Part two has presented evidence of the scope and impact of FDI on Poland and Romania so far. The 
impact was assessed at four interconnected levels, each of them related to the elements of the 
economic and political circles considered in this dissertation: progress of transition to a market 
economy or economic reforms, integration into the EU, better life or security concerns and further 
FDI. The analysis has noted that some of the relationships considered in order to assess the FDI 
impact were bi-directional. This was the case of privatisation or reforms and FDI or FDI and 
economic integration with the EU, to name just a couple. The way to deal with this reversed 
causality was to dissociate determinants from impact and to test the role of FDI in enhancing 
72 Carlin, Estrin and Schaffer, "Measuring Progress in Transition and towards EU Accession", p. 8. 
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further FDI, as a way to reinforce a virtuous economic circle. The investigation has shown an 
overall positive impact of FDI in both countries, despite certain negative effects. The analysis has 
emphasised that earlier and more substantial investment in Poland has led to an enhanced impact at 
all levels considered. The impact has, nevertheless, depended on additional factors such as the 
sectoral distribution of FDI and the integration of foreign firms within the host economy. 
All these levels of impact are interdependent and the relations between them are bi-directional. 
Thus, by contributing to achieving market economy FDI has played an important role in Poland's 
quest for integration into the EU. Then, by improving standards of living FDI can maintain the 
support for FDI and reforms, thus enhancing prospects for achieving market economy in Romania 
in the very near future. By contributing to further investment, FDI can reinforce a virtuous circle of 
development in Romania, provided that other determinants of FDI arc favourable. This is possible 
given that statistics on different indicators have already shown an important catching up potential 
for Romania. Thus, data regarding the performance of foreign firms in Romania had reached by 
2000 the levels of 1998 in Poland, suggesting a reduction in the gap between the two countries. 
The following chapter will look at how security concerns have influenced the process of EU 
accession and consequently the country image. It will also assess the ways through which prospects 
for EU membership contribute towards enhancing positive perceptions of security in the candidate 
countries, thus equally affecting each country's image. The analysis of FDI determinants will be 
concluded through an econometric model in chapter seven. This model will also analyse the 
impact of FDI on economic reforms and will test the hypothesis of path dependency in a country's 
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Appendix 5.2. B 
Foreign investment by activities, investors and countries in Poland and Romania 
Foreign investment stock by activities in Poland and Romania (% In total) 
Field of activity Poland Romania 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 0.1 3.6 
Industry total 41.9 44.4 
Mining and quarrying 0.4 Na 
Manufacturing 37.8 Na 
Electricity, gas, water supply 2.7 Na 
Construction 4.6 4.5 
Wholesale, retail trade, repair motor vehicles 11.6 20.1 
Hotels and restaurants 1.0 3.1 
Transport and communications 9.5 7.3 
Financial intermediation 21.8 Na 
Real estate, renting and business activities 1.1 Na 
Public admin, defence Na Na 
Education Na Na 
Health and social work Na Na 
Other community, social and personal services 2.9 Na 
Other not elsewhere classified activities Na 17.0 
Sourcc: WIIW and PAIZ 






Country of origin Activities 
1. LNM Holdings N. V 485.21 UK based Indian Steel industry 
2. Clearwave Holdings B. V. 330.53 Canada Mobile telephony 
3. The Rompetrol Group B. V. 309.01 Netherlands Oil processing 
4. Renault 235.94 France Automobile industry 
5 RAG eisen Zentralbank Oesterreich 171.75 Austria Banking 
6. Daewoo Motor Company Ltd 156.12 South Korea Automobile industry 
7. Colgate-Pahnolive(America) Inc 128.70 USA 
8. Orange S. A. 103.31 UK Mobile telephony 
9. Shell Overseas Holdings Ltd. 100.50 Netherlands and UK Petrol distribution 
10 Plasticos Tatay S. A. 98.21 Italy Construction industry 
Source: ARTS 
' By June 2002 
2 By December 2001 
3 WIIW9 NandbookofStatistics, CDROM, p. 450; PAIZ, http: //www. paiz. goupL/facls2 I. hbnl 
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Country of origin Activities 
1. 
KBC Bank 442.0 Belgium Banking and insurance 
2. EBRD 239.6 International Capital investments 
3. fTI Group NV 150.0 The Netherlands Media and entertainment 
4. Credit Agricole 146.8 France Banking 
5. Glaxo SmithKline 139.5 Great Britain Pharmaceutical products 
6. GATX Rail Overseas Holding 
Corporation 114.8 USA Transport 
7. Metro AG 100.0 Germany Trade 
8. Guardian Industries Corporation 99.2 Spain Glass manufacturing 
9. Carrefour 86.0 France Trade 
10. Deutsche Bank Trust Company 
Americas 84.0 USA Mining and quarrying 
Sourcc: PA1Z5 
Investment in Poland and Romania by origin countries by 2001 
(% in total investment) 
Origin countries Poland Romania 
Germany 16 11.3 
Austria 5.9 
USA 19 6.4 
Netherlands 11 16.2 
France 20 6.9 
Italy 9 7,0 






Other countries 6 
Source: WIIW and PAIZ 
4 ARIS, "Important Foreign Investors", http: //www. arisinvest. ro/investors. php 
5 PAIZ, http: //www. paiz. gov. p! /jacts2 1. htm1 
6 WlIW in G. Hunya, FDJ in South Eastern Europe in Early 2000s, p. 14; PATZ, hitp: //www. paiz. p! 
192 
CHAPTER SIX 
Internal and external security concerns in Poland and Romania 
Chapter five has analysed the determinants and the impact of FDI in Poland and Romania. Attracting 
FDI was identified as a necessary element of a successful transition to a market economy and of EU 
membership. An important determinant of FDI was considered the country image which was 
associated inter alia with internal political and economic stability. These two issues will be addressed 
in this chapter as part of the security concerns in Poland and Romania. 
The present chapter aims to identify the internal and external security concerns in Poland and Romania 
and their impact on the EU accession process. It then aims to assess different ways in which EU 
membership can diminish the security concerns in Poland and Romania, thus addressing the bi- 
directional relationship between security and the EU integration process identified in chapter one and 
in diagram 1A. Furthermore, the chapter sets out the stage for the analysis of the role of EU 
membership prospect in enhancing FDI. By analysing EU's impact on security, the chapter aims to 
reveal whether prospects for EU integration can be a means to break the vicious circle of internal 
instability, hence high security concerns, low investment, poor reforms and thus poor progress in 
accession. This has been the case for Romania for the early period of transition as presented in diagram 
6A(a). This assumption will be tested quantitatively in chapter seven. 
This chapter is organised as follows. It first provides a theoretical framework by reviewing the new 
assumptions of the post-1989 order. Second, it analyses the internal and external security concerns in 
Poland and Romania and their impact on the EU accession process. Finally, the chapter identifies the 
main channels through which the EU appears to ensure security in Poland and Romania in parallel with 
membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 
6.1 Theoretical framework of the chapter 
The 1989 revolutions have changed irrevocably the international security system, bringing an 
irreversible end to the post-1945 'pax Sovietica'. However, this was not the 'end of history' as 
Fukuyama proclaimed, but rather an 'awakening of history', in the words of Hyde-Price. 1 Traditional 
patterns of co-operation reasserted themselves, older disputes resurfaced and new antagonisms started 
to develop. 2 Furthermore, security concerns were defined based on different assumptions from the 
ones valid during the Cold War. 3 These assumptions will be reviewed below and will constitute the 
' Fukuyama, F., The End ofHistory and the LastMan, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1992; Hyde-Price, A., 
European Security beyond the Cold War. Four Scenarios for the Year 2010, The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, London, 199 1, p. 49. 
s Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War, p. 49. 
3 Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War, p. 105. 
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theoretical framework of this chapter, drawing on the theoretical framework of the dissertation 
presented in chapter two. 
Diagram 6A 
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The political sphere 
The economic sphere 
a)Arrows 2(-), 3(-), 4(-), 5(-), 6(-) indicate a potential vicious circle in the economic sphere resulting from 
perceptions of insecurity. 
b) Arrows 2(-), 3(-), 4(-), 1(-) indicate a potential vicious circle in the economic sphere which reinforces the 
perceptions of insecurity. 
c) Arrows 1(+), 2(+), 3(+), 4(+), 1 (+) indicate a potential virtuous circle in the economic sphere resulting from 
the prospect of EU membership. Arrows 5'(+), 6'(+), 7(+), 8(+) indicate a virtuous circle in the political sphere 




relationships that are addressed in chapter six 
relationships that are addressed in other chapters 
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First, the military threat of the Cold War gave way to diversified threats. ' A whole 'Pandora's box' of 
new and old threats that had been contained or 'put on ice' during the Cold War was now opened. 5 
Security, understood by Buzan as the'freedom from threat', was reinforced as a contested and complex 
concept 6 Security sectors included now: political, economic, societal, environmental and military 
security, as defined in chapter two. 7 
Second, the difficult experience of economic and political transition in the former CEECs emphasised 
the danger of economic and political instability and thus shed a new light on the importance of internal 
security! The highest security concern for the CEECs became the continuous economic and political 
crisis to which these countries were subjected in the early years of the decade. 9 Furthermore, these 
crises reinforced each other. Economic crises led to protests, changes of government and thus political 
instability and security concerns. This in turn affected FDI and the continuity and scope of economic 
reforms, thus potentially reinforcing the economic crisis and the internal insecurity as in diagram 
6A(b). 
Third, a bi-directional relationship between security and transition has emerged. Security became the 
necessary condition for democratisation and marketisation to succeed. In the words of Nelson: 'Without 
security, the systems cannot devote resources to the arduous tasks of building a new polity and 
economy from the rubble of communist rule. Where there is no security, democracy and market 
economy will not survive X10 Furthermore, the success of democratisation and markctisation affected 
the perceptions of security of the candidate countries. All in all, internal transformations could not be 
dissociated from the concept of security. " Democratisation and marketisation became greatly 
dependent on external factors of security and the border between internal and external security became 
increasingly blurred. 12 International factors played a main rather than a marginal role in the internal 
4 Taracova, E. et al, "Public Attitudes in Four Central European Countries" in Smoke, R. (ed. ), Perceptions of 
Security. Public Opinion and Expert Assessments in Europe's New Democracies, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1996, p. 39; A Hyde-Price, 1991, p. 11. 
'Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War, p. 100. 
6 Buzan, B., "Is International Security Possible? " in K. Booth (ed. ), New Thinking about Strategy in International 
Security, HarperCollins Academic, London, 1991, pp. 34-35; Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold 
War, p. 11. 
7 Buzan, B. et al, The European Security Recast: Scenarios for the post-Cold War Era, Pinter, London, 1990. 
8 Stefanowicz, J., "Poland" in Smoke, R. (ed. ), Perceptions of Security. Public, p. 120. 
9 Taracova et al, "Public Attitudes in Four Central European Countries", p. 34; Stefanowicz, "Poland", p. 120. 
10 Nelson, D., "The Comparative Politics of Eastern Europe", Political Science and Politics, Vol. 27, No. 1.1994, 
50. ý' 
Smoke, R, "The Security Situation of the Central European Countries: Historical Background", in Smoke (cd. ), 
Perceptions of Security, p. 15. 
12 Bigo, D. cited in Buzan et at, The European Security Recast, p. 182; I len ing, E., "International Security and 
Democratisation in Eastern Europe" in Pridham, G., Herring, E. and Sanford, G. (eds. ), Building Democracy? 
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transformation of the CEECs. 13 For example, the revolutions were an international phenomenon from 
the start. They were influenced greatly by Gorbachev's economic and political reforms in the Soviet 
Union at the time and the abandonment of the Breshnev doctrine. Furthermore, the transition that 
started in Central and Eastern Europe at the same time enhanced a sense of cross-fertilisation and other 
transnational influences at the early stage. 14 Finally, the CEECs' search for security guarantees in an 
international or European framework further enhanced the external dimension of security and the 
interaction with the internal security concerns. 
Fourth, perceptions of security became increasingly related to political geography. Four subsystems 
were identified in Europe, drawing upon common features from before and during the Cold War and 
blending them with geography. 15 The first region is Western Europe and includes the EU member 
states. This is seen as the 'kernel' of Europe, comprising states that have increased their economic and 
political integration over the past fifty years and have ensured the security and prosperity of the 
continent. The second region is Central Europe whose rebirth was acknowledged through the 1992 
Petersbourg declaration. It comprises eight countries previously under Soviet influence: the three 
Baltic states, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. 16 Attempts were 
made to restrict the concept to only Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia to support their 
strong claim of belonging to the European family and to enhance a positive image of the area. 
Belonging to Central Europe was seen as a guarantee of a fast accession to the EU. 17 The third group 
was the Balkans or South-Eastern Europe. This group of states was traditionally seen as an area of 
instability, leading to the spark for World War One and more recently to the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia. Countries in the area include the former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and, in the opinion 
of several analysts, Romania. The fourth group includes the successor states of the former Soviet 
Union who are still defining their identity. Geographically, these range from the more European 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to the more distant Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which are still likely to 
incline towards authoritarian practices. Perceptions of security were different between these regions 
and especially between Central Europe and the Balkans. Furthermore, it has been difficult to define 
precisely the borders of these areas, countries such as Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states 
gravitating between such regions. Escaping the Balkan identity has been an aim of Romanian foreign 
policy, as will be discussed later on. 
13 Agh, A., Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1998, 
p. 303; Pridham, G. , "The International 
Dimension of Democratisation: Theory, Practice and Inter-Regional 
Comparisons" in Pridham, Herring and Sanford (eds. ), Building Democracy?, p. 9; E. Hering, "International 
Security and Democratisation in Eastern Europe" in Pridham, Herring and Sanford (eds. ), Building 
Democracy?, p. 87; Kaldor, M. and Vejvoda, I., "Democratisation in Central and East European Countries", 
International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1,1997, p. 60. 
14 Pridham, "The International Dimension of Democratisation", p. 8. 
is Croft, S. et al, The Enlargement of Europe, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999, p. 5. 
16 Mele§canu, T, "The National Security of Romania. Priorities and Legitimate Concerns", Central European 
Issues, Vol. 1, No. 1,1995, p. 14. 
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Fifth, rather than being sees as divisible as Park, Rees and Ullman suggested initially, European 
security has become indivisible, as acknowledged by Latawski and Dorman and Trcachcr. 18 Events 
such as the Yugoslav wars showed that nationalist unrest have a destructive effect, not only within the 
originating country, but also by bringing spells of insecurity to an entire area through increased 
migration, economic embargoes or fear of spread of conflict. Moreover, the 1999 Kosovo crisis led to 
the understanding by the EU that insecurity in countries in South-Eastern Europe was a threat to 
Europe as a whole. This resulted in an increased commitment of the EU to the security of the area 
through renewed assurance of EU membership for Bulgaria and Romania. The two countries were 
invited at the 1999 Helsinki European Council to open accession negotiations with the EU. Prodi, the 
President of the European Commission, admitted then that: Peace and stability across Europe arc not 
yet a matter of fact. They must be maintained in some areas and achieved in others. This is the 
situation in which the Commission has chosen to act as initiator and guardian. [.. ] Enlargement is the 
most effective means we have of upholding our shared values across Europc. i19 Furthermore, the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe was launched to support financially the post-war 
reconstruction of the area and to encourage investment in projects developed through regional co- 
operation. The aim was to foster economic growth in the area and thus avoid further instability that 
could spread to other areas, including the EU. 
Finally, the dismantling of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation left the CEECs in a 'security vacuum '. 20 
They looked for alternative institutional frameworks to fill in this vacuum and to 'return to Europe'. 21 
The debate was between enlarging eastwards old organisations such as NATO, the EU and the Western 
European Union (WEU), relying on a pan European organisation such as the Organisation for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)22 or even creating new regional security arrangcmcnts. 23 Scholars 
were divided over the survival chances of the old organisations. On the one hand, nco-rcalists like 
Mearsheimer believed that institutions such as NATO, the EU or the WEU were kept together during 
the Cold War period merely by the common threat of the Soviet Union and that the prospects for their 
role in ensuring the security of the continent were bleak 24 On the other hand, nco-institutionalists like 
17 Sava, I. N. , Zece ani 
de trazilie in Europa de Est, Editura Fundaliei Romane, Bucure§ti, 2000. 
18 Park, W. and Rees, G. W., Rethinking Security in post Cold-War Europe, Longman, London, 1998; R. Ullman, 
Securing Europe, Adamantine Press, Twickenham, 1991, p. 28; Latawski, P., "NATO and East Central Europe: 
The Case of Poland", in Williams, A. J. (ed. ), Reorganising Eastern Europe: European Institutions and the 
Refashioning of Europe's Security Architecture, Dartmouth Publishing Company, Dartmouth, 1994, p. 86; 
Dorman, A. M. and Treacher, A., European Security. An Introduction to Security Issues in Post-Cold Europe, 
Dartmouth Publishing Company, Dartmouth, 1995, p. 86. 
19 Business Central Europe, February, 2000. 
20 Latawski, "NATO and East Central Europe: The Case of Poland", p. 42. 
21 Smoke, "The Security Situation of the Central European Countries: Historical Background", p. 99; Vukadinovic, 
R, "Challenges to Security in South-Eastern Europe", COPRI Working Paper No. 35, Copenhagen, 2000, p. 4; 
Stefanowicz, "Poland", p. 118. 
22 OSCE was until 1994 the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). 
23 Latawski, "NATO and East Central Europe: The Case of Poland", p. 81. 
24 Mearsheimer, J. J., "Back to the Future", International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1,1990, pp. 4-56. 
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Rees considered that these institutions had 'a life of their own' and thus they could be adapted to 
'export' security to the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. 25 So far, the reality has 
favoured the second point of view. Security has been ensured by an overlapping institutional 
framework which has both benefits and shortcomings. ' On the positive side, the complcmentarity and 
specificity of each of these institutions makes co-operation useful in dealing with complex situations 
such as the wars in Yugoslavia. Each organisation offers a different degree of security and addresses 
certain sectors. 27 On the negative side, co-operation is sometimes hampered by practicalitics, conflict 
of interests or lack of interest. The OSCE does not have enforcement power, the WEU is in a process 
of redefinition and NATO caters mainly for military and political security. 
This chapter argues that the best guarantee of all sectors of internal and external security for Poland 
and Romania is EU membership. In the words of Hyde-Price: 'The European Union is the only reliable 
guarantee of democratic consolidation, economic wellbeing and national security. '2S As stated earlier, 
military threats no longer play the major role in the security concerns. 29 The new emphasis should be 
on prevention of war. 30 While the wars in Yugoslavia have emphasised the need to create independent 
crisis management for the EU, they also demonstrated that creating conditions for durable peace are 
fundamental for the security of the continent. Moreover, economic security is increasingly important 
and can be seen a crucial sector of security. Economic hardship can create political and social unrest, 
endanger the environment and accentuate prospects for military or ethnic conflict, thus affecting other 
sectors of security. EU membership addresses all sectors of security and by providing prospects for 
economic development and prosperity addresses the very concern of economic insecurity. By its 
normative power exercised through the conditionality of the accession criteria the EU has already 
enhanced the process of democratisation and marketisation, thus contributing towards ensuring internal 
security of both Poland and Romania. The following discussion will address mainly security concerns 
in the political and economic sectors. Furthermore, the EU has a vast potential of de-securitising the 
candidate members by changing perceptions of security. This can then enhance foreign investment, 
foster economic reforms and prosperity, thus ensuring internal stability. Furthermore, the prospect of 
EU membership can reinforce a political virtuous circle with then a positive effect on the economic 
sphere, as in diagram 6A(c). This was one of the motivations for the EU pursuing an 'all inclusive' 
25 Rees in Park and Rees, Rethinking Security in post Cold-War Europe, p. 177. 
26 Ruhle, M. and Williams, N, "Managing Security in Europe", in Algieri, F. et at (eds. ), The European Union 
and the Challenge of Enlargement, Bertelsmann Foundation, Gutcrsloh, 1996, p. 89; See also Sakwa, R., "The 
Keystone in the Arch: Inclusion, Democracy and Universalism in Central and Eastern Europe", in Cottey, A. 
(ed. ), New Security Challenges in Postcommunist Europe, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2002, 
131. 
2' park, W. "Introduction" in Park and Rees (eds. ), Rethinking Security in post Cold-War Europe, p. 14. 
Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War, p. 264. 
29 Stefanowicz, "Poland", p. 120. 
30 Valki, L., "Security Problems and the New Europe: A Central European Viewpoint" in Williams, A. J. (cd. ), 
Reorganising Eastern Europe, p. 112. 
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enlargement strategy since the 1997 Luxembourg European Council and especially since the Kosovo 
crisis, initiative from which Romania has benefited greatly. 
However, the relationship between security and EU membership is bi-directional. Not only does EU 
offer security guarantees to its members, but security factors have affected Poland and Romania's 
institutional progress towards EU membership. Security factors have affected both countries' external 
image and the capacity to comply with the accession criteria. External security factors have acted either 
as catalysts for, or as brakes on, the progress towards EU membership as discussed in chapter three. 
Finally, security concerns have affected the level of FDI in the two countries, thus impacting upon the 
economic reforms and on both formal and economic integration with the EU. Security concerns appear 
to influence greatly the political and the economic circles identified by this project. Thus, the 
remainder of the chapter will identify the internal and external security concerns mainly in the 
economic and political sectors and their impact on Romania and Poland's progress towards EU 
membership. The last section will analyse the way EU membership addresses the internal and external 
threats identified in both Poland and Romania. 
6.2 Security concerns in Poland and Romania and their impact on EU membership 
6.2.1 Internal security concerns 
In the absence of a strong military threat, the prime insecurity for both Poland and Romania became 
the internal political and economic crises which characterised the beginning of the 1990s. Furthermore, 
the political crisis reinforced and was reinforced by the economic one. However, the extent to which 
security concerns have affected Poland and Romania's quests for EU integration was different. Thus, 
previous Polish attempts at economic and political reforms gave Poland a relative comparative 
advantage over Romania, as already shown in chapter four. Furthermore, the international 
community's perceptions of security in Poland acted as a catalyst for positive change by de-securitising 
some of the internal and external threats. 1 
In the political security sector, the main security concerns, both at individual and state level, were 
related to the success of the democratisation process. 32 Democratisation represents the process of 
becoming democratic, while democracy is at its most crude 'popular or majority rule'. 33 Based on 
Doyle's famous assumption that 'democracies do not go to war with each other', the promise was that 
democratic states would provide 'a key building bloc for a less militarised and more co-operative 
security structure in Europe. i34 Internally, democracy would ensure security at individual level through 
31 For a definition of the terms'securitisation' and 'de-securitisation', see Chapter Two. 
32 Kaldor and Vejvoda, "Democratisation in Central and East European Countries", p. 61; Pindcr, J., "The 
European Community and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe" in Pridham, Herring and Sanford (eds. ), 
Building Democracy?, p. 125. 
33 Herring, "International Security and Democratisation in Eastern Europe", p. 88. 
34 Doyle, M., "Liberalisation and World Politics", American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4,1986, 
pp. 151-169; Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War, p. 105. 
199 
inclusive citizenship, rule of law, respect of human and political rights, freedom of expression and 
alternative sources of information, separation of powers, elected power-holders, free and fair elections, 
associational autonomy and civilian control over the security forces. 35 Any abatement from the 
democratic behaviour was perceived as a potential security concern. This included threats to the system 
of government and its ideology, as well as secessionist or nationalist movements. Finally, political 
instability resulting from protests and frequent changes of government was also seen as a source of 
internal insecurity. This referred more to Buzan's definition of political security as organisational 
stability of the state. 
A first political security concern was the potential return to an authoritarian regime and the 
abandonment of democratic values. 37 This was more acute in Romania than in Poland. In Poland, the 
semi-free elections of 1989 were initially considered revolutionary. They had been initiated before the 
total fall of Communism in the Soviet Bloc. 38 Moreover, they led to the victory of Solidarity, the trade 
union which had challenged the communist rule since early 1980s. This regime change ensured 
external credibility for the Polish government and reflected commitment to reforms and democracy, 
thus de-securitising the partially free elections. However, soon they became 'too limited, too moderate 
and too rational' and new elections had to be held in 1990 for presidency and 1991 for parliament. 9 By 
coming second in elections, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) raised certain concerns regarding the 
return of the Left to the political life. 40 Furthermore, elements of authoritarian rule were preserved by 
president Walesa who 'wanted all the power for himself. 41 Amendments to the Constitution finally 
diminished the presidential powers in 1995, thus eliminating the concerns over authoritarian rule in 
Poland. 42 The international community acted as a de-securitising agent with respect to the results of the 
1993 elections. After an initial shock, the return to power of post-communists in 1993 was considered 
not as the negation of democracy, but as a sign of democratic rule. Almost applying double standards 
compared to Romania, the return of post-communists was interpreted as a peaceful double change of 
power rather than a regime change. 43 In time, this became in the eyes of the analysts the rule of thumb 
3s Kaldor and Vejvoda, "Democratisation in Central and East European Countries", p. 63. 
36 Buzan, "Is International Security Possible", p. 35. 
37 Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War, p. 57. 
38 Lewis, P. G., "East-Central Europe: The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland" in White, S., Batt, J. 
and Lewis, P. G. (eds. ), Developments in Central and Eastern Europe, Vol. 2, MacMillan Press, London, 1998, 
p. 27. 
39 Tismäneanu, V., Reinventing Politics. Eastern Europe from Stalin to Navel, Free Press, New York, 1993, 
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when analysing the democratic status of a country, including Romania. " Poland was providing this 
example of democratic procedures and thus the elections' results did not affect negatively its prospects 
for returning to Europe. One has to remember though two important facts. First, Poland was the first 
country in Central Europe to vote post-communists back into power. 45 In initially the most radical 
reformer in Central and Eastern Europe, the electorate voted out of power the government whose 
shock therapy economic reforms led to a sharp decrease in its standard of living, thus pushing for a 
more gradual approach to economic transition. Second, Kwasnicwski's Party of Social Democracy 
was the direct heir of the Polish United Workers party which had changed its name in 1990 and 
retained its members, two million as of 198646 Although this might have constituted a serious security 
concern, it did not. Furthermore, in time, the return of post-communists was de-sccuritiscd. This was 
largely because post-communist parties in most of the CEECs embraced the general goals of achieving 
democracy, market economy and returning to Europe. Through conditionality, the quest for 
membership of NATO and of the EU ensured that democracy and market economy were pursued 
regardless of the ideological stand of the parties in power. At present, both Poland and Romania are 
ruled by post-communists, but this is not particularly considered a security concern. Ash believed that 
the real danger to democracy in Poland was not the victory of Kwasniewski, but the 'large right-wing 
extra-parliamentary movement of Walesa, supported by the Church and Solidarity. '47 Furthermore, 
president Kwasniewski and his team want to be seen not as Eastern post-communists but as regular 
Western social democrats. 48 Similar efforts are made by the Romanian president Iliescu and PM 
Nästase and there are signs that the international community sees them as such. All in all, today the 
most important dangers to democracy are not the post-communists, but the emergence of extremist 
parties, as shown later. 
The ascent to power of post-communists in Romania as a result of the 1989 revolution and of the 1990 
and 1992 elections affected Romania's external credibility negatively and its progress towards EU 
membership. Romania was seen as a 'facade democracy' under which authoritarianism had survived. 49 
Agh even used the phrase 'the revolution that never was' to refer to the Romanian revolution. 30 The 
National Salvation Front (FSN) which acceded to power in 1989 was seen as a'nationalist party run by 
ex-communist apparatchiks' and so were its successors, the Democratic National Salvation Front 
44 Huntington, S., "How Countries Democratise", Political Science Quarterly, Volume 106, Number 4,1991- 
1992. 
45 Lewis, P. G., "East-Central Europe: The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland" in White, Batt, and 
Lewis (eds. ), Developments in Central and Eastern Europe, p. 35. 
46 Agh, Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans, p. 46; TismAneanu, Reinventing Politics., 
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(FDSN) and the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR). 5' These doubts made the break with 
the past seem less radical in Romania than in other CEECs, including Poland. 32 One has to remember 
though that Romania had little democratic experience before 1945 and that any democratic 
manifestation had been impossible during Ceu$escu's dictatorship. Furthermore, apart from being a 
communist, Iliescu had dissociated himself from the Ceau$escu regime. Some suspicions over the 
fairness of the 1990 and 1992 elections in Romania led to further doubts over the country's 
commitment to democracy. Moreover, the participation of the Socialist Labour Party (PSM) and of the 
chauvinist Greater Romania Party (PRM) in the governing coalition in 1995 was perceived as a serious 
threat to democracy by the international community. 53 One has to take into consideration though that 
this coalition was forced by the other parties' refusal to form the government. Overall, it was only after 
the 1996 victory of the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) that the country's image improved 
and the international community intensified its interest in Romania and its accession to the EU and 
NATO. ' The 1996 elections were seen as a 'historical turning point' in Romania's post-1989 history. 55 
Closer to the present, the return of post-communists to power through the 2000 elections was not seen 
as a threat. Furthermore, some relatively recent internal accusations over the slightly authoritarian 
manner of the NAstase government in ruling the country have not constituted serious concerns 
externally. On the contrary, it was considered that the government was very determined in conducting 
economic reforms. This enhanced its external credibility, improved the country image and Romania's 
prospects for EU integration. The threat of authoritarianism was this time de-sccuritised, rather than 
securitised, as a result of the new approach of the EU. 
A second security concern in the political and societal sectors was the rise of nationalism and of 
extremist parties. The potential for nationalist uprisings was lower in Poland as a result of its post-1945 
ethnic homogeneity. Only 3% of the current 38.6 million population belongs to minorities such as the 
Ukrainian, Belarusian, German, Lithuanian communities or the smaller groups of Czechs, Slovaks, 
Armenians and Tatars. ' However, the homogenous 'Polak- Katolik' majority in Poland has been 
accused of ethno-nationalism. 57 Furthermore, Poland's painful history, the repeated changes of borders 
and the legacy of the World War Two induced certain fears with regard to the status of its German 
minority. These were eliminated through the signing of the neighbourly relations treaty with Germany 
which will be discussed later as part of the external security concerns. Nowadays, the previously not 
acknowledged German minority in Poland has hundreds of associations and is represented in the Polish 
51 Agh, Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans, p. 259. 
52 Weiner, R.., "Democratisation in Romania" in Stan, L. (ed. ), Romania in Transition, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 
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parliament. 58 Some concerns have remained, nevertheless, regarding the issues of the Roma and Jewish 
minority. 59 Overall, Poland has done everything to meet the European standards of national minority 
treatment as acknowledged by the Opinion in 1997 and the regular reports produced ever since. 60 
However, the long and difficult process of economic reforms and EU accession has imposed costs on 
the population that led to the rise of extremist parties, including anti-European ones. Thus, the 
Confederation for Independent Poland won several seats in the 1993 parliamentary elections but was 
successfully marginalised afterwards. 61 Nonetheless, the votes won at the Polish 2001 elections by 
extremist parties such as the League of Polish Families (LPR) and Self Defence of the Polish Republic 
(S) were a sign of the 'social fatigue' with transition. Additionally, the decreasing support for EU 
membership pointed to the need to finalise the EU enlargement within the very near future, thus 
rewarding the candidate countries for their human, social, economic and political efforts over the last 
decade and avoiding the danger of internal instability. 
Given its ethnic composition and its highly oppressive post-1945 communist history, Romania was 
more exposed to the danger of nationalist uprisings than Poland. Thus, 11% of the Romanian 
population consists of ethnic minorities including German (0.5%), Roma (1.8%), other (1%) and 
Hungarian (7.1%), which is a dominant minority in Transylvania 62 Several districts in Transylvania 
are predominantly inhabited by ethnic Hungarians and some of them constituted between the two 
world wars an autonomous region. This geographical distribution, the historical precedent and the 
legacy of an overt policy of suppression of ethnic minorities practised during the last decades of the 
communist regime generated a strong sense of identity in the Hungarian minority in Romania. 
Furthermore, once the communist oppression was removed and the democratic values endorsed, ethnic 
minorities started to assert their identity and claim increased rights. 63 The claims of the Hungarian 
minority were at times supported by the Hungarian authorities, making an internal security concern 
depend on external factors. Thus, in the early 1990s, the Hungarian PM Antall declared himself the 
prime minister of all fifteen million Hungarians, including the Diaspora. 64 Romanian politicians 
themselves exploited at times the anti-Hungarian sentiment as a means to gain votes. This appeared to 
be the case not only of Funar, the mayor of Cluj Napoca, an old Transylvanian city, but also of the 
58 Wallace, C. et al, "Old and New Security Issues in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Results of an 11 Nation 
Study", Europe Asia Studies, Volume 51, Issue 6,1999, p. 997. 
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Romanian president Iliescu in his early mandates Several events in the early 1990s contributed to 
nationalism being a security concern in Romania. The Council of Europe's Recommendation No. 1201 
regarding ethnic minorities' group rights was a bone of discontent between the government and the 
Democratic Alliance of the Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). Internally, this created unease between 
the government, UDMR and the civil society and perceptions of insecurity for both the Romanian 
majority and the Hungarian minority. Externally, this was seen as a hesitance from the Romanian 
authorities to comply with international legislation and shed further doubts on Romania's commitment 
to democracy, creating a perception of insecurity and impeding upon the country's prospects for 
returning to Europe. This negative perception was accentuated by the violent confrontation between 
ethnic Romanians and Hungarians at Tärgu Mure$ in 1991. This led to Romania's initial exclusion 
from the Phare Programme. Furthermore, UDMR threatened in 1995 to unleash a programme of civil 
disobedience as a protest against the adoption of an education law by the Parliament, which was 
considered discriminatory. 67 However, ethnic violence remained just an unfortunate accident and 
peaceful co-habitation has remained the rule in Romanian society ever since the events of Tkgu 
Mure*. 68 
Moreover, significant steps in avoiding extremism and promoting minority rights have been made in 
Romania. For example, the UDMR acceded to power in 1996 as a coalition partner of the Democratic 
Convention of Romania (CDR). This change led to considerable improvements in the observation of 
minority rights in Romania which were saluted by the international community. 69 Furthermore, the 
Romanian authorities have managed to solve diplomatically certain differences of opinion with the 
Hungarian government regarding the law on Hungarian status proposed in 2001 by the Hungarian 
authorities. The prospect of EU integration for both countries and the conditionality that came with it 
were partially responsible for the resolution of this difference of opinions. Furthermore, as part of a 
mutually agreeable solution, the Hungarian government offered its thorough support for Romania's 
membership of both NATO and the EU. This is an example of how a security threat can be dc- 
securitised and how it affects and is affected by the process of return to Europe. Finally, despite 
winning a large number of seats in both chambers of the parliament and having a serious contestant for 
presidency in the 2000 elections, the nationalistic and xenophobic Greater Romania Party was isolated 
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by the political class and its impact on the legislative process was minimised. The results of the 2000 
election in Romania were an indication that while threats to democracy by extremist parties arc 
contained, they still exist and thus international support is important in anchoring some of the CEECs 
in democratic practices. 
A third internal security concern in the political sector was internal instability resulting from political 
fragmentation. Political liberalisation in both countries led to the creation of numerous and diverse 
political parties that competed in the political arena. The party formation process was lengthy and 
complex and time was required for the political system to polarise. This wide variety of parties made 
coalitions necessary in order to form governments and carry out the legislative process. In Poland, the 
shock therapy affected the unity and credibility of Solidarity, eroded its membership and popular 
support and accentuated its disintegration starting in 1990.70 This disintegration and the infighting, also 
known as the 'war at the top' created high political instability until 1993 71 For example, the three party 
coalition 1991 government of Olszewski only survived six months, while the relative stable 1992 seven 
party coalition of Suchocka was brought down by economic crises and discontent n Additionally, the 
electoral legislation in Poland did not initially address the issue of political fragmentation. By setting a 
low threshold for participation in the parliament, the Polish electoral law increased the number of 
parties in the legislature and thus negatively affected its cohesion. 73 Divergent interests of parties 
represented in parliament or in government led to deadlocks in legislative initiatives and in policy 
making, thus creating political instability, especially in the early 1990s. 74 The first year without a 
change of government was 1994.75 Thereafter, lessons were learned regarding the negative effects of 
fragmentation and in preparation for the 1997 elections the opposition parties organised themselves in 
three large blocks. This strategy led to the victory of the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) of 
Krzaklewski which formed a coalition government with the Freedom Union (UW) of Balccrowicz. 76 
Although the government was reshuffled several times, Buzck remained prime minister until the 2001 
elections. Government stability was finally ensured in Poland and relatively maintained through the 
government of Miller, despite a few reshuffles. 
In Romania, the political fragmentation of the democratic opposition before 1996 and in 2000 greatly 
contributed to the victories of post-communists in the 1990,1992 and 2000 elections. Thus, in 1990 
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there were more than eighty parties in the Romanian political arena. " Furthermore, the three parties 
that traced their roots back to the inter-war period had lost touch with the Romanian voters. The 
National Liberals, The National Peasants and the Social Democrats needed time to build their 
organisations and to reconnect with the electorate. ' They recalled the pre-communist past, rather than 
pointing towards the post-communist future, thus failing to address contemporary issues. 79 Their 
leaders had been living mostly in exile and failed to attract enough support to win the elections. 
Although Väcäroiu remained PM for the full mandate between 1992 and 1996, several reshuffles took 
place as a result of non-confidence motions and street protests. Political fragmentation also led to the 
participation of the extremist Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) in government in 1994. 
Furthermore, this illicit 'liaison' became a 'legalised menage' with the signing in 1995 of the four party 
protocol which included alongside PUNR and PDSR the national communist Social Labour Party 
(PSM) and the chauvinist Greater Romania Party. Gallagher saw these developments as a 'reversed 
wave' of democratisation. 80 Indirectly, political fragmentation was a threat to democracy and thus a 
security concern, both internally and externally. The same political fragmentation and government 
infighting led to many changes of ministers during the democratic governance of 1996-2000 which 
slowed down the pace of economic reforms. 81 Being a collection of eighteen parties and organisations, 
the Democratic Convention of Romania that won the 1996 elections lacked cohesion and unity. 82 The 
differences of opinion were further exacerbated during the 1996-2000 governance to the extent that 
several parties left the alliance and presented their own candidates for the presidency and parliamentary 
elections. The votes were therefore spread and the two who qualified for the second round were Ilicscu, 
the PDSR candidate, and Vadim Tudor, the candidate of the extremist Greater Romania Party. All in 
all, political fragmentation led to a high political and economic instability which were reflected in a 
negative image abroad until 1996 and only slightly improved afterwards. The 2001 victory of PSDR 
was not seen as a threat anymore and ensured relative political stability, contributing towards the 
creation of positive perceptions of security. 
At the crossroads between political, societal and economic sectors of security lay the threats posed by 
street protests and strikes. These were connected with the pace, the depth and the success of political 
and economic reforms. As a sign of freedom, protests symbolised the tension between markctisation 
and democratisation. 83 They were securitised by the extent to which they were conducted in an 
undemocratic manner, triggered undemocratic behaviour from the authorities or led to numerous falls 
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of governments with possible impact on the continuity of reforms. In Poland, the shock therapy 
economic reforms implemented by Balcerowicz led initially to a loss of output, high inflation, high 
unemployment and generally a fall in the standard of living of the population. This resulted in 
numerous protests and collapses of governments in the early 1990s leading to an overall perception of 
high internal instability, as shown in chapter four. 84 Although this country image deterred FDI, the 
governments' commitment to radical reforms ensured a high external credibility and thus external 
support, as has been discussed in chapter four. This external support has contributed greatly to the 
economic recovery and to reducing the internal instability of Poland, contributing towards full virtuous 
circles in the political and in the economic spheres. 
This was not the case in Romania. In 1990 the Romanian government violently repressed the peaceful 
protests organised by students in the University Square against tendencies of an authoritarian rule. This 
repression was a gross infringement of human rights which alarmed the international community. It led 
to a stop of the international financing and to a pause in the negotiations for an association agreement 
with the EC. 85 Moreover, the violent protests of the miners in June 1991 were a strong threat to 
democracy and political stability. They violated any concept of rule of law, retarded democratic 
development and harmed Romania's reputation abroad. 86 Furthermore, they led to the fall of the 
reformist government of Roman and thus led to a slowing down of the economic reforms with a 
subsequent impact on the rate of progress towards accession into the EU. 87 Trying to ensure economic 
and social stability, pre-1996 governments postponed real reforms in economy. 88 The half hearted 
economic reforms in Romania in the early 1990s accentuated the economic crisis and made Romania 
fall further behind other CEECs in the quest for EU membership. 89 Furthermore, deep economic 
reforms became unavoidable by late 1996 and under international pressure a shock therapy was 
adopted by the democratic government of Ciorbea. This prolonged economic instability in Romania as 
it brought high inflation, unemployment, a further fall in the living standards of the population and 
protests by miners, hence political instability. 90 Security concerns came, as in early 1990s Poland, from 
the challenge to keep the balance between the speed of reforms and their social sustainability. Further 
fears were related to the possibility of ascent of non-democratic and extremist forces in case of failure 
of economic reforms. 91 
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To sum up, economic and political instability were inevitable in the first decade of transition. Poland's 
perceptions of insecurity came from the pace and depth of economic reforms and their impact on the 
political sector while Romania's internal security concerns were mainly related to the drawbacks of 
the democratisation process. Deeply rooted in its lack of democratic experience, Romania's political 
instability was highly securitised by the international community, thus impacting negatively on its 
prospects for EU integration. Furthermore, the early attempts to maintain political stability through 
postponing economic reforms had the reverse results of spreading instability over a longer period and 
of damaging the external credibility of the government. Credibility was regained once the post-1996 
and the post-2000 Nästase governments initiated deep reforms in economy. While Polish security 
concerns resulted initially from the high costs the shock therapy imposed on the population, they were 
de-securitised to a certain extent by the international community. The early radical reforms were seen 
as a real commitment to market economy and return to Europe. International credibility and reforms 
helped Poland create a virtuous economic and political circle as early as 1993. Nonetheless, reforms 
have led in both countries to an increased gap between winners and losers of transition and the rise of 
extremist parties which is now of more concern that the return of post-communists. This phenomenon 
emphasises the tension between marketisation and democratisation, certain limitations of the accession 
process and the need to ensure internal and external economic security. The external security concerns 
in Poland and Romania will be addressed below. 
6.2.2 External security concerns 
An analysis of the external threats faced by Poland and Romania in the post-Cold War era should be 
based on several observations. First, the end of the Cold War meant that two conditions were fulfilled. 
On the one hand, Soviet involvement in Central and Eastern Europe diminished considerably in 
importance. This occurred with the end of the Breshnev doctrine by Gorbachev. He made clear that the 
Soviet Union would no longer use coercion to maintain in power the communist regimes that Moscow 
had once imposed upon much of the region. On the other hand, the Federal Republic of Germany 
became a power committed to preserving Central Europe's status quo rather than revising it. The 
German reunification made unlikely a popular upheaval against the repressive government of the 
German Democratic Republic, an event that might have forced Bonn's intervention and possibly 
precipitated a larger war in the area. 92 However, these conditions do not necessarily imply that Russia 
and Germany stopped constituting threats, as will be shown later. 
Second, Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe have been historically a buffer zone between 
different empires. French, German, Austrian, Russian or Soviet and Ottoman empires came and went 
and imposed different rules. Borders were changed many times, countries were created, destroyed or 
simply moved to a different place. Moreover, the population comprises a mix of different ethnic groups 
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speaking many different languages and having distinct identities. As a result, borders have always 
been disputed and the area has been troubled by ethnic tensions and nationalist irredentia. Moreover, 
unlike 'pax Americana' in Western Europe which at least tried to resolve some of these problems, the 
pax Sovietica in the East simply suppressed them. Thus, with the disintegration of the socialist 
community and the intensifying economic crisis in the region, the danger of resurgent nationalism 
became very real. Moreover, neighbours that could make historically justified claims to territory 
became potential threats. That is why recognition of the existing borders, however arbitrarily drawn, 
became the first security key issue of the post-1989 settlement. ' Border recognition and minority 
rights also became the sine qua non of membership of NATO and implicitly of the EU. 
Finally, the end of the Cold War led to the revival of political geography as discussed previously. 
Terms such as Central Europe and the Balkans were recalled to help identify sub-security systems. 
Perceptions of security in Central Europe differed from the ones in the Balkans and the two notions 
have greatly contributed to the de-securitisation of Poland and the securitisation of Romania. This is 
why discrimination by the international community became an important security concern of Romania 
as will be seen below. 95 
The following section looks at how external security concerns have impacted upon Poland and 
Romania's quest for EU integration by analysing the role of the great powers, the significance of 
neighbourly relations and the importance of 'Central Europeanness' for each country's image. Some of 
these issues affected first the prospects for NATO membership. However, as NATO enlargement was 
seen by some as a condition for the EU enlargement, these concerns affected indirectly EU 
membership. Furthermore, chapter three has shown that security motives have played a pivotal role 
within the 'healthy' approach to EU enlargement, while early security concerns have acted as brakes on 
the accession process. The discussion will show how Poland has transformed security concerns into 
opportunities while Romania failed to do so for most of the transition period. 
Poland and Romania between the great powers 
Russia 
According to Park and Rees, European security will always be defined as opposed to Russia. ' Russia 
not only remains a great nuclear power, but its resources, size, economic and political potential make it 
still a great power in international relations. Furthermore, its geographical position close to Central 
Europe means that it will potentially have an influence in this area. As an example, Russia has shown 
92 Ullman, Securing Europe, p. 138. 
" Wallace et al, "Old and New Security Issues", pp. 995-996. 
94 Brzezinski, Z. , "Post-Communism 
Nationalism", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 5, Winter 1989/1990, pp. 1-25; 
Wallace et al, "Old and New Security Issues", p. 998. 
95 Mele§canu, "The National Security of Romania", p. 17. 
209 
reluctance at times to fully acknowledge the loss of the empire. ' Finally, a politically and 
economically unstable or undemocratic Russia would still constitute a threat for the CEECs. 98 Even 
more so, given that serious antidemocratic tendencies might lead to renewed nco-imperialism or to 
threats such as drugs, arms or human trafcking. 99 
Poland and Romania's fears towards Russia have been centred around two basic questions: the future 
economic and political shape of Russia and the possibility of future Russian imperialistic ambitions, 
regardless of the nature of the state. 100 Before August 1991, a conservative take-over in Moscow was 
considered a threat in Poland because the Soviet army was the only one in the region which had real 
invasion capability. 101 Furthermore, Russian troops continued to be stationed in Poland until 1992.102 
However, these fears of Soviet military intervention appear to have been overestimated. For the 
potentially conservative leaders, preserving order in the Soviet Union would have been a difficult 
enough task. 103 Second, according to many reports, the morale of the Soviet armed forces had 
weakened so that no rogue general would have dared to attempt a restoration of the borders of the 
former outer empire. Finally, the situation in 1991 was totally different from that of 1953,1956,1968 
or 1979 when the Soviet Union had to face only one single enemy. In 1991 the Soviet'revanchism' 
would have had to be directed against several nations simultaneously, which would have been 
impossible. 104 Closer to the present, although Russians themselves might be unwilling to recreate the 
military ambitions of the former Soviet Union, demagogic politicians such as Zhirinovsky still had the 
power to stir up popular feelings. '05 
The ambiguity of Russia's idea of 'near abroad' made Poland fear imperialistic tendencies over the 
former Warsaw Treaty Organisation member states. Thus, Russia's disguised reluctance to recognise 
96Park and Rees, Rethinking Security in post Cold-War Europe, p. 10. 
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the independence of Ukraine fuelled these concerns. 106 In effect, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
most elements in Moscow, even the most democratic reformers, wanted to perpetuate the status quo in 
Central Europe, i. e. a situation in which these countries belonged to no defence system or alliance, and 
definitely not to NATO. 107 Furthermore, Russia interpreted NATOs' expansion and intervention in 
Yugoslavia as attempts to exploit its weakness and threats to its security. 108 This is why Russia 
maintained for a long time a veto power over NATO's enlargement and president Yeltsin even warned 
over a 'cold peace', should Poland join NATO. 109 However, Russia's stand towards NATO's 
enlargement softened in time. With regard to Poland's accession, conflicting opinions had already 
started to appear in 1993. A declaration by President Yeltsin that Russia would not object to Poland's 
future participation in NATO was withdrawn and followed by many Russian dcmurrals. 10 In 1994, the 
Russian foreign minister Kozyrev declared that Russia would permit a NATO enlargement, on 
condition that it be done 'discretely' and 'without isolating Russia'. "' Since then, bilateral relations have 
focused on Poland's role as a bridge to the East and on the Europeanisation of Russia. ' 12 Finally, the 
signing in May 1997 of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between 
NATO and the Russian Federation has contributed to facilitating NATO's first wave of expansion and 
to establishing a Joint Council between Russia and the Alliance. 113 Furthermore, the Kosovo crisis and 
the War on Tenor necessitated co-operation between NATO and Russia and showed that a viable 
security arrangement has to consider Russia's participation. "' While Poland has favoured Russia's 
close relationship with NATO, Poland's accession to NATO in 1999 appears to have eliminated Polish 
security concerns regarding Russia's proximity. 
Until 1996, Romania's foreign policy shifted between East and West. Hence, its relations with Russia 
negatively affected Romania's return to Europe. Thus, the fear of a Soviet invasion appeared to be the 
motivation for the signature of a bilateral treaty in 1990 including a Soviet veto for Romania's 
participation in a security agreement. By being the only Central European country to sign such an 
agreement, Romania was perceived for a long time to be under Russian influence, although the initial 
bilateral treaty was never ratified and the Soviet Union was dismantled at the end of 1991.115 Even in 
1994 the Russian foreign affairs ministry declared that the Romanian partners were ready to develop 
military relations as strong as during the Warsaw Pact'. 116 However, for the Romanian part The 
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Romanian-Russian relations were cold' and diplomacy was already shifting towards the desire to 
become a part of NATO. '7 The delay in signing the treaty with Russia was amongst the reasons for 
Romania not being invited to join NATO at the 1997 Madrid Summit. "' The resuming of negotiations 
for the bilateral treaty was important for Romania being invited to join NATO by 2004 within the 
larger context of the Russia-NATO co-operation in the War on Terror. 
In the economic and political sectors of security Russia's influence on Poland and Romania has also 
been strong during the first decade of transition. Thus, the fall of the CMEA has been an important 
factor that led to the transitional recession in the early 1990s, thus enhancing the economic and 
political insecurity of both countries. The negative impact was higher in Poland, whose trade was 
greatly dependent on the organisation prior to 1989. Polish exports fell by 45% and imports by 33%. 119 
On the positive side, Poland's strong need for new trade partners constituted a push factor for Poland's 
economic integration with the EU. Then, Russia's financial crisis in 1998 has affected FDI in Poland 
and Romania, albeit only to a little extent. Furthermore, a relatively economically sound Russia has 
become an important trade and investment partner for both Romania and Poland, thus contributing to 
their economic reforms and economic security. Despite a certain debate, there is no real fear of 
economic domination by Russia. 
Germany 
Although rarely admitted, Germany appeared to constitute a potential security concern for many 
Europeans after the end of the Cold War. Its history, overwhelming economic power and geographical 
position contributed to this perception. Some Europeans feared that Germany would leave NATO, ask 
the allied troops to leave its territory or acquire nuclear weapons. 120 However, these fears were 
counterbalanced quickly by Germany's commitment to remain anchored in NATO, to deepen the 
process of European integration through the adoption of the Euro and to widen both NATO and the EU 
by supporting the CEECs for membership. 121 Germany has not constituted a particular threat for 
Romania and therefore the analysis will be concentrated on the relationship between Poland and 
Germany. 122 
Poland's perception of Germany was characterised by mixed fcelings. '23 On the one hand, Poland 
feared that a nationalist government might aggressively raise issues such as the borders, the German 
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ethnic minorities or the rights of expellees. 124 This fear had deep roots in the troubled common history 
in which the German Drang nach Osten' had culminated with the partition of Poland in 1939 and the 
beginning of the World War Two. Furthermore, as a result of the 1945 peace treaties Poland was 
shifted westwards, now incorporating important former German territory. Future economic dominance 
over Poland was also feared. Poles feared that Germany would abuse its economic power to extort 
political concessions. 125 On the other hand, Germany became an inspiration for Poland through its 
concept of social market economy and, in the eyes of the Polish, 'the most desirable place to live in. '126 
It was also believed that German investment was good for the economy and that German economic and 
political influence could bring stability in the whole region. 127 Overall, the relations shifted from 
conflict to collaboration, a shift supported mostly by the young and within the Solidarity circles. "' 
How did Poland diffuse these threats and how did they affect its prospects for EU integration? 
First, the Federal Republic of Germany formally committed itself to respect the existing border by 
signing with Poland the reconciliation and neighbourly bilateral relations treaty in June 1991. Although 
the treaty eliminated the fear that Germany might again resort to military aggression, it was not 
sufficient in totally diffusing all shadows from the past and anxieties for the future. The best way to 
diffuse these anxieties was to make sure that Germany remained anchored in the Western structures of 
integration and security and that it supported Poland's return to Europe. 129 Thus, the legacy of past 
turbulent relations between Germany and Poland was a catalyst for Poland's quest for membership of 
both NATO and the EU. The existence of a bilateral treaty was sine qua non for pursuing NATO and 
EU membership. Moreover, the good bilateral relations were a condition for increased bilateral trade 
and German investment in Poland and thus increased integration with a main EU member state, as seen 
in chapter three. Furthermore, the recognition of minority rights has contributed towards meeting the 
Copenhagen political criteria of accession to the EU. However, memories of border changes made 
land acquisition by foreigners impossible, constituting a negative element of the investment climate in 
Poland for a long time. Furthermore, the fear of economic invasion by Germans once the EU enlarged 
made accession negotiations stumble over the land acquisition transition periods and hence affected 
Poland's quest for EU membership. Second, Germany became the most committed and influential 
supporter of Poland's integration into NATO and the EU. Statesmen in both countries used repeatedly 
the cliche that Germany's road to the East lay through Poland while Poland's road to Europe lay 
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though Germany. 130 While this did not eliminate the fear of German economic domination, German 
support helped speed up the process of obtaining firm security guarantees through NATO membership. 
Furthermore, German support for early Polish EU membership succeeded even when Poland was 
lagging behind in meeting the accession criteria or conducting the accession negotiations, as already 
shown in chapter three. 
For Poland, the initial threat posed by Germany became a catalyst for EU integration. While Poland 
cultivated co-operation with Germany, Romania failed to acknowledge in the early 1990s the benefits 
that Germany's support might bring. Thus, when Kinkel, the German foreign affairs minister, offered 
in 1990 to visit Romania ahead of the French diplomacy, the Romanian authorities declined the offer, 
in an attempt to emphasise the traditional links with France. This diplomatic signal downsizcd the 
support Germany was ready to give Romania in the early 1990s. 13' Although Germany became by 
1998 one of the largest investors and main trade partner of Romania, it hesitated in supporting 
Romania's bid for NATO membership in 1997. Since then, Romania's efforts to ensure Germany's 
diplomatic support and economic interest have intensified. France, on the other hand, has proven a 
rather feeble advocate of Romania's return to Europe. France's limited involvement with NATO 
diminished its power in supporting Romania's candidacy for NATO in 1997. Furthermore, the 
recommendation of the French foreign minister addressed at the Nice European Council of December 
2000 to start accession negotiations with all twelve CEE candidates was rejected by the European 
Council. However, the United Kingdom has become an active supporter of Romania's candidacy for 
EU membership. This increased support appears to be motivated by economic and military interests, as 
well as by the British stand over EU which favours widening over the deepening of the Union. A more 
in depth analysis is, nevertheless, beyond the scope of this study. 
Neighbouring relations 
Borders have always been disputed and the area has been troubled by ethnic tensions and nationalist 
irredentia. Furthermore, with the experience of the Yugoslav wars, relations between neighbouring 
states and the issue of national minorities became increasingly a security concern not only for the 
states in the area, but also for the EU. There was a fear that further nationalist conflicts could become a 
challenge to the territorial or political status quo in the region which could draw in other major powers, 
'spill into contiguous geographical areas such as NATO's southern region' or 'degenerate' into a 
'Lebanon-type' situation of incessant conflict. 1132 This led to the initiation of the Balladur Pact which 
made NATO, and implicitly EU membership, conditional on signing neighbourhood treaties with all 
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neighbours and on respecting the rights of minorities. 133 Instability in South-Eastern Europe has also 
led to the revival of the terms Balkans' and 'Balkanisation' with negative perceptions of security in the 
area as will be discussed later on. How did Poland and Romania deal with the issues of borders and 
political geography? 
Poland. a pole of stability and a gateway to the East 
Borders have been a sensitive issue for Poland, a relatively new state which suffered numerous 
transfigurations in history, including the dismantling during the World War Two and the westwards 
territorial shift institutionalised at the end of the conflict. 134 Thus, since 1989 the Polish overriding 
political objective was to supersede the legacy of hostility with its neighbours. 133 Soon after the end of 
the Cold War, Poland found itself amidst seven new neighbours which had replaced the three previous 
ones. Thus, the German Democratic Republic had vanished into the Federal Germany, Czechoslovakia 
had given way to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while the Soviet Union had been replaced by 
Lithuania, Russia (through its district of Kaliningrad), Belarus and Ukraine. To minimise the possible 
threats that might arise from these new states, Poland signed treaties of reconciliation and good 
neighbourly relations with every one of the seven within only four years. These treaties contained 
clauses that frontiers would remain unchanged and inviolate and that the rights of minorities would be 
observed. 136 They constituted an important condition for NATO membership and a signal of Polish 
security which enhanced Poland's prospects for EU integration. 
Poland has also met all requirements regarding minority rights as recognised by the Opinion and the 
regular reports. Furthermore, Poland's good relations with its eastern neighbours made Poland an 
important gateway towards the East, a pillar of stability in the area. Poland became the advocate of 
Ukraine's quest to join the EU and Poland tried to ensure that no 'paper curtain' will cross between the 
two countries. 137 It has good relations with Lithuania which has joined the race for EU membership and 
was invited to join in May 2004. Poland's relationship with Belarus aimed to minimise the threats that 
might appear from a closer relationship between Russia and Belarus. Furthermore, Poland's increased 
control of its eastern borders has aimed to minimise the danger of illegal immigration, drugs, human 
and arms trafficking. It raised, however, the question of a new division line between the East and the 
West, of a 'paper curtain' rather than an iron one. 138 As a result of its strategic geographical position 
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136 Stefanowicz, "Poland", p. 107. 
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138 For a further discussion on Poland's relationship with its eastern neighbours, see: Wallace ct al, "Old and New 
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and of its good relations with its neighbours, Poland's membership of the EU and NATO became a 
valuable asset for both organisations and Germany in particular. Poland's appeal to the EU was further 
enhanced by its co-operation with Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia and with the rebirth of 
Central Europe as a political concept. The role of 'Central Europeanness' in creating positive 
perceptions of security will be discussed in a later section. 
Romania's neighbourly relations: between challenges and opportunities 
Romania's borders have changed since 1918 when the country incorporated all its historic provinces. 
The country suffered in 1940 huge territorial losses which Romania only partially recovered at the end 
of the World War Two. Transylvania was reincorporated into Romania but Bessarabia became the state 
of Moldova within the Soviet Union. South Dobrudja became Bulgarian territory and Bucovina, a 
north eastern Romanian territory, was annexed by Ukraine. With this legacy, borders have been 
contested and an important security concern for Romania. Furthermore, their recognition was a key 
condition for Romania's membership of NATO and implicitly of the EU. Given the contested history, 
the negotiation of the treaties has suffered several delays. These delays have negatively affected 
Romania's prospects for both NATO and EU integration. Most of the treaties were signed under the 
pressure of the Madrid Summit of 1997 when the decision over NATO's enlargement was planned. 
In the absence of a proper institutional framework, Romania's relations with its ncighbours have 
constituted important security concerns until mid-1990s. Thus, the most sensitive relations were with 
Hungary and Moldova. Bilateral relations between Romania and Hungary have been largely affected 
by suspicions over the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania and over the intentions of the 
Hungarian authorities to interfere in Romania's internal affairs on this basis. These suspicions and 
developments presented earlier on as part of the internal security concerns were partially the cause of 
the failure of the two parties to sign a bilateral treaty ahead of the Conference on Stability. The 1995 
Conference on Stability was initiated by the Balladur Pact as a condition for the CEECs' return to 
Europe. The neighbourly and friendship treaty was signed in 1996 ahead of the 1997 Madrid Summit 
which was to decide over NATO's enlargement. This was, nevertheless, not enough for Romania to be 
invited to join NATO, further affecting the prospects for EU membership. By 2002 the relations 
between Romania and Hungary did not constitute special security concerns given changes in the 
attitude of both of the Romanian and Hungarian authorities. Romania has improved its attitude towards 
its Hungarian minority and, despite several incidents, Hungary has become an advocate of Romania's 
integration into NATO and the EU. 139 
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Romania's relations with Moldova were affected by Romania's early nationalistic stand in its foreign 
policy and Moldova's own search for identity in the aftermath of its independence. Early attempts to 
build a special relationship between the two countries were then affected negatively by the separatist 
conflict in Transnistria and by an increasingly pro-Russian approach by the Moldovan authorities since 
mid 1990s. They accused at times the Romanian party of interfering in Moldova's internal affairs and 
led to a further delay in signing the bilateral agreement. The lack of such an agreement by 1997 
contributed to Romania's delayed NATO membership and to maintaining perceptions of external 
insecurity. The 2000 bilateral treaty paved to a certain extent the way to the 2002 invitation of joining 
NATO. As NATO membership was considered a pre-condition for EU membership, this treaty 
contributed indirectly to progress in Romania's quest for EU integration. 140 
Yugoslavia's proximity negatively affected Romania's efforts to be seen as a Central European state 
rather than a Balkan one. Developments in Yugoslavia have given rise to security concerns for 
Romania while representing the most serious challenge to the security of the whole area. In the early 
1990s, by trying to have amiable relations with the Milosevic regime, by being reluctant to condemn 
human rights violations in Yugoslavia and by expressing concern for Yugoslavia's exclusion from the 
CSCE, the Romanian government appeared as a tacit supporter of what was seen by the EU and 
NATO as a 'pariah regime'. This did not enhance Romania's prospects for returning to Europe. '' 
Later, the Yugoslav wars created instability in South-Eastern Europe which led again to a low interest 
in Romania's integration into the EU. Furthermore, economic embargoes against Yugoslavia and the 
blockage of traffic on the Danube also affected Romania's trade, economic growth and prospects for 
prosperity. These concerns made the Romanian government reluctant to participate in the UN 
sanctions, an attitude which had a negative effect on Romania's prospects for EU integration. 141 
Yugoslavia's negative impact on Romania has diminished since the signing of the bilateral agreement 
in 1996. By distancing Romania from the Milosevic regime, the post-1996 leadership improved the 
Romania's image abroad and facilitated more positive assessments of country's suitability for 
integration into the EU. 13 The previous Yugoslav threat became the catalyst for Romania's integration 
in the EU in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis as was seen in chapter three. 
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Security in South-Eastern Europe", COPRI Working Paper No. 35, Copenhagen, 2000. 
140 For further references to the Romanian-Moldovan relations, see J. Bugajski, Nations in Turmoil. Conflict and 
Co-operation in Eastern Europe, Westview Press, Oxford, 1995; Valli, "Security Problems"; Vukadinovic, 
"Challenges to Security in South-Eastern Europe"; Partos, "Hungarian-Romanian and Romanian-Moldovan 
Relations". 
I" Phinnemore, "Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989", p. 4; Severin, "Romania- Contribuitor si 
benficiar al integrarii", p. 16. 
142 Phinnemore, "Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989", p. 4. 
143 Phinnemore, "Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration since 1989", p. 5. 
217 
Some analysts argue that a democratic Serbia and Montenegro is no longer a threat to the stability of 
the area and will not retain EU's interest for integration in South-Eastern Europe. 144 However, the 
country still has a lot of problems on all sides. Montenegro is on a brink of separation, Kosovo can 
practically be written off for Serbia, Sandzak is demanding autonomy and Hungarians have been 
supported in their aspirations for a full secession from Yugoslavia by nationalistic political forces from 
Hungary145 Furthermore, stability depends on economic security which can be enhanced through 
international financial assistance and FDI, as has been envisaged through the Stability Pact. Romania's 
internal stability, good relations with Yugoslavia and its active participation in the Stability Pact appear 
to be good conditions for Romania's membership of the EU. Romania can maintain stability in an area 
which is still likely to pose threats to the security of Europe as a whole. However, a thorough 
investigation of the bilateral relations between Romania and its neighbours is beyond the scope of this 
study. 
To be or not to be Central European? 
Poland's relations with the Visegrad Group and the' rip vilege' of Central Europeanness 
Poland has searched to create a network of political, economic and even security tics with Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia by setting up the Visegrad Triangle in 1990, renamed as the Visegrad Group after the 
split of Czechoslovakia in 1993. This was an institutionalisation of the revival of Central Europe as a 
political concept and had initially an exclusive nature. Thus, Romania's attempt to become a member 
in 1992 was 146 From a Polish point of view, the organisation was meant to be valuable in 
its own right. From the other members' point of view, the group was just an integration exercise useful 
in enhancing their prospects for EU integration. "' Regional co-operation was seen as a stability factor, 
increasing members' credibility through their ability to work together. 148 However, it was also feared 
that anything that would resemble an alliance might hinder the members' entrance to the EU, NATO or 
other organisations. 149 Regardless of the motives for membership, this collaboration had the merit of 
projecting outside, and especially to the EU, a positive image of its members. The Viscgrad Group 
came to symbolise a keen drive for EU membership, successful democratic transition and advanced 
economic reforms. Doubts loomed over Slovakia's performances, but the general image was extremely 
positive. Foreign investors were attracted by the stability and prosperity of the area, and the EU's 
intention to enlarge was also channelled onto Central Europe. Furthermore, the concept of Central 
Europe was the opposite of the Balkans which were associated with instability, ethnic hatred and 
violence, so well symbolised by the Yugoslav wars in the early 1990s and the 1999 Kosovo crisis. 
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Eventually, competition between the Visegrad Group's members led to a lessening of the importance 
of the group in enhancing EU accession. 150 In 1993 the economic tics took the form of the Central 
European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) which in 1997 enlarged towards Romania and Bulgaria. 
The Central Europeanness of Romania was slowly accepted by Central Europeans themselves, despite 
having been recognised at EU level as early as 1992. This was proof of the constant redefinition of the 
political geography in the area, very well captured by Agh who refers to the past: Central Europe was 
like a ferry boat moving back and forth between West and East' with 'successful and unsuccessful 
stories'. "' Nevertheless, the early years of the Visegrad Group created positive perceptions of security 
for Poland, creating the conditions for a political virtuous circle. 
Romania: from Central Europe to the Balkans and back 
In 1992 the Petersburg Declaration clearly recognised Romania's Central European status amongst the 
other eight countries as follows: the three Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. 152 Nevertheless, soon afterwards, perceptions of Romania seemed to 
disregard its official Central European identity. Academics, officials and international organisations 
such as the EBRD referred to Romania as a part of the Balkans. This was partly due to Yugoslavia's 
proximity which has largely perpetuated an image of instability in the area, as discussed earlier on. The 
Balkan label was also partly justified in the early 1990s by the internal political instability of Romania 
and by its failure to guarantee all its borders through signing bilateral relations agreements. The slow 
progress in economic reforms contrasted with the good economic record of countries such as Poland, 
Hungary or the Czech Republic, thus further distancing Romania from Central Europe. While Central 
Europe was perceived positively, the Balkans had a negative perception. Moreover, 'Balkanisation' 
became a negative term to suggest instability, lack of rule of law, danger and violence. Mcarshcimcr 
even used it to warn against the consequences of the end of the Cold War on security in Europe. 1S3 Not 
only was this image fuelled from inside, but it was equally constructed from outside, in order to 
enhance the superiority of Central Europe. 154 Within a highly competitive EU accession process, such a 
dichotomy was useful in speeding up the accession of Central European countries at the expense of the 
Balkan ones, to the extent that a Romanian scholar stated: 'Who enters Central Europe, enters 
Europe. "55This discrimination was seen as an important security concern by the Romanian 
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authorities. ' It had the potential of enhancing a negative circle of instability and underdevelopment in 
which the countries in the area seemed to be trapped in the early transition. 
On this basis, the Romanian authorities have intensified their efforts to promote Romania as a Central 
European country. The attempts in 1992 to join the Visegrad Group were unsuccessful, but 
membership of CEFTA was finally achieved in 1997. This affiliation to a Central European 
organisation was paralleled by a stronger commitment to economic reforms, NATO and EU 
membership by the newly elected centre-right government and thus gave more substance to Romania's 
'Central Europeanness'. This appears to have been reflected in a positive external image which, 
correlated with progress in privatisation, has led to an increased level of FDI in Romania. Romania 
remained at the same time deeply anchored in South-Eastern Europe. Its participation in the Black Sea 
Economic Co-operation initiated in 1992 was enhanced as a proof of Romania's capability to co- 
operate on a regional scale. Furthermore, Romania became part of the Stability Pact on South-Eastern 
Europe initiated in 1999 by the EU as a result of the Kosovo crisis. This pact marked the beginning of 
the de-securitisation of the area. By replacing the notion of 'Balkans' with 'South-Eastern Europe', an 
attempt was made to improve the external image of the area and prospects for stability. Moreover, in 
2000 the launch of the EU accession negotiations with all remaining candidate countries seemed to 
contribute to a reconciliation of political geography and the de-securitisation of the Balkans. Romania 
remains a pole of relative stability in South-Eastern Europe, an area which can be still threatened by 
instability. This has been a major argument put forward by Romania in its quest for both NATO and 
EU membership. 
To sum up, Poland has transformed most of its external security concerns into opportunities through 
an active policy of integration into NATO and the EU, ensuring good neighbourly relations towards the 
East from the first years of transition and promoting regional co-operation in a Central European 
framework. Furthermore, Germany's support enhanced the Polish prospects for returning to Europe, 
while the proximity of Russia's near abroad has constituted an important push factor for a rapid 
integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. On the other hand, Romania's external security concerns 
emerged from the delay in signing bilateral treaties with its neighbours and from political 
developments both within Romania and within its neighbours. Furthermore, this delay and Romania's 
shifting foreign policy in the early 1990s have contributed to the postponement of NATO and hence 
EU membership and the perpetuation of the security vacuum brought by the end of the Cold War. 
Finally, it has been shown that perceptions of security are as important as security concerns 
themselves. The fear of discrimination as a result of a perceived Balkan identity represented an 
important external security concern. Thus, by being perceived as a Balkan country, Romania has been 
'56 Nästase, A., "Politics in Transition", Central European Issues, Vol. 1, No. 1,1995, p. 7; Mcle, canu, "The 
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lagging behind in both EU integration and attracting FDI for most of the transition period. However, 
a change of perception since 1996 and increasingly since 1999 with the Helsinki European Council has 
contributed to Romania entering a virtuous circle of development. Overall, the international 
community and especially the EU have contributed greatly to the securitisation or de-sccuritisation of 
some of these security concerns. The role of EU in enhancing security of Poland and Romania will be 
assessed in the following section. 
6.3. Is EU membership the best way to ensure security in Poland and Romania? 
Given its internal challenges, its history and its geographical position, the stability of Central and 
South-Eastern Europe is contingent on security arrangements at European wide levcl. 15' Furthermore, 
for Poland and Romania EU and NATO membership are not only pragmatic projects, but also very 
symbolical ones. 158 They are an insurance against a new Yalta, the symbol of the real end of the Cold 
War 159 As an investigation of NATO's role in providing security is beyond the scope of this study, the 
following pages will refer only to the EU. Thus, the EU itself does not want to sec the CEECs going 
back to communist economies and authoritarian rule as this would have a 'seriously dcstabilising effect 
on the security of the continent as a whole'. 160 The majority of EU members placed emphasis on further 
economic and political integration as a means of reinforcing the CEECs economic and societal security 
and ultimately military security. 16' This is because in addition to its economic and political substance, 
the EU is a security mechanism, the significance of which, even though indirect in its operation, should 
not be underestimated. '62 
Thus, EU membership appears to be the best way to guarantee security for Poland and Romania in 
conjunction with NATO membership. 163 Several arguments will be put forward to support this claim. 
First, the EU has provided security through its initiation, previous enlargements and through launching 
the Stability Pact in South-Eastern Europe. Second, EU membership addresses all sectors of security, 
be it economic, political, societal, environmental or military. Finally, Europe has increasingly become 
a security complex in which an indivisible security makes co-operation sine qua non for maintaining 
peace and stability. By security complex one means a 'set of states whose major security concerns and 
perceptions are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or 
"' Gow, J. cited in Smith, M. A., "The NATO Factor: A Spanner in the Works of EU and WEU Enlargement? " 
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resolved apart from one another. "m Furthermore, security interdependence between states inside this 
complex is higher than among states outside them. '6' This interdependence makes co-operation in 
security terms necessary for all members of the security complex and thus co-operation in Europe the 
sine qua non for the security of the continent. 
Previous experience shows that the EU can de-securitise the countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
through economic integration. 166 For more than filly years the EU has ensured prosperity and peace for 
its members and now once again the EU is called upon to ensure security in the face of new threats. 
Thus, economic security and avoidance of another world conflict were the main motivation for the 
setting up of the EU's predecessors. By pooling together the economic resources of the six founding 
economies, the EEC, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the EURATOM made 
war between France and Germany inconceivable. 167 Furthermore, the EU has contributed greatly to 
democratic consolidation in Greece, Spain and Portugal by granting them membership soon after they 
abandoned totalitarian regimes. 168 The present hopes for security in the continent rely once again on the 
EU's potential to ensure reconciliations such as the French-German one, now in the case of Poland and 
Germany, or Romania and Hungary, or to consolidate democracy in the former communist countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. In the words of Hyde-Price at the beginning of the 1990s: 'One of the 
best ways to ensure that the disintegration of the Soviet bloc does not produce a zone of chronic 
instability and authoritarian nationalism in the eastern bloc of Europe is by enmeshing these newly 
democratising states in a web of ever deepening interdependencies. In this way, it might be possible to 
create a favourable and supportive international environment for the reform process in the East. By 
providing positive incentives and an institutional framework of pan-European co-operation it may be 
possible to give practical encouragement to liberal and reforming coalitions in the East and prevent the 
emergence of autarchic and excessive nationalistic policies in these fragile politics! 169 
Potentially, EU membership addresses all sectors of security, including military. An in depth 
discussion of the EU's potential role in ensuring military security is beyond the scope of this study. A 
few remarks will be made, nevertheless. Thus, the continuous interest in increasing the security of the 
continent has included the initiation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as a distinct pillar of 
the European Union through the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. Furthermore, following the Maastricht 
agreement, the increased powers given to the Western European Union were meant to give substance 
to EU's ambition to become an actor in military terms and to decrease the reliance on NATO in self- 
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guarding the security of the continent. 10 Although the Yugoslav wars, the Gulf war and the Kosovo 
crisis have exposed numerous limitations to the EU's military capability, they pointed towards the need 
to further develop the military capabilities of the EU. These would enable the EU to respond 
effectively to crises in which NATO might have no interest in intervention. This is, nevertheless, still a 
project. 
Although there is a certain potential for further development of a military capability of the EU 
independent of NATO, at present the best way that the EU can ensure the security of the continent is 
through addressing non-military threats. Thus, the EU's role in Central and Eastern European security 
consists of establishing long term conditions for peace and stabilisation through economic and political 
co-operation. 171 By addressing the political and economic sectors of security, the EU makes a major 
contribution to the stability of the continent, given that economic and political security arc 
interdependent and impact greatly upon the other sectors of security, including military security. The 
section below will look at the ways the EU has addressed the internal and external security concerns in 
Poland and Romania which were defined earlier in the chapter. The indivisibility of security of the 
continent makes security of Poland and Romania important not only for themselves, but for the EU and 
for the continent as a whole. There are several channels through which the EU has contributed to 
enhancing security of Poland and Romania: by providing the incentive for membership and the 
accession criteria; by offering funds, enhancing trade and investment, thus reducing the potential for 
economic and political instability; by changing external perceptions of each country with regard to 
their security concerns; by addressing the external threats to each country. These will be discussed 
below. 
First, by offering the 'carrot' of membership and setting up the accession criteria, the EU imposed 
certain standards of democratisation and marketisation. 1n By exercising its normative power on the 
candidate countries and creating incentives for adherence to democracy and market economy, the EU 
aimed to minimise the danger of return to authoritarian regimes and centrally planned economics. 173 
Although achieving democracy and market economy were genuine goals of Poland and Romania 
regardless of the prospect of EU membership, by offering a 'prize' for successful transition and 
anchoring these countries in an international framework, a stronger commitment by the local 
authorities and population was ensured. This was especially important given a certain tension between 
marketisation and democratisation and the large cost borne by both population and the political elite as 
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shown in chapter four. 174 With the prospect of EU membership, the population was encouraged to cope 
with the hardships induced by economic reforms and the political elites were pushed to apply 
unpopular reforms with positive results in the long term. 173 The motivational impact of the EU 
membership prospect was especially acknowledged in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis when the 
Commission invited the previously second track candidates to start accession negotiations. Partially 
justifying this decision, Prodi, the president of the European Commission, said: 'We risk losing some 
countries along the way by depriving their reforms of a tangible, credible objective and as the political 
consequences of such an exclusion cannot be measured, no risk should be taken. ' 176 
The prospect of EU membership also encouraged the political forces in both countries to minimise the 
impact of extremist parties on the political arena, thus defending the democratic rule. The extremist 
Greater Romania Party was marginalised in Romania after the 2000 elections, despite obtaining 20 
percent of the seats in parliament. Furthermore, in the context of the EU accession process, not only 
was the threat of extremism in Romania contained, but contributed to the mobilisation of the political 
class in ensuring a faster rhythm of reforms and of preparation for EU membership after the 2000 
elections. Through EU conditionality a security concern was transformed into a catalyst for change and 
progress towards EU accession. Furthermore, through the imposition of the economic criteria, 
governments in both countries were encouraged to promote reforms for transition to a market 
economy. The criteria constituted landmarks in conducting economic transition. They also included 
important conditions for attracting FDI, completing privatisation, enhancing economic growth and 
prosperity. Although the pace of economic reforms depended also on the internal conditions of each 
country, the EU's support had an important catalytic role which will be assessed quantitatively in 
chapter seven. This role emergsed despite several limitations which will be discussed below. 
At times compliance with these standards induced internal debates or protests. In Romania, human 
rights observation led to differences of opinion regarding the interpretation and the limitations of such 
rights. The 1201 Recommendation of the Council of Europe created an intense debate between the 
government and the UDMR as was already discussed. A similar debate was provoked by the law on 
Hungarian status proposed by the Hungarian government in an attempt to ensure the financial 
prosperity of its nationals outside Hungary. However, on this occasion it was the normative power of 
the EU which tempered Hungary's claims to apply the Hungarian Status law in a discriminatory way 
towards Romanian nationals. Furthermore, the 'carrot' of EU membership was not able to stop the 
emergence of extremist parties in either of the countries and their election in parliament. Thus, 
disillusioned with some of the results of economic and political transition, voters in Romania turned in 
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2000 to the extremist PRM in Romania and in Poland to the League of Polish Families (LPR) and to 
the Self Defence of the Polish Republic (S). These results pointed towards a 'fatigue' with transition 
and towards the need to support externally the democratic consolidation in both countries. 
The assessment of progress towards EU membership according to compliance with the economic 
criteria also had several negative side effects. Thus, the closing of sensitive sectors such as mining led 
to important protests in both Poland and Romania. The prospect of implementation of the common 
agricultural policy upon accession to the EU have led to frequent protests by the Polish farmers ahead 
of closing the accession negotiations on agriculture. Similarly, capital market liberalisation 
requirements met increased resistance and protests from citizens wary of foreigners buying Polish land. 
Indirectly, these EU requirements increased political instability in both countries. Furthermore, some 
argue that the rapid transposition and implementation of the acquis communautaire required an 
enormous financial, human and administrative effort thus using resources which could have been used 
in more productive areas of economic and political reforms. " ' This might have been the case of 
Romania which lagged behind regarding the accession target date. Additionally, the market economy is 
associated with greater risk and thus it is difficult to dissociate it from economic insecurity. Companies 
can go bankrupt and thus lead to increased unemployment, a source of increased insecurity at 
individual level but a common occurrence in a market economy framework. Furthermore, increased 
competition has led to a polarisation of society, an increasing gap between poor and rich, another 
potential source of corruption and political instability in both Poland and Romania. Despite these 
limitations, the prospect of EU membership has provided the prospect of a long term benefit to 
counteract the short term losses. The prospect of EU membership also signifies the real end of the 
order imposed by the Yalta agreement at the end of World War Two. 
Second, by providing pre-accession funds, liberalising trade and encouraging FDI, the EU contributed 
to the progress of economic reforms and the economic development of both Romania and Poland. 
Economic development can minimise political and economic instability and thus increase internal 
security. By being directed towards ensuring safety nets for the people most affected by the economic 
transition, some of the pre-accession funds have contributed towards reducing political instability and 
societal insecurity. Furthermore, funds have been used to ensure the institution building of both Poland 
and Romania, thus creating a strong basis for political and economic stability. Additionally, any funds 
directed towards building the civil society are an investment in the process of democratisation, thus 
eliminating the threat of return to authoritarian regimes. 17' Then, trade and FDI arc important 
determinants of economic growth, thus enhancing economic convergence with the EU, the prospect of 
176 Business Central Europe, February, 2000. 
t" Bevan, A. A., Estrin, S. and Grabbe, H., "The Impact of EU Accession Prospects on FDI Inflows to Central 
and Eastern Europe", Policy Paper No. 6, December 2001. 
225 
accession and of increased welfare. Furthermore, access to markets and investment represents an 
important condition for achieving economic security, as defined by Buzan et at. 179 However, there arc 
several limitations to EU's impact on Poland and Romania's internal security through funding, trade 
and FDI. 
Thus, suspicions appeared over the misuse of some of the pre-acccssion funds and thus increased 
perception of corruption in both Poland and Romania. Then, trade liberalisation has increased the 
dependence on the EU market which accounts for almost two thirds of both imports and exports in 
both countries. Moreover, for most of the decade access to the EU markets was imperfect as it did not 
incorporate areas such as steel, textile and agriculture in which both Romania and Poland have a 
comparative advantage over the EU. The limited access diminished the contribution trade liberalisation 
might have had to enhancing economic growth and economic security in the two countries. 
Furthermore, as a result of the significant trade and foreign investment by German businesses, 
concerns of German economic domination over Poland have increased. Finally, FDI did not always 
measure up to expectations and closure of plants in both Poland and in Romania has led to increased 
unemployment, thus fostering economic insecurity. 
Third, the prospect of early or belated EU membership affected each country's image and acted as a 
signal for investors. Based on the assumption that security threats are constructed by the observer, by 
offering early prospects for EU integration to Poland, the EU reinforced the positive perceptions of the 
country, thus enhancing FDI and its impact on the economic and political spheres as in diagram 6A(c). 
On the other hand, by initially labelling Romania as a second wave country in the process of accession, 
the EU risked further discouragement o foreign investors and thus enhancing the vicious circle in 
which the country had been trapped for the first years of transition. The subjective nature of security 
was partially the reason why the EU enhanced the all inclusive character of the enlargement process in 
the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo crisis. By inviting Romania and the other remaining candidate 
countries to open accession negotiations, the EU showed its commitment to their development, 
positively affecting their external image. This had the potential to enhance Romania's attractiveness 
for foreign investors, thus boosting reforms and reinforcing the positive image of the country. This 
will be further discussed in chapter seven. Finally, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe also 
contributed to de-securitisation by committing the international community to the economic 
development and security of the area and by enhancing regional co-operation. 
178 Sakwa, "The Keystone in the Arch", p. 142. 
19 Buzan et al, The European Security Recast, Pinter, London, 1990, p. 14. 
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Finally, the EU is addressing the external threats that Poland and Romania have perceived since the 
end of the Cold War and which have been discussed earlier on. Thus, by extending the area of 
prosperity towards east, the EU complements NATO in filling the security vacuum resulting from the 
dismantling of the Soviet empire. By contributing to the CEECs' political and economic reforms, the 
EU minimises the influence that Russia can exert through economic or political means on either Poland 
or Romania. Furthermore, the EU's co-operation with Russia and financial support are likely to 
enhance further Russia's own democratisation and marketisation, thus reducing the risks of future 
instability or imperialist policies in the 'near abroad'. Moreover, by contributing to securing the eastern 
borders as part of the preparations for membership of the Schengen agreement, the EU can minimise 
the inflow of migration, drugs, arms and prostitution trafficking which have constituted an important 
security concern for Poland, Romania and the EU itself. EU membership also offers a solution to 
Poland's fears of German economic dominance. By expanding the EU, the eastern candidates have 
reinforced the Union's members' commitment to integration, including Germany. Thus, by being well 
anchored in the EU, Germany constitutes less of a threat for Poland. Furthermore, by joining the EU, 
Poland becomes an equal partner in an organisation whose decisions Poland can now influence. Poland 
has taken part in the Convention on the future of Europe thus contributing to shaping the role that 
Germany will play in the organisation. EU membership is also likely to benefit from and enhance 
Romania's role as a pole of stability in South-Eastern Europe. As it is inconceivable to sec EU member 
states going to war with each other, EU membership is the natural answer to the normalisation of 
relations not only between Poland and Germany but also between Romania and Hungary. Furthermore, 
through its participation in the Stability Pact and the Black Sec Economic Co-operation, Romania is 
likely to continue to enhance co-operation and development in the area. Overall, the EU enlargement 
to the east removes the fear of fragmentation which appears to be a crucial security concern for Europe 
while the further development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is likely to increase 
the EU's say in ensuring the security of the contincnt. 180 
However, EU membership brings fears as well. To note just a few, EU membership implies 
surrendering some sovereignty, thus replacing the Soviet influence with the European onc. 18' While 
this is true to a certain extent, the process of Europeanisation has been a voluntary project of both 
Poland and Romania and is likely to bring more benefits that costs. '$Z Furthermore, in a world of high 
economic interdependence total sovereignty has become an obsolete concept. However, a deeper 
discussion on this issue is beyond the scope of this study. Second, EU membership is likely to create 
new division lines of the continent and to replace the Iron Curtain with a so called 'Paper Curtain' or a 
'Golden Paper'. The accession of Poland and Romania will enhance discussions over the likelihood of 
18O Waever, 0., "European Security Identities", Journal of Common hianket Studies, Vol. 34, No.!, 1996, p. 129. 
181 Buzan et al, The European Security Recast, p. 153. 
182 Starzynski, "Poland" p. 55; Croft et al, The Enlargement of Europe, p. 10. 
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membership by Ukraine and Moldova, thus restating the question of 'Where does Europe end? ' 
Increased security measures at the Polish and Romanian eastern borders will limit the freedom of 
movement of citizens from Belarus, Ukraine and Kaliningrad in the case of Poland and from Moldova 
and Ukraine in the case of Romania, thus possibly creating a new sense of exclusion. Third, Polish 
people have expressed fears that in an enlarged Europe they would become 'second class citizens' and 
Poland would be a source of manpower and cheap and low quality goods. 183 Although the EU 
authorities have made efforts to diffuse the fears over second class citizenship, the results of the 
European Convention might bring back these fears by confirming an option for increased integration 
of the initial six and a Europe of variable geometry. Then, foreign investment has indeed been attracted 
by cheap labour but has aimed towards providing good quality products. Finally, in terms of ensuring 
military security, the CFSP has still considerable limitations. '" While the early 1990s wars in 
Yugoslavia have indicated the need for EU independent crisis management capabilities, the Kosovo 
crisis has revealed shortages in the capabilities of EU acting alone militarily and the need to co-operate 
with NATO and Russia. These flaws led analysts to conclude that 'the EU is unlikely to achieve a truly 
autonomous defence capability in the next 10-15 years which would allow it to carry out medium-sized 
combat operations such as Kosovo without the United States. i183 Additionally, the recent war on Iraq 
has shown that the EU is not prepared to act with a single voice and can be in disagreement with some 
members of NATO. Furthermore, the candidate countries themselves disagreed with important 
members of the EU such as Germany and France, thus emphasising the division of the continent in 
matters of external security. While the EU is likely to eliminate the security concerns between its 
members, it still lacks the capability of ensuring full guarantees against outside threats. The EU's co- 
operation with NATO is still essential in ensuring the security of the continent. llowever, a more in 
depth discussion of the EU's role in ensuring the military security of the continent is beyond the scope 
of this study. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the main internal and external security concerns in Poland and Romania in 
the aftermath of the Cold War and their impact on the EU accession process. A political and an 
economic sector of security were identified corresponding to the two sets of factors analysed by this 
study as in diagram 6A. Security was seen as both a condition and a result of the EU integration 
process. While the border between internal and external security concerns has become blurred, a 
distinction between these two categories was useful for analytical purposes. Acknowledging the bi- 
directional relationship between EU integration and security, the chapter presented several channels 
183 Starcynski, "Poland", p. 55. 
184 Rusi, "Europe's Changing Security Role", p. 1 14. 
iss Rusi, "Europe's Changing Security Role", p. 119. 
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through which EU membership consolidates security of Poland and Romania, thus cnsuring the 
security of the continent in parallel with NATO membership. 
Several conclusions were drawn. Security concerns have acted initially as brakes on the accession 
process and increasingly as an engine since the Kosovo crisis. Furthermore, security concerns were as 
important as the perceptions of security themselves. The prospect of EU membership has played an 
important role in de-securitising the two countries. The analysis has shown that the main internal 
security concerns for both Poland and Romania were related to the political and economic crises that 
characterised the early years of transition and to the extent to which these crises were securitised or de- 
securitised by the international community. Given the magnitude and the tension between 
marketisation and democratisation, economic and political crises were inevitable during transition. 
However, their causes were most important in the way they affected EU integration. Thus, Romania's 
internal instability was mainly due to the imperfections of the dcmocratisation process resulting from 
the legacy of the authoritarian regime of Ceau§cscu. Romania was in a vicious political circle until 
1996. It was through the ascent to power of the Democratic Convention of Romania in 1996 that 
security concerns related to the democratisation process were eliminated. 186 Episodes of political and 
economic instability occurred as a result of the fragmentation of the political class and of the more 
radical reforms initiated, but they were inevitable and political change finally led Romania towards a 
virtuous political circle and a virtuous economic one. External security concerns such as the Kosovo 
crisis became catalysts rather than brakes on Romania's integration with the EU. A strong commitment 
to reforms by the post-communist government of Nästase elected in 2000 contributed to the dc- 
securitsation of the country, despite the rise of extremist parties and accidental popular unrest. These 
elements created the preconditions for the creation of a virtuous political circle. 
On the other hand, Poland's high internal instability in early 1990s was a direct result of the shock 
therapy economic reforms initiated by the Balcerowicz government. They imposed high costs on the 
population, led to increased protests, falls of governments and the disintegration of Solidarity, thus 
accentuating political instability and political fragmentation. However, the reform programme showed 
a high commitment to the market economy and ensured international support for reforms and EU 
integration, thus creating a virtuous political circle by 1993. Furthermore, the high commitment to a 
market economy contributed to the de-securitisation of the 1993 return to power of post-communists 
and to maintaining a generally positive country image with positive effects on its return to Europe. The 
authoritarian tendencies of President Walesa were also overlooked and the three major changes of 
government between 1993 and 1997 or the reshuffles between 1997 and 2001 were not seen as 
186 Grabbe, H. and Hughes, K, Eastward Enlargement of the European Union, The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London, 1997, p. 17. 
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particular security concerns. Poland had already entered a virtuous circle of economic and political 
stability in 1993 as a result of the refonns and the credibility brought by them. 
The analysis has also shown that external security concerns have affected to a considerable extent 
Poland and Romania's quests for integration into the EU. Their impact depended greatly on the extent 
to which threats were transformed into opportunities through a successful foreign policy. Thus, Poland 
has succeeded in turning most of its external threats into catalysts of EU integration while Romania 
was slow in doing so. Poland's fear of Russia determined an important turn in its foreign policy after 
the 1991 coup and an active commitment to NATO and EU membership. On the other hand, 
Romania's foreign policy was still shifting between East and West by 1994. Poland's concerns over 
German domination led to the early signing of the bilateral treaty, the intensification of economic and 
political collaboration and to Germany becoming the strongest advocate of Polish return to Europe. On 
the other hand, Romania's hesitance in searching for Germany's support diminished its prospects for 
early integration in both NATO and the EU. Poland has also built strong relations with its eastern 
neighbours, the former Soviet Union republics, aiming to become a key factor in the stability of the 
region and a gateway towards the East. Good neighbourly relations constituted a condition for NATO, 
and implicitly, EU membership and made Poland a good asset for both organisations. NATO 
membership achieved in 1999 gave Poland the security guarantees necessary to focus on further 
economic reforms. 
On the other hand, Romania has postponed the recognition of its borders with most of its neighbours 
and suspicions over territorial claims expressed by Ukraine and Moldova did not comply with the 
image of a'pole of stability'that Romania wanted to promote. This led to the delay in both NATO and 
subsequently EU membership. It was only since 1996 that Romania has tried to turn the external 
security concerns into opportunities. By signing bilateral treaties with Hungary and Ukraine, inviting 
the Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania to take part in the government, by initiating 
negotiations with Moldova and Russia and by distancing themselves from the Milosevic regime of 
Yugoslavia the Romanian authorities have reduced the external security concerns of Romania. 
Furthermore, by supporting NATO's military campaign in Kosovo, Romania turned the Yugoslav 
threat from a brake into a catalyst for its return to Europe. The Helsinki European Council rewarded 
Romania's commitment to NATO and the EU by inviting it to open accession negotiations in 2000. 
The analysis has also shown that perceptions of security in Poland and Romania appear to have been 
influenced by the revival of Central Europe and the Balkans with their respective positive and negative 
connotations. Poland's Central European status has maintained a positive image and the Viscgrad 
Group was initially a means of enhancing Poland's chances for early integration into the EU. On the 
other hand, the negative image associated with the Balkans and Romania's proximity with this area 
have enhanced perceptions of insecurity that slowed down Romania's return to Europe. Nevertheless, 
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by initiating the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe the EU has contributed greatly to the dc- 
securitisation of the Balkans, thus appearing to enhance a virtuous economic circle in the area, 
including Romania. 
Finally, the chapter has argued that European security is indivisible and thus security in Central and 
South-Eastern Europe is crucial for the stability of the continent. Furthermore, despite several 
limitations, EU membership appears to be the best way to consolidate the security of Poland and 
Romania, by complementing the security guarantees given by NATO. Furthermore, both countries are 
important assets for both the EU and NATO through their role as pillars of stability and gateways to 
the East and South-East. The EU's normative power and the incentive of membership have enhanced 
democratisation and marketisation, thus eliminating the danger of return to authoritarian rule and a 
centralised economy. Financial support, trade and investment from the EU have enhanced reforms and 
thus increased economic security of the two countries. Additionally, the EU accession process has 
changed perceptions of security in each country, acting as a signal for potential investors. This impact 
will be tested through the econometric model in chapter seven. Last but not least, EU membership 
addresses the external security concerns of both Poland and Romania and the issue of fragmentation in 
Europe which is a threat in itself. 
Overall, the bi-directional relationship between security and EU integration has been proven. The 
following chapter will complement this analysis through a quantitative assessment of the impact 
security factors, EU integration and economic reforms have had on FDI. Furthermore, the impact of 
FDI and EU integration on economic reforms will be analysed in order to capture the remaining facets 
of the vicious or virtuous circle identified by this study. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, SECURITY, 
AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
Chapter six has discussed the complex nature of security since the end of the Cold War. The 
success of internal economic reforms and the fear of return to an authoritarian regime were 
identified as some of the main security concerns of both Poland and Romania. The qualitative 
analysis has also shown that internal and external security concerns have affected Romania and 
Poland in their quests to integrate into the European Union. Furthermore, the discussion suggested 
several ways in which the prospect of EU membership can address the security concerns of each 
candidate country and thus increase security in the area. This risk diminishing effect of the prospect 
of EU membership and its impact on FDI and economic reforms are assessed in the present 
chapter. 
The first aim of this chapter is to test quantitatively the hypothesis put forward in chapter one of the 
dissertation that countries such as Romania have been trapped in a vicious circle of high security 
concerns, low FDI, poor economic reforms, poor prospects for EU integration and thus high 
security concerns as in diagram 7A(a). Economic reforms represent a component of security 
concerns and appear both as a determinant and a result of FDI as represented in diagram 7A(b). 
This bi-directional relationship appears to be at the core of the vicious circle in the economic 
sphere and is examined quantitatively. Furthermore, the hypothesis of path dependency is tested by 
assessing the impact that the initial conditions and previous investment have had on present FDI. 
The second aim of the chapter is to suggest ways of turning the vicious circle in the economic 
sphere into a virtuous one. This is achieved by testing the role European integration and security 
factors other than economic reforms play in enhancing FDI in the CEECs. The assumption is that 
poor security resulting from slow reforms could be overcome through prospects for EU integration, 
hence bringing about positive perceptions of security, economic integration or government 
determination for future reforms. This may create the necessary conditions for fostering FDI and 
implicitly economic transition and EU membership. The chapter is structured as follows: 
theoretical framework; description and motivation of variables; empirical analysis and results; 
conclusion, tables and appendixes. 
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Diagram 7A' 
The role of security and EU integration factors in enhancing a virtuous circle 






2 (+) (-) 







a) Arrows 2(-), 3(-), 4(-) and 1(-) indicate the vicious circle in which Romania was trapped till late 1990s as a 
result of negative perceptions of security. 
b) Arrows 3 and 3' capture the bi-directional relationship between FDI and economic reforms which enhances the 
danger of path dependency. 
c) Arrows 3(+), 4(+) 1(+), 2(+) indicate a potential virtuous circle induced by FDI. 
d) Arrows 2(+), 3(+), 4(+) 1(+), 2(+) indicate the virtuous circle induced by positive perceptions of security from 
which Poland benefited since 1992/1993. 
e) Arrows 1(+), 2(+), 3(+), 4(+) indicate a virtuous circle induced by the prospect of EU membership (and its 
impact on security concerns) from which Romania has benefited since the I lelsinki European council. 
f) Arrows 1'(+), 2'(+), 3(+), 4(+) indicate a virtuous circle induced by the impact of the prospect of EU 
membership and economic integration with the EU on attracting FDI in a candidate country. 
Legend: 
relationships that are addressed in chapter scvcn 




1 Diagram 7A is based on diagram 1A. 
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7.1. Theoretical framework of the chapter 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, marketisation, democratisation and integration into the EU have 
been the main goals of the CEECs, including Poland and Romania. FDI appears to be intrinsically 
bound up with economic reforms and EU accession. As shown in chapter five, FDI contributes to 
privatisation and modernisation, thus influencing the success of transition to a market a economy. 
Furthermore, by enhancing economic reforms FDI can accelerate the process of integration into the 
European Union as in diagram 7A(c). Moreover, investment flows are a measure of economic 
integration with the EU and are associated with increased bilateral trade with the Union. They may 
also boost the support of the business and political community for the host's country economic 
development and EU membership. Given these potentially positive effects, attracting FDI seems to 
be vital for countries such as Romania or Bulgaria which are less advanced in economic reforms 
and in the EU accession process. However, the experience so far has shown that the bulk of FDI 
has been directed especially towards the frontrunners in reforms and European integration. These 
countries were considered less risky by investors and thus attracted large financial flows. 
Furthermore, investment induced by perceptions of security appears to have enhanced economic 
reforms, prospects for EU integration and perceptions of security, thus creating a virtuous circle of 
economic development as in diagram 7A(d). Poland's case seems to illustrate this virtuous circle, 
despite some elements of internal insecurity in the early 1990s. On the other hand, countries such 
as Romania seem at the beginning of transition to have entered a vicious circle as presented below 
and in diagram 7A(a). 
The chapter seeks to illustrate the vicious circle by establishing the impact FDI has on economic 
reforms and the impact economic reforms, other security variables and European integration 
variables have on FDI. The model also tests whether prospects of EU integration foster economic 
reforms. However, the main focus lies on the assessment of FDI determinants for a panel data of 
the ten CEECs candidates to the EU over ten years, between 1990 and 2000. The main question 
investigated here is whether security factors and European integration are capable of enhancing 
FDI in the candidate countries, thus breaking the path dependency induced by poor previous 
economic reforms. 
The framework for the empirical model is provided by Dunning's OLI paradigm for reasons 
explained in chapter two. This maintains that FDI can be explained by three categories of factors: 
ownership advantages for firms to operate oversees (0), such as intangible assets; locational 
advantages to investment in the host rather than in the donor country (L) and the benefits of 
internalisation (I). Studies on FDI in transition economics have focused mainly on locational 
advantages of the region and so will this study. The literature suggests that the key locational FDI 
determinants are demand, cost factors and the risk of investment, in terms of both political and 
economic environment. Lucas, Jun and Singh put particular stress on indicators of economic and 
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political risk, including macroeconomic stability, institutional stability and political stability. 2 
Holland and Pain used principal components analysis across macro-economic and institutional 
variables, Garibaldi et al used a variety of World Bank and EBRD indicators. Resmini used a 
synthetic indicator of risk, the operation risk index, while Bevan and Estrin used the credit rating 
to account for the country risk 3 Risk assessment has been especially important for the transition 
countries which have confronted themselves with internal economic and political crises, or with the 
danger of external instability posed by events such as the Yugoslav wars and the Kosovo crisis. 
These factors have been referred to earlier on in the dissertation as security concerns and will be 
captured by the security variables used in the model. Consistent with the definition of security 
proposed in chapter six, security variables considered here refer to macroeconomic stabilisation, 
institutional reforms, the ideological orientation of the government, participation in free trade 
arrangements and discrimination on political geography grounds. The choice of these variables will 
be motivated in the following section. 
The literature also refers to trade openness and participation in free trade areas as important FDI 
determinants as discussed in chapter two. Furthermore, EU membership is seen as a particular case 
of regional integration, with positive effects on attracting investment in the candidate countries. 
Not only does EU membership offer access to the single market, but the prospect of EU 
membership can enhance the security of the candidate countries as seen in chapter six. By 
improving the country image and diminishing the perceptions of a country' risk, the prospect of EU 
membership can thus increase FDI. Furthermore, the prospect of EU accession can also foster 
economic reforms, thus creating conditions for further FDI. Hence, the econometric analysis in this 
chapter tests the impact of European integration on both FDI and economic reforms. Further 
references to the literature will be made when motivating and describing the variables. 
Overall, three categories of variables are used in assessing the FDI determinants: economic 
(demand and cost) variables, security variables and European integration variables. FDI and 
European integration variables are used to assess the determinants of economic reforms. The choice 
of variables is motivated and the variables are described below. For a description of variables also 
see appendix 7A. 
2 Lucas, R., "On the Determinants of Direct Foreign Investment: Evidence from East and Southeast Asia", 
World Development, Vol. 21, No. 3,1993, p. 391; Singh, H. and Jun, K. W., "Some New Evidence on 
Determinants of FDI in Developing Countries", Policy Research Working Paper No. 1531, World Bank, 
1995. 
3 Holland, D. and Pain, N., 'rhe Diffusions of Innovations in Central and Eastern Europe: A Study of the 
Determinants and Impact of FDI", NIESR Discussion Paper No. 137, National Institute of Economic 
Research, London, 1998, p. 1; Garibaldi, P. et al, "What Moves Capital to Transition Economics? ", IMF 
Conference "A Decade of Transition", Washington, DC, February, 2000; Resmini, L., "The Determinants of 
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7.2. Description and motivation of variables 
7.2.1 Foreign direct investment 
Foreign direct investment is the dependent variable. As a vicious circle was identified, the model 
tests inter alia the dependence of FDI on the lagged FDI. This addresses the question of path 
dependency, i. e. of FDI being its main determinant. Furthermore, in order to assess the impact of 
previous investment on present reforms, lagged FDI is an independent variable in the regression on 
the determinants of economic reforms. FDI is also an endogenous variable in the system of 
simultaneous equations. The FDI variable is expressed in natural logarithm. In the system of 
simultaneous equations and in the panel data regressions on the determinants of economic reforms, 
when FDI is an independent variable, its coefficient can be interpreted as elasticity. FDI represents 
aggregate yearly inflows as generally employed by studies of investment in transition economics. 
Several specifications were tried with standardised measures of FDI such as FDI per capita and 
FDI as a percentage of GDP, but the results were inconclusive and thus were not reported. 
The question of path dependency for the CEECs was raised by the transition literature and the post- 
1989 reality might also indicate such an evolution. The fast reformers attracted higher levels of 
FDI and it was feared that this would enhance the gap between the CEECs 5 Moreover, the initial 
two-track approach to the EU enlargement was abandoned in 1999 Inter alla based on path 
dependency arguments. However, the path dependency theory can be challenged. Thus, Bulgaria, 
which was the last in the quest for EU membership as assessed by the regular report in 1997 made 
improvements by the 2001 regular report, leaving Romania the least advanced country in the 
accession process. 6 Moreover, it is highly possible that by delaying their accession into the EU, 
Romania and Bulgaria will continue to attract FDI as a result of maintaining comparatively lower 
production costs with the new EU member states. This is likely to be the case if the ten new EU 
member states will be price convergent with the EU upon accession. All these contradictory 
opinions regarding the possibility of path dependency justify the investigation of FDI being its own 
determinant. Path dependency will be also tested by assessing the impact of initial conditions on 
FDI and on economic reforms. 
Several data problems must be noted with regard to the FDI variable. Distortions limiting the 
comparability of the data may come from differences in the minimum stake necessary for an 
investment to qualify as direct investment rather than portfolio investment or from currency 
translation adjustments. 7 Furthermore, the aggregate nature of the variable limits the use of certain 
FDI into the CEECs: New Evidence from Sectorial Patterns", 2000; Bevan, A. A. and. Estrin, S, 'The 
Determinants of FDI in Transition Economies", CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2638, December 2000, p. S. 
4Falcetti, E. et al, "Defying the Odds: the Initial Conditions, Reforms and Growth in the First Decade of 
Transition ", EBRD Working Paper No. 55,2000, p. 5. 
S See also Smith, A., The Return to Europe: The Reintegration of Eastern Europe Into the European 
Economy, MacMillan in association with the School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, Basingstoke, 
2000, p. 177. 
6http: //www. europa. eu. int/eomm/enlargement/index htm. 
7 EBRD, Transition Report, EBRD, London, 1998, p. 82. 
236 
regressors when assessing the FDI determinants. For example, independent variables capturing the 
geographical proximity between source and host countries or characteristics of the source countries 
such as GDP and interest rates are either irrelevant or cannot be used, thus explaining the 
specification of the models used in this study. 
7.2.2 Economic (demand and cost) variables 
Market size 
The size of the domestic market is a generally recognised determinant of FDI and empirical work 
by Lankes and Venables, Resimini, Deichmann and Bevan and Estrin suggests that most of the 
investors in the CEECs are market-seeking. 8 Not only the national market, but also regional 
(supranational) markets are important for the decision to invest. Thus, the host's country's 
membership of free trade agreements offers access to a larger market than the domestic one. 
Furthermore, if the host country has free trade agreements with countries with which the source 
country does not practice free trade, then the advantages of a free trade area membership are even 
higher for investors. Overall, membership of free trade agreements is a measure of market openness 
and thus a determinant of FDI. However, under the title 'Market size' only the domestic market is 
considered, leaving the regional market to be represented by variables under the title 'Security' 
relating to membership of free trade areas such as the Central European Free Trade Association 
(CEFTA) and the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC). The choice of treating CEFTA and 
BSEC membership as security variables was based on the assumptions that economic integration 
increases security. The use of these variables also stems from the assumption that the two 
organisations were meant to enhance prospects for EU membership by providing experience of 
economic and political co-operation. 
There are several indices for market size used in empirical work. Deichmann argued that GDP 
growth represents an excellent yardstick for the extent and direction of change in economy. Like 
Culem and Landsbury at al., he concluded that market growth is an important determinant of FDI 9 
Resmini used GDP per capita and population as proxies for actual demand and absolute size, 
respectively. She found that investors prefer large markets with high growth prospects. 10 Bcvan et 
al. used the host country GDP in current prices- to reflect the attraction of the host country as a 
market and location of complementary resources- and the GDP for the source country- to reflect 
g Lankes, H. P. and Venables, A. J., "FDI in Economic Transition: The Changing Patterns of Investments", 
Economics of Transition, Vol. 4, No. 2,1996, p. 331; Resmini, "The Determinants of FDI into the CEECs", 
p. 675; Deichmann, J. I., "Distribution of FDI among Transition Economics in Central and Eastern Europe", 
Post Soviet Geography and Economics, 2001, Vol. 42, No. 2, p. 145; Bevan and Estrin, "The Determinants of 
FDI", p. 13. 
9 Deichmann, "Distribution of FDI among Transition Economics", p. 145; Culem, C. G., "The Locational 
Determinants of FDI among Industrialised Countries", European Economic Review, Vol. 32, No. 2,1998 , 
p. 885; Lansbury, M. et al, "FDI in Central Europe since 1990: An econometric Study", National Institute 
Economic Review, No. 156, p. 107. 
10 Resmini, "The Determinants of FDI into the CEECs", p. 678. 
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the economic power of the source country to generate multinational firms and outward FDI. They 
also found a significant and positive relationship between the GDP in the host country and FDI. '1 
Given that in this study FDI flows are not analysed with respect to source countries, only a variable 
for the host country will be used as an estimate of market size, i. e. GDP. This is the GDP of the 
host country in current prices at exchange rate in US dollars (USD). LNGDP is the logarithm of 
GDP so that the coefficient can be interpreted as elasticity. It is expected that there is a positive 
relationship between LNGDP and LNFDI. The results might be, however, affected by the imperfect 
quality of the data which relies on different statistic systems in the CEECs. This data might not be 
totally comparable. Furthermore, due to a still significant share of the hidden economy in the 
transition economies, the data may not cover entirely the extent of the economic activity. On the 
positive side, by including transport costs, the GDP in current prices comprises implicitly 
information on the location of the countries considered, which relates to market potential. This 
helps overcome the limitations of the absence of an accurate variable on distance comparable with 
some used in other studies. 
Labour cost 
Labour cost advantages are generally recognised as one of the FDI dctcrminants. '2 Given the high 
wage differentials between the EU and the CEECs and the industrial restructuring in Wcstem 
Europe, foreign investors were expected to use factor cost differences and to build cxport oriented 
production in the CEECs. 13 Thus, manufacturing businesses experience simultaneously a cost push 
in the West and a cost pull in the East. Furthermore, this quest for lower costs is justified as a pay. 
off for the lower productivity obtainable in the host countries. 14 Empirical studies generally support 
the affirmations above. Resmini used wage differentials and found that this difference affects FDI 
positively, especially in traditional sectors. 15 Bevan and Estrin found that wages are not significant 
but that relative unit labour costs are an important determinant of FDI. 16 Ilowever, Dcichmann 
concluded that labour costs are not a statistically significant determinant of FDI in Central and 
Eastern Europe because the gradual wage variation within the region, as opposed to the large gap 
between the average CEE wage and that of the West, does not offer additional information beside 
the one conveyed by more influential variables. 17 
"Bevan, A. A. et al, "Institution Building and the Integration of Eastern Europe in International Production", 
Working Paper No. 16,2001, University of Sussex, ESRC, p. 13. 
12 Culem, "The Locational Determinants of FDI among Industrialised Countries", p. 885; Dcichmann, 
"Distribution of FDI among Transition Economies", p. 146; Lansbury et al, "FDI in Central Europe since 
1990", National Institute Economic Review, No. 156, p. 107; Resmini, 'The Determinants of FDI into the 
CEECs", p. 675. 
13 Falcetti et al, 'Defying the Odds", p. 5; Business Central Europe, http: //www. bcemag. constatsdb. 
14 Ozawa, T., "FDI and Economic Development", Transnational Corporations, Vol. 1, p. 28,2000. 
15 Resmini, "The Determinants of FDI into the CEECs", p. 675. 
16 Bevan and Estrin, `The Determinants of FDI", p. 15. 
17 Deichmann, "Distribution of FDI among Transition Economics", p. 150. 
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For the purpose of this study AVER is defined as the annual mean of the monthly wage in USD at 
market prices at official exchange rate. The anticipated sign is positive, given that a higher wage is 
still lower than in the EU but represents a higher potential market. The data has to be taken with 
caution for several reasons. First, total labour costs should include also day training and benefits 
not customarily provided in the West. " Second, there are differences in wages according to the 
sector of activity, i. e. public v. private or manufacture v. services, and these arc not captured by the 
variable chosen. However, in absence of a comparative data for labour costs that would take into 
consideration the facts above, average earnings can be considered satisfactory. Furthermore, as FDI 
is neither country, nor industry specific, a narrower definition of labour cost was irrelevant. 
7.2.3 Security variables 
The variables under this title can be seen as components of a general concept of security. As 
discussed in chapter six, security concerns include inter alla the success of economic reforms, the 
type of government in power and membership of regional organisations, be they regional free trade 
organisations or the EU. Variables such as REF, STAB, GOV, CEFTA and BSEC were introduced 
to test the importance of these factors in determining FDI and will be briefly presented below. 
Furthermore, chapter six has noted that for the Romanian authorities the potential discrimination 
against Romania as a result of its externally constructed Balkan identity constituted an important 
security concern, especially at the beginning of transition. This is why dummies such as VISE and 
BALK were constructed and tested in several specifications of the model. Although EU integration 
has a significant security component as it was shown in chapter six, EU integration variables will 
be discussed separately. Finally, a variable capturing the initial conditions in the CEEC is used in 
order to assess the hypothesis of path dependency. This variable is included under this title because 
it is part of each country's image and thus relates to a certain extent to the security concerns as 
defined in chapter six. 
Initial conditions 
Theoretical studies have emphasised the impact of initial conditions on the pace and results of 
economic transition in the CEECs, as has been shown in chapter four. Furthermore, the EDRD has 
produced an index which reflects the initial conditions in each of the ten candidates to EU 
membership. This index is derived from factor analysis. The index of initial conditions represents a 
weighted average of measures of the level of development, trade dependence on CMEA, 
macroeconomic disequilibria, distance to the EU, natural resource endowments, elements of market 
economy and state capacity-19 For the purpose of this analysis the index computed by the EBRD 
was inverted so that higher values of the index relate to more favourable starting conditions. The 
18 Deichmann, "Distribution of FDI among Transition Economics", p. 146. 
19 Snoy, B., "How Successful Transition is Paving the Way for EU Enlargement. a View Based on EBRD 
Indicators", Paper Presented at the Seventh Biennial International Conference Organised by the European 
Community Studies Association (ESC4), May 31-June 2001, Madison, Wisconsin, USA, p. 12. 
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index takes a value of 1.9 for Poland and 1.7 for Romania 2° Not previously used in studies of FDI 
determinants, the EBRD transition index of initial conditions was found significant in a study of 
economic growth in the CEECs conducted by Falcetti et al. 21 It is expected that better initial 
conditions led to a higher FDI inflows and thus INI T has a positive sign. It is also possible that 
difficult initial conditions were seen by investors as potentially triggering deeper economic 
reforms, thus actually enhancing FDI. This would be represented by a negative sign displayed by 
INIT. 
Economic transition 
The experience of the most advanced countries in transition has proven that FDI depends on 
prospects of macroeconomic stability and on the institutional framework of the host countries. 
These aspects have been quantified through eight different transition indicators by the EDRD and 
have been used by Bevan et al to explain FDI in the CEECs u Chapter six has argued that the 
success of economic reforms has been considered an important security concern in both Poland and 
Romania. Furthermore, Lankes and Venables found that risk perception of a country is closely 
correlated with the EBRD ranking of national transition level . 
2s Hence, the inclusion of economic 
transition amongst security variables appears to be justified. 
A mean of the eight EBRD transition indicators was used in a study by Bevan ct al to identify the 
FDI determinants and was found significant24 However, most of the studies have assessed the 
impact of individual elements of the transition process on FDI and amongst these, of privatisation. 
Lansbury et al. found that private sector share has a positive effect on inwards FDI in the Visegrad 
countries, a result which was not confirmed by Holland and Pain though 23 The latter found, 
nevertheless, that the method of privatisation, measured on a four-point scale, accelerates FDI 
inflows. 6 Moreover, Bevan et al. concluded in a panel data analysis of the institutional 
determinants of FDI that private sector development, reform of the banking sector, price, foreign 
exchange and trade liberalisation along with legal development have a positive impact on foreign 
investment . 
27 Furthermore, Resmini concluded in an analysis of FDI determinants across sectors 
that the pace and depth of structural reforms are crucial for attracting the FDI and consequently the 
type of investor, the technology transferred and the level of industrial restructuring 28 
20 For values for all CEECs, see Snoy, "How Successful Transition is Paving the Way for EU Enlargement", 
12. 
2' Falcetti et al, 'Defying the Odds", p. 5. 
22 Bevan et al, "Institution Building and the Integration of Eastern Europe in International Production", EI3RD 
Working Paper No. 16, January 2001, p. 2. 
23 L. ankes and Venables, "Foreign Direct Investment in Economic Transition", p. 331. 
24 Bevan et al, "Institution Building", p. 2. 
zs L. ansbury et al, "FDI in Central Europe since 1990"; Holland and Pain, "The Diffusions of Innovations in 
Central and Eastern Europe", p. 1. 
26 Holland and Pain, "The Diffusions of Innovations in Central and Eastern Europe", p. 1. 
27 Bevan et al, "Institution Building", p. 2. 
28 Resmini, "The Determinants of FDI into the CEECs", p. 683. 
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This chapter builds upon the findings of previous research and enriches them by considering 
economic reforms as both a determinant and a result of FDI. Thus, FDI is a major means of 
restructuring while a certain degree of reforms, privatisation included, are expected in order to 
foster FDI 29 This bi-directional relationship between FDI and reforms seems to be at the centre of 
the vicious or virtuous circles identified in this study. Unlike previous studies, this chapter 
identifies two main components of the economic transformation, liberalisation/stabilisation and 
institutional reform which conform with the main policy elements analysed in chapter five. 
Furthermore, these two components are part of the assessment of the investment climate conducted 
in chapter five. They are quantified on the basis of the EBRD transition indicators in order to assess 
the impact of liberalisation/stabilisation and institutional reforms on foreign direct investment. 
The macroeconomic stabilisation/liberalisation variable STAB is defined as the mean of the two 
indicators computed by the EBRD with regard to stabilisation, i. e. PR (price liberalisation) and 
FOREX (trade and foreign exchange system). These are part of the investment climate and of the 
locational advantages in the OLI paradigm and thus are important conditions for FDI, as already 
discussed in chapter five. On the other hand, the composite index REF reflects the institutional 
reform and it is a mean of six indices computed by the EBRD: LSP (large scale privatisation), SSP 
(small scale privatisation), ENT (governance and enterprise restructuring), COM (competition 
policy), BK (banking reform and interest rate liberalisation), SEC (securities markets and non-bank 
financial institutions). These are elements of the investment climate, some of which were addressed 
in chapter five from a qualitative point of view. This specification of these two composite indices 
was justified by the roughly similar trends in time displayed by their components, as suggested in 
appendix 7B. Thus, the mean is an appropriate estimate for the general trend in the case of REF and 
for the main two components in the case of STAB. REF was constructed in order to investigate the 
bi-directional relationship between FDI and institutional reforms. Its components arc likely to be 
influenced by FDI, and to influence FDI. An equal weighting was given to all factors in order to 
create an overall indicator of the level of reforms in which all components arc equally important. 
Several specifications have been tried with different weights of the components of REF. I lowcvcr, 
the overall significance of the model is not sensitive to these different weights, thus justifying the 
choice of equal weighting. The expected sign for both REF and STAB is positive. 
The EBRD indices take discrete values between 1 and 4.3 (corresponding to 4+), higher values 
indicating better progress towards achieving market economy. 0 REF and STAB were preferred to 
an investment climate rating such as the one produced by the Heritage Foundation, which only 
takes values from 1 to 3 with little variation across countries or for each country31 fiowcvcr, 
29 Svetli&6, M., Artisen, P. and Rojec, M., "FDI in Central and Eastern Europe: An Overview" in Svctlieid, 
M., Artisen, P. and Rojec, M. (eds), FDI in Central and Eastern Europe, St. Martin's Press, New York, 
1993. 
30 For a comprehensive description of the scale used in computing the EBRD transition indicators, see 
EBRD, Transition Report, 2000, EBRD, London, p. 25. 
31 The Heritage Foundation, www. heritage. org/research/features/Index 
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certain caution is necessary about the data regarding the progress of transition. In fact, measures of 
reform are highly imperfect as the EBRD relied partially on subjective indices rather than on 
directly observable variables. Furthermore, the low variability of the EBRD indicators may transfer 
the weight of impact onto other variables. Finally, the transition indicators are categorical variables 
and their combination with numerical ones such as the average monthly wages or aid per capita can 
pose questions of estimation and interpretation. In fact, only the coefficients of numerical variables 
expressed in logarithm can be interpreted as elasticities 32 Furthermore, differences in the 
magnitude of the variables can influence their significance in determining the dependent variable. 
Governance 
Despite several references in policy documents, no FDI empirical literature has included the 
ideological orientation of the host country government among the independent variables. As 
discussed in chapter six, the return to power of post-communists constituted one of the main 
security concerns in the CEECs. This not only posed the threat of return to authoritarianism, but 
was partially perceived as a factor that would slow down economic reforms. Thus, Snoy pointed 
out that there is a correlation between institutional performance and initial government turnover. 33 
Then, the EBRD, Balcerowicz and Camdessus emphasised the role of the government orientation 
in affecting the pace and the depth of economic reforms. Potentially, a post-communist 
government would also affect the country's attractiveness for FDI. In the early 1990s, post- 
communists in Romania promoted slogans such as We do not sell our country', thus deterring FDI. 
The variable GOV included in this study addresses the external perception of security, based on the 
assumption that a post-communist government would be seen outside as less reformist than a 
democratic one. 
The dummy variable GOV was computed to account for the different ideological orientation of the 
host country's governments. GOV takes value 0 for a post-communist government and 1 otherwise. 
Problems might occur for countries such as Latvia, for example, in which the governments in 
power were not radically different in terms of ideological orientation. It is expected that a 
democratic government (as opposed to post-communist) would have a positive effect on FDI and 
thus the sign of GOV would be positive. This has to be interpreted with caution though in the 
present conditions when post-communist governments took over in many of the CEECs, including 
Romania and Poland. By being anchored in the process of accession to the EU and by pursuing 
deep economic reforms, including policies meant to foster FDI, the post-communist nature of these 
governments may be of less importance and thus have a less impact on the country image and on 
FDI. 
32 The coefficient of a dummy variable has to be transformed in antilog to base c, then subtract 1 
and then be interpreted as an elasticity. For details, see D. N. Gujarati, Basic Econometrics, 
McGraw-Hill International Editions, London, 1995, p. 526. 
33 Snoy, "How Successful Transition is Paving the Way for EU Enlargement", pp. 11-12. 
34 EBRD, Transition Report, EBRD, London, 1994, p. 47; Camdcssus, L. M., Achievements and Prospects 
after Ten Years of Transition. Opening Remarks at a Conference on Transition, IMF, 1 February 1999. 
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Geography and political geography 
Physical and psychological proximity are important FDI determinants. Both theory and empirical 
evidence generally suggest that contiguity or proximity to the countries of origin is a relevant 
determinant of FDI35 Martin and Velasquez found a significantly negative effect of distance on 
FDI in the OECD countries and a positive significant effect if the host countries share a common 
border. 36 Bevan at al. concluded that the existence of a common border is an important 
determinant for FDI in the context of the Central and Eastern Europe, where borders have moved 
enormously in the past century, reflecting the intertwined history and culture of the region. 7 Wei 
found a negative effect of distance and a positive one for language tie. 38 However, Sölvcll and 
Nordström concluded that the importance of geographical distance has declined since the 1970s 
and economic conditions are becoming more important 39 
Remini used the average distance from the each host country to the EU and showed that this affects 
FDI negatively. The closer a country is to Western Europe, the higher its FDI attraction capacity. 40 
Another way to account for proximity is to use dummies for different geographical regions. While 
they are not entirely accurate in terms of physical distance, they can capture to a certain extent a 
psychological distance reflected in the connotations of political geography terms. Thus, dummies 
for Central Europe, Southern Europe and CIS were used in an assessment of transition by Gros and 
Suhrcke and they proved significant. This shows that there is a common clement of countries 
within these regions, possible related to risk perception as well 41 The present study favours such an 
approach, given that areas such as the Balkans appear to have a negative meaning that could deter 
FDI. 
Given the aggregate nature of the FDI data, it is only possible to use proxies for geographical 
distance. The emphasis in this study lies on assessing the relevance of political geography notions 
of Balkans and Visegrad. BALK is a dummy variable with value 1 for Romania and Bulgaria and 0 
otherwise and VISE is a dummy with value 1 for Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia 
and 0 otherwise (the remaining countries are the Baltic states and Slovenia). BALK is expected to 
have negative value capturing the negative connotation of the Balkans as a political geography 
term, whereas VISE is expected to have a positive one. The Visegrad Group was meant to ensure a 
quick integration of its member states in the EU through political and economic co-operation and 
35 EBRD, Transition Report, 1998, p. 82; M. Drudi6, Regional Dispersion of FDI in Eastern Europe, in S. 
Sharma (ed. ), Restructuring Eastern Europe. The Microeconomics of the Transition Process, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 1997, p. 103; Resmini, "The Determinants of FDI into the CEECs", p. 675. 
36 cited in Bevan et al, "Institution Building", p. 20. 
37 cited in Bevan et al, "Institution Building", p. 20. 
38 cited in Bevan et al, "Institution Building", p. 20. 
39 Sölvell, 0., Entry Barriers and Foreign Penetration. Emerging Patterns of International Co-operation in 
Two Electrical Industries, Institute of International Business, Stockholm Institute of Economics, Stockholm. 
40 Resmini, "The Determinants of FDI into the CEECs", p. 676. 
41 Gros, D. and Suhrcke, M., "Ten Years After. What Is Special about Transition Countries? ", EBRD 
Working Paper No. 56, August 2000. 
243 
through maintaining a determined pace of internal reforms. VISE and BALK are an expression of a 
country's image which is an important determinant of FDI, as discussed in chapter five. 
Regional free trade organisations 
Chapter six has argued that integration in regional organisations such as the Central Free Trade 
Area (CEFTA) and the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) has been a means for both 
Poland and Romania to diminish the external security concerns and to promote and enhance a 
positive country image. As country image is an important FDI determinant, this chapter tests the 
relevance of CEFTA and BSEC membership for FDI. Furthermore, membership of free trade 
organisations is a sign of market openness and can encourage FDI through access to a larger 
market, as already mentioned. Dummies for membership of each of these organisations are 
computed, 1 for membership, 0 otherwise. A positive effect on FDI is expected, equivalent to a 
shift. Nevertheless, several limitations regarding the use of these dummy variables can be noted. 
First, membership of CEFTA and BSEC are not powerful enough proxies for the market size, as 
they do not differentiate between the size of the two markets or their geographical position. 
Furthermore, the BSEC dummy does not capture the fact that some of the countries which form 
this organisation do not have preferential trade agreements with the EU and thus Romania appears 
to be a bridge between them and EU investors. Despite these limitations, a positive sign is expected 
for both CEFTA and BSEC. 
7.2.4 European integration variables 
The last category of independent variables used to assess the FDI determinants in the CEECs 
comprises European integration variables. Chapter three has distinguished bctwccn institutional 
and economic integration and has shown how these components of European integration reinforce 
one another. Furthermore, chapter six has argued that prospects for EU integration can enhance the 
positive image of a candidate country through security guarantees both in the economic and 
political spheres 42 Thus, by diminishing perceptions of risk, the prospect of EU membership or 
steps in the institutional integration with the EU may have a positive impact on attracting FDI. 
Furthermore, chapter six has shown that economic integration through increased bilateral trade and 
aid from the EU can enhance security in the candidate countries. This may affect positively the 
level of annual FDI. The European integration variables used in this study comprise two 
subcategories consistent with the previous analysis conducted in chapter three: institutional 
integration variables and economic integration variables. 
Institutional integration variables 
As shown in chapter three, the signing of the association agreements has led to an increase in the 
trade with the EU through the setting up of an imperfect free trade area with each candidate 
country. Although the first real commitment for enlargement from the EU's part only came at the 
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June 1993 Copenhagen European Council, it is likely that the accession agreements have impacted 
on FDI through their effects on trade and possibly through the anticipation of future closer relations 
with the EU. Furthermore, a study by Bevan and Estrin shows that the Essen announcement of 
EU's commitment for enlargement has had a positive impact on FDI in the Visegrad countries. 
These were not only geographically closer to the EU, but also more advanced in economic 
reforms 43 Moreover, the same study showed that the publication of the Opinion has increased FDI 
in the then first track countries faster than in the second track ones, thus increasing the gap between 
the frontrunners and the laggards of accession. 44 Additionally, the progress towards membership 
acknowledged by the regular reports since 1997, or through the opening of negotiations, have 
influenced the external image of the candidates, their credibility and possibly the foreign 
companies' decision to invest. Thus, Verheugen, the commissioner for enlargement, mentioned at 
the 1999 Helsinki European Council that the opening of the accession negotiations by Romania 
was equally a signal for investors that the country was worth investing in . 
45 On the other hand, an 
expert in Romania's process of accession to the EU argued that negotiations themselves are not 
enough for investors. They need real commitment in the form of reform. 46 To a certain extent, 
though, the opening of negotiations has accelerated economic reform in Romania. The Helsinki 
European Council decision was conditioned upon further progress in economic reform and, 
following the European Council, president Constantinescu appointed a new prime minister. During 
his mandate, the country has reached positive economic growth for the first time after three years 
of recession, proving that economic reforms have worked. 47 These facts justify an assessment of 
the effects the prospect of EU membership have had so far on FDI in the CEECs. 
Several dummies representing the progress towards EU membership arc defined. ASOC is a 
dummy that reflects the impact of the existence of an association agreement between the respective 
country and the EU. ASOC takes a value of 1 starting with the year after the signing of the 
association agreement and 0 otherwise. It is assumed that increased FDI is a consequence of the 
signing of the agreement, and of the anticipation regarding the trade libcralisation effects. NEG is a 
dummy which reflects the beginning of the accession negotiations with the ten central and eastern 
European candidate countries for EU membership. It takes a value of I for the years when 
accession negotiations took place. So, NEG is one from 1998 onwards for the first five CEECs to 
start negotiations as a result of the 1997 Opinion of the European Commission, and from 2000 
onwards, for the remaining five countries, which benefited from the Kosovo crisis and were invited 
42 The Copenhagen School refers to sectors of security but for consistency with the model proposed in this 
dissertation the term of spheres is preferred. 
43 Bevan and Estrin, "The Determinants of FDI", p. 12. 
44 Bevan and Estrin, "The Determinants of FDI", p. 19. 
45 Verheugen, G., http: //www. infoeuropa. ro, December 1999. 
46 Interviews, Expert on Romania's Accession to the European Union, European Institute, Romania, 2000 
and 2001. 
47 Adevärul, January, 2001. 
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at the 1999 Helsinki European Council as Otherwise, NEG is 0. However, as the decision to open 
accession negotiations was motivated by different factors in 1999 as compared to 1997, the use of 
two different dummies was also considered. These dummies are meant to capture the different 
nature of the two decisions regarding the launch of negotiations, as well as their potential different 
impact on the countries concerned. The difference of the two events stems, on the one hand, from 
the fact that the Avis recommended negotiations based mainly on a rather strict assessment of the 
candidate countries' compliance with the economic Copenhagen criteria for membership. On the 
other hand, at Helsinki, the recommendation for opening of accession negotiations made was made 
largely on security considerations, at the expense of strict conformity with the economic criteria. 
As argued in chapter six, it is likely that the decision takcn at Helsinki has greatly affected 
perceptions of security in the five remaining candidate countries, with a potential beneficial effect 
on attracting FDI. 
AVIS reflects the impact of the decision taken in 1997 to open negotiations with the then six first 
track countries (1 for 1998 onwards for the six fast track countries, 0 otherwise) and HELSINKI is 
a dummy for the decision taken in 1999 to open negotiations with the remaining six candidates (1 
for 2000 onwards for the six former second track countries, 0 otherwise). A positive relationship 
between each of these variables and FDI is expected. A positive sign of HELSINKI would suggest 
that the vicious circle identified for Romania in the economic sphere has been broken. The results 
might however be affected by the few number of observations since 2000 included in the panel. It 
is also likely that the results will be affected by the correlation between the institutional integration 
variables and REF which is shown in appendix 7C. The correlation between REF on one hand and 
AVIS or ASOC on the other confirms that these stages of institutional integration reflected the 
success in the economic reforms. Finally, the lack of correlation between REF and I IELSINKI is 
consistent with the fact that this new stage occurred regardless of the economic performance of the 
candidate countries. 
Economic integration variables 
Trade with the EU 
Chapter three has given evidence of economic integration through trade and FDI between Poland 
and Romania on the one hand and the EU on the other. Furthermore, chapter six has suggested that 
the EU has contributed to enhancing security of the candidate countries through providing financial 
aid. These elements constitute the basis for analysing the impact of economic integration on FDI. 
Thus, trade openness is generally recognised as a determinant of FD149 However, the positive 
relationship between FDI and trade is debatable, the two being seen in the literature as either 
48 The first five countries to start accession negotiations in 1998 include: the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The second track five CEECs, who started accession negotiations in 2000, 
include: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. 
49 Caves, R. E., Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1996; Singh, H. and Jun, K W., "Some New Evidence on Determinants of FDI in Developing Countries", 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 1531, The World Bank, 1995. 
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complementary or competitive in nature. " Thus, Hakansson's model of transnational corporations 
sees trade as an arms-length precursor to foreign direct presence in the form of FD!, as a first step 
of internalisation 51 On the other hand, the positive relationship between the two was pointed out by 
both theoretical and empirical studies such as those by Caves, Singh and Jun, Balasubramanyam et 
al, Resmini, Deichmann, Bevan et al. 52 
This study seeks to identify the impact trade with the EU, and thus economic integration with the 
EU, has had on FDI. Two thirds of trade is conducted with the EU and it is thus possible that FDI 
would follow the same geographical pattern. Furthermore, it is likely that non-EU investors would 
aim to have access to the EU market through investment. Thus, trade with the EU would affect the 
level of FDI, as well as the other way round. A similar approach was adopted by Bevan and Estrin 
who found a negative but not significant relationship between the imports from the EU relative to 
total imports and FDI. 53 The negative sign appeared to suggest a substitution effect between 
imports and FDI which was, nevertheless, not significant. In this study three variables reflect the 
trade between the CEECs and the EU. TRADEU is the most commonly used indicator of economic 
integration with the EU and reflects the percentage of trade with the EU in the total trade of the 
candidate country. IMPEU is the share of imports from the EU in total imports and EXPEU is the 
share of exports to the EU in total exports. It is expected that a higher trade openness enhances 
foreign investment and thus the sign of TRADEU is positive. Furthermore, the study assumes a 
complementary relationship between imports and FDI and equally a positive relationship between 
exports and FDI. It is expected that higher imports of capital goods enhance investment, or imports 
of raw materials are associated with reinvested profits by the foreign investors. On the other hand, 
export driven industries are likely to have attracted foreign investors or to have determined the 
reinvestment of profits by initial investing companies. It is, however, likely that the trade variables 
capture some of the effects of the new institutional stages in the integration process represented by 
ASOC, AVIS or HELSINKI, as shown by the correlation matrix presented in appendix 7C. 
Financial aid 
In the 1970s it was believed that governmental aid should be replaced by private foreign 
investment. However, the post-1989 developments showed that the economic and political 
transformation in the CEECs required that aid was directed towards areas which did not meet 
efficiency requirements for private investment, but which were absolutely necessary for the 
50 See Deichmann, "Distribution of FDI among Transition Economics", p. 145. 
51 Hakansson cited in Deichmann, 'Distribution of FDI among Transition Economics", p. 145. 
52 Caves, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis; Singh and Jun, "Some New Evidence on 
Determinants of FDI in Developing Countries"; Balasubramanyam, V. N. et al, "FDI and Growth: New 
Hypotheses and Evidence", Lancaster University Economics Discussion Papers Series EC7,1996; Rcsmini, 
The Determinants of FDI into the CEECs", p. 677; Deichmann, "Distribution of FDI among Transition 
Economics", p. 145; Bevan, A. A., Estrin, S. and Grabbe, H., "The Impact of EU Accession Prospects on FDI 
Inflows to Central and Eastern Europe", Policy Paper No. 6, December 2001, p. 5. 
53 Bevan and Estrin, "The Determinants of FDI", p. 25. 
54 Meier, J. M., 'Private Foreign Investment" in Dunning, J. H. (ed. ), International Production and 
Multinational Enterprise, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1981, p. 412. 
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success of the transition process. Furthermore, as shown in chapter four, the contribution of 
international financial institutions to the launching of economic reform programs acts as a sign of 
credibility of the country and affects FDI positively. Moreover, if aid is directed towards 
modernising the infrastructure and improving the human resources, the impact of aid on FDI 
becomes even more relevant and direct. However, due to data restrictions it was not yet possible to 
distinguish between aid in general and aid in infrastructure as such. Finally, general aid affects 
indirectly FDI through casing the cost of transition and consequently encouraging both population 
and governments to support deep economic reforms. 
No empirical study that the author is aware of has included aid amongst the FDI determinants in 
the CEECs. Here AIDCAP is aid per capita and is used to assess the impact of international aid on 
FDI in the ten Central and Eastern European candidates for EU membership. This assessment is 
increasingly relevant, given that the CEECs have received substantial pre-accession aid from the 
EU in support for their preparation for EU membership. A positive relationship is expected, 
showing that keeping up the momentum for EU membership through financial assistance both from 
the EU and international financial institutions can foster FDI and economic reforms. The EU's 
decision to increase substantially the financial assistance given to the remaining two candidates that 
are not joining the EU in 2004 appears to confirm this assumption and the role that aid can play in 
the quest of the eastern European countries for membership of the European Union. 
7.3 Data, empirical analysis and results 
Earlier in the chapter a potential economic vicious circle has been identified between perceptions of 
insecurity, low FDI, poor economic reforms, low prospects for European integration and 
consequently further perceptions of insecurity. In order to illustrate this vicious circle and to assess 
ways to turn it into a virtuous one, two main panel data regression were drawn. The choice for 
panel data had a twofold motivation. First, the focus of this dissertation is on comparing the 
evolution of Poland and Romania throughout time, hence neither cross-sectional data, nor times 
series were adequate. Second, a panel of ten countries and eleven years comprises enough 
observations and variation, both across time and individuals, to allow for meaningful comparisons. 
The single panel data equations are testing the determinants of economic reforms (REF) and of 
foreign direct investment (LNFDI). For the FDI determinants, a basic model was considered and 
gradually security and integration variables were added to test their significance. The existence of 
individual random or fixed effects was tested. For all specifications the Lagrange multiplier 
favoured the existence of individual effects over the classical model and the Hausman test indicated 
the presence of random effects which are shown in tables 7.1,7.2, and 7.3. Additionally, in order to 
capture the bi-directional relationship between economic reform and FDI assumed by this study, a 
system of simultaneous equations has been drawn. REF and LNFDI are endogenous variables and 
institutional integration variables are included in each equation as exogenous variables. The system 
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is just identified and was estimated through three stage least squares (3SLS), a specific method for 
systems of simultaneous equations. 
The analysis proceeds in three parts, as follows. First, the reform equation assesses the rclevancc...; -f . 
FDI for economic reforms which are a necessary condition for EU integration. Once this causality 
is established, the focus changes to the FDI determinants. As discussed in more detail in chapter 
five, the assumption here is that FDI contributes to privatisation, enterprise restructuring, increased 
competition, banking restructuring and the development of securities market which are all 
comprised in the REF variable. To capture the time lag between FDI and its potential effects on 
economic reforms, REF is regressed on LNLAGFDI. The equation also tests the importance of the 
prospect of EU integration in fostering economic reforms which was discussed in qualitative terms 
in chapter six. The inverse relationship is also assumed in building the vicious circle in the 
economic sphere, but it is not tested statistically. Thus, reforms remain a main determinant of 
progress towards EU membership complemented by the increasing importance played in the 
accession process by security factors, as shown in chapter three. The importance of economic 
reforms in accession was shown by the delay of Romania and Bulgaria's accession which is likely 
to take place in 2007. Second, the FDI equation tests the role security and European integration 
variables have in determining FDI. The variable REF is part of the security variables considered 
and it is assumed that FDI is attracted by countries more advanced in economic reforms. This bi- 
directional relationship between economic reforms and FDI appears to be at the core of the vicious 
economic circle identified in this study. It is thus reasonable to look for other factors that can 
impact on one of these variables and create a leap forward, regardless of what happens with the 
other variable. So, are European integration and security variables other than economic reforms 
capable of breaking the vicious circle by enhancing FDI? This question is addressed by the panel 
data regressions on the FDI determinants. Finally, the hypothesis of a vicious circle is tested 
through the system of simultaneous equations in which LNFDI and REF are cndogcnous variables. 
The results are compared with the estimations of the single equations panel data regressions to 
check their consistency. 
The data ranges from 1990 to 2000 and includes the ten CEECs candidates to EU membership: 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia. The main series are provided by the EBRD Transition Reports and by the WIIW 
statistics data base. A certain precautionary note regarding the results is due from the outset for 
several reasons. There are some missing variables which make the number of observations differ 
from one specification to the other. Furthermore, it is likely that results have been affected by a 
certain degree of correlation between the main reggressors as suggested by the correlation matrix in 
appendix 7C. This correlation gives, nevertheless, a strong evidence of the interdependence of the 
factors considered and supports the assumption of a vicious circle. Moreover, the combination of 
categorical, numerical and dummy variables might make interpretation of coefficients rather 
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difficult. Finally, the fact that only random effects were identified is to a certain extent a limitation 
of the study, as it is rather improbable that in reality FDI and reform are caused by random rather 
than individual fixed effects. However, the existence of random effects makes it possible to 
generalise the results and partially dismisses the assumption of path dependency. If the 
determinants are not necessarily country specific, then path dependency can be avoided. Other 
limitations related to the availability and quality of the data were identified when discussing and 
motivating the variables. Despite all these precautionary notes, the coefficients of the basic model 
are robust to all specification changes. Furthermore, there are enough observations to allow 
generalisations to be inferred from these results. Finally, the high R squared and the joint 
significance of the variables used in different specifications give the estimations an important 
explanatory power. 
7.3.1 Panel data regressions for the determinants of the economic reforms 
REF=(STAB, LNLAGFDI, ASOC, NEG) + F. (Model 1) 
REF=(STAB, LNLAGFDI, ASOC, AVIS, HELSINKI) +e (Model 2) 
The regressions above test the hypothesis of a vicious circle between security factors, European 
integration variables and FDI by considering the determinants of economic reform. Can FDI 
enhance economic reforms and thus integration into the European Union, as in diagram 7A(c)? Can 
the prospect of EU membership maintain the momentum for economic reforms, as suggested in 
chapter six? Some limitations are expected, given that the bi-directional relationship between 
economic reforms and FDI could be also explained by a simultaneous equations system, as 
presented later on in the chapter. A specification with the LNFDI was tried but the results were not 
significantly different. The lagged variable was preferred in order to account for the time necessary 
for FDI to have an impact on economic reforms. Furthermore, a specification with the initial 
conditions was also tried, but IN1T was found to be not significant and thus was not reported. This 
does not necessarily contradict the assumption made in chapter four that economic reforms 
depended on the initial conditions, which seems to be supported by the 0.20 correlation shown in 
appendix 7C. This only shows that any index of initial conditions has to take into consideration 
other factors, including political and institutional ones, as suggested in chapter four. Furthermore, 
appendix 7D shows that REF displays a positive trend towards reaching a ceiling at the end of the 
period. It is thus likely that HELSINKI has a lower impact as a result of both this ceiling and the 
small number of observations for this variable. 
The results of the estimations are presented in table 7.1. They suggest that STAB is not significant, 
but LNLAGFDI is. This is consistent with the hypothesis that FDI has contributed towards 
economic reforms. Model 1, both ASOC and NEG are significant, showing that early economic 
and political ties with the EU and prospects for EU membership have urged governments to 
promote economic reforms. However, the results may also pick up the reverse relationship between 
reforms and accession, i. e. that the association agreements and the launching of negotiations have 
250 
depended on a certain level of economic reforms, especially in the case of the first five to start 
negotiations in 1998. However, NEG does not capture the different high symbolical value of the 
negotiations started in 2000 which were meant inter alia to speed up reforms and to create different 
perceptions of security. Thus, in order to distinguish between the impact of the AVIS and of 
HELSINKI on economic reforms, model 2 is drawn. 
In model 2, two of the EU institutional integration variables, ASOC and AVIS, appear to have had 
a significant positive impact on economic reforms through the so called 'carrot effect'. As explained 
earlier and in chapter six, economic reforms have been anchored in the process of accession into 
the European Union and EU membership was regarded either as the 'stick' or as the 'carrot', 'the 
prize' for the sacrifices needed during transition, the 'light at the end of the tunnel'. The accession 
agreement was a first step towards closer relations with the EU and it appears to have given 
momentum to the internal reforms in which the CEECs were embarking in early 1990s. I Icnce, it 
appears that early ties with the EU have greatly affected the economic performance of the candidate 
countries, thus potentially placing them in a virtuous or a vicious circle of economic transition. 
Furthermore, the publication of the Avis in 1997 appears to have contributed towards maintaining 
the pace of economic reforms in the countries then recognised as the more advanced in economic 
and political transition and thus in the accession into the EU. However, it is also possible that the 
regressions only capture the inverse relationship between reforms and EU integration, i. e. the fact 
that the faster reformers concluded association agreements earlier and that they were recommended 
through the Avis to open accession negotiations in 1998. The lack of significance of the Ilelsinki 
European Council may be due to the little number of observations from 2000 onwards and to the 
fact that REF itself had already reached a ceiling by that time. The lack of significance of 
HELSINKI may also suggest that reforms in the second track candidates had already picked up 
before 2000, as a result of the 'stick' effect of the Avis. By not being invited to open accession 
negotiations, the then second wave countries feared exclusion, hence needed to reform quickly to 
be maintained in the race for membership. This was the case of Romania who has speeded up 
reforms since 1997. 
Furthermore, the coefficients of the three European integration variables appear to indicate that the 
impact of progress towards EU membership on reforms diminishes though in time, from a 
coefficient of 0.33 to 0.18 and then 0.10. These decreasing coefficients appear to indicate a 
possible 'social fatigue' with regard to two processes which took longer than expected at the 
beginning of the 1990s. It is known that the target date for the EU enlargement has been postponed 
several times and that the positive results of economic reforms took longer to appear in the laggard 
countries. It is thus possible that using EU membership as an excuse for implementing unpopular 
reforms has become more and more difficult in time, given the delays mentioned. 
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Overall, the results of the panel data regression above are consistent with the argument that FDI has 
a positive and significant impact on future reforms and that the prospect of EU membership has 
constituted a strong motivation for sustained economic reforms in the candidate countries, 
especially in the early stages. Once the role of FDI in enhancing economic reforms has been 
established, the reverse of this bi-directional relationship will be analysed below. Furthermore, the 
analysis seeks to suggest FDI determinants other than economic reforms that can keep up the 
momentum for investment and hence economic reforms and economic integration into the EU, thus 
enhancing a virtuous economic circle as in diagram 7A(d). 
7.3.2 Panel data regressions for the determinants of foreign direct investment 
The basic model 
LNFDI= (REF, LNGDP, GOV) +e (Model 1) 
The results of the regressions for the FDI determinants are presented in tables 7.2 and 7.3. A basic 
model was built through the combination of REF, LNGDP and GOV. The results obtained through 
different specifications proved to be robust, and the variables jointly significant, with an R squared 
between 0.75 and 0.89. LNAVER was also introduced in this model but it was found insignificant 
and therefore it was dropped from the basic model specification. There arc several clarifications to 
be made regarding this main model. First, LNGDP is both an indicator for the market size and a 
normalisor for FDI. Several specifications were run with a dependent variable expressing FDI as a 
percentage of GDP but the results proved not significant, hence the choice for FDI and GDP levels. 
This was probably due to the small values that such a variable takes in the case of the CEECs. 
Furthermore, several specifications were run with economic growth as a regressor but it was found 
not significant and therefore the results were not reported. This might be related to the ambivalent 
effect of growth on FDI presented in chapter five, part one. Second, GOV is slightly correlated 
with REF and it is mostly important from the point of view of investors' perception. Thus, at early 
stages of transition the turnover of ex-communist governments signified high determination of the 
new rulers to reform the economy. Investors might have been attracted by bold reforms initiated by 
democratic governments early in the decade. However, towards the late stages of transition some 
democratic governments proved feeble in advancing reforms while post-communist ones were 
almost forced to be reformist by the race for FDI or for EU membership. The results have also to be 
taken with caution as at the present most of the CEECs governments are post-communist and 
reformist at the same time. Then, REF is not only a measure of the present economic reforms, but 
also an indication of potential future reforms, thus determining certain expectations from investors. 
REF also reflects the initial conditions the country faced at the beginning of transition, as was 
argued in chapter four. The correlation between REF and INIT shown in appendix 7C supports this 
argument. Finally, the fact that LNAVER is not significant does not necessarily contradict the 
hypothesis that FDI is attracted by lower labour costs. Regardless of the average wage in each of 
the candidate countries, they will be much lower than in the EU member states and thus will 
represent a reduction in the production costs. 
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Model 1 validates the choice of variables and has an important explanatory power with an R 
squared of 0.75. It shows that economic reforms are a very important determinant of FDI, 
consistent with the fact that FDI is directed towards countries advanced in transition. It potentially 
signals the path dependency of poor reforms, low FDI, hence poor reforms as suggested in diagram 
7A(b). As anticipated, the perception of the host country's government is also significant, with a 
positive coefficient of 0.35, indicating that a democratic government of the host country appeals to 
investors. This has been the case of Poland and Romania whose post-1997 and post-1996 
democratic governments saw indeed the highest surge in FDI during the whole transition. 
Additionally, the model suggests that FDI in the CEECs is market-seeking as LNGDP is significant 
and has a very high coefficient of 0.92. Finally, the positive sign of LNAVER shown in model 2 
indicates that, given that wages in the CEECs are already significantly lower than in the EU, 
foreign investors are interested in relatively high wages that represent a potentially larger market. 
Higher wages may also indicate a higher productivity which could be associated with lower rather 
than higher labour costs. However, the data available is not sufficient to draw definite conclusions 
regarding the market-seeking or rent-seeking nature of investment in the ten CEECs considered. 
Overall, the results of both the basic model of FDI determinants and of the regressions on the 
determinants of economic reforms are consistent with the hypothesis of a bi-directional relationship 
between FDI and reforms, or FDI and security, as economic reforms are part of security concerns 
in the CEECs. These results indicate a potential path dependency and the potential danger that 
slow reformers attract low FDI with little impact on economic reforms, EU integration, and thus 
security, as represented in diagram 7A(a). To what extent are the initial economic conditions and 
previous FDI able to reinforce this path dependency? 
Path dependency 
LNFDI= (REF, LNGDP, GOV, INIT) +c (Model 3) 
LNFDI= (REF, LNGDP, GOV, LNLAGFDI) +E (Model 4) 
Model 3 assesses the importance of initial conditions in determining FDI. INIT is not significant 
but REF is, thus showing that economic reforms rather than initial conditions have affected FDI in 
the ten CEECs. However, this does not eliminate entirely the possibility of path dependency, as 
REF itself is correlated with INIT, as shown in appendix 7C. Thus, chapter four has shown that the 
pace and results of economic reforms have been determined to a certain extent by the economic and 
political initial conditions of each country considered. Additionally, INIT may not be significant 
because this variable does not take into consideration political factors that have shaped the initial 
conditions in the transition countries, as suggested in chapter four. Finally, the negative sign of 
INIT appears to suggest that harsher initial conditions created expectations of radical reforms and 
of improved economic prospects, thus fostering FDI. Overall, the lack of significance of INIT can 
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be interpreted as an indication that the danger of path dependency can be eliminated by considering 
other variables, including security and European integration variables, as will be seen later. 
Model 4 tests the significance of LNLAGFDI for LNFDI. It is arguable whether this regression 
alone may prove path dependency, rather than simply the fact that previous investment affects, 
indeed, the present one. However, in the absence of data which could allow for the estimation of 
different types of lagged variables and/or different equation forms, this specification may be 
considered consistent with the argument of path dependency. LNLAGFDI is significant. Its 
coefficient of 0.51 is the largest of this specification and supports the hypothesis that FDI is to an 
extent its own determinant. This is also suggested by the correlation of 0.67 between LNFDI and 
LNLAGFDI shown in appendix 7C. It appears that investors will reinvest their profits, provided 
that a certain amount of economic reform has been achieved and that there is a market for their 
products, as anticipated in chapter five. In this context, perception of the government becomes 
insignificant and first hand experience of the country through investment is the most relevant. The 
results can be also interpreted as FDI acting as a country risk assessment for new investors, which 
are encouraged by the existence of previous investment. This specification requires a further 
observation with regard to the REF variable. The small coefficient can be explained in several 
ways. Investment could be resilient to a slow down in economic reforms, provided that previous 
investment has already been attracted by previous reforms. This might be the case of Poland in the 
late years of transition. Then, this low coefficient might be a reflection of the bi-directional 
relationship between FDI and reforms, thus allowing for FDI to impact on further reforms, rather 
than being greatly affected by them. This might be the case of the surge in FDI in Romania since 
1998. Overall, the low coefficient of REF might be induced by the correlation between REF and 
LAGLNFDI presented in appendix 7C. Not surprisingly, this model has the second largest R 
squared of, 0.84, emphasising the danger of path dependency unless security and European 
integration variables are considered. 
The security determinants of FDI 
LNFDI= (REF, LNGDP, GOV, CEFTA) + F. (Model 5) 
LNFDI= (REF, LNGDP, GOV, BSEC) +c (Model 6) 
LNFDI= (REF, LNGDP, GOV, BALK) +E (Model 7) 
The security variables considered by this study are REF, STAB, GOV, CEFTA, BSEC and BALK 
as was discussed earlier on. REF and GOV are part of the basic model and they are significant for 
FDI in all specifications with a positive sign as expected. STAB was tried and proved insignificant 
and was thus dropped from the basic model and not reported here. A certain parallelism between 
stabilisation/liberalisation and institutional reforms might explain why STAB is not significant. 
Furthermore, the effects of stabilisation might actually be captured in the variation of the GDP 
itself, thus compensating for the lack of a specific variable for the stabilisation/liberalisation 
process. 
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Models 5 and 6 show that CEFTA and BSEC are not significant, but they have positive 
coefficients, as expected. The fact that these results are not consistent with the hypothesis of 
regional integration being a signal for foreign investors, might suggest that EU integration is 
perceived by investors as a more important process than the set up of free trade areas such as 
CEFTA and the BSEC. The results might also be affected by the fact that membership of these 
agreements is represented through a dummy variable. In model 7 BALK is also not significant and 
it has a sign contrary to the expected one. This result contradicts the hypothesis that FDI has been 
deterred by perceptions of insecurity related to the political geography concept of Balkans. 
However, the results might have been affected by the high correlation with other variables such as 
economic reforms. (See appendix 7C. ) Furthermore, as argued in chapter six, it is possible that 
BALK has actually affected the prospects for European integration and thus indirectly FDI. VISE 
and COMBRD were also tested, but there was high collinearity and thus they had to be dropped. 
The collinearity may result from the fact that VISE and COMBRD refer to countries which have 
been faster in reforms, hence in attracting FDI. 
The European integration determinants of FDI 
Institutional integration with the European Union 
LNFDI= (REF, LNGDP, GOV, ASOC, NEG) +c (Model 8) 
Models 8 to 13 test the significance of European integration variables from an institutional and an 
economic perspective. In model 8, ASOC is significant but NEG is not. This is only partially 
consistent with the hypothesis that institutional integration with the EU enhances foreign direct 
investment in the candidate countries. By initiating a gradual increase in the bilateral free trade 
with the EU, the agreements increased the openness of the CEECs and thus appear to have fostered 
FDI. It is also possible that some investors saw the agreements as a stepping stone for the CEEC's 
closer relationship with the EU and thus a promise for economic reforms and political stability, 
necessary conditions for both EU integration and FDI. This is consistent with the fact that, although 
the EU confirmed its commitment for enlargement only in 1993 at the Copenhagen European 
Council, the Polish association agreement of 1991 already mentioned EU membership as a goal of 
the Polish foreign policy. The results of model 8 suggest that early differentiation through the 
different timing of the association agreements had an important positive impact on investors, thus 
potentially already deepening the gap between the frontrunners and the laggards of transition and 
enhancing the vicious or the virtuous circles of their economic development. As at the time of the 
signing of the accession agreements the experience with reforms was still minimal, it is likely that 
anticipation still played an important role in influencing FDI. These findings partially contradict the 
results by Bevan and Estrin which found that the accession agreements did not have a significant 
impact on FDI, but complement their conclusion that the Essen announcement had a positive effect 
on foreign investment, especially in the Visegrad countries. " However, the lack of significance of 
NEG suggests that, over the whole sample, there is no systematic relationship between foreign 
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direct investment and the beginning of the accession negotiations with the EU. This does not 
necessarily contradict the hypothesis that new stages of European integration represent signals for 
investors, but points to the need to use different variables, reflecting the different motivations 
behind launching the negotiations in 1998 and in 2000 respectively and thus their potentially very 
different impact on FDI. The impact of AVIS and HELSINKI is investigated in model 9. 
LNFDI= (REF, LNGDP, GOV, ASOC, AVIS, HELSINKI) + F. (Model 9) 
In model 9 the signing of the association agreements appears to be a significant signal for foreign 
investors with a high coefficient of 0.52, with an interpretation as above. Model 9 also finds that 
the publication of the Avis did not have a significant impact on the level of the FDI in the candidate 
countries that were recommended to start accession negotiations in 1998. By differentiating 
between the frontrunners and the laggards of transition, the Avis did not communicate something 
new to potential investors. It merely recognised the status quo and confirmed the old perceptions of 
the attractiveness of the different countries. The high correlation between AVIS and REF seems to 
support this argumentation, which also conforms with Bevan and Estrin. They found no impact on 
the level of FDI attracted by the then so called first track candidates? The lack of significance of 
AVIS can also be attributed to the impact of the 1997 Russian financial crisis. These results do not 
contradict, however, the fears expressed by the Romanian authorities at the time, that the 
differentiation created in the EU accession process would decrease the FDI attracted by the less 
advanced countries. In fact, the regression refers to levels of FDI and not to the rate of growth of 
FDI. Empirical evidence and the study by Bevan and Estrin show that after 1997 FDI has grown 
faster in the 'first track' candidates than in the second track ones, thus potentially creating a vicious 
s' circle in the second track CEECs. 
In model 8 HELSINKI is significant and has a positive sign, showing that maintained prospects for 
EU integration are important signal for investors, especially for the countries with weaker results in 
terms of economic reform. Whereas recognising the status quo of the frontrunners through the 
AVIS appeared to have no significant impact on increasing FDI levels, enhancing the prospects for 
integration for the laggards in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis appears to have been able to give 
further guarantees to investors, thus increasing the attractiveness of these countries. Institutional 
progress towards EU membership appears, therefore, to be more significant when economic 
reforms are limited. By improving substantially the perceptions of security of the remaining five 
candidate countries, the Helsinki European Council gave new signals to potential investors and 
enhanced FDI. Maintaining prospects for EU integration appears to be a way to enhance FDI and 
thus lead to further economic reforms- potentially a way to break the vicious circle captured in this 
model. It is, therefore, possible that since the Helsinki European Council Romania has entered a 
virtuous circle of development as suggested in diagram 7A(e). On the other hand, the results might 
be affected by the fact that the frontrunners in economic reforms had already approached the end of 
56 Bevan and Estrin, "The Determinants of FDI", p. 18. 
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their privatisation programmes and saw increasing cost convergence with the EU, thus facing a 
relative fall in their FDI inflows leading to a diversion towards countries less advanced in 
economic reforms and EU accession. 
Economic integration with the European Union 
LNFDI= (REF, LNGDP, GOV, AIDCAP) +c (Model 10) 
LNFDI= (REF, LNGDP, GOV, TRADED) +e (Model 11) 
LNFDI= (REF, LNGDP, GOV, IMPDEU) +z (Model 12) 
LNFDI= (REF, LNGDP, GOV, EXPEU) +c (Model 13) 
Models 10 to 13 assess the importance of economic integration with the EU in enhancing FDI by 
considering variables such as: aid per capita, trade with the EU percentage of total trade, 
percentage of imports from the EU in total imports and finally percentage of exports to the EU in 
total exports. Model 9 tests the role of financial aid in enhancing FDI. Financial aid is here a result 
and a sign of further integration with the EU. Thus, the pre-accession programmes provide for 
important funds to be directed towards institution building or investment feasibility projects, 
conditions that can foster FDI into the candidate countries. The results show that aid per capita is 
indeed significant, but the low coefficient shows a relatively low impact. This can be due to aid 
being so limited in the first place, needing time to show of ects, or being used with not enough 
efficiency to deliver the results expected. Nevertheless, aid remains an important component of the 
pre-accession strategy and can be a catalyst for improving conditions for FDI, including investment 
in human resources, and the model recognises its significance. 
Models 11 to 13 investigate the impact on FDI induced by integration with the EU in terms of 
trade. The models consider the trade with the EU percentage of total trade (TRADED), the 
percentage of imports from the EU in total imports (IMPEU) and finally the percentage of exports 
to the EU in total exports (EXPEU). The positive coefficients of each of these three variables 
suggest complementarity between FDI and trade rather than substitution. Furthermore, TRADEU 
and EXPEU are significant and suggest that higher economic integration with the EU attracts 
higher investment. The high coefficient of EXPEU and its significance appear to suggest that FDI 
is attracted in industries which are export oriented. While this appears to imply a potential positive 
effect on economic growth in the host countries, it is also possible that FDI is attracted by already 
competitive industries, thus diminishing its role on modernisation in the recipient country. On the 
other hand, the positive coefficient of IMPEU suggests a move from imports towards a superior 
stage of internationalisation, i. e. foreign investment. The introduction of the European integration 
variables suggests that institutional and economic integration with the EU can represent a way to 
break the vicious economic circle presented in this study. 
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To sum up, the panel data regressions have shown that FDI in the CEECs is market driven and is 
determined by security and European integration factors, including economic reforms, democratic 
governments, prospects for EU integration and economic integration with the EU. Furthermore, 
there is a certain danger of path dependency, with slower reformers attracting lower FDI, 
progressing slower in economic reforms and in the EU accession process and thus attracting again 
lower investment. However, difficult initial conditions appear to have been overcome. 
Furthermore, the positive impact of the prospect of EU membership on the slower reformers may 
suggest that institutional integration with the EU can diminish the risk of path dependency and thus 
break the vicious circle in the economic sphere. Overall, the result of different specifications of 
regressions on both FDI and REF are consistent with the hypothesis of a bi-dircctional relationship 
between these two variables. Furthermore, the results have reinforced the need for considering a 
system of simultaneous equations as below. 
7.3.3 A system of simultaneous equations on the determinants of foreign direct investment 
and of economic reforms 
In order to capture the vicious circle and the bi-dircctional relationship between the variables 
considered here, a system of simultaneous equations was drawn having as cndogcnous variables 
foreign direct investment (LNFDI) and respectively the economic reform (REF). A system of 
simultaneous equations is also more appropriate given the cndogcncity in the single equation 
estimations. Furthermore, it is assumed that the relationship between FDI and REF is simultaneous, 
hence it is more difficult to break the vicious circle. The question is whether institutional 
integration variables affect directly economic reforms by providing further motivation, the 'light at 
the end of the tunnel', or through FDI, acting as a signal for investors that the candidate countries 
are desirable locations for investment. 
The three stage least squares method used here addresses the limitations of testing the bi-dircctional 
relationship between FDI and economic reforms through single equation estimation methods, as in 
the panel regressions drawn earlier. The results of the system of simultaneous equations estimations 
reveal once again the complex relationship between the factors considered. Furthermore, they are 
consistent with some of the previous fmdings and provide complementary explanations as well. 
The three stage least squares results are explained below and presented in table 7.4. 
The accession negotiations variable 
REF=(LNFDI, STAB, ASOC, NEG) +c 
LNFDI=(REF, LNGDP, GOV, ASOC, NEG) +c (Model 1) 
The results of model 1 are consistent with the results of the single equation estimation of the 
determinants of economic reforms. FDI is found a significant determinant, emphasising the need 
for attracting FDI in transition countries in order to speed up economic transition. Furthermore, 
progress of institutional integration with the EU appears to be a motivational factor for 
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governments to pursue economic reforms, consistent with the analysis in chapter six. The 
estimations also suggest that the impact of FDI on reforms is instantaneous, hence the strong 
advantages of attracting FDI. The results regarding the FDI determinants are only partially 
consistent with the ones of the single equation estimations. Only the domestic market is significant. 
At a first glance, the lack of significance of REF could be seen as a limitation. However, this could 
indicate a way to break the economic vicious circle, by affecting FDI through other factors than 
reforms. Furthermore, a higher GDP could be associated with more advanced reforms resulting in 
economic growth, hence counterbalancing the lack of significance of REF. Finally, neither ASOC, 
nor NEG are significant determinants of FDI. The lack of significance of ASOC may again be 
counterbalanced by the significance of LNGDP, with a higher GDP resulting partially from higher 
exports due to trade liberalisation with the EU. The lack of significance of NEG suggests the need 
to differentiate between the AVIS and HELSINKI. 
The role of the Avis and of the Helsinki European Council 
REF=(LNFDI, STAB, ASOC, AVIS, HELSINKI) +c 
LNFDI=(REF, LNGDP, GOV, ASOC, AVIS, HELSINKI) +c (Model 2) 
Model 2 suggests the same interpretation for the determinants of foreign direct investment. ASOC 
and AVIS are significant for economic reforms, but it is possible that the results capture the reverse 
relationship, i. e. that faster reformers have concluded association agreements sooner and have also 
been invited to negotiate sooner. The lack of significance of HELSINKI may be due to the little 
number of observations. The main limitation of this model is that it does not capture the 
significance of FDI for economic reforms. This might be due to the correlation between FDI and 
AVIS presented in appendix 7C. However, if the institutional integration variables arc defined as to 
account for anticipation effects rather than consequences, then LNFDI, ASOC, AVIS and 
HELSINKI are all significant determinants of foreign direct investment. " This is consistent with 
the nature of the system of equations which captures simultaneous effects. The results of model 3 
are consistent with the hypothesis that the prospect of EU integration has been an important 
motivational factor for economic reforms in the candidate countries. 
Overall, the three stage least squares results are consistent with the hypothesis of complex 
relationships between the variables considered in this study. They arc also consistent with the 
existence of a vicious and respectively virtuous circle of economic development in which certain 
countries in transition may have been locked in for some periods of time. Some lack of consistency 
between the findings of the single equations estimations and of the system of simultaneous 
equations estimations was predictable from the start, given the cndogcncity in the single equations 
regressions, and can only support the hypothesis of complex relationships between the variables 
assessed. The main limitations are the lack of significance displayed by REF and European 
integration variables for FDI. However, one can argue that the GDP level is correlated with 
58 See new definition of variables in table 4. 
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economic reforms and thus its significance for FDI implicitly suggests the importance of REF. 
Furthermore, following the same reasoning, REF seems to be affected by European integration 
variables which thus affect FDI, at least indirectly. Finally, the simultaneous relationship examined 
through the three stage least squares seems to overlook the fact that there is a certain gap between 
FDI and their impact on economic reforms, hence the advantages of using lagged FDI when 
assessing the determinants of economic reforms, as in the single equation models. 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the interplay between security, FDI and European integration in the 
CEECs during the first ten years of transition and has arrived at two main conclusions. First, it has 
been demonstrated the existence of a potential vicious circle of insecurity, low FDI, poor 
economic reforms and thus poor prospects for EU integration as in diagram 7(a). This vicious 
circle may account for Romania's relatively poor evolution during the first decade of transition in 
terms of attracting FDI and progressing towards EU membership. Security here included concerns 
regarding the success of economic reforms, the ideological orientation of the government, 
membership of regional free trade agreements and discrimination on political geography grounds, 
consistent with the analysis conducted in chapter six. Second, it has been shown that the prospect 
of EU membership enhanced by security motives can create a virtuous circle in the economic 
sphere by improving perceptions of security, fostering integration with the EU, FDI, economic 
reforms and finally full EU membership. 
The results of the panel data regressions are consistent with the hypothesis of a bi-dircctional 
relationship between FDI and economic reforms which appears to be at the centre of the vicious 
circle in the economic sphere. Furthermore, the estimation of the system of simultaneous equations 
pointed, indirectly, to the existence of a bi-directional relationship between FDI and economic 
reforms. The analysis has also shown that FDI is to a high extent its own determinant and thus 
there is the danger that countries with initial high investment will continue to attract investors at the 
expense of the lower FDI recipients. This potential path dependency seemed to be enhanced by the 
sensitivity of FDI to early ties with the EU through the signing of association agreements. Early 
commitments to EU integration appear to have been important for FDI, thus potentially creating a 
virtuous path or circle of development. 
Second, the empirical analysis has investigated ways to break the path dependency and the vicious 
circle in the economic sphere. The analysis suggested that the prospect of EU membership and 
economic integration with the EU can lead to path shaping by transforming the economic vicious 
circle into a virtuous one. Thus, the panel data regressions have shown that the initial conditions arc 
not a significant determinant of FDI, despite the correlation between the two variables. This finding 
appears to suggest that in terms of attracting FDI, the legacy of the past has been overcome to a 
certain extent, thus reducing the scope for path dependency. The same conclusion can be inferred 
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from the lack of significance of the initial conditions in determining economic reforms. The 
insignificance of political geography (BALK) in determining FDI in countries such as Romania 
and Bulgaria can also be seen as a sign that the vicious circle of development considered here can 
be broken. Perceptions of insecurity related to an externally constructed Balkan identity appear to 
have been overcome by progress in economic reforms and by prospects for EU integration. A 
further indication that the vicious circle can be broken is given by the lack of significance of the 
AVIS in enhancing FDI in the frontrunners of transition and EU accession. Furthermore, the 
negative sign of this variable appears to be consistent with the increased FDI attracted by Romania 
since 1997. This increase was a result of Romania's speeding up its privatisation programme and of 
FDI diversion from countries such as Poland, where privatisation was closer to completion. 
Nevertheless, the real potential of breaking the vicious circle seems to be displayed by the Helsinki 
European Council variable. At Helsinki, prospects for EU integration were renewed for countries 
previously considered the laggards of accession, as they were invited to open accession 
negotiations with the EU. This has greatly changed perceptions of security of the five candidate 
countries invited to negotiate, thus giving new signals to foreign investors. This new momentum 
for EU integration appears to have fostered FDI in the five CEEC candidate countries previously 
considered second track candidates. It had the potential to turn the previous vicious circle of 
development into a virtuous one as in diagram 7A(e. ) The high coefficient of HELSINKI 
emphasises this conclusion. Institutional integration variables have also been shown to have 
enhanced economic reforms, consistent with the analysis in chapter six. 
The single equation regressions have also shown that economic integration with the EU has 
enhanced FDI in the CEECs. Thus, financial aid, percentage of trade with the EU and of exports to 
the EU were found to be significant FDI determinants. The findings regarding the role of financial 
aid reinforce the justification for substantial pre-accession funding being allocated to countries 
such as Romania and Bulgaria, whose EU accession was delayed until most likely 2007. They 
make the case for continued financial support for these countries in order to maintain the pace of 
reforms and continue to attract FDI. Pre-accession financial assistance will potentially temper the 
widening of the gap between them and the new members of the EU that might result from 
increasing funding for the ten CEECs that are likely to join in 2004.59 Furthermore, the results 
suggest that competitive, export oriented sectors are likely to attract FDI, thus reinforcing a 
virtuous circle of development. This suggests that industrial policies should continue to encourage 
sectors in which candidate countries have comparative advantages in terms of quality/price ratio. 
Overall, the empirical analysis is consistent with the argument that FDI is market-seeking and has 
proven that security and European integration variables are important FDI determinants. The lack 
of significance of BSEC and CEFTA appears to suggest that accession to the EU is more 
59 See also Smith, A., "Economic and Trade Relations Between the European Formcr Communist States and 
the States of Western Europe", in Smith, J. and Jenkins, C. (eds. ), Through the Paper Curtain. Insiders and 
Outsiders in the New Europe, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2003, p. 34. 
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important for investors that any exercise of regional co-operation which were meant in the first 
place to enhance prospects for EU integration. Trade liberalisation represented by the association 
agreement and changes in perceptions of security by the Helsinki European Council have had a 
strong positive effect on FDI and on economic reforms in the initially second wave candidates. 
However, the decreasing impact that each new stage of institutional European integration has had 
on economic reforms warns about the danger of a certain 'fatigue' with transition. This 'fatigue' 
might reduce even further the motivational and risk diminishing impact of the prospects of EU 
membership. It is thus important that in the case of Romania and Bulgaria prospects for EU 
accession are maintained and complemented by further economic integration and internal economic 
reforms. All these elements appear to be able to enhance FDI, complete transition to a market 
economy and finally bring EU membership as per diagram 7A(f). The attractiveness of the two 
countries will also consist in the persistence of relatively low production costs given that EU 
membership was delayed until most likely 2007. It is likely that FDI will be diverted from the new 
EU members which will be price convergent with the EU towards the remaining candidates, not yet 
aligned to the EU price levels. 60 
7.5 Tables and appendices 
60 See also Grabbe, H. and Hughes, K, Eastward Enlargement of the European Union, The Royal institute 
of International Affairs, London, 1997, p. 34. 
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Tables and appendices 
Table 7.1 
Panel data estimations of the determinants of economic reforms 
Models on REF Model I Model 2 
STAB -. 00 . _00 (. 00) (. 00) 
LNLAG FDI . 17* . 19* (. 44) (. 03) 
ASOC . 52* . 33* (. 09) (. 08) 
NEG (. 20)* 
(. 09) 
AVIS . 18* (. 08) 
HELSINKI . 10 (. 10) 
Constant -1.06 -1.28* 
(. 63) 
R Squared . 57 . 58 
Individual Effects R. cffccts R. Effccts 
Note: 
a) The coefficients and the standard errors are provided in the columns. 
b) The coefficients marked with* and" are significant at 5 and respectively 10 pcrccnt. 
263 
Table 7.2 
Panel data estimations of the determinants of FDI 
LNFDI Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
REF 1.07* . 89* 1.04* . 38* 1.06* 1.07* 1.10* (. 14) (. 17) (. 14) (. 18) (. 18) (. 14) (. 15) 
LNGDP . 92* . 93* 1.07* . 41* . 91* . 93* . 92* (. 16) (. 15) (. 21) (11) (. 17) (. 17) (. 17) 
GOV . 35* . 53* . 35* . 05 . 35* . 35* . 35* (. 15) (. 15) . 15 (. 13) (. 16) . 16 (. 15) LNAVER . 09 
. 19 INIT -. 16 
(. 15) 
LNLAGFDI . 51 09 
CEFTA . 02 
. 26 BSEC . 38 (. 33) 
BALK 
. 27 (. 45) 
Constant -5.25 -5.60 -8.36* -1.10 -4.91* -5.47 -5.31 (3.74) (3.52) (4.84) 2.15 3.97 3.98 (3.99) 
R squared . 75 . 78 . 
89 . 84 . 75 . 75 . 75 Individual Random Random Random Random Random Random Random 
effects Effects effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects 
Note: 
a) The coefficients and the standard errors are provided in the columns. 
b) The coefficients marked with * and ** are significant at 5 and respectively 10 pcrccnt. 
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Table 7.3 
Panel data estimations of the determinants of FDI 
LNFDI Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
REF . 66* . 70* 1.04* . 89* . 99* . 87* 20 . 20 (. 14) (. 16) (. 15) (. 17) LNGDP . 85* . 91 * . 94* . 91 * . 89* 96* (. 15) (. 17) (. 17) (. 16) (. 18) (. 17) 
GOV . 34* . 37* . 39* . 42* . 46* . 44* (. 15) (. 15) (. 15) (. 16) (. 16) (. 16) 
ASOC . 55* . 
52* 
(. 22) (. 22) 
NEG . 23 (. 18) 
AVIS -. 07 
(. 21) 
HELSINKI . 61 * (. 27) 
AIDCAP . 01* (. 005) 
TRADEU . 78** (. 47) 
IMPEU . 83 (. 84) 
EXPEU 1.16** 
(. 72) 
Constant -2.77 -4.24 -5.99 -5.40 -4.88 -6.36 
3.67 4.06 (3.87) (3.79) (4.11) 4.04 
R squared . 77 . 
78 . 77 . 77 . 76 . 77 Individual Random Random Random Random Random Random 
effects Effects Effects Effects Effects effects Effects 
Note: 
a) The coefficients and the standard errors are provided in the columns. 
b) The coefficients marked with * and ** are significant at 5 and respectively 10 percent. 
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Table 7.4 
Estimations of the system of simultaneous equations 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3*** 
EQUATIONS LNFDI REF LNFDI REF LNFDI REF 
REGRESSORS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 
REF . 03 . 
12 . 28 
(1.23) (1.30) (1.27) 
LNFDI . 10* . 07 . 
10** 
(. 05) (. 05) (. 05) 
STAB .. 00** -. 00 
(. 00) (. 00) 
LNGDP . 87* . 88 . 93* (. 10) (. 10) (. 11) 
GOV . 40 . 
41 . 36 
(. 34) (. 32) (. 27) 
ASOC 1.03 . 59* . 96 . 62* . 
57a . 500a (. 86) (. 13) (. 92) (. 13) (. 72) (. 13) 




AVIS . 37 . 45* . 37b . 55*b (. 57) (. 13) (. 80) (. 12) 
HELSINKI . 60 . 10 . 63c . 24**c (. 38) (. 17) (. 43) (. 12) 
CONSTANT -1.89 . 39 -2.50 . 77 -3.84 . 57 (2.17) (1.00) (2.41) (. 17) (2.24) (. 96) 
R Squared . 73 . 
55 . 74 . 56 . 72 . 56 
Note: 
a) The coefficients and the standard errors are provided in the columns. 
b) The coefficients marked with * and ** are significant at 5 and respectively 10 percent. 
***) For this model the specification of the institutional integration variables has changed to account 
for anticipation effects, rather than causal ones. ASOC takes value one since the year of signing the 
association agreement. AVIS takes value 1 since 1997, when the recommendation to start accession 
negotiations was made for five CEECs. Helsinki takes value 1 since 1999, hen the recommendation 
to start accession negotiations was made for five CEECs. 
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Appendix 7A 
List of variables 
Abbreviations Full description Source 
FDI FDI, aggregate annual inflows, current USD World Bank, 




REF Reform composite indicator mean of six reform EBRD, Transition Report, 1999 
indicators by the EBRD (LSP, SSP, COM, SEC, 
ENT, BK) 
STAB Stabilisation composite indicator: mean of two EBRll, Transition Report, 1999 
stabilisation indicators of EBRD (TREX and 
PR) 
GDP GDP at market prices, current USD World Bank, 
LNGDP= In (GDP) World Development Indicators, 
CDROM 
AVER Average monthly earnings USD, PPP Central Business Eumpc, 
LNAVER =1n http: //www. bcenrag. com 
(AVER) 
GOV Government dummy (0 for leftist, 1 otherwise) Computed by the author 
INIT Initial conditions categorical variable EBRD, Transition Report, 1999 
ASOC Impact of the association agreement dummy Computed by the author 
(1 starting with the first year after the signing 
of the agreement, 0 otherwise) 
NEG Impact of the launching of accession Computed by the author 
negotiations (1 for each year when a country 
negotiated with the EU, 0 otherwise) 
AVIS Impact of the Avis dummy: recommendation Computed by the author 
for opening negotiations by the six first track 
countries (1 for 1998 for the six first track 
countries, 0 otherwise) 
HELSINKI Impact of the Helsinki Council dummy: Computed by the author 
recommendation for opening negotiations by the 
six second track countries (1 for 2000 for the six 
second track countries) 
CEFTA Membership of CEFTA dummy (1 for years of Computed by the author 
membership, 0 otherwise) 
BSEC Membership of BSEC dummy (1 for years of Computed by the author 
membership, 0 other wise) 
VISE and BALK Visegrad v. Balkans v. others dummies (VISE: Computed by the author 
1 for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia, 0 otherwise; BALK: 1 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 0 otherwise) 
COMBRD Common border dummy (1 for common border Computed by the author 
with the EU, 0 for otherwise) 
AIDCAP Aid per capita World Bank, 
IForld Development Indicators 
TRADEU Trade with EU % in total trade (openness WIIW and World Development 
towards EU) Indicators 
IMPEU Imports from the EU % in total imports WI1W and II orld Development 
Indicators 
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Correlation matrix for listed variables 
CEFTA 
CEFTA 1.00000 
BSEC -. 24160 
COMBRD . 70175 
INIT . 63294 
GOV . 05340 
REF . 65920 
LNAVER . 57286 
AVIS . 30592 
CEFTA 
HELSINKI . 19089 
AIDCAP . 02798 
BALK -. 27518 
ASOC . 46648 
AVIS . 25963 
LNFDI . 59941 
LNGDP . 63570 
LNLAGFDI . 64744 
HELSINKI 
HELSINKI . 15485 
AIDCAP . 15485- 
BALK . 21848 
ASOC . 13868 
AVIS -. 08391 
LNFDI . 04222 
LNGDP -. 01606 
LNLAGFDI . 11851 
CEFTA 
STAB -. 06506 
VISE . 57543 
IMPEU . 41396 
EXPEU . 08324 
TRADEU . 25572 
HELSINKI 
STAB -. 03007 
VISE -. 05286 
IMPEU -. 02435 
EXPEU -. 03096 
TRADEU -. 03214 
BSEC COMBRD INIT GOV REF LNAVER AVIS 
-. 24160 . 70175 . 63294 . 
05340 . 65920 . 57286 . 30592 
1.00000 -. 59874 -. 06286 -. 21938 -. 58758 -. 56915 -. 27088 
-. 59874 1.00000 . 76998 . 05340 . 
57505 . 72354 . 30592 
-. 06286 . 76998 1.00000 -. 
08748 . 21248 . 45158 . 16366 
-. 21938 . 05340 -. 08748 
1.00000 . 22236 . 25278 . 13340 
-. 58758 . 57505 . 21248 . 
22236 1.00000 . 65736 . 51617 
-. 56915 . 72354 . 45158 . 
25278 . 65736 1.00000 . 47278 
-. 27088 . 30592 . 16366 . 13340 . 
51617 . 47278 1.00000 
BSEC COMBRD INIT GOV REF LNAVER AVIS 
. 23112 -. 09756 . 
02676 . 00223 . 01798 -. 11698 -. 10939 
-. 29724 . 01697 -. 27674 -. 16165 . 
26673 . 15320 . 14436 
. 95907 -. 62429 -. 06064 -. 
26294 -. 66865 -. 62771 -. 28244 
. 03205 . 27148 . 24928 . 
01605 . 54652 . 25212 . 32867 
-. 20778 . 25963 . 15728 . 
09577 . 40759 . 39101 . 76106 
-. 27405 . 54213 . 34853 . 
08175 . 64608 . 37316 . 37889 
-. 09775 . 67622 . 60220 -. 15445 . 
35920 . 36137 . 21293 
-. 24682 . 58117 . 39279 . 
11445 . 69142 . 46173 . 38190 
AIDCAP BALK ASOC AVIS LNFDI LNGDP LNLAGFDI 
. 21848 . 13868 -. 08391 . 
04222 -. 01606 . 11851 
1.00000 -. 26492 . 14451 . 12799 . 17816 -. 02174 . 
07189 
-. 26492 1.00000 -. 02238 -. 21665 -. 32260 -. 12022 -. 34434 
. 14451 -. 02238 
1.00000 . 25211 . 61201 . 46239 . 60464 
. 12799 -. 21665 . 
25211 1.00000 . 33693 . 24939 . 33695 
. 17816 -. 32260 . 
61201 . 33693 1.00000 . 76653 . 90941 
-. 02174 -. 12022 . 46239 . 24939 . 76653 1.00000 . 75050 
. 07189 -. 34434 . 
60464 . 33695 . 90941 . 75050 1.00000 
BSEC COMBRD INIT GOV REF LNAVER AVIS 
. 11302 -. 20200 -. 
39023 -. 05740 -. 00694 -. 20126 -. 02923 
-. 48695 . 81330 . 
59033 -. 09453 . 53452 . 30423 . 19115 
-. 37883 . 50985 . 
23641 . 17469 . 40759 . 55543 . 29429 
-. 44786 . 11375 -. 
23992 . 33931 . 48241 . 36695 . 31406 
-. 47790 . 32233 -. 
04257 . 30750 . 51454 . 51060 . 34904 
AIDCAP BALK ASOC AVIS LNFDI 
. 02218 . 
07383 . 15124 -. 01428 . 30477 
. 02856 -. 
50774 . 39644 . 16530 . 68725 
. 06824 -. 43215 . 
01533 . 27974 . 46731 
. 23181 -. 
51280 . 14849 . 22874 . 37004 
. 18525 -. 
54641 . 10488 . 28598 . 46982 
STAB VISE IMPEU EXPEU TRADEU 
STAB 1.00000 . 03405 . 10361 . 
19261 . 17672 
VISE . 03405 1.00000 . 
28241 . 07632 . 18727 
IMPEU . 10361 . 28241 
1.00000 . 52310 . 82903 
EXPEU . 19261 . 07632 . 
52310 1.00000 . 91026 
TRADEU . 17672 . 18727 . 
82903 . 91026 1.00000 
LNGDP LNLAGFDI 
. 32578 . 26573 
. 72524 . 67979 
. 45327 . 51260 
. 02564 . 38009 
. 23703 . 49842 
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The main aim of this dissertation was to explain why Poland and Romania have had different 
evolutionary paths in their quests for EU membership, by focusing on the role of foreign direct 
investment and security concerns, as well as on the interplay between these factors. The main 
argument of the dissertation was that performance in the EU accession process is a result of the 
interaction between a political circle and an economic circle of determinants. Each set of 
determinants, be it in the political or in the economic sphere, has the potential to constitute a 
vicious or a virtuous circle. Furthermore, each of these circles is self-reinforcing and can reinforce 
the circle in the other sphere. Foreign direct investment is a necessary component of the economic 
circle of determinants. Furthermore, political and economic elements of the circles considered can 
constitute security concerns for each of the countries analysed, as discussed in chapter six and 
suggested in diagram 1A. Thus, it has been argued that in the early transition period Romania has 
been trapped in vicious circles in both the political and economic spheres %%hile Poland appears to 
have enjoyed a combination of two virtuous circles since 1992/1993. Furthermore, in the absence 
of full support from the EU, the 1996 change of power in Romania created an ambiguous circle, 
rather than a virtuous political circle, with only a limited influence on the circle within the 
economic sphere. However, the changes within the EU accession process following the Kosovo 
crisis and the 2000 parliamentary and presidential election appear to have induced virtuous circles 
in Romania in both the political and economic spheres. In Poland, vicious economic circles were 
avoided through maintaining virtuous circles in the political sphere, as presented in table 8.1. 
Table 8.1 presents a quantification of the factors examined in this study. It attributes a plus sign if 
they contribute towards a virtuous circle and a negative one otherwise. The intensity of the impact 
of each factor is reflected by the number of signs attributed, which ranges from one to five. The 
attribution of these signs captures both the individual evolution of Poland and Romania 
respectively, and the factor intensity in one country relative to the other country. A virtuous circle 
is created if the overall number of plus signs is at least eight. A combination of signs can lead to 
either an ambiguous, or to a vicious circle respectively. The years in the tables represent the 
beginning of four periods considered, corresponding to electoral cycles and events in the accession 
process. The starting point represents the year of revolutions, while 2002 is the year of the 
Copenhagen European Council when Poland was invited to join the EU and the end point of this 
analysis. 1990,1992,1996 and 2000 correspond to the Romanian elections while 1993,1997 and 
2001 correspond to the Polish ones. Furthermore, in 1997 the European Commission has presented 
its Opinion on the progress of the candidate countries towards EU membership and invited rive of 
them to start accession negotiations as of 1998.2000, on the other hand, is the year when Romania 
started accession negotiations alongside four other candidate countries, previously known as the 
'second wave' countries. The assessments within each column of the table refer to the trends 
initiated by the events of the beginning of each period. 
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Insert table 8.1 
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Diagram 8A' 
The role of security and EU integration factors in enhancing virtuous circles in the economic 
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The political sphere 
The economic sphere 
ý 
f_. - 2' 
a) Arrows 1,2,3,4 and 1,2,11,12 indicate two alternative virtuous circles in the economic sphere induced by 
prospects of EU membership. 
b) Arrows 1 to 4 and 5 to 8 show how through political decisions on the enlargement process, prospects of 
EU membership can create a virtuous economic circle that induces in turn a virtuous political circle as well. 
c) Arrows 9 to 12 indicate a virtuous economic circle induced by a virtuous political circle through its impact 
on prospects of EU membership. 
d) Arrows 1', 2', 3 and 4 show a virtuous circle in the economic sphere induced by the effects of the prospect 
of EU membership on economic integration with the EU. 
1 This diagram is based on diagram 1B presented in chapter one. 
E 
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The hypothesis of reinforcing political and economic circles was tested empirically with respect to 
foreign direct investment in order to suggest a means of turning a pair of vicious circles into a pair 
of virtuous ones. Several questions have directed the inquiry: 
a) What were the general factors that have affected Poland and Romania's accession to the 
European Union? Is there evidence of increasing economic integration between Poland and the EU 
and Romania and the EU? Can institutional integration enhance economic integration? 
b) Which factors have determined the path towards, and the results of, transition to a market 
economy in Poland and Romania? 
c) What are the main determinants of foreign direct investment in Poland and Romania? Is there 
evidence of impact of foreign direct investment in Poland and Romania ? 
d) What are the main security concerns for Poland and Romania and how did they affect the 
prospects of EU membership? And how did prospects of EU membership affect security concerns 
in Poland and Romania? 
e) What is the impact of security and European integration factors on FDI? S it possible for the 
prospects for EU membership and economic integration with the EU break the vicious economic 
circle in which Romania has been trapped for most of the transition period? 
Using the tools presented in chapter one for analysing the object of the empirical inquiry, a number 
of conclusions have been drawn relating to each of the above questions. These findings are 
presented below with reference to diagram 8A and table 8.1. Furthermore, policy recommendations 
are offered while reviewing these findings. 
8.1 The quest for EU membership: an institutional and an economic perspective 
When discussing the factors that have influenced Romania's and Poland's quests for EU 
membership, it is important to distinguish between institutional and economic integration and to 
acknowledge the bi-directional relationship between them. It has been argued that institutional 
integration between Poland and Romania, on the one hand, and the EU, on the other, appears to 
depend on several factors and their interaction: the EU's attitude towards enlargement, Poland and 
Romania's attitude towards EU accession, progress of transition to a market economy and finally, 
internal and external security concerns. The first two factors are part of the political circle of 
determinants analysed in detail in chapter three. The remaining two factors were analysed in depth 
in chapters four and six. Furthermore, it has been shown that this bi-directional relationship is one 
of the ways through which the two circles considered in this study interact with each other. Thus, 
evidence has been given that institutional integration with the EU has led to increasing economic 
integration in terms of both trade (chapter three) and foreign investment (chapter seven. ) 
Furthermore, it has been argued that economic integration enhances the prospects for EU 
membership, hence institutional integration with the EU. Thus, it has been shown that foreign 
direct investment- an element of factor markets integration identified in chapter three- is a 
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necessary means of privatisation (chapter five) and contributes to economic reforms in general 
(chapter seven). In turn, economic reforms are a necessary prerequisite for institutional integration 
with the EU, as shown in chapter three. 
The analysis of the factors which have influenced Poland and Romania's institutional integration 
with the EU has identified several vicious and virtuous political circles during the first decade of 
transition. These have depended on the relative influence of each of these factors, as well as on the 
interaction between them. Regarding the first factor in the political sphere, the EU's early 
discriminatory attitude towards Romania created the conditions for vicious circles in both the 
political and economic sphere. Furthermore, the EU's early positive attitude towards Poland, a 
member of the Visegrad group, contributed towards creating both political and economic virtuous 
circles of determinants of the accession process. However, as the focus switched from economic 
determinants of expansion towards security determinants, creating what a Polish analyst has called 
a 'healthy', rather than a 'wealthy' approach to enlargement, Romania's prospects of EU 
membership have been enhanced. Security concerns have increasingly constituted the 'engine' of 
enlargement, despite poor internal reforms acting as brakes'. Thus, security concerns raised by the 
Kosovo crisis triggered the launch of accession negotiations with Romania and with other 
remaining candidates, previously considered not yet ready from an economic point of view for this 
new phase of institutional integration with the EU. By launching the accession negotiations and by 
creating positive perceptions of security in Romania, the Helsinki European Council has 
contributed towards the creation of virtuous circles in Romania in both the economic and the 
political sphere. The quantitative analysis conducted in chapter seven was consistent with this 
argument. Furthermore, in 2000 the EU's warnings for Poland regarding the slowness of reforms, 
accession negotiations and implementation of the acquls communautalre prevented virtuous 
economic and political circles from turning into vicious ones, as represented in table 8.1. 
Second, a main distinguishing factor in Poland and Romania's progress in accession was each 
country's governments' attitude towards EU membership. Poland adopted a proactive attitude from 
the beginning and, despite some loss of momentum during the 1997-2000 governments, Poland 
projected a strong will to join the EU as soon as possible. The bold Polish attitude was based not 
only on an early radical approach to economic reforms and on the external credibility gained, but 
also with the knowledge that Poland's accession to the EU was strongly supported by Germany, for 
both economic and security reasons. Romania, on the other hand, lacked a coherent strategy for 
accession for most of the transition period and has had a reactive attitude, avoiding exclusion rather 
than seeking inclusion. This attitude was accompanied by a hesitant approach to economic reforms, 
which resulted in low external credibility and in an inability to use fully the diplomatic support 
given by members of the EU such as France. Overall, a pro-active official attitude, a coherent 
accession strategy and efforts to enhance the lobby within the EU member states are crucial 
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elements of a positive attitude of a candidate state able to contribute towards the creation of a 
virtuous political circle. 
A crucial determinant of EU accession has been each country's compliance with the Copenhagen 
criteria and especially the progress of transition to a market economy. Poland's compliance with 
the Copenhagen criteria, including a good record of economic reforms, was the basis for the 
Commission's recommendation to open accession negotiations in 1998, as with other 'first wave' 
candidates. Success in economic reforms became part of a virtuous circle in the economic sphere 
since 1993, as represented in table 8.1. On the other hand, Romania's poor record of economic 
reforms by 1997 was reflected in the Avis and in the European Commission's decision to place it 
amongst the 'second wave' candidates, which would not open accession negotiations at that stage. 
This poor record of economic reforms was part of the vicious circle in the economic sphere until 
1996, as represented in table 8.1. Reforms implemented by the post-1996 governments created 
conditions for improving the prospects in the economic sphere and the achievement of a full 
virtuous economic circle starting in 2000. Failure to become a market economy so far has delayed 
Romania's accession until most likely 2007, while Poland's market economy status has contributed 
to Poland's accession to the EU in May 2004. The factors leading to the different paths in transition 
towards market economy were investigated in chapter four and the conclusions drawn will be 
presented in the following section of this chapter. All in all, no candidate country should 
underestimate the importance of meeting the Copenhagen criteria for a successful accession to the 
EU. 
Finally, security concerns have played an increasing role within the 'healthy' approach to 
enlargement. When economics acted as a brake, security acted as the engine of the enlargement 
process, as discussed in chapter three. Thus, Germany's strategic interest in Poland's accession to 
the EU was the drive of a generally positive EU attitude towards Poland for most of the decade, 
thus contributing towards creating a virtuous political circle. Enlargement without Poland in the 
first wave seemed inconceivable. When by 2000 Poland fell behind other candidate countries in 
terms of internal reforms and accession negotiations, the EU was ready to postpone the entire 
enlargement process to allow Poland to catch up. This virtuous political circle avoided the creation 
of a vicious circle in the economic sphere for Poland. On the other hand, Romania's closeness to 
the Balkans, the 'powder keg' of Europe, appears to have affected negatively its prospects of EU 
membership by leading to a hesitant attitude of the EU, especially in the early 1990s. Negative 
perceptions of security in the early 1990s reinforced the vicious circles in the political and 
economic spheres. While the support offered by France did not have the substance of Germany's 
backing of Poland, the Kosovo crisis became a catalyst for Romania's accession to the EU through 
the security concerns posed. The Helsinki European Council de-securitised these concerns and 
created positive perceptions of security for Romania by launching the accession negotiations. The 
focus has changed from security, as a condition for the enlargement process, to security as a result 
of it, as discussed in chapter six. This point is consistent with the evidence that Poland and 
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Romania have already benefited largely from the accession process in terms of trade, hence the 
additional benefits of EU membership in security terms and further foreign direct invcstmcnt, inter 
alia, as discussed in chapter three. 
8.2 Transition to a market economy: the interplay between the political and economic spheres 
Given that the achievement of a market economy is a necessary condition for EU membership, it is 
necessary to investigate the main factors that have determined the path and results of economic 
transition in Poland and Romania. It has been argued that performance in economic transition was 
dependent on the interaction between governments' attitude towards reform, domestic support, 
international backing for reforms, policy mix (or the economic reforms implemented) and initial 
conditions of transition. The first three factors represent the political circle of determinants of 
transition and accession to the EU, while the fourth is part of the economic circle. The initial 
conditions have been included in order to test the hypothesis of path dependency and of self. 
reinforcing circles in both the economic and the political spheres. 
The analysis has shown that the initial conditions of transition were more influential than initially 
expected. Although purely economic conditions have proven not to be significant for either reforms 
or FDI (chapter seven), a simple economic account of the initial conditions is not sufficient, as 
shown in chapter four. Instead, differences in the state of the economy and of the nation, as well as 
differences in the institutional framework should be considered. It has been shown that the 
interplay between the initial conditions and other elements of the political and economic circles has 
created the premise for a faster economic transition in Poland than in Romania. In Poland these 
interactions led to a economic virtuous circle as soon as 1993, while Romania only cntcrcd one in 
2000, as shown in table 8.1. Not only did they create a certain gap bctwccn the two countries, but 
they had a strong impact on the scope and pace of the early economic reforms. These accentuated 
even further the differences, thus enhancing the path dependency. Furthermore, the initial 
conditions determined largely the level of domestic support for economic reforms and the 
governments' attitude towards embarking on either a bold or a gradual reform programme. In 
addition, the choice of a particular approach to economic reforms influenced the degree of 
international backing which had in turn the potential to sustain the pace and scope of economic 
reforms. All in all, any assessment of economic transition in the CEECs has to be aware of the 
potential for path dependency and hence take into consideration the initial conditions of the 
transition. 
Second, governments' attitude towards reforms was a crucial determinant of the path and results of 
the economic transition. It affected greatly not only the policy mix, but also the international 
support for a successful economic transition of the country. Governments' attitude towards reforms 
depended on previous exposure to democratic procedures and market thinking, on prior attempts to 
reform the system and on the emergence of a new political class devoted to promoting democracy 
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and market economy. Domestic and international support also impacted upon governments' 
readiness to reform. Prior experience of both economic and political reforms made the Polish 
society more open, more susceptible to change and gave the newly emerged 1989 democratic 
government a relatively clearer understanding of the aims and means of economic transition. 
Furthermore, the change of power at the beginning of transition facilitated the implementation of 
an IMF supported reform package which ensured external credibility of both government and 
economic reforms. Poland therefore made full use of the early window of opportunity of 1989 by 
showing strong commitment to a market economy, regardless of the cost for the population or the 
governments in power. Early commitment to bold reforms created a virtuous political circle which 
was able to influence the economic sphere, contributing to the creation of a full virtuous economic 
circle by 1993. The economic circle then reinforced the political cirlce, despite the post. 
communists' election into power in 1993. In 1997, the AWS' election reinforced the commitment 
to reforms and the virtuous political circle that had been created was able to enhance a virtuous 
economic circle of development. Slowness in FDI and in economic reforms in 2000 did not create 
vicious economic and political circles, given the 'carrot and stick' role of the EU accession process, 
as shown in table 8.1. 
On the other hand, Romania's lack of political and economic reforms prior to 1989 led to a 
relatively poor vision of the priorities and aims of economic transition. It also led to a very slow 
formation of a new political class that could commit firmly to radical changes. As a result, the 1989 
window of opportunity was lost through the rise of post-communists to power, thus further 
diminishing internal and international support for economic reforms. These developments 
contributed towards the creation of a vicious political circle which set Romania on a vicious 
economic circle as well. The two vicious circles have persisted until 1996, when a new window of 
opportunity was partially lost. Despite international and domestic support for reforms, the 
government infighting affected the scope and pace of economic reforms, thus negatively 
influencing Romania's prospects for EU membership. Elements of virtuous circles emerged, 
however, without the power to create a full virtuous political circle or a full virtuous economic 
circle. Increased foreign direct investment induced by FDI related policies since 1998 and 
economic reforms applied in 2000 by the newly elected government, following the EU's renewed 
commitment for Romania's accession, appear to have been part of a virtuous circle in the 
economic sphere. These were discussed in chapters four and seven and represented in table 8.1. All 
in all, it proved best for governments needed to and should use windows of opportunity such as 
elections to apply necessary, but potential unpopular policies. Continuity of economic reforms 
should also be ensured by maintaining the cohesion of the government. 
The analysis has also shown that popular support for economic reforms has bccn rathcr volatile and 
has acted both as a catalyst for as well as a brake on change. Popular support has impacted upon the 
external credibility and international support for the government (chapter four), as well as on 
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perceptions of security of each candidate country, as discussed in chapter six. Furthermore, the 
high cost imposed by economic reforms on population in general, and on some categories in 
particular, have led towards a certain 'fatigue' with transition. This can have a negative impact on 
future election results and hence on future governments' readiness to reform. This is consistent 
with the quantitative analysis conducted in chapter seven. Furthermore, the increasing support for 
extremist parties shown in the 2000/2001 election in both Poland and Romania warned of the 
limitations of applying economic reforms at any cost. It also suggested that governments should 
ensure higher popular support through growth promoting policies, ensuring safety nets for the 
population and by providing prospects of long terms benefits associated with EU membership. This 
may diminish the danger of internal instability and contribute to enhancing the political circle of 
determinants of transition and integration into the EU. The danger of loss of support for a market 
economy as a result of economic reforms suggests, inter alla, the need for an assessment of the 
impact that foreign direct investment has had on the standards of living, as in chapter five. 
Fourth, the path and results of economic transition in both Poland and Romania have depended 
greatly on the support given by international organisations, and especially on the process of 
accession to the EU. The international financial institutions offered humanitarian aid, 
macroeconomic multilateral financing, financial and technical assistance for privatisation or for the 
establishment of safety nets necessary in order to attenuate the cost of transition. Furthermore, 
through the conditions set, the IMF standby agreements provided landmarks for economic reforms, 
ensured the continuity and credibility of the policy mix and triggered assistance from other IFIs. 
Landmarks for the economic reforms, technical and financial assistance were also offered through 
the EU accession process. Moreover, EU membership acted both as a 'carrot' and as a 'stick'. 
Progress in institutional integration with the EU encouraged governments in the candidate countries 
to apply at times unpopular reforms and rewarded the countries who did so. On the other hand, 
delays in accession resulted from hesitance to embark on bold reforms. Hence, fear of further 
delays determined some governments to implement real reforms. This contributed to the de- 
securitisation of the country, as discussed in chapter six. However, the effectiveness of the 
international support depended on each country's ability to meet the requirements set by the 
international organisations or to make full use of the assistance offered. Thus, by complying with 
the conditions set in the 1989 IMF standby agreement, Poland has ensured credibility of its reforms 
and further financial assistance leading to positive effects on performance in economic transition. 
Moreover, early compliance with the Copenhagen criteria enhanced the prospects for integration 
into the EU, which in turn constituted motivation for further economic reforms, as discussed in 
chapter seven. On the other hand, Romania's consistent failure to comply with the conditions set by 
the IMF standby agreements had a negative impact on the government's credibility, on the 
financial assistance offered and on the economic reforms as such (chapter four). Although 
difficulties in complying with the Copenhagen criteria led to delays in the accession process 
(chapter three), the financial assistance provided within the general framework of accession has the 
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potential to contribute positively to the success of economic reforms, either directly, or by 
enhancing FDI, as seen in chapter seven. 
Fifth, the path and the results of the economic transition have greatly depended on the reform 
measures applied. These were affected greatly by the determinants in the political sphere, as 
discussed in chapter four. Successful transition needs continuity, credibility and co-ordination of 
economic reforms. Contrary to the early opinions, transition supposes a combination of gradual and 
shock therapy reforms, rather than an exclusive option for one or the other. While liberalisation and 
stabilisation seem to benefit from a bold approach, privatisation is more likely to profit from a 
gradual approach, consistent with its large scope and significant social implications. It is also more 
likely that highly legitimised governments choose to implement bold reform programmes, based on 
high internal and international support. Furthermore, the state needs to redefine its role, rather than 
roll back completely. The governments should elaborate economic reform programmes based on 
the specifics of the country and consistent with the goals of achieving a market economy and 
integration into the EU, thus contributing towards a virtuous economic circle. Macroeconomic 
stabilisation and liberalisation measures have to be accompanied by deep restructuring, economic 
growth promotion and the provision of safety nets for the population, in order to ensure continuous 
support. Furthermore, industrial policies should enhance the comparative advantages of each 
economy in order to ensure its competitiveness and its successful integration into the world market, 
including the Single Market. Finally, the analysis has concluded that attracting foreign direct 
investment appears to be a prime necessity for the completion of privatisation and markctisation 
and subsequently for the accession into the EU, a key element of the Polish success in the quest for 
EU membership. Creating conditions for foreign investment needs to be continue to be a priority of 
the economic policies pursued by governments, as discussed in chapter five. 
8.3 Foreign direct investment: the missing link in economic transition and accession to the EU 
Given the need for attracting FDI in order to enhance privatisation, markctisation and EU 
membership, it is important to assess the main determinants of foreign direct investment both in the 
political and economic spheres. It is also necessary to provide evidence of the impact foreign direct 
investment has had in transition in both Poland and Romania. This supports the identification of 
FDI's place within the economic circle and the interplay with the other factors considered. The 
analysis has shown that factors from the political sphere have had a great impact on FDI related 
policies (or reforms in general), thus illustrating the interaction between the political and the 
economic sphere. The reluctant attitude of the government and public opinion in the early transition 
period has delayed the adoption of appropriate FDI related policies in Romania. On the other hand, 
Poland's relatively greater openness towards FDI has contributed towards adopting FDI related 
policies with a positive impact on FDI. Furthermore, several bi-directional relationships have been 
acknowledged between FDI and elements of both the political and economic spheres considered 
here, signalling the potential for vicious or virtuous circles. 
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The first bi-directional relationship is between foreign direct investment and economic reforms. It 
has been shown that FDI was affected greatly by the pace and methods of privatisation (chapter 
five) and by progress in institutional reforms in general (chapter seven). Macroeconomic 
stabilisation was proven to be a necessary (chapter five), however, not significant (chapter seven) 
condition. Evidence was provided regarding the FDI involvement in large scale privatisation 
(chapter five) and FDI has been found to be a significant determinant of institutional economic 
reforms (chapter seven). 
The second bi-directional relationship identified is between foreign direct investment and the EU 
integration process, the latter being seen from both an institutional and an economic perspective. 
Thus, it has been shown that new stages in institutional integration with the EU enhance foreign 
direct investment (chapter seven). This is either due to trade liberalisation, as in the case of the 
signing of the association agreements, or due to improvements in perceptions of security, as in the 
case of the starting of the accession negotiations with the initial 'second wave' CEECs, in the 
aftermath of the Kosovo crisis and of the Helsinki European Council. Furthermore, foreign direct 
investment enhances economic reforms (chapters five and seven), which in turn lead to progress of 
institutional integration with the EU (chapter three). Moreover, it has been shown that foreign 
owned firms participate largely in foreign trade, hence enhancing the integration of both Poland 
and Romania into the world economy in general, and with the EU in particular (chapter five). 
Additionally, FDI appears to be enhanced by a high openness to the EU in terms of deports, as well 
as by financial aid, some of which has been granted by the EU (chapter seven). This reflects the 
impact of economic integration with the EU on FDI. Finally, FDI by EU member states represents 
a measure of increased integration with the EU, with a higher degree for Poland. This is consistent 
with Poland being invited to join the Union in May 2004 and Romania aiming to do so in 2007. 
This evidence also emphasises the need to attract further FDI in Romania, in order to benefit from 
its potentially positive impact in economy. 
The third bi-directional relationship singled out in the analysis is between FDI and security 
concerns. First, it has been shown that FDI has contributed to a general improvement of the 
standard of living (chapter five). This improvement may increase public support for market 
economy and hence diminish the security concerns related to internal instability, as defined in 
chapter six. However, FDI may also be associated with negative phenomena, such as high 
unemployment in Poland and increased income disparities within both Poland and Romania, thus 
enhancing the need for attracting investment with potentially a net positive impact (chapter five). 
Second, it has been shown that foreign investors are sensitive to the country image and that country 
image reflects, to a certain extent, security concerns (chapter five). The Balkan identity of Romania 
appears not to have had a direct effect on foreign direct investment (chapter seven), Instead, it 
appears to have had an indirect effect through its impact on the quest for EU membership (chapters 
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six and seven). Furthermore, the renewed prospects for EU integration, resulting from the start of 
the accession negotiations in 2000, have provided positive signals to investors in the five CEECs 
concerned, consequently enhancing FDI (chapter seven). 
Finally, the analysis has shown that there is potential for path dependency in attracting foreign 
direct investment. FDI can attract further FDI through either reinvested profits, or through 
improvements in economic reforms, the country image and perceptions of security concerns in 
general (chapters five and seven). So far FDI directed to Poland has contributed greatly to the 
transition to a market economy, economic integration with the EU and attracting further FDI 
through an improved investment climate, thus maintaining a virtuous economic circle of 
development. This virtuous economic circle had in turn the potential to enhance the political circle 
through increased support for the market economy resulting from prospects of a better of life, as 
discussed in chapter five. While FDI has been relatively low in Romania and with a more modest 
impact on transition and EU integration, there is the possibility that once attracted, FDI will 
determine future investment, and thus contribute towards a virtuous circle of economic 
development. The question remains how to attract foreign direct investment despite poor previous 
investment or despite a poor record of economic reforms. One way to avoid the consequences of 
this path dependency appears to be to enhance FDI through expectations about the future, rather 
than simply through observations of the present situation. Perceptions of security seem to be 
important here and were addressed in chapter six 
8.4 European integration and security concerns in Poland and Romania 
Given that security has been an important determinant of both EU accession and FDI, it is 
imperative to assess closely the nature of security concerns in Poland and Romania. Internal and 
external security concerns have been identified in both the political and economic spheres in 
chapter six. It has been argued that changes in security concerns (or perceptions of security) appear 
to influence both the economic and the political circles, eventually contributing towards turning a 
vicious (or ambiguous) circle into a virtuous one. It is also necessary to investigate ways in which 
perceptions of security in one country may be changed, and in particular, the role of prospects for 
EU membership in doing so. In other words, can the EU enhance security in the candidate 
countries, thus potentially creating an economic virtuous circle of positive perceptions of security, 
high FDI, economic reforms, economic integration with the EU and high prospects of EU 
membership as in diagram 8A(a)? This virtuous economic circle would have in turn the potential to 
enhance a virtuous political circle of support for reforms, a positive government attitude to reforms 
and firm international backing. This would further impact positively on the EU accession process. 
The analysis has shown that during the first decade of transition the main internal security concerns 
in both Poland and Romania were related to the political and economic crises and the extent to 
which they were securitised or de-securitised by the international community (chapter six). 
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Although these crises were inevitable, given the magnitude of transformation and the tension 
between democratisation and marketisation, their individual causes were responsible for their 
different impact on EU accession. Thus, Romania's main sources of internal political instability 
and external perceptions of insecurity were the imperfections of the democratisation process, 
deeply rooted in the legacy of the communist system. Furthermore, the attempts of early 
governments to limit popular unrest through postponing economic reforms only spread the public 
discontent over longer periods and securitised the country even more, creating negative perceptions 
of security up to 1996, as illustrated in table 8.1. This had a negative impact on Romania's 
prospects for EU integration. Political instability persisted in Romania throughout the 1996-2000 
governments, given the lack of political experience of these democratic governments and in 
particular the cost of the shock therapy implemented by the Ciorbca government. Added to other 
security concerns, this created uncertain, rather than positive perceptions of security regarding 
Romania, as shown in table 8.1. On the other hand, Poland's early strong commitment to both 
democracy and a market economy ensured international credibility and support. It also contributed 
to de-securitising to a certain extent the internal political and economic instability resulting from 
the shock therapy reforms implemented by Balcerowicz or the return to power of the post- 
communists in 1993. International support contributed towards turning the circle of economic 
instability into a virtuous one. It also contributed towards avoiding a negative political circle that 
could have emerged from the low support for radical reforms already displayed by 1993.1lcnee, 
since 1993 Poland has enjoyed positive perceptions of security, as demonstrated in table 8.1. The 
2000 election in both countries showed that increasing poverty represents an additional challenge 
to security, by triggering the rise of extremist parties. However, the prospects of EU membership 
de-securitised these events, contributing towards positive perceptions of security in both countries. 
Hence, governments and international organisations should ensure that prospects of poverty arc 
minimised through successful economic reforms and through offering long term gains, including 
prospects of EU membership. 
The analysis has also shown that external security concerns have greatly affected the progress of 
integration into the EU. Their impact depended on the extent to which each country transformed 
threats into opportunities through a successful foreign policy. Thus, Poland has been largely 
successful in turning most of its external threats into catalysts for NATO and EU membership, 
while Romania has been slow in doing so. Poland's fear of Russia determined an important change 
in its foreign policy since the 1991 Moscow coup and an active commitment to both NATO and 
EU membership ever since. On the other hand, Romania's close relationship with Russia until 1994 
gave the impression of Romania still being in Russia's sphere of influence. This maintained a 
negative perception of external security and slowed down Romania's return to Europe. Polish 
concerns over Germany were the catalyst for close bilateral economic relations and triggered strong 
German support for Poland's integration into the EU. As Germany did not constitute a particular 
concern for Romania, Romania was hesitant to seek its support for EU membership, thus lacking 
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an important lobby necessary to EU accession. Furthermore, Poland's commitment to build good 
neighbourly relations led to early bilateral agreements with both Eastern and Western neighbours. 
These developments justified Poland's claim to be a pole of stability in the region and a 'gate' 
towards the East, thus leading to early membership of both NATO and the EU. On the other hand, 
Romania postponed border recognition with its neighbours. Suspicions over territorial claims 
expressed by Moldova and Ukraine in the early 1990s did not fit the image of a pole of stability 
that Romania wanted to promote. Up to 1996, negative perceptions of security accentuated the 
vicious political and economic circles in which Romania had been trapped. Improvements since 
1996 have not been sufficient to ensure early membership of either NATO or the EU, creating only 
ambiguous circles in both the economic and the political spheres. Only security concerns posed by 
the Kosovo crisis and the War on Terrorism have been able to speed up Romania's return to 
Europe through the opening of accession negotiations with the EU in 2000 and through NATO's 
invitation in 2002 for membership by 2004. These contributed towards positive perceptions of 
security and the creation of a virtuous political circle, as shown in table 8.1. All in all, governments 
should not underestimate the impact that external security concerns have on internal security and 
on the process of accession into the EU. Enough support from influential members of the EU 
should be sought, in order to ensure a successful accession. 
The study has further shown that perceptions of security in Poland and Romania appear to have 
been influenced by the revival of the political geography notions of Central Europe and the Balkans 
with their positive and negative connotations respectively. Thus, Poland's recognised Central 
European status has maintained a positive image and the Visegrad Group was a means to enhance 
Poland's chances for early integration into the EU. In the early 1990s, internal political instability 
and the lack of economic reforms underlined Romania's Balkan identity. This was despite Romania 
being classified in 1992 as a Central European country. Romania's proximity to the Balkans 
accentuated perceptions of insecurity, thus slowing Romania's return to Europe. Ilowever, the 
launch of the accession negotiations and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in the 
aftermath of the Kosovo crisis appears to have contributed to the dc-sccuritisation of the Balkans, 
thus leading to virtuous circles in both the economic and the political spheres (chapter six). 
Finally, it has been argued that, despite several limitations, EU membership appears to be the best 
way to consolidate the internal and external security of Poland and Romania by complementing the 
military security guarantees given by NATO. Through its normative power and incentive of 
membership, the EU has enhanced democratisation and marketisation in both Poland and Romania. 
This diminished the danger of return to authoritarian rule and a centralised economy, thus 
enhancing their internal economic and political security. Financial support, trade and investment 
from the EU have also increased the economic security of each country. Moreover, EU 
membership addresses the external security concerns of both Poland and Romania and the issue of 
fragmentation in Europe, which is a threat in itself. By enhancing a virtuous circle in the political 
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sphere, prospects for EU membership appear to affect the economic sphere as well. Finally, the 
impact of prospects for EU membership on FDI has been proven in chapter seven, as will be 
discussed below. 
8.5 The interplay between foreign direct investment, security and European integration: Can 
the prospect of EU membership break the vicious circle in the economic sphere? 
It is important, finally, to test the existence of a vicious circle in the economic sphere and to 
investigate ways to break it. The vicious circle in the economic sphere has been illustrated through 
the quantitative analysis conducted in chapter seven. The econometric models have confirmed the 
bi-directional relationship between economic reforms and FDI which are seen to be at the centre of 
the vicious economic circle. Foreign direct investment also appears to be highly influenced by 
previous investment, thus pointing towards the danger that countries with a high initial investment 
would continue to attract investors at the expense of recipients of lower FDI. This potential for path 
dependency seems to be enhanced by FDI's sensitivity to early ties with the European Union in the 
form of association agreements. By liberalising trade through anticipating closer relations with the 
EU, early commitments to EU integration appear to have been important for FDI, thus potentially 
creating a virtuous circle or path of development for countries such as Poland. 
However, the analysis has also suggested that this path dependency may be broken. Thus, the initial 
conditions have been shown not to be significant either for FDI, or for economic reforms. 
Furthermore, FDI appears not to be sensitive to political geography identity such as the Balkans, 
suggesting that perceptions of security are dynamic, rather than static. Progress of EU accession 
and of economic reform appears to have been more important for investors than simply 
identification with a geopolitical area. It is thus likely that the vicious circle can be brokcn through 
security or European integration factors. 
Thus, it has been found that progress in European integration can turn a vicious cconomic circle 
into a virtuous one through its impact on FDI and on economic reforms. In particular, by renewing 
the prospects of EU membership for the slower reformers, and thus improving perceptions of 
security in these countries, the 1999 Helsinki European Council has enhanced foreign direct 
investment in countries previously considered second wave candidates (chapters six and seven). 
This has created the conditions to turn a vicious economic circle into a virtuous one. This finding is 
particularly important given that the launching of accession negotiations with the frontrunners of 
transition (as a result of the 1997 Avis) has not been shown to be significant. This signifies that 
prospects for EU membership are effective in creating positive perceptions, especially when there 
are flaws in economic reforms. This is particularly important for Romania (and Bulgaria), whose 
accession to the EU has been delayed until 2007, and where there is a need for further FDI in order 
to complete privatisation and modernisation of the economy. 
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Furthermore, it has been shown that economic integration with the EU in terms of financial aid, 
percentage of trade with the EU and exports to the EU have all had a positive effect on foreign 
direct investment. The finding regarding the role of financial aid makes the case for maintaining 
and enhancing the financial support offered to Romania and Bulgaria as a means of continuing to 
attract investors. This would also minimise the widening of the income gap between the remaining 
candidate countries and the EU or the CEECs joining in 2004, and the potential effects this 
increased inequality would have on European security. The significance of openness in terms of 
exports for FDI suggests that competitive, export oriented sectors, are likely to attract foreign direct 
investment, thus potentially reinforcing a virtuous circle of economic development. This appears to 
indicate that industrial policies in general, and policies to attract FDI, in particular, should be 
directed towards sectors in which the candidate countries already have comparative advantages. 
Given that Poland and Romania's main competitive advantages are in sectors considered sensitive 
by the EU, complete trade liberalisation is essential for the impact on FDI to be at its maximum. 
The econometric analysis has also shown that progress in institutional integration with the EU has 
accelerated reforms in the candidate countries. However, the lack of significance of I Iclsinki for 
economic reforms and the decreasing impact that each new stage of institutional European 
integration has had on both FDI and economic reforms, signals the danger of a certain 'fatigue' with 
transition. This 'fatigue' might reduce even further the impact that prospects of EU membership 
have had on FDI and economic reforms, directly or indirectly. Thus, in the case of Romania and 
Bulgaria it is important not only that prospects of EU membership are maintained, but that they arc 
also complemented by economic integration through aid and trade and by further internal economic 
reforms, including the improvement of the business climate. All these appear to be able to cnhancc 
FDI, complete transition to a market economy in Romania and finally bring full EU membership. 
The attractiveness of the two countries will also consist in the persistence of relatively low 
production costs, given that EU membership has been delayed most likely until 2007. It is also 
likely that FDI will be diverted from the new EU members, which will be price convergent with the 
EU, towards the remaining candidates not yet aligned at the EU price levels. 
8. Final conclusions, their significance and further research 
The main argument of this dissertation has been that, unless security concerns are considered in the 
process of EU enlargement, there is a danger that the slow reformers are trapped in the vicious 
economic circle of high perceptions of insecurity, low foreign direct investment, poor economic 
reforms, low prospects of EU membership and thus further insecurity. This scenario would have 
potential negative effects on Europe as a whole through challenging the security of the continent. 
However, political decisions on EU enlargement, such as the one taken at the Helsinki European 
Council, appear to have the potential to break this vicious economic circle. 
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First, by maintaining prospects of EU membership despite poor records of economic reforms, the 
EU can enhance prospects of security in the candidate countries, thus creating the conditions for a 
virtuous economic circle. Prospects of security can attract the necessary FDI for reforms and for 
EU integration. This virtuous economic circle can then reinforce itself and enhance a virtuous 
political circle of determinants of EU accession as shown in diagram 7A(c). Such a scenario 
appears to diminish the threat that instability in a candidate country poses to Europe as a whole. 
Second, by maintaining prospects of EU membership, the EU may encourage governments in the 
candidate countries to adopt bold economic reforms that attract further FDI, enhancing economic 
integration and finally leading to full EU membership, as in diagram 8A(c). Fatigue with transition 
appears to indicate though that the motivational impact of the prospect of EU membership is 
decreasing, indicating serious limitations of this scenario. 
Finally, the prospect of EU membership may enhance trade with the EU, leading to increased FDI, 
progress of economic reforms and hence full membership, as in diagram 8A(d). I lowever, given 
that trade liberalisation is almost complete and the candidate countries are as integrated as full 
member states in terms of trade, the effects of these scenario appear to be rather limited. It is most 
likely that the combined effects of all three scenarios may contribute to full EU membership by 
candidates such as Romania. 
These findings are important for several reasons. First, contrary to some opinions, European 
security is indivisible and thus stability in South Eastern Europe is necessary for the stability of the 
continent as a whole. While Romania does constitute a pole of stability and security in the area, EU 
membership can offer supplementary guarantees that could further strengthen its security and its 
de-securitising role in the area. Second, like in many candidate countries, the last general election 
in Romania have shown that there is a certain 'fatigue' with both transition and accession to the EU 
and a danger of extremism or return to totalitarianism, should the EU accession be delayed even 
further. Third, despite the EU's acknowledgement of Romania and Bulgaria's aim to join the EU in 
2007, there are yet no firm guarantees from the EU, as the two countries have to conclude the 
accession negotiations and fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. Furthermore, Romania's prospects of EU 
membership are likely to be affected by the impact the first phase of enlargement will have both on 
the EU and on the CEECs that will join in 2004 2 Thus, by emphasising the importance of 
prospects of EU membership for the political and economic development of Romania, this 
dissertation argues that the remaining two candidates are granted increased financial assistance and 
that the target date is observed. Loose target dates have been previously modified, postponing 
accession and risking a loss of support for reforms and for EU membership as such. Fourth, as FDI 
2 See also Smith, A., "Economic and Trade Relations Between the European Former Communist States and 
the States of Western Europe" in Smith and, Jenkins, J. C. (eds. ), Through the Paper Curtain. Insiders and 
Outsiders in the New Europe, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2003, p. 2. 
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appears to be necessary for economic reforms, integration into the EU and prospects of a better life 
in the candidate countries, finding the factors that foster investment seems to offer solutions for 
both transition to a market economy and accession into the European Union. This is important not 
only for the candidate countries considered, but also from the point of view of investors who may 
exploit business opportunities in the area. Finally, the findings can be applied and tested in 
comparisons between Ukraine and Moldova. The general findings of this dissertation can also help 
in assessing the progress towards EU membership made by candidate countries such as Croatia or 
Turkey, as well as other potential candidates for EU membership. 
The contribution of this dissertation can be seen from several perspectives. First, the study has an 
interdisciplinary nature and investigates the interplay between politics and economics in the 
process of the eastern enlargement of the EU. To my knowledge, this is the first study that puts 
forward a coherent model that explains EU enlargement based on the bi-dircctional interaction 
between the economic and the political sphere, while equally emphasising the role of security 
factors, of FDI and their interplay. This project answers Nelson's call in the early years of 
transition for studies which address the new nature of security and its interplay with the processes 
of democratisation, marketisation and Europeanisation 4 
Second, the present research enhances the debate over path dependency and path shaping potential 
in transition and accession to the EU. Identifying the dynamics of the present enlargement process 
remains a useful exercise, given that in the absence of firm guarantees of EU membership by 2007, 
the accession of the remaining negotiating candidates, Bulgaria and Romania may be influenced by 
the effects of the first phase of enlargement or by unexpected events. The conclusions drawn from 
the comparative analysis of Romania and Poland can thus be extrapolated to Bulgaria or potential 
candidates for EU membership. By acknowledging the path dependency potential the study follows 
Ekiert's plea that post-communist studies take into consideration the particular nature of the legacy 
of the communist system in the countries considered. s 
Third, as a comparative empirical study of Poland and Romania's quest to accede to the EU, 
accomplish economic transition and attract FDI, this research enhances our understanding of the 
post-1989 evolution of each of these two countries. To my knowledge, there has been so far no in. 
depth comparative analysis of Poland and Romania with regard to the processes mentioned above. 
The merits of the comparison lie equally in the different paths that Poland and Romania have 
3 See also Sakwa, R., "Postcommunist Studies: Once Again Through the Looking Glass (Darkly)? ", Review 
of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4,1999, p. 712. 
See Nelson, D., 'he Comparative Politics of Eastern Europe", Political Science and Politics, Vol. 27, No. 
1.1994, p. 51. 
5 Ekiert, G., "Peculiarities of Post-Communist Politics. The Case of Poland", Studies in Comparative 
Communism, Vol 25,1992, cited in Sakwa, R., "Postcommunist Studies: Once Again Through the Looking 
Glass (Darkly)? " in Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4, October 1999, p. 716. 
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followed with regard to EU accession, economic transition, attracting FDI and eliminating security 
concerns, given that most comparisons are usually made between countries with roughly similar 
evolutions. 
Fourth, from a methodological point of view, the study demonstrates the advantages of adopting a 
mixed-method approach. The qualitative assessment allows the establishment of causal 
relationships between the factors considered in the model, while the use of quantitative methods 
allows generalisations with regard to all ten transition countries candidate for EU membership as 
well as future candidates. The findings of the comparison are validated within the larger framework 
of the ten central and eastern European countries considered. To my kno%rledge, this is the first 
study which investigates the bi-directional relationship between FDI and economic reforms in the 
candidate countries. The role of security and European integration variables in attracting FDI has 
also been under-studied. 
Finally, this study points towards several areas of further investigation. First, it will be important to 
evaluate the extent to which Romania's quest for EU membership will be affected by the 2004 
enlargement of the European Union. Second, an analysis of economic convergence with the EU 
may follow the examination of the evidence of economic integration between Poland and itoniania, 
on the one hand, and the EU, on the other. Third, although a detailed analysis of the dctcrminants 
of FDI has been offered, both qualitatively and quantitatively, it will be useful to assess the 
determinants of green field investment, as a means to maintain FDI levels beyond the completion 
of privatisation. Furthermore, with firm level data, a more systematic examination of the FDI 
impact at microeconomic level may be conducted. Finally, the discussion of security concerns may 
be enriched by looking at ways of accommodating the Common Foreign and Security Policy by 
Poland, upon accession in 2004. 
2x') 
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